HISTORY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS

Vietnamese Marine Artillery

Captain Luong Xuan Loc

After the Geneva Accords, a new unit, the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was established by the Navy of the South Vietnamese Forces, to protect the islands off the Vietnam shores. This new military branch would have the strength of one CO-brigade; its base was at the Cuu-Long compound. The First Commanding Officer of the Vietnamese Marine Corps was Major Le Quang-Trong, his successor was Major Pham Van-Lieu, then Colonel Le Nhu-Hung. The current Commanding Officer of the Administrative and Financial Company, Captain Le Nguyen-Khang, was promoted to Honorary Major to replace Colonel Hung when he was transferred to the presidential forces. The last Commanding Officer of the VNMC was Brigadier General Bui The-Lan.

In the beginning, the VNMC was organized by the North Commando Companies (Commandos Nord), the South commando companies (Commandos Perserolle), and the riverine companies. At first, the VNMC had only two amphibious battalions, the First Marine Infantry Batallion and the Second Marine Infantry Bataillion and one 106mm mortar company located at Binh-ba island (Cam-Ranh). In 1960, the Third Marine infantry battalion and additional amphibious support units were formed. 

In mid 1961, the first Marine artillery unit was created, the Marine Mountainous Cannon Battery. The Marine CO-brigade was comprised of one headquarter, one administrative and financial company, one amphibious support battalion, one recruit company, three amphibious infantry battalions, and one amphibious battery.  The battery was the first artillery unit of Vietnamese Marine Artillery and would go on to gain fame on the battlefields of all four tactical regions in the future.

II. History Of The Creation of the VNMC/ Artillery

A. The Marine Cannon Battery

1.   The predecessor of VNMC/ Battery

The predecessor of the VNMC/Cannon Battery was the 106mm company, located at "Hang-Phan"(My-Tho), which then moved to Binh-Ba Island (Cam-Ranh); Captain Nguyen Hai-Dang was the first Commanding Officer of this unit. It was First Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh-Yen who replaced him when he was assigned to Can-Gio as district chief later. Lieutenant Nguyen Vi-Tan was Company Executive Officer (XO), during the time the heavy company was created, Army First Lieutenant Ton That-Soan was transferred to the unit as operation and training officer, after he finished the class of 4'2 (106mm) heavy weapons at Dalat Academy. The Platoon Commanders were Second Lieutenant Vo-Kinh, Gunnery Sergeant Tran Kim-Ty, and Staff Sergeant Le Van-Nguu.  Almost all the non-commissioned officers (N.C.O) and the enlisted men of the unit were transferred from the dismissed riverine company at the city of Hue. In late 1957, the 106mm Company moved to the Cat-Lai compound (Thu-Thiem).

2.   The Marine Battery

a.   The creation of the Marine Battery 

When Marine Headquarters received the order to form the "Cannon Battery," the Marine Commanding Officer transferred the current Executive Officer of the Second Marine Battalion to the new unit as battery commander. 

Before the cannon battery was established, Navy Headquarters consulted with the Armed Forces Artillery Headquarters about a weapon new to the Vietnam War and to the Vietnamese soldiers, but not to the Allied forces during World War II or the Korean War.  Artillery Headquarters informed the Armed Forces Headquarters that the materials, the function, and the firing technique of the "new" weapon were very similar to the 105mm and 155mm howitzer. Therefore, The Marine Corps needed officers who graduated from the Artillery Academy to manage this unit.  The Navy then asked the Artillery Headquarters of ARVN for Army Artillery officers to transfer to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. 

The first Army artillery officers who reported to Major Le Nguyen-Khang, the CO-brigade commanding officer, were First Lieutenant Doan Trong-Cao as Battery XO, Third* Lieutenant Nguyen Trong-Dat as firing officer, Third Lieutenant Nguyen Tan-Loc (Elder Loc) as First Platoon commander, Third Lieutenant Luong Xuan-Loc (Little Loc) as Second Platoon commander, and Third Lieutenants Nguyen Huu-Lac, Tram Uu-Phuoc, Nguyen Vinh-Duyet as Forward Observers. Those officers were potential cadres of the new unit. They were the first specialists who built and trained this unit which would become famous on all battlefields for its firing abilities, as well as its knowledge of the effects of many different weapons, and different kinds of fire support.  All this contributed to reason why the Marine Artillery was so consistently successful when offering any kind of fire support to amphibious operations.

b.  Training

When we came to the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters to receive the weapon, we only got the howitzers, but not the instructions.  This was the first time that we had ever seen howitzers, so no one yet knew how to operate this weapon.  Learning to use the weapon would be a formidable but interesting challenge.  

