Recapturing The Old Citadel
of Quang Tri
16 September 1972
Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
According to intelligence sources, the NVA planned to shell 10,000 rounds of 130mm artillery canons on the Old Citadel and the city of Quang Tri on 1 May 1972. To avoid the potential loss of lives, Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, Commander of the 3rd Infantry Division ordered his units to evacuate and avoid the shellings. The troops evacuated in the direction of My Chanh. In their retreat, the units were shelled by the NVA Artillery and were blocked by the NVA Infantry in places. Their withdrawal left the city of Quang Tri undefended, and the Old Citadel duly fell into enemy hands and was occupied by the NVA from 1 May 1972.
At that time, Marine Brigade 369 (Commanded by Colonel Pham Van Chung) had been instructed to deploy along My Chanh River, 15km south of Hai Lang, in order to block the enemy’s south bound movements along National Highway 1. The presence of the Marine Brigade in this position enabled the retreating units of the 3rd Infantry Division to reach the safety of My Chanh.
Throughout the month of May 1972 the waves of NVA attacks on the positions held by Marine Brigade 369 were consistently repulsed by the Marines and the Rangers, despite being far outnumbered by the NVA Regiments and tanks.
During this period we organised several helibourne reconnaissance operations into Hai Long district. There were also amphibious operations on the coast of My Thuy. A number of skirmishes occurred with NVA Regiments in village route 555, also known as the “Avenue of Sadness.”
On 4 May 1972 Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong was appointed to be Commanding Officer of I Corps, replacing Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam. At the same time, VNMC Colonel Bui The Lan replaced Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang as Commandant of the VNMC.
During this time US forces had ceased all land operations. Only a handful of American Advisers stayed to coordinate air and naval gunfire from the Pacific Fleet and B52 strikes from Guam and Thailand.
My Chanh River became the front line of I Corps, and was defended by Marine Brigade 369 under the Command of Colonel Pham Van Chung. The campaign to recapture Quang Tri commenced on 28 June. Vietnamese Airbourne and Marines crossed the departure line which was the My Chanh River and advanced to Quang Trò The Airbourne were in charge of areas to the west of National Highway 1; the Marines were responsible for the area from National Highway 1 to the sea. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong allowed the honour of recovering the actual city of Quang Tri and the Old Citadel to go to the Airbournes, despite both targets being (within the area of responsibility/within the grasp) of the Marines. (check this with Dad). This was most likely a deliberate decision on the part of the Lieutenant General - to ensure that the glory would go to the Airbournes.
On 11 July the 1st Marine Battalion was helibourne to the village of Bich La Nam in the district of Trieu Phong, 2km northwest of the city of Quang Trò The village was in a strategic position, and occupying it would significantly facilitate the recapture of Quang Trò.
A fleet of 32 helicopters transported the 1st Marine Battalion to the target. There were seventeen CH53 each carrying 60 persons and fifteen Chinooks CH46 each carrying 20 persons. On reaching the landing zone, one helicopter was hit by a SA7 rocket and exploded. Most the marines on board were killed. Twenty nine of the helicopters in the fleet were hit by anti-aircraft guns. One exploded on the landing zone, two were downed - one of which fell into the sea. The 1st Marine Battalion, commanded by Major Nguyen Dang Hoa, suffered heavy losses with more than 200 troops wounded or killed in action. This battalion had been met by a strong enemy force comprising of both infantry and tanks, but somehow managed to keep its positions and endure the attacks from the enemy.
After nearly one month of heavy fighting and severe losses, the Airbournes and Marines neared the city of Quang Trò Meanwhile, further a field, many factors were influencing the situation in Vietnam - among them the policy of Vietnamisation, the Paris Peace Talks, and the anti-war movement in the USA. These factors all contributed to the decision of Congress and the US President to withdraw out of Vietnam.
President Nguyen Van Thieu wanted a quick victory and recapture of Quang Tri to justify a claim for the Provisional Revolutionary Government to be in power. I did not know the reason behind the orders issued on 27 July 1972 for the Marines to replace the Airbournes in the task of recovering Quang Trò Upon receiving the order, each commander had his own opinion and misgivings, but there was no time to question the motivation. Responsibility for the onerous task of recovering Quang Tri thus fell on the shoulders Brigadier General Bui The Lan who had only been recently appointed Commandant. Despite this, he appeared to be proud to shoulder this difficult task, the result of which would no doubt influence the rest of his military career. After thorough consultation and planning, he reached the decision to use Brigade 258, composing of five battalions (1, 2, 5, 6, and 9) and one Marine Artillery Battalion of 105 Howitzers to replace the 2nd Airbourne Brigade (of Colonel Tran Quoc Lich) who were positioned southwest of the Old Citadel.
Brigade 147 (under the Command of Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao) comprising of three Battalions (3, 7, and 8) and another Marine Artillery Battalion was to attack the east side of the Old Citadel. Brigade 369, commanded by Colonel Nguyen The Luong served as a reserve for the Marine Division. The target the Old Citadel was divided in half. Brigade 258 was positioned southwest of the target; Brigade 147 was in charge of the northeast. We were proud to be a part of this supremely important operation, and yet at the same time were filled with anxiety. The underlying cause of our anxiety was the knowledge of the unavoidable heavy loss of life which lay ahead. Back when the Old Citadel was under the control of the 3rd Infantry Division it had been solidly prepared to withstand attacks. I had previously attended meetings inside the Old Citadel before it fell into Communist hands on 1 May 1972. I recalled that its defence included a high peripheral wall and moat filled with deep water. The NVA forces defending their position were four times larger than us, and were supported by long range Artillery, two tank regiments and many anti-aircraft units. They also had a store of ammunitions and weaponry at Dong Haï Their ships carrying supplies entered Cua Viet daily to provide their units in Quang Tri with food, ammunition and weapons. Our strength lay in our tactical and strategic aircrafts and Naval Artillery.
