Marine Task Force A at Duc Co
Colonel Ton That Soan
I. Generality
At the beginning of 1965, the VC was terrified by the US Armed forces being poured into South Vietnam and of the US bombings in North Vietnam. To cope with that new situation, the VC increased their military activities in South Vietnam, aiming at dispersing our strength.
Their first main point of attack was Dong Xoai, Phuoc Long province, MR III. Next came Ba Gia Campaign, Quang Ngai province, MR I. In MR II, they severed main roads in the South of Western Highland and finally they encircled and then attacked the Special Force Camp Duc Co in Pleiku province.
II. Sequence of events
1. Period 1
11. Camp Duc Co
The camp was established on a hill slope, in the form of a triangle. It lay next to an airstrip. Thick forests were around on its three sides. Duc Co was about 13 km from the Viet Kampuchea border in the west and 55 km away from Pleiku in the North East. From here, patrol groups were in charge of collecting intelligence information and of blocking the NVA infiltration from Kampuchea and at the same time protecting the last segment of the strategic National Route 19.
Units positioning inside the Camp were:
- A Vietnamese special force unit commanded by 1st lieutenant Tran Tu Lap, of class 17 Da Lat Military Academy.
- US Special Force Group A. 215 commanded by US Captain R.B Johnson.
- CIDG numbered at about 400. Most of them were mountaineers and a number were of NUNG ethnic minority. Vietnamese Special Force underofficers were their Company Commanders.
12. Events:
- On 30-6-1965, the NVA Battalion 952 attacked and occupied the Le Thanh district, 8 km north east of Duc Co camp.
- On 31-5-1965, NVA Regiment 32 laid siege to Duc Co camp in attempt to attract and annihilate reinforcements which would come by National Route 19. The camp had been out of the ARVN artillery support range and so it was controlled by the NVA artillery in the first minutes.
- On 4-8-1965, at 8.00 am, Brigadier General Vinh Loc, MR II commander, ordered the Airborne Task Force 2 to be helilifted into Duc Co to remove the enemy pressure. This Task Force was commanded by Lieutenant Ngo Xuan Nghi and was composed of Airborne Battalion 3 of Major Truong Ke Hung and Airborne Battalion 8 of Major Dao Van Hung. The helilift was accomplished at 16.00 pm. Troops landed on the field airstrip situated in front of the camp. The situation was quiet that night.
- On 5-8-1965, Airborne Task Force 2 started performing operations in the north of the camp. At 15.00, Airborne Battalion 3 began engaging the enemy at the south of Chu Kram hill. Then VNAF skyraiders appeared and airstruck enemy positions. US gunships also arrived to support the Airborne Battalion 3. Major Hung, the commander of Airborne Battalion 3 was severely wounded. Airborne Battalion 8 also confronted the enemy. While giving close supporting airstrikes, the US gunships mistakenly fired at company 83 which had been deployed on an edge of a forest and caused 1st Lieutenant Lam Don (the Company Commander) to be severely wounded. A number of others were also injured. First Lieutenant Bui Quyen, of class 16 Dalat Military Academy, from Company 81 was temporarily transferred to Company 83 to command it.
- On 6-8-1965, at 2.00 am, the NVA attacked Camp Duc Co at two directions, West and South West. The NVA artillery torrentially poured into the camp, while the NVA infantrymen assaulted the Airborne Battalion 3 outside the camp, in the South West direction. C-47 aircrafts arrived from Pleiku to drop illuminating flares above the battlefield. Fightings decreased in intensity towards daybreak, while the NVA shellings increased. Their mortars exploded continuously in camp Duc Co, on the airstrip and also two Airborne Battalions positions. The NVA AAA were too strong and the cargo aircrafts had to fly very high to avoid bullets. This meant that most of the parachuting supplies fell out of the camp. Foods and ammunition became scarcer and scarcer. The camp became the hell under the NVA artillery poundings.
- On 9-8-1965, from 7.00 am, under strong fire supports from the VNAF and USAF aircrafts, Airborne Battalion 5 of Major Ho Trung Hau was helilifted and landed at one end of the Duc Co airstrip and then advanced to occupy some positions north of the camp. Later, it successfully made contact with Airborne Battalions 3 and 8.