We took the howitzers back with us.  Usually we tugged field howitzers by trucks when we were moving; then we guided them to the firing position. The mountainous howitzer was secured by one metal ring, and we pulled it along by a jeep. Otherwise we would place it onto a Dodge 4x4 truck or even sometimes onto a Navy battle craft, such as a Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) or a Landing Craft Medium (LCM). These amphibious crafts are very convenient for moving weaponry on riverine operations. When we wanted to set up the weapon for firing we had to unpack it, and then reassemble it. Howitzers can not be fired from a moving position, and there are no exceptions for mountainous howitzers either. 

The next afternoon after receiving the weapon, Third Lieutenant "Little Loc" grouped his platoon and asked: "Is there anybody who can operate the weapon; or is there anybody who has seen this howitzer before?" Fortunately, there was one old gunnery sergeant, the platoon sergeant, who had served in the French Alliances Armed Forces. He had once commanded a 75mm mountainous howitzer section. He was on leave the day before, which was why no one familiar with the weapon was present when the battery received the howitzers. When he heard the platoon commander's question, he replied: "I just can teach them to assemble the weapon, anything else I don't know, Sir!"  

That much information was enough for "Little Loc," who smiled contently. This was because if the howitzer could be set up for firing, he could observe the function of the weapon, and he would then understand its firing technique. After the  "gunny" showed his troops how to assemble the howitzer, Third Lieutenant Loc tried its horizontal and vertical wheel. He saw that the function of the mountainous howitzer was very similar to that of the field howitzer. After that, he studied the aiming sight and put it onto its mount, and then he aimed the howitzer. He recognized that the aiming sight of the 75mm howitzer was very similar to the aiming sight of the 155mm howitzer.  Eventually, he decided to establish the 75mm firing chart to be the same as that of the 155mm.

The next day, he had a briefing about what his troops had gained from yesterday's observation, to the battery commander and other officers; he also reported to the battery commander and the other officers that he had established a 75mm firing chart similar to that of the 155mm howitzer. After a long argument and some analysis, all officers in the battery agreed that the battery should use the firing chart as the Second Platoon had recommended.

The Marine Artillery used this firing chart for training as well as firing at the enemy when supporting friendly troops, until they had received the instruction manual almost one year later from an adviser.

c.  Demonstration

After a successful firing test at the Phu-Loi firing yard (Binh-Duong), the Marine "cannon battery" showed off their tactical movement abilities and their firing skills to the Artillery Commanding Officer of the III Corps, the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps and his staff. In the performance, the Second Platoon scored one special "Time On Target" (T.O.T) strike with two rounds from only one howitzer. To perform this show, the platoon commander of the Second Platoon let two rounds explode at the same time on the target by firing the first round from a high angle elevation, the second from normal tender elevation. To do that, Third Lieutenant "Little Loc" had to operate the gunnery works to determine the time of flight on the trajectory of each round from the current position to the target, and then he gave the firing data of each round to the section and ordered them to fire in accordance to such data.

B. The departure of Marine Artillery

1.  Operation "Rung-Sat"

After that performance, the Marine Artillery was ready to engage the enemy in battle. It was during Operation "Rung Sat" in December 23rd, 1961. The Second Platoon of "Little Loc" became "pioneers" in a sense, as the first members of Marine Artillery to enter into combat.  

For Operation "Rung Sat" the First Marine Battalion of Captain Tran-van Nhut embarked at the Eastern Arsenal.  The Marine Artillery embarked at the 1st Pier. The entire Marines Operational Forces were transported by Navy ships for the entire night. Ready to support the marine landing, the Marine Artillery landed on Ly-Tin Island (Quang-Xuyen) at 240430H.

After landing, the Marine Artillery Second Platoon moved towards "Rung-sat, secret zone." First Battalion continued moving to the landing zone; they landed at 240600H. Due to their great secrecy, the VC were surprised and feebly defended against the landing forces. They resorted to a disorderly retreat, resulting in a lost chance for the Marine Artillery to test out their new weapons. After one week of searching, the Marines found and destroyed many enemy ordnance arsenals, weapon caches, ammunition, and most of their food supplies. To guard the rear of the forces on the way to the concentration zone, the Commanding Officer of the First Marine Battalion allowed the Marine Artillery unit to make their "Baptism of Fire". This was done by ordering the platoon to fire over 100 artillery rounds at suspect enemy concentration points and behind the Marine operational forces while withdrawing to the rendezvous area to wait for the Navy ships. After this operation, the Marine Artillery took part in all battlefields where the were "Sea-Tigers" engaged.

