The Victory at Dam Doi
10-9-1963
Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
Introduction:
Dam Doi was a geographic name, which very few people knew even if they had been born and raised in South Vietnam. Most of South Vietnam's population however had heard at least once that name in the song "Marines' March".
Victory at Dam Doi was thirty-six years ago. I'm sure that as I recount the following facts related to it now, it will be insufficient, partially because of my low position at that stage, and also because too long had passed since. I was however, a Company Commander in that operation. I hope my superiors and friends will add complementary details.
I'm writing this article in commemoration of Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen, the then 2nd Marine Battalion commander, and for all officers, under-offers and other ranks who had participated in this operation. After thirty-six years, a number of them have passed away, in different ways and different situations. Some have lost their fight with ageing or illness, while most have lost their lives on the battlefields since that victory. As you read this souvenir, I ask you to spare one minute to think of, and pray for all marines who sacrificed in all corners of South Vietnam.
1. General Overview
The 2nd Marine Battalion activities as a reinforcement for MRIV (Military Region 4) since August 1963
In August 1963, the 2nd Marine Battalion was signed as reinforcement for MRIV and was transported via convoy to Can Tho to receive orders. The Battalion was put under command of MRIV Forward Headquarters positioned in An Xuyen. In this period, the Battalion participated in short operations in Long Xuyen, Vinh Long, and then returned to An Xuyen.
At the beginning of September 1963, the 2nd Marine Battalion was sent to Kien Giang Province for one week. Operations ended on 9-9-1963. The Battalion was transported by convoy to An Xuyen. It arrived at 9:00 pm, because, about one kilometer from An Xuyen, VC had built mounds on the road. Marines had to alight to deploy in order to remove the obstacles. Although it was dark, all Companies of the Battalion had no difficulties camping in previous positions they had occupied before their departure for Kien Giang.
2. Enemy conditions on 9-9-1963
On the night of 9-9-1963, VC attacked Dam Doi district, about twenty kilometers southeast of An Xuyen city as the crow flies. There was no road leading to An Xuyen. The means of transport between An Xuyen and Dam Doi was via sampans on boats.
According to MRIV information, they did not know which enemy's unit had attack that district on the night 9-9-1963. After several hours of fighting, VC succeeded in entering the district, but only managed to occupy about half of all positions. MRIV G2 had noted that there was only regional VC companies, sapper and local militia, and no regular forces.
3. Friendly forces situation
The Chief of district was killed in action when the Regional Forces had been at the district. A great number of RF were wounded in action. The remainder continued to resist. Radio contact between MRIV and the province were maintained throughout.
4. Organizing operation
MRIV decided to organize an operation on 10-9-1963 to annihilate VC and to relieve the district of pressure. General Huynh Van Cao, commander of MRIV, directly commanded this operation. MRIV headquarters positioned at An Xuyen Airfield. The 2nd Marine Battalion was to perform the operation, and was to be helilifted into Dam Doi on 10-9-1963.
5. The 2nd Marine Battalion planning
After a meeting with company commanders and staff officers, the Battalion commander decided that there would be five H21 helicopters available. With that limited number, the battalion would require four trips back and forth. They would only be able to transport one company each time. If nothing happened to these US helicopters, the helilift would be accomplished by the late afternoon. If fighting did occur however, a number of helicopters could be damaged in the process and hence, the helilift might not be accomplished until a later time.
Company 4 was transported first to landing zone alpha, three kilometers south east of the district. Company 3 followed, being dropped at landing zone Bravo only one kilometer away on the right hand side of Company 4. Their responsibilities were to search and destroy the enemy along Dam Doi river to the north west.
After having accomplished that goal, they were to return to Dam Doi district. The Battalion Headquarters and Company 2 were aboard the third flight, and finally Company 1 was transported. Companies 1 and 2 were to land close to the district to the northwest.
Every company were to be ready at the picking up zone, in An Xuyen airfield at 7:00 pm on 10-9-1963.
6. Supporting fire
There was no artillery support for this operation. There was however some VNAF aircraft support, but it would depend on the situation. At this stage in time, Marine Corps only had one artillery battalion with three companies of 75mm guns.
7. Process of operation
At exactly 8:30 am, Company 4 mounted helicopters at An Xuyen airfield and arrived at Landing Zone Alpha at 9:00 am. That landing zone was a rice field. Water was up to knee level at shallow places and waist height in the deeper areas.