It must be said without bias that the fight to recover Quang Tri was the bloodiest and most fierce, resulting in the highest loss of life for both sides in the Vietnam War. It goes without saying that some people, for whatever reason, will not see this reality in their recollections. Bombs rained daily on the city of Quang Tri, accompanied by incessant shellings. The ground shook continuously, vibrating violently as if there were earthquakes. The following figures should serve as some indication as to the ferocity of the battle: after 51 days (since 27 July 1972 - the day that we replaced the Airbourne Division until the date the mission was accomplished) more than 3,500 marines were killed in action, and thousands wounded. On the part of the NVA, Divisions 308, 304, 325 and the tank regiments suffered devastating losses. Regiment 48 which was defending its position from within the Old Citadel was virtually annihilated: 5,542 NVA were killed and 83 captured as prisoners, alongside a mound of weapons of all descriptions.
All nine marine battalions were directly involved in the battle. They were each rotated in turn to fight on the front lines. Which is why both the 3rd and the 6th Marine Battalions can lay claim to recapturing the Old Citadel. and together hoisting the yellow South Vietnamese flag with its three red horizontal stripes over the walls of the Citadel on 15 September 1972. The official ceremony to raise the flag over the Old Citadel occurred the following day, 16 September 1972 at 12.45.
News of the victory was reported back to Saigon. President Nguyen Van Thieu immediately summoned his cabinet and a telegram congratulating Brigadier General Bui The Lan and all the Marine Divisions was immediately dispatched, in which they were praised for their efforts in winning the most glorious victory in the Vietnam War. The President announced that he would personally visit the marines at Quang Tri, and on 20 September 1972, President Thieu came to see the marines at the Old Citadel. I had the honour of driving to the Old Citadel the President, the Lieutenant General, Commanding Officer of I Corps, and the Brigadier General - the Commandant of the Marine Division. Other significant visitors on that occasion included Major General Cao Van Vien, Chief of JGS and other high ranking government officials. The President praised the troops and numerous medals were awarded and promotions announced.
The NVA suffered severe losses after our victory at Quang Trò Although it must be said that the victory would not have been made possible but for Brigade 369's successfully blocking the NVA at My Chanh River. Under the command of Colonel Pham Van Chung, this brigade prevented the enemy from proceeding directly on to Hue and Danang after their initial victory at the start of May 1972. Without them stopping the communist advance, there would not have been the opportunity to even launch the mission to recapture Quang Trò And it must be said, that the victory bought South Vietnam another three years of existence.
USMC Colonel Gerald H Turley was the last Marine Adviser to leave Quang Tri before it fell into communist hands. He later returned to the USA where he became the Vice Defence Minister. He also penned a book titled 'The Easter Offensiveù in which he heaps praise on the VNMC officers and troops for their bravery and courage in the face of battle. Despite the extreme conditions that faced them in the form of a larger NVA force armed to the teeth with modern weaponry, the ARVN rallied and repelled the patently larger and better armed enemy. According to Colonel Turley, the VNMC excelled in combat and could rival any other marine corps in the world.
In writing this paper, we thank all the American Marine Advisers who assisted us in securing the victory at Quang Trò After returning to the USA, 27 of the “Co Van” (Vietnamese for Adviser) were promoted to the rank of General:
* Major Walter Boomer, the adviser to my Brigade 258, was promoted to the rank of Major General.
* Captain John Sheehan, adviser to the 2nd Marine Battalion in 1968, was promoted to the rank of Major General.
* Major James D Beans, adviser to the 9th Marine Battalion, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General.
* Captain Ray Smith, adviser to the 6th Marine Battalion was promoted to the rank of general as was
* Captain Lawrence Livingston, adviser to the 1st Marine Battalion.
The list of American Advisers promoted to the rank of general goes on. In time, these Marine Generals commanded Divisions or Corps in the Gulf War of 1991. These generals have always said that the victory in the Gulf War came from the experience which they learnt while being advisers to the VNMC. And it is a great source of pride to us all to hear that.
The battle for Quang Tri accounted for the highest loss of life in the history of both the ARVN and the VNMC. But the heavy losses of the enemy which ran many times higher than our own should not be discounted. Even in recent times newspapers in Hanoi are known to publish articles detailing the horrific fighting and death which occurred in the struggle for Quang Trò
I pen these memories so that later generations will know of the glory of the marines and the victory of the South Vietnamese at Quang Tri on 16 September 1972. It is a date which should always stand out in the history of Vietnam, and be forever engraved on our collective memories. For my part I will always be proud to be a VNMC officer, and how I too played a part in the glorious victory. I am lucky to be able to have this pride to hold on to in my old age. I will never forget the 3,500 marines sacrificed in battle, most of them with the bloom of youth still on their cheeks.
I note also the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Do Huu Tung, the commanding officer of the 6th Marine Battalion, for it was his unit that spear headed the attack to reclaim the Old Citadel. I remember that he stood beside me for a photograph taken on 16 September 1972.
Three years after the victory at Quang Tri, two young officers who had been in the same class 16 of the Military Academy in Dalat, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Lieutenant Colonel Do Huu Tung (who were respectively the commanding officer and executive officer of Brigade 369) were reported missing in action on the beach in Danang on 29 March 1975. Both had barely turned thirty.
This article was written in memory of (my classmate) Cuong Quyet, Do Huu Tung and Nguyen Xuan Phuc. We will never be able to stand next to each other as before.
Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
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