2.  The "not before, nor later" Operation "Son-Duong 2"

In 1962, the Marine CO-Brigade possessed the strength of only one brigade but was still a subordinate to the Navy, under the control and manoeuvre of the Navy Commanding Officer. During this time the fourth Marine Battalion was created.  On the first departure of the Fourth Marine Battalion, the VNMC had a "not before, nor later"** operation, the only battle of its kind in the history of the world of Marine Corps.

During Operation "SON-DUONG 2", the "Sea-Tigers" of the Fourth Marine Battalion attacked the "Le-Hong-Phong secret zone" of the Viet-Cong in the province of Phan-thiet. In any operation from the open sea to the ground, the Commanding Officer of the Amphibious Forces and his Staff Officers would usually have to lay out a preparation fire ground on the landing beach. This is done by the Navy providing gun fire while the Marines, onboard the Navy landing crafts, hit the shore, attempting to occupy enemy territory. If the Fourth Marine Battalion had carried out the amphibious landing as ordinary as that, there would have been nothing to speak of.  Instead, the "Sea-Tigers" of the Fourth Marine Infantry Battalion and the "A" Marine Battery, its predecessor the "Marine Cannon Battery", of battery commander First Lieutenant Doan-Trong-Cao, landed in wooden fishing boats and sampans, without preparation fire, which made this amphibious operation particularly harrowing and a battle to be retold, even years later. 

At the time of landing, the sea was rough, so getting the landing forces onto the beaches was getting extremely difficult and dangerous. The sampans and wooden ships would sway as the marines disembarked, causing them to lose their balance and fall in the water.  During the landing, there was one howitzer section, commanded by Corporal Le Van-Binh, which started to sink near the shore. The artillerymen, in full and heavy combat gear, disappeared beneath the waves along with the howitzer. Corporal Binh resourcefully salvaged his section by ordering the strong men to rescue the weak ones first; then they went back into the sea to search for the howitzer. After the salvage, Binh and his men pulled the weapon to shore by hand.  He then oriented the gun to be ready to support the operational forces advancing into enemy territory.

C. The Marine/Artillery Battalion

Along with the birth of the Fourth Marine Battalion, Marine Artillery had also grown to the strength of one battalion. This comprised of one Battery Headquarters, two 75mm mountainous howitzer batteries ("A" Battery + "B" Battery), and one 105mm field howitzer battery ("C" Battery). The first Commanding Officer of the Marine Artillery Battalion was Captain Nguyen Van-Truoc. Captain Cao Van-Thinh served as the (XO). First Lieutenant Doan Trong-Cao was "A" Battery commander while Second Lieutenant Nguyen Tan-Loc was "B" Battery commander and First Lieutenant Nguyen Ho-Qui (just transferred from Army Artillery) was "C" Battery commander.

According to the original equipment table, there were eight howitzers in each Marine battery. As the North Vietnamese began to commit more and more men and weapons to the war, the Marines began to require stronger firepower to counter them. Therefore, the 75mm mountainous howitzer "B" Battery was transformed to a 105mm field howitzer battery. After that, the Marine Artillery Battalion had one 75mm mountainous battery ("A" Battery) and two 105mm field batteries ("B" Battery + "C" Battery). After getting the instructions manual for the 75 mm howitzer, the Artillery Battalion Commanding Officer concluded that the "A" Battery (75mm) firing chart had to be altered in accordance to the instructions manual. (The firing chart of the 75mm howitzer was now considered to be the same as that of the 105mm howitzer.) 

D. The Task Force

1.  The Forward Observers and the Liaison Teams.

For all the strategies involved, the Marine brigade had organized two Task forces (A Task Force & B Task Force). For all the operations, the Task force was combined from two to three Amphibious Battalions and one 105mm battery or 75mm battery; sometimes one combination of a 105mm and a 75mm battery. Marine Artillery were to ask the Army Artillery in the Brigade's area of operation AO for additional fire support if necessary. 