They advanced in formation towards Target A, about five hundred metres from the landing zone. By the time they reached a sparse row of trees, there was still no site of any resistance; there were no civilians either. The atmosphere was highly charged. Company 4 deployed at that row of trees and waited for Company 3 so that they could move in parallel to the riverbank.
At 10:00 am, Company 3 was helilifted. MRIV had sent one platoon of this company north of the district where an AD6 aircraft had bee shot down. 3rd Lieutenant Dien's platoon arrived at Landing Zone Bravo at 10:00 am to the right of Company 4. They advanced towards a thin row of coconut trees in front of Target B.
This platoon was welcomed by violent machine guns .30 fire from VC hidden on the riverbank. They also utilised other types of weapons. Marine returned fire, but they were in a disadvantageous situation since they had been in the rice field without shelter.
At that time, the marines were armed with Garant, carbine, Thompson and middle machine gun BAR only, while VC were equipped with AK 47s (submachine gun), CKCs (VC personal rifle), B40s (VC rocket launcher) and Czechoslovakian middle machine guns. Their firearms were significantly more modern than our own. Although our position was detrimental to our resistance, suffering losses in the first minute, marine of Company 3 were still charging forwards, aiming to occupy a high position in front of them.
Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao recounted that Company 3 had managed to occupy VC positions close to the river at nightfall only. A VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force) aircraft arrived but could not support with airstrikes because the VC had been in such close proximity to the marines. 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Dien's platoon landed to the right of Company 3 at 1:00pm. Fighting broke out the instant when they alighted the helicopters.
As previously mentioned, this platoon had been ordered to travel north of the district to where an ADG aircraft had been downed. However, since Company 3 was involved in heavy combat, this platoon was ordered to return to its original unit, namely Company 3. This platoon had about forty people, including 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the Executive Officer of the company, and 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phan. It also had a 57mm gun platoon of Company 2. Everybody was under commands of 2nd Lieutenant Phuc.
This platoon was dropped about fifty metres to the right of Company 3 and about one hundred and fifty meters from the target. Two VC machine guns sprayed bullets at this platoon formation. Two marines were wounded, including Private Nguyen Van Tam, a liaison soldier.
In the late afternoon, lying on rice fields, the marines were hungry and were going to have a shortage of ammunition soon. 3rd Lieutenant Dien suggested a charge forward to occupy Target 1. 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Nang Bao, the company commander, agreed with his plan.
The whole platoon stood up and charged forward across the rice field. After two thirds of the distance to the target had been covered, 3rd Lieutenant Dien received a machine gun bullet from the left. These two machine guns had stopped Company 3 movement at noon. Dien lay in his place, while others continued to charge forward because it was too dangerous to stop midway. Facing such a strong movement, VC withdrew to the riverbank.
3rd Lieutenant Dien was severely wounded. When he recovered consciousness he saw the killed and wounded marines lying in the rice field, scattered along the advancing axis. Meanwhile, on the left side, Company 4 could not approach the riverbank due to intense VC firing. A platoon was wounded when they were trying to use 57mm guns to destroy the machine gun, which had impeded Company 4 movement.
At nightfall, Company 4 occupied Target A, killed seven VC, captured four individual firearms and one machine gun .30 and seized much ammunition. However, VC were still between Company 3 and Company 4.
At noon on that same day, the Battalion Headquarters and Companies 1 and 2 were airlifted and landed close to the district. Lieutenant Colonel recounted that these contingents advanced and entered the district, without any VC resistance whatsoever. They had withdrawn entirely and there was no combat.
Company 3 finally succeeded in occupying the target at sunset. It organized defensive line and medivac. A small bout of rain impeded the medivac effort, however it was still accomplished quickly. All killed and wounded in actions were transferred to An Xuyen that night. Lightly wounded were treated at An Xuyen, while moderately wounded soldiers were transferred to Field Hospital and severely wounded were evacuated directly to Military General Hospital at Cong Hoa.
3rd Lieutenant Dien received a bullet that pierced through his left hemi thorax. The bullet entered on the lateral side of it and exited near the thoracic spine, breaking two ribs as it passed through his body. He was evacuated directly to General Hospital Cong Hoa. Now, after thirty-six years, his wound still hasn't filled up. In this battle, his lost about two thirds of his platoon.
