Friday, 25 July 2014

Task Force B's Operation 
in Viet An Valley
6-8-1966

Colonel Ton That Soan

Contributors:
Le Ba Binh, Tran Xuan Quang,
Phan van Thang, Do Dinh Vuong, Pham Cang.

A. Overview :
This operation aimed to annihilate 1 NVA Regiment of Division 3 “Gold Star”, which had just infiltrated Viet An Valley.  In the morning of 6-8-1966, I Corps commenced a combined operation between US forces and ARVN. The area of operation was west and southwest of Que Son district of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces.

B. Operating forces :
Operating forces composed of:
1. US: 3 US Marine Battalions with Artillery and Air supports
2. ARVN: Brigadier General Hoang Xuan Lam commanded a force formed by:
* An infantry regiment and M113 APC.
* Marine Task Force B.
- Lieutenant Colonel Ton than Soan, Commander.
- 1st Marine Battalion commanded by Major Phan Van Thang.
- 3rd Marine Battalion commanded by Major Nguyen The Luong.
- 4th Marine Battalion, commanded by Major Nguyen Thanh Tri
- An Artillery Company 105mm Howitzer commanded by Captain Doan Trong Cao.

C.    Process :
          1.  Day N (6-8-1966)
At 7:00 day N, Task Force B was helilifted from a land field in front of Quang Tin administrative edifice to landing zones near mountainous areas in the Tam Ky district. This was the first time Task Force B operated with three battalions, and until then, it was also the first systematic helilift operation. Each battalion, consisting of more than seven hundred soldiers, was helilifted at the same time with US helicopters such as H34, H21 and Chinook 47.
The order of movement was as follows:
- 1st Battalion, Task Force B Headquarters, 3rd Battalion and then 4th Battalion.

1st Battalion:
Landing in enemy territory, the 1st Battalion stormed to occupy Target 1. There were only some scattered skirmishes with a signal unit of NVA Regiment Headquarters. A number of radios, radio-code documents and weapons were seized. A number of uniforms and hats were also found. Their hats had a red star on them, conveying that the enemy had been regular NVA. At that time, ARVN were yet to be informed about NVA uniforms, and hence why we had incorrectly assumed that we had captured a NVA general.

3rd Battalion:
After arrival, 3rd Battalion advanced in parallel with the 1st in order to occupy Target 3.  They located many new enemy positions and annihilated NVA Blocking posts along their axis of advance.  Five AK 47s and other equipment were seized in this advance.

4th Battalion:
Its landing was accomplished at 11:00 am and encountered the enemy right at the landing zone. They quickly disbanded the NVA blocking posts and acquired control of the situation.  This was an area in juxtaposition with mountains. Wells needed to be dug deeply (down twenty metres) in order to obtain water, and they dried out in the dry seasons. The VC exploited these wells, digging laterally and transforming them into frog's caves to hide in.   Whenever NVA saw our soldiers approaching they hid in these places.
While searching, the marines of the 4th Battalion tied explosives to slow burning detonating wire and dropped them down the wells.  On occasion, the NVA would cut the burning wire and let the explosive fall to the bottom of the dried wells, thus exposing their position and becoming targets to a rain of bullets from above them.
On the 1st day, the 4th Battalion searched the area of responsibility and had some skirmishes. The NVA main forces had withdrawn towards Truong Son Range to the west. This was an unsafe area which South Vietnam government had no control over. Units performing this operation received order to reposition residents of this area to the safer resettlement center, under government protection in Tam Ky district.

2.  Day N+1 and N+2 
At night on these days, units positioned themselves at highpoints of CHAM Mountain and performed searching during the daytime.  On the third day, according to a plan of 2nd Infantry Division, Task Force B crossed the Viet An Valley, moving southeast. The advancing formation was in three prongs, set up as follows:
- 4th Battalion in the north.
- 3rd Battalion in the south.
- Task Force B Headquarter in the middle.
- 1st Battalion moved took the rear.
In the last few days, the situation had remained calm, however, the battalions were at full alert. This was because G2 of 2nd Infantry Divisions, civilian sources, and signs of NVA preparations (noted by marine units), revealed that NVA had been organizing a big battle.