According to the equipment table, each Marine infantry company could attach one forward observer to adjust the artillery impact to enemy objectives. One liaison officer from the artillery unit was dispatched to one Marine Infantry Battalion. He would be beside the Battalion C.O. to control and manoeuvre the separate forward observers in assistance to the infantry companies. There would be one Artillery Liaison Officer at the Task Force Headquarters also. A captain would take charge of this position; but usually an ancient Second Lieutenant or a First Lieutenant was responsible for this job due to the lack of officers. The responsibility of the liaison officer at Task Force Headquarters was more important than the ones at the Amphibious Battalions: He has to make the artillery fire support plan, the navy gun fire support plan, as well the air support plan. He has to draw the fire support overlays of the entire area of operation (AO) for the Task Force. He also has to control, coordinate, and manoeuvre the liaison officers at their battalions and the forward observers at their companies. Additionally, he also has to communicate with the friendly artillery units when the Marine Artillery needed the additional fire support for its Marines. Sometimes the Marine Artillery offered additional fire support to Army Artillery when their infantry had made heavy contact with the enemy. Lastly, he also has to quickly deliver the needed requests and the necessary data to the Marine Artillery units for support to the Army's AO.

2.  The Upper Forward Observers

From 1965 to 1968, the ARVN was very short of logistics for combat: the means of communication, transportation, especially the command and control helicopters (C&C Clips) were poor. When the Task Force launched an attack on enemy territory, the commanding officer advanced with two columns. Each column was in charge of one battalion; the Task Force Headquarters was in either column, usually with the main force; the entire command post would walk, even the Task Force CO and the Arty liaison officer. 

The main concern for the Marine Artillery Battalion CO was how thinly spread the Marine Artillery Batteries were within the Battalion. The sudden growth of the Marine Artillery battalion strength caused it to suffer from a lack of forward observers and Platoon Commanders as well as Liaison Officers to man the individual batteries. This meant that the Marine Artillery could detach only two forward observers to one amphibious battalion.   

One of these two forward observers would also concurrently be the liaison officer to go with the Amphibious Battalion commanding officer. The responsibility of the liaison officer at the Task Force echelon level was more important than his responsibilities at the battalion echelon level.  For that reason, if we took this position, we would keep this position for a long time. The liaison officer at the Task Force echelon also walked to the AO as the forward observers at the companies did; this allowed his friends to call him "Upper F/O". I was one of them.

III. Marine division / Artillery

A. Organization

In 1968 the Marine Corps expanded to one division and were detached from the Navy.  The Marine Artillery also expanded to three Marine artillery battalions and was equipped entirely with 105mm field howitzers. In the meantime, to synchronize the equipment of the ARVN, the Marine batteries had to shorten their artillery strength from eight to six howitzer sections. To unify the command of Marine Artillery units, a "Division Marine Artillery Headquarters" was established. Also, to control the fire support activities (Navy, Air, Artillery fire support) of the lower echelons' of the Fire Support Control Centre (FSCC) and to keep them informed about the movements and locations of subordinate units, the Fire Support Control Centre was organized beside the Division Tactical Operation Centre (TOC). According to the kind of tactical requisition, the Division Artillery Headquarters could monitor subordinate units as necessary.

B. The Fire Support Control Centre

The Task Forces were dismissed after the Marines were expanded to Division strength.  To replace the Task Forces, three Amphibious Marine Brigades were created, and of course the Arty Liaison Team were dispelled too. When going on operations, each brigade had one Marine Artillery Bttalion for direct support. There was a FSCC beside the Brigade TOC to replace the Arty Liaison Team at the former Task Force; but its authority was larger than that of the Liaison Team. The Chairman of the FSCC at the brigade had to make the fire support plan and draw the fire support overlay over the Brigade AO. Depending on the situation, he could monitor the subordinate and the attached Artillery units. 

IV. The "Hot Fire Summer"

A. Thwarted ambition of the Communists

From the beginning to the end of Operation "Lam-Son 719," the Marine Artillery performed many feats, but none quite as bright as the ones from the "hot fire summer" of 1972, when the Marines recaptured the old Citadel of Quang-Tri. 

In 1972, after the NVA attacked and thoroughly occupied Quang-Tri province, the ARVN at the front line had to withdraw to the southern bank of the My-Chanh River to make the final line of defence. The South Vietnamese Marine Corps got the order to stand in place at any price to thwart the enemy advance.

After capturing the district of Hai-Lang, the Communists continued moving to the South. When they tried to overrun the defence line of the Marines along the bank of My-Chanh River, they met strong resistance from the "Sea-Tigers" that were positioned there. From this battle, the Marine cannoneers became well known for their courage. The Marine Artillerymen were not ashamed of their "sea-wave striped uniforms". In spite of heavy casualties, the canonneers still held their ground.  They lowered their howitzers and shot directly at the enemy infantrymen following the tanks, pushing back all enemy assaults. 