2. Period 2
21. Operation Dan Thang 7
On 9-8-1965, a special task force was formed to perform operation Dan Thang 7 to clear National route 19 and to resupply Camp Duc Co. It was commanded by Brigadier General Cao Hao Hon, Commander of Special District 24 which was located between Kontum and Pleiku provinces.
This Special Task Force was composed of 2 Task Forces:
211. An Armour Task Force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat. It was formed by:
"3rd Armour Regiment headquarters.
"Armour Battalion 1/5 of Captain Tran Van Thoan.
"M113 APC Battalion 2/6 of Captain Du Ngoc Thanh.
"Ranger battalion 21 of Captain Nguyen Van Sach.
"A 105mm Howitzer Artillery Battery.
"A platoon of combat engineers.
"An armour Company M8.
"Some logistics, transports elements.
212. A Marine Task Force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Thanh Yen. It was composed of:
"Marine Task Force A headquarters whose chief of staff was Major Co Tan Tinh Chau.
"Marine Battalion 2.
Commander: Major Hoang Tich Thong.
Executive officer: Captain Nguyen Van Hay. He also commanded Company 2.
Company Commanders:
- Captain Pham Nha (Company 1),
- Captain Nguyen Nang Bao (Company 3),
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan Phuc (Company 4)
"Marine Battalion 5
Commander: Major Duong Hanh Phuoc
Executive officer: Captain Nguyen Kim Phuong
Chief of S3 : Captain Nguyen Van Nho (not Major Nguyen Van Nho, Commander of Marine Battalion 4, being killed in Binh Gia Battle 1964)
Company Commanders:
- 1st Lieutenant Vo Tri Hue (Company 1)
- 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phan (Company 2)
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Dinh Thuy (Company 3)
- 1st lieutenant Nguyen Kim De (Company 4)
"75mm Artillery Company commanded by Captain Doan Trong Cao.
213. Movements of Marine Task Force A.
Before the siege of Duc Co, Marine Task Force A had been reinforcing Special District 24 and performing activities in Kontum. It had short rests now and then within a regiment rear base of the 22nd Infantry Division, near Kontum city. To prepare for operation Dan Thang 7, the whole Marine Task Force A was airlifted by US C-130 aircrafts from Kontum airfield to Cu Hanh airfield, Pleiku Province. Then it was transported by a convoy to a mountaineer village north of MRII Headquarters, to position overnight.
- On 7-8-1965, Marine Task Force A was transported back to Pleiku city by a convoy, then along the prolongation of National Route 19. It positioned in the Tea Plantation Catecka. There was a small airstrip here for L-19 reconnaissance airplanes, but this would be used for the coming helilift.
- Camp Duc Co had been encircled for more than a week and completely isolated. Aircrafts, day and night, bombed and airstruck close to the defensive fence. Airborne Task Force's Battalions were attacked and divided. The situation was not becoming better.
- On 8-8-1965, Company 3 of Battalion 2, of Captain Nguyen Nang Bao received an adventurous mission, i.e., to be helilifted and then land in an open heath, 1 km north west of Camp Duc Co. It was to sound an enemy reaction and to make contact with friendly units being dispersed in the area of operation. At noon, Company 3 already mounted helicopters and waited for their take-offs at the scheduled time. Brigadier General Cao Hao Hon arrived by his Jeep, at one end of the airstrip, to give his last directives and to shake hands with Captain Bao and at the same time, wish him luck in accomplish the mission… However, the weather of the highlands changed so quickly that the VNAF pilots informed that there would be a very strong wind coming to Duc Co. That helilift was cancelled. The next day, Company 3 was returned to Battalion 2 and then departed with the Battalion at Cau Can near Le Thanh T-junction on 9-8-1965.
214. Weather and terrain
- The factors of weather and of enemy deployments obliged the Headquarters of the operation to accept the battlefield already chosen by the enemy and to face up to the enemy tactic of "Attack outpost, assault reinforcements" To adapt to the terrain of National route 19, Armour Task Force/Ranger advanced first. Marine Task Force followed, 3 km behind, to be ready to reinforce the former and to search on both sides of the axes of advance.