3.  Day N + 3
3rd Marine Battalion:
Group B was commanded by the executive officer of the battalion, Captain Nguyen Minh Chau.  This group, consisting of Company 1 of Captain Chau and Company 2 of 1st Lieutenant Le Ba Binh, advanced to Target 3.  Group A consisted of Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen van Nhac, and Company 4 of Cpatain Nguyen van Da. The latter's purpose was to protect the Battalion Headquarter.
Moving down from Cham Mountain, Company 2 had to advance slowly while searching, since the axis of advance passed through dense forest.  Company 2 had to move in parallel with Company 1, which was searching the spring of Ly River.  
At 11:30 am Captain Chau informed 1st Lieutenant Le Ba Binh:
“When the 1st Group of 4th Battalion crossed the river, a number of civilians said that communist guerillas had not allowed civilians to live in Target 3 and Target 4.  You should be careful, especially on your right flank.  I will let Company 1 advance in parallel with you”.
Company 2 temporarily stopped to observe Target 3. This target was not unfamiliar to the 3rd Battalion. More than one year earlier, this battalion had fought a violent battle in the same valley. The 3rd Battalion requested TOT artillery to bombard Target 3.  When departing, sounds of NVA 82mm mortars and 75mm and 57mm recoilless rifles could be heard. Fifteen minutes after that shelling, the enemy sent a unit from hill 41 to the east. Group B was ready. The Artillery Battery of Captain Doan Trong Cao was also prepared. When the enemy unit entered into their firing range, the whole of Company 1 and Company 2 opened fire; not a single VC could escape.  Company 1 captured two prisoners and Company 2 seized a brand new 75mm recoilless rifle.