Colonel Bao recalled that Company 3 had fourteen killed in action and forty-three wounded in action. 3rd Lieutenant Son Xil was wounded in the head, 3rd Lieutenant Le Van Huyen was wounded in the neck and 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Dien was wounded in the thorax. Adjutant Nguyen Van Ha (Dien's platoon vice leader) and 1st Corporal Nguyen van Dan (a squad leader) were severely injured. Sergeant Lam van Do, another squad leader, was killed.
At night, on 10-9-1963, the Battalion Headquarters and Companies 1 and 2 stationed themselves in the district. Companies 3 and 4 stationed themselves in the fighting areas. Companies 3 and 4 had not been able to join each other, since there was a river between them and a rice field with water at waist level. Besides, VC firing was continuing along the river.
When Company 3 searched the occupied target they reported the following:
- 27 VC cadavers were found
- 30 individual firearms were seized
- 2 machine gun .30s were seized
- Lots of boxes of ammunitions that originated from Red China were seized.
On the morning of 11-9-1963, the Battalion
Headquarters and Company 3 advanced along the river towards Companies 3 and 4. Company 1 continued to protect the district, enabling it to reorganize itself. Company 2 searched the fighting area from the previous day and stumbled upon a 106mm cannon with lots of fresh rounds. Based on captured weapons it was guessed that the VC force was a battalion reinforced by a heavy weapons company. Since we were in disadvantageous terrain, without any artillery supports to annihilate them, a number of VC successfully crept away, escaping along the riverbank.
This operation ended on 11-9-1963. The 2nd Marine Battalion marched towards An Xuyen and then returned to Thu Duc some days later. The victory at Dam Doi was the greatest victory for the ARVN throughout 1963. It was also the first time that ARVN had captured heavy weapons as mentioned above. This triumph instilled much fear in VC troops and incited admiration from (US) allied forces.
The flag of 2nd Marine battalion was awarded the Palm leaf Bravery medal. The Battalion Commander was decorated with a National Protection medal. Four companies' commanders and other officers were also awarded with medals. The US President granted US Presidential Unit Citation to the flag of 2nd Marine Battalion and to all participating marines of this Battalion.
Abrams represented the US President in order to decorate the 2nd Marine Battalion with a fouragere in 1967. That fouragere had three colours - navy blue, red and yellow - and was ten centimetres wide and one metre long, which was to be attached to the flag. Medals for each participating marine were to be attached above the right chest pocket of the shirt of uniforms.
Lieutenant Nguyen Nang Bao, commander of Company 3 was given a Silver Star by the US President for his valour in that operation.
8. Commentary
a. The enemy was completely surprised when a marine unit came to the rescue of Dam Doi district. If they had known about the 2nd Marine Battalion's presence in An Xuyen, they probably wouldn't have attacked it in the night of 9-9-1963. The operation headquarters was too subjective in estimating situations and VC's capability in the area of operations. There was no artillery support provided. The enemy had no intentions to confront us. The proof of that was that they had no trenches or bunkers built. If they had seriously intended to fight us and prepared for a confrontation, I believe that with their machine guns and 106mm cannons they would have been quite capable of destroying all helicopters at the landing zone when Company 3 arrived. Also, there would have been no more means for companies to transport troops into the fighting areas.
In terms of terrain, VC certainly had the privileges. They were situated at the riverbank, with high terrain and were covered from observations but could observe us very clearly. The enemy was obliged to fire because Company 3 had landed precisely on their flank. Their goal was to delay Company 3 and 4's movements until nightfall so they could effectively retreat. The enemy had known that we had no artillery support and only limited air support.
b. In this victory, the greatest credit was given to Company 3 commanded by 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Nang Bao. His unit had fought in ratio of 1:5 marines to VC in very detrimental terrain. Furthermore, this company lacked their executive officer and was short of one whole platoon for the first three hours of combat. (Platoon of 3rd Lieutenant Dien was airlifted to the area at 1300 hours). Their weapons were also unsuitable. Moreover, they had only just returned from an operation in Kien Giang without sufficient resting time. However, 3rd Lieutenant Dien's platoon and a Company 2's platoon of 3rd Lieutenant Phan, all under 2nd Lieutenant Phuc's (Executive Commander of Company 3) command, contributed significantly to this victory. Due to their high morale during combat, the Company 3 fighters had overcome all difficulties and sweated and shed blood during the fight against a force of better-equipped VC that greatly outnumbered them. This was a tremendous victory for the 2nd Marine Battalion, and was also the greatest victory for the ARVN in 1963.
Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
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