215. Movements of Armour/Ranger Task Force on 9-8-1965.
It moved in the following order:
- Tank Battalion 1/5 (one Company of it protected the rear) accompanied by a Ranger Company of Ranger Battalion 21.
- M113 APC Battalion
- Ranger Battalion 21 and a Tank Company
- Engineers, Artillery, Transport units
- Tanks Company M-8
On the way to Duc Co, there were scattering villages where refugees from the North and peoples from Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen had settled. Civilians, including a local catholic priest supplied information about the NVA hiding and ambushing in the direction of Duc Co… To cope with the NVA tactic "attack outpost, assault reinforcements”, the spearheading Tank Battalion 1/5 advanced in "vat legs". Each Company, in turn, occupied important positions which were in the range of the protection of 75mm cannons of other tanks. The next company then moved forward in the same manner, and so on. At about 14.00 pm, when the first Company arrived at a T-junction leading to Le Thanh district, it was ambushed by a NVA battalion of Regiment 32.
First, two tanks were hit by the enemy anti-tank fire. The Ranger Company accompanying tanks were paralysed and suffered heavy losses. Two tanks of the commanding Platoon fired anti-human wave bullets to both sides of the road to prevent the enemy charges. One of two F-100 jet fighters which had arrived to give supporting airstrikes was shot down. The pilot parachuted out and was rescued. After a short period of time, the ambush was smashed. While the ARVN were searching the battlefield, the NVA attacked the convoy of supporting units which were following behind. The battalion commander of Tank Battalion 1/5 was wounded while he had been commanding tanks to come to the rescue. The battle became a diminuendo because of nightfall.
216. Activities of Marine Task Force A on 9-8-1965.
Being reinforcement, Marine Task Force A received order to overtake the Armour/Ranger Task Force, in order to lift the pressure in the front.
The terrains were arduous. On the right side was a valley. On the left side was a summit trail, it was very difficult to move. There was only one small road leading to Duc Co.
Marine Task Force A moved as follows:
- Marine Battalion 2 deployment
" Company 4 accompanied a tank Company in the forefront.
" The battalion headquarters and company 1 followed.
" Group B composing of Companies 2 and 3 advanced on the left side, along the summit trail.
Late in the afternoon, when the battalion was advancing upwards on a slope, the enemy attacked on its flank. The tank company in the forefront sped up the slope and fired all guns while the Marines charged. Finally, the enemy gun positions were occupied. The NVA suffered some losses while another number ran towards 1a Drang valley.
- Marine Battalion 5 moved in the following order:
" Company 2 led the movement, following Marine Battalion 2.
" Company 3
" Battalion Headquarters, the Marine Task Force A Headquarters, Marine 75mm Artillery and an engineers unit.
" Company 1 formed the rear.
" Company 4 and the Executive Officer advanced along the summit trail to protect the left flank of the Battalion.
While the spearheading company 4 of Battalion 2 was attacked, the rear contingent of Battalion 5 was also assaulted. From the summit trail on the left, company 4 saw the VC using tactic "Artillery first, charges follow". It was 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Kim De, company commander that reported the situation to the 5th Battalion commander. De suggested a plan which was immediately permitted. Company 4 deployed in a row and from the high summit trail and made a dash down at the back of the enemy…
The 5th Battalion captured many weapons including .50-caliber machine guns and 57 mm Recoilless rifles. The enemy had heavy losses. A number of the NVA survivors fled into the deep valley. Company 2 of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phan, advanced deeper to the edge of a forest on the left side of the advancing axis to fight and protect the Marine Artillery in trouble…
The battle then intensified with all kinds of guns sounds. Two F-100 jet fighters flew with long noises tearing the atmosphere. Bombs were dropped on a hill in front. Smokes and flames billowed. In the sky, L19 reconnaissance aircrafts turned in small circles. Following tiger grasses and bushes, 2nd Lieutenant Quang led platoon 22 and charged up the hill. Hiding in thick bushes on the hill, the enemy used middle-sized machine gun and AK 47s to spray bullets on that Platoon. AK 47s gun sounds were so intimidating… 2nd Lieutenant Quang, Sergeant Major Kien and Corporal Tho (Quang's RTO) were killed.