4th Marine Battailion:
After having crossed the shallow segment of Ly River, the 4th Battalion swiftly occupied Target 2. This was a low hill with low tree, but bushy. The 4th Battalion then received order from Task Force B to occupy Target 4. The 4th Battalion advanced in 2 prongs:
- The Battalion Commander, Major Nguyen Thanh Tri, commanded Group A. It was composed of Company 3 of 1st Liieutenant Huynh Ngoc Lien, Commanding Company of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen  Bach and Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen The Phuong.  
- Captain Nguyen Huu Nhon, the executive officer of the Battalion, commanded Group B.  This group consisted of Company 2 of 1st Lieutenant Phan Nhu Don and Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Tran Xuan Quang.
The formation of advance was in a row, with the two groups moving in parallel towards Target 4. When approaching four hundred meters from the target, Group B moved along a deserted village edge. The width of this village was about fifty metres, extending to Target 4.  On the right hand side was a low slant, covered in rocks. Forefront groups detected telephone lines at the beginning of the village. 1st Lieutenant Quang let his boys advance carefully and slowly. That's why Group B was slow in comparison to Group A, who were moving across barren field without shelter. That's the reason why Group A had to move quickly to reach a village edge in the shape of an arc. It was also the limit of Target 4.
It was some minutes past noon when the 4th Battalion reached approximately one hundred and fifty metres away from the village edge. It was then that the enemy attacked, firing with all weapons at Group A of the 4th Battalion, especially with two recoilless rifles and machine guns aiming directly at Company 4 and the right flank of the group.
Major Tri reported the situation and asked for artillery support. Lieutenant Colonel Soan used all available lines from The Seventh Fleet to support the 4th Battalion. At the same time he ordered Group B of the 4th Battalion to dash forward and attack Target 4 directly, in an attempt to allay the enemy pressure on the exposed Group A. Since the enemy was concentrated on Group A, they were unprepared to defend against the sudden attack of Group B.  Their two machine guns and even their two recoilless rifles were muted instantly.
When recounting this situation, Lieutenant Colonel Tran Xuan Quang could not forget Corporal Huynh Van De, the 57mm recoilless rifle gunner of Company 4.
“De was a big robust man, but very kind.  He carried the recoilless rifle on his shoulder, as easy as another fighter did with a light personal firearm. It was admitted that he had been an excellent expert in manipulating the 57mm recoilless rifle. Only with the 1st round he completely destroyed one NVA recoilless rifle, which was seventy metres away, which had previously wreaked much havoc on Group A. He would have logically changed position after that first round, but he wanted to quickly destroy another NVA recoilless rifle further in the distance. He stood up to observe, but another NVA recoilless rifle fired at him. His torso received that round. Immediately, the whole group of M79 and all firearms of the whole spearheading platoon destroyed that NVA recoilless rifle. To the great sorrow of all who were present, his older brother, Private 1st Class Huynh Van Cot, a very simple and honest man, sat right at that front line embracing his younger brother's body.  He sat there waiting for the order to aécharge forwardaê and refused to move to the rear.  He was the soldier who cooked meals for the Company Headquarters. There was one thing that Lieutenant Colonel Quang did not believe at that time. People said: 'If there are two brothers in the same unit, and if one of the two will be killed, the other would also be killed, sooner or later”ê.
Private 1st Class Cot would have been given a position in the logistics group staying a little bit further in the rear. But Lieutenant Colonel Quang thought it was not that bad if he would be with the Company Headquarters.  Besides, everybody in the Company liked him.  And so, a few months later, he stepped on a mine and was killed.
Lieutenant Colonel Quang recalled: “Cot was tall, lean, with a slightly pock-marked face and a spider gait”. His hair was long, curly, hanging loose in front of his forehead. Quang, then a 1st Lieutenant, once sat next to him and joked: “I would have to use a fish knife to cut your hairs”.ê His wife and children's whereabouts are unknown now.
Back to the fighting at Target 4. At that time the enemy switched their targets and aimed at Company 4. The 1st Battalion received order from Lieutenant Colonel Soan to support the 4th Battalion. Immediately after being replaced by the 1st Battalion, the whole Group B of the 4th Battalion advanced forward in a row. Company 2 of 1st Lieutenant Phan Nhu Don expanded to their right hand side onto a lower, barren slope. It had to use some rocks for shelter.
Meanwhile, the enemy was on higher ground and were firing continuously at Company 2. Two RTO of 1st Lieutenant Don were instantly killed. On the contrary, two USAF napalms under adjustment of Task Force B blanketed the hilltop where the enemy had been. At a later stage, intelligence sources form G2 of 2nd Infantry Division informed that these two napalms had completely destroyed the NVA regiment headquarters. This air support had never been so accurate in the past.
About fifty aircraft of all kinds (based at Chu Lai and 7th Fleet), including B57s, participated in air strikes. Several varieties of bombs and napalm were alternately dropped on the enemy positions from 14:30 pm until the evening, under the instruction and coordination of Task Force B advisors. This group was led by the Executive Officer of Marine Brigade Advisory Team, who had arrived from Saigon to visit Task Force B.
Not giving the enemy an opportunity to raise their heads, 105mm and 155mm Howitzers of the Marines and 2nd Infantry Division continuously pounded their positions, causing NVA bodies to fly in all directions. The napalm transformed NVA into running torches. All marines in the front line were excited, forgot to hid, and just waited to release triggers when they saw NVA emerging from their shelters. Along a wide front line, NVA bodies and weapons were scattered everywhere. Major Tri proposed to Lieutenant Colonel Soan to give his unit orders to charge and search Target 4. However, Colonel Soan ordered him to keep his unit where it had been, because aircraft from the 7th Fleet had been continuing their strikes.
At 3:00 pm, a group of NVA ran from the eastern side of Target 4 to avoid Artillery and airstrikes, but an Infantry unit and M113 APC's blocked them.  Machine guns on these APCs fired and the NVA were terrified and spiralled into chaos. At the beginning of the battle, the enemy had deployed in a long fighting front by a reinforced regiment. They sent a prong to the west to occupy highpoints with the plan to cut through the right flank of Task Force B. The 3rd Battalion had detected that plan and smashed the prong. Another prong of NVA had targeted the left flank of the 4th Battalion, but an Infantry unit and tanks annihilated it.
The curtain of night had fallen and air force activities were therefore limited. A quiet atmosphere suddenly swept across the battlefield. Occasionally an NVA fled from his hiding position, giving the Marines the opportunity to cheerfully shout and to pursue.
At 6:00 pm, helicopters arrived to resupply and to medevac the wounded, among them being 1st Lieutenant Huynh ngoc Lien, the commander of Company 3 of the 4th Battalion.
At night, everybody lay in positions, watching and occasionally firing at NVA who tried to remove their wounded or to recover lost weapons. Some marines, without asking for permission from commanders, daringly crawled toward the enemy's defensive line to collect NVA weapons. One machine gun was too heavy to pull back. It was chained to the NVA gunner.
Early the next morning, a very young soldier tendered a K54 pistol to 1st Lieutenant Quang, which begged the question, “Where did you get that from?”
The young soldier replied, “Sire, that's from a NVA.  You can go and see that body.  He was big and wearing different uniform, distinct from NVA's.  He was probably a Red Chinese advisor.  He also had a pair of binoculars which had been broken already.  You see, there was a red star on the pistol butt”.
When Major Soan visited the battlefield that morning, 1st Lieutenant Quang offered that pistol to him.  1st Lieutenant Quang asked why Major Soan had not given permission to his unit to charge to Target 4 the previous night.  Major Soan answered, “The US has plenty of weapons and ammunitions.  It's easy to manufacture them.  But human lives, once lost, could never be resurrected”.
1st Lieutenant Quang never forgot these words.  He used to reflect upon the following matter: 
“Being a commander, no matter of what rank, makes it easy to gain fondness from superiors. It is difficult, however, to win sympathy from subordinates. It's better to choose this difficulty.  Sometimes we would loose some temporary benefits because our subordinates don't understand, but our soul would be relaxed because we would not be ashamed of ourselves”. In fact, the two Company commanders Quang and Don had thought they would accept some human losses in charging towards Target 4, rather than staying exposed in barren fields.  “However, Lieutenant Colonel Soan had conceived that it was best to use enough aircraft to perform devastating air strikes on the enemy, instead of using small firearms and potentially sacrificing marines' lives”.