While withstanding the enemy's strong attacks, the "Sea-Tigers" of No-Than (Divine Bow) unit destroyed many enemy tanks by shooting directly at their advancing troops. After the enemy's tanks were destroyed by the Green Beret soldiers, the enemy infantrymen retreated in a disorderly fashion; the "Sea-Angels" simultaneously stood up from their foxholes and assaulted the retreating enemy formation. Because the enemy soldiers were too close, the Marine Artillery men could not fire their howitzers as usual because they had to support the friendly Marines pursuing the enemy by direct firing. We destroyed scores of enemy tanks, killed hundreds of enemy soldiers, of both infantrymen and cavalrymen, and captured many kinds of enemy weapons at this battle.

B. Counter attack

After this victory, the spirit of the "Sea-Tigers" was heightened, not only for the Marines, but for everybody in the ARVN too. This was also the beginning of a sequence of victories to come later. The Marines won one victory after another until they recaptured the old citadel of Quang-Tri. 

After the first victory at the My-Chanh line, the Marine Artillery continued to prove their capabilities which shined their reputation in the military history of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. On the way back from the counter attack from the My-Chanh front line, the Marine Artillery continued performing feats to improve their reputation with one difficult kind of fire support called the "Destroying Fire."  Very seldom did artillery units work out this kind of fire during the Vietnam War because it is too complicated to calculate the gunnery works at the Fire Direction Centre (FDC). 

Usually, forward observers adjust fire to strike in large 50 meter increments. The request for "Destroying Fire" annoys the howitzer section and forward observers, because it requires them to make a rapid yet accurate series of 10 meter firing adjustments to "walk" the fire up to the target and hit it exactly.

Destroying Fire, coupled with the awesome fire power of the 105mm or 155mm shell, can be devastating for the enemy, as it makes artillery fire very effective. This kind of fire can blast the enemy out of their "A" foxholes, infamous for protecting them during even the most severe air or artillery strikes. Afterwards, the way would be cleared on the advanced route for friendly or supporting troops.

For this tactic, the forward observers must adjust to 10m firing increments to bring the impact of the artillery fire directly to the "A" foxholes in order to crush the enemy withholding positions on our advanced route.

One of the most famous feats of the "water-land warriors" was "the ground B52 bombardment," conducted by "Red Dalat."  He used many different kinds of cannons, many different kinds of ammunition from many different positions, to fire on many different kinds of targets at the same time (T.O.T). All kinds of ammunition from many kinds of weapons from different fire bases exploded at different targets concurrently to surprise the enemy, and they didn't have enough time to take cover and protect themselves. Consequently, the Marine Artillery entirely erased the entire NVA 606th Special Engineer regiment and immobilized the 202nd Tank Regiment of the Communist forces along the provincial road "555" near Van-Trinh Bridge.  After suffering heavy casualties, these two NVA units were kicked out of the war; they could not battle any longer.

After these victories, the FSCC of the Marine Division applied the Loi-Hoa fire support plan. The goal of this plan was to employ the firepower of many branches to oppress the enemy's spirit, weaken their resistance, and inflict maximum damage. The units took turns or simultaneously used air bombardment, artillery firepower or navy gunfire on the enemy strong hold, both day and night, in order to destroy obstacles in our way as we were advancing. Using this firepower plan, the "Sea Angels" recaptured the Old Citadel Dinh-Cong-Trang successfully. This bright yet bloody victory made the Marines and all Vietnamese soldiers radiant with pride.

After an absence of 135 days, the "yellow font and three red stripes" national flag of South Vietnam as well as the flag with the slogan "As strong as a Giantwave," the flag of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, flew once again on the flag pole of the Quang-Tri Old Citadel at 8 a.m., in the morning of September 9th in 1972.

V. Collapse

In early 1975, the Marine Corps formed the fourth brigade which was the 468th Marine Brigade. The Marine Artillery was planning to establish the fourth Marine Artillery battalion, "P" battery, which was commanded by Captain Nguyen Van-Vinh, who would be the first son of the future 4th Marine Artillery Battalion. 

However, the nation's destiny changed as the country disintegrated into national chaos with its unconstitutional president. That, combined with a betrayed alliance, resulted in tragedy: the Republic of Vietnam was deleted from the world map; the ARVN unwillingly and resentfully stopped fighting; the Vietnamese Marine Corps along with other friendly branches of the Vietnamese Arms Forces bitterly and sorely became suffocated; and the Vietnamese Marine Artillery threw down their weapons sorrowfully and tearfully!!!

Seattle, Summer 1998

Captain Luong Xuan Loc