Quang sacrificed his life, leaving behind his wife and his first child - a son, still inside his mother's womb. The son had already been named by Quang as Han Giang.
217. On the night of 9-8-1965
Late in the afternoon, the NVA ceased their attacks. Marine units positioned in place overnight.
At 1.00am of 10-8-1965, the NVA returned to make attacks upon the positions of Battalion 2. A Company of M113 APC positioned next to Company 4 of Battalion 2. The NVA goal was to open a road to rescue a NVA unit being stuck and hiding in the valley. That was the NVA unit which had engaged Marines the previous afternoon.
The NVA started shelling and attacking Battalion 2. Their push was blocked by Marines. Due to the NVA tactic "shelling first, attack follow" and an unclear coordination between the Marines and Armour units there were some Marine losses due to mistaken shots of the Armour unit. After the guns sounds stopped, the Marine had thirty-one killed in action, among them were 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Dinh Khoi, 2nd Lieutenant Huynh Sinh, 1st Sergeant Niem, Sergeant Chau Senh, Sergeant Tuan and Corporal Le Chit. Twenty seven Marines were wounded. Most of them belonged to Company 4, Battalion 2 and among them 2nd Lieutenant Ly Van Dam. He was severely wounded and was medevacuated to Pleiku Military Hospital the next morning.
218. Entering Duc Co
At 8.00am on 10-8-1965, helicopters arrived to resupply and medevac for all units. C 47 aircrafts dropped fuel and ammunitions for Tank Task Force by parachute. Engineers units and cavalrymen dug a big hole to bury all NVA bodies being left behind by their comrades on the battlefield. Many traces of blood were found near a stream on the way to Duc Co. The NVA had carried away many of their wounded on the way of their retreat.
Marine Task Force A entered Duc Co first. The Armour/Ranger Task Force followed. The 2nd Marine Battalion was the first unit which set foot on Duc Co airstrip runway at 11.00am. Camp Duc Co was partially desolate! Most of its units and CIDG had dispersed inside forests waiting for friendly reinforcements. Marine Task Force A organised defences around the camp and tried to contact friendly units in the area.
CIDG units slowly returned to receive defensive lines from Marines.
On 11-8-1965, the ARVN units started to organise operations to dissolve the enemy pressure around Duc Co.
Airborne Task Force 2 performed a "Sweep" operation in the Thang Duc village, west of Camp Duc Co, until the Viet-Kampuchea border. The Marine Task Force A was in charge of the South area, while the Armour/Ranger Task Force performed activities around the Camp and in the North area of it.
Operation Dan Thang 7 officially ended on 15-8-1965. Brigadier General Vinh Loc, commander of MRII who arrived by helicopter in the Base, praised the results gained by participating units and decorated a number of combatants. Participating units started to withdraw along National Route 19. They walked to Le Thanh T-junction and then were transported by convoys to Pleiku to have a rest. US Airborne Brigade 173 was in charge of protecting the route while units had been moving.
On 17-8-1965, the Airborne Task Force 2 was airlifted to Nha Trang to prepare for an operation to open National Route 21 from Nha Trang to Ban Me Thuot. Marine Task Force A returned to Kontum to continue and reinforce Special District 24.
At the ceremony of celebration of victory in Pleiku stadium, heroes of participating units which had performed operations in the MRII received crowns. Highland schoolgirls put these wreaths of flowers on their heads. These circles of flowers were renamed by Marine Huynh Van An and other Marines as "crown of ant-bitings". The reason for that was that schoolgirls picked and collected fresh flowers in forests, incidentally harbouring fire ants to make crowns. When these were worn round the necks, these fire ants freely crawled out and bit Marines necks and torsos during the whole process of the ceremony.
III. Results
- Airborne Task Force 2 had twenty killed in action in Duc Co. In the fighting between Airborne and the enemy, the NVA had 158 bodies left behind, among them, the cadres told that 100 of them were killed by airstrikes.
- US Special force group A-215 commanded by Captain R. B Johnson suffered heavy losses.
- Marine Task Force A had thirty-one killed and twenty-seven wounded in action.
- According to MRII headquarters, after Operation Dan Thang 7, NVA had a total of 566 killed, twenty-six captured. The ARVN seized twelve collective weapons, ninety-four individual firearms and destroyed two NVA .50-caliber machine guns, and two 81mm mortars.