1st Marine Battalion:
When the NVA Artillery shelled Task Force prongs, the 1st Battalion immediately advanced between Target 4 and Target 5, moving a little bit into the lower terrain than the 3rd Battalion. Group A of the battalion was fired at with 82mm mortars. Five marines were wounded.  Major Ram, the Battalion US advisor, was also slightly wounded at a forearm.
When Group A of the 4th Battalion was attacked, Major Phan Van Thang proposed that the Task Force Commander should let Group B of 1st Battalion advance to the left hand side of it to lessen NVA pressure. Lieutenant Colonel Soan, however, said that an infantry unit with tanks was coming, and to beware of the possible NVA attack on the rear of the Task Force Headquarters.

4.  The night of N + 3
Sounds of guns ceased on the battlefield completely. 2nd Infantry Division and Task Force B had successfully stifled the NVA's final attack. They began to run to the south. Units prepared to position overnight and Artillery began harassment-and-interdiction fire.

5.  Day N + 4
Early in the morning, Task Force units were expanding and searching NVA positions, which had been pulverized by air strikes and Artillery the pervious day. Many personal and collective weapons were seized, among them being two 75mm recoilless rifles. Communist cadavers lay ubiquitously. The NVA had withdrawn and could not carry them away.
Task Force B, Infantry and tanks then simultaneously moved to a gathering area.  The operation ended that afternoon.  We did not know about the three US Marine Battalions' fightings.

D.    Commentary :
1.  Operation in Viet An valley started on 6-8-1966. It was a great victory for ARVN and Task Force B was the main force. Colonel Pham Van Phu, the Executive Officer of 2nd Infantry Division, praised Task Force B when he visited it in an area of gathering at Thang Binh district:
“This was the 1st time that ARVN units had broken the back of one of NVA’s Divisions, the 3rd Division 'Gold Star' in this difficult terrain”
2.  This was the 1st time that Task Force B had performed operations with three battalions and one Marine Artillery Battery.  Numerous US helicopters supported this operation. Only three waves of helilifting had transported and landed three Marine Battalions with 2100 soldiers.
3.  US air supports from Chu Lai Base and from 7th Fleet were accurate, continuous and extraordinarily powerful. NVA plans were broken and their human losses were so unpredictably heavy. They never expected that.
4.  The enemy had planned to surround and annihilate all ARVN units that dared enter Viet An Valley. They had chosen and organised the battlefields with a great number of regular NVA being involved.  They deployed throughout large terrain and prepared very wide battlefields. They applied the tactics of “Movement War” to surround, cut into pieces, and finally annihilate ARVN. However, they completely failed.
5.  The victory at Viet An 6-8-1966 had washed away the shameful wounds of the 3/ Marine Battalion (in 4/1965). Many medals were granted to participating units. 1st Lieutenant Hoang ngoc Lien, the commander of the 3rd Company was decorated with the 5th grade National Order and with a Bravery medal with palm. 2nd Lieutenant Tran Ve, a platoon leader of 4th Battalion, was on the spot promoted to 1st Lieutenant on the battlefield.
Colonel Ton that Soan 




No comments:

Post a Comment