IV. Sommary
1. In 1965, executing an order of Vietnamese Communist party, the NVA and the VC local guerrillas increased their terrorist activities and sabotages in cities. They also attacked and occupied remote ARVN positions, aiming to alleviate the US pressure in North Vietnam. The battle of Duc Co and events in MRII were only links of a chain in the NVA general strategy at this time.
2. The NVA attacked the Duc Co camp with the goal of annihilating their reinforcements. They chose Duc Co because it was near the Chu Prong mountain and the Ia Drang valley and at the same time it was close to the Vietnam-Kampuchea border. It was very convenient and easy for them to resupply. It was also easy for their troops to move.
Moreover, ambushes could be organised easily. There was only one route, namely National Route 19, which could be used as the advance axis for our reinforcement forces. The NVA Regiment which had recently been infiltrated was armed with two basic infantry weapons. These were much more sophisticated than the ARVN weapons, i.e., AK 47 rifles and the B40 and B41 anti-tank rockets.
3. The NVA operational plan was based on their tactic "Attack outpost, Assault reinforcements". A battalion created pressure by encircling and shelling the Special Force Camp Duc Co. The two other battalions of Regiment 32 ambushed to annihilate reinforcements which came to the rescue.
4. The NVA tactic "Attack outpost, assault reinforcements" was not very effective in the Vietnam War since the day US Armed Force had been pouring into Vietnam. The reason was that the ARVN had high mobility, strong firepower thanks to the VNAF and the US helicopters.
The failure of the NVA Division 9 was a typical example. It ambushed the US Division 1 on National Route 13 in June and July 1966 in MRIII. Although the NVA had carefully chosen a place for an ambush and thoroughly prepared, they had to flee in escape with heavy losses. However, back to the battle of Duc Co, reinforcements were crack troops of the general Reserve Forces. They were supported by Tanks and so quickly, the NVA ambush was smashed into pieces.
5. Special District 24 Headquarters and higher authorities were passive. They had irrationally and wastefully used General Reserve units in this Duc Co operation. Moreover there were discordance in commands between Armour/Ranger Task Force and Marine Task Force.
6. During the time Special Force Camp Duc Co was encircled, the NVA continuously shelled, destroying the defensive system of the Camp. The Ammunition dump exploded. The drinking water tank was broken. Food and ammunition were decreasing. Resupplies by parachute fell down outside of the camp due high flying aircrafts in order to avoid the NVA AAA.
The spirit of the fighters inside the Camp was very tense. A number of CIDG, who were mostly mountaineers, moved out of the camp to safely hide in forests, waiting for reinforcements. That's why, at the beginning, G2 of the Special District 24, received an alarming warning that a number of the CIDG could rise in rebellion.
However, when Marine Task Force A arrived in the Camp at 11.00 am 10-8-1965, the above mentioned number of CIDG mountaineers started returning to the camp with all personal firearms.
7. Although the US Airborne Brigade 173 protected the route of return for the ARVN units, they just concentrated on occupying the high points in order to protect the movements. There was no clear instruction about clearing mines along National route 19. That's why a number of the APC and trucks were hit by NVA mines and were destroyed on the way to the Le Thanh T-junction.
8. Collecting experiences about the NVA in the Duc Co battle, MRII Headquarters victoriously won in the battle of Pleime in 10-1965 with following factors:
a. Use the VNAF and USAF firepower to a maximum to strike the NVA gathering positions based on intelligence sources and daily air photos. This method caused the NVA division of the VC general Chu Huy Man to suffer heavy losses right at the beginning. This NVA division had three Regiments, 32, 33, 66. Regiment 33 suffered the heaviest loss, fractured, and was eliminated out of battlefield immediately.
b. Save enough necessary time to form reinforcements. Chief of units studied the terrains thoroughly and let their units advance carefully and did not let them enter in the ambush zone.
9. The victory at Duc Co was written down by Major Co Tan Tinh Chau in his song: "Marine March":… Being famous as Marines, we never retreated. Victory everywhere, we were commandos. Compatriots gladly welcomed the victory at Duc Co'…
Colonel Ton That Soan
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