Marine Brigade 258's Victory
at Quang Tri April 1972
Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
I. The general situation
Taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from Vietnam following President Nixon's proclamation of “Vietnamisation”, the North Vietnamese launched a campaign to attack South Vietnam dubbed the “Nguyen Hue Campaign”. There were three main elements to the campaign:
1. Crossing the Ben Hai River with a large number of troops to occupy our fire bases located south of the DMZ, and from there advancing to seize the province of Quang Tri.
2. Advancing from Cambodia to attack Binh Long, An Loc.
3. Attacking Kontum in the Highlands.
In this paper I will focus solely on the first element of the three pronged campaign: the battle for Quang Tri.
The following North Vietnamese troops were deployed in the DMZ:
* Divisions 304 and 308.
* Four independent regiments belonging to Front B5:
- Sapper regiment 126
- Regiments 31, 246 and 270
* 200 tanks from tank regiments 203 and 204
* Artillery regiments 38 and 68
* “Ground to Air Missiles” Regiment 84
A total of 30,000 North Vietnamese infantrymen brazenly crossed the DMZ to attack our fire bases to the north of Quang Tri province. The bases were razed by heavy artillery and shelling. Within the first four days of April, the communist forces had seized control of 11 firebases, and consequently thirty six 105mm, eighteen 155mm Howitzers and four 175mm from the various bases fell into communist hands.
One unit of the ARVN's 3rd Division - the 56 Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Pham Van Dinh, surrendered at 14.30 on 2 April 1972. Marine Brigade 147 had previously sent Artillery Company B of the 1st Battalion to reinforce this regiment as per the orders of the ARVN's 3rd Division. As a result of the surrender of Regiment 56, the Commander of Artillery Company B, Captain Nguyen Van Tam and his unit were forced to surrender too, and many of them have remained as POWs for many years after.
On 23 April 1972, Hanoi Radio broadcasted Colonel Dinh's explanation for his surrender. In the broadcast, Colonel Dinh falsely claimed that other units of the 3rd Infantry Division had retreated to a safer distance in the face of the “Liberating Army's” ferocity at Tan Lam base (Camp Carroll). As a result, Colonel Dinh claimed that his unit had been abandoned to fight on their own and that his surrender to the communist forces had been motivated by his desire to prevent further casualties amongst his unit. The broadcast ended with Colonel Dinh calling on other ARVN units to follow his example.
While the words of an uninfluential man did not have any impact on the morale of any of the marines, the American Advisers became somewhat apprehensive. They had been apprised of the fierce fighting at Camp Carroll by two American advisers who had narrowly escaped from the base. The two advisors had been picked up by helicopters only to be rained upon from all directions by North Vietnamese fire. The helicopter was hit but somehow managed to limp back to a relatively safer zone. From there, the two American advisers were transferred by helicopter to Quang Tri.
II. The battle at Dong Ha bridge
The Headquarters of Marine Brigade 258 and the 3rd Marine Battalion were located at Fire Base (FB) Nancy, 10 km south of the city of Quang Tri. On 29 March 1972 Brigade headquarters had ordered the 3rd Battalion to move from FB Nancy to Dong Ha during the night. Upon arrival, they were to secure National Route 9 from Dong Ha to Cam Lo. On 1 April 1972 Brigade headquarters also departed FB Nancy and relocated to Ai Tu. At this time, units under the command of Marine Brigade 258 were:
* The 1st, 3rd and 6th Marine Battalions.
* The 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion.
The 6th Marine Battalion under the command of Major Do Huu Tung was in charge of defending the Ai Tu Combat Base, where the Headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division had previously been stationed prior to 1 April 1972.
The 1st Marine Battalion, commanded by Major Nguyen Dang Tong, was deployed in the area of the Ai Tu Combat Base to act as a reserve force for the Brigade.
The 3rd Marine Battalion headed by Major Le Ba Binh was in charge of the area of Dong Ha.
As mentioned above, in the first days of April the communists had succeeded in occupying 11 of the fire bases near the DMZ. Meanwhile, the Dong Ha Bridge was the responsibility of one of the units of the 3rd Infantry Division, which instead of holding the bridge had looked to preserving its own well being by not fighting and voluntarily withdrawing after the 3rd Infantry Division's Headquarters had retreated to the citadel in Quang Tri. The bridge was consequently left unprotected.
The 3rd Marine Battalion arrived in Dong Ha early on the morning of 30 March 1972. The night of 1 April 1972 saw the 57th Infantry Regiment withdraw along National Route 1 from the fire bases north of Dong Ha where they should have been stationed. The northern Vietnamese communist pursued the retreating regiment. And civilians seeing the retreating troops knew the communists were not far away and fled in the wake of the 57th Infantry Regiment. The retreat unleashed a wave of chaos with panicked civilians getting caught up amongst the retreating troops and the advancing communists. To add to the chaos and confusion, the Northern Vietnamese troops donned the uniform of the South Vietnamese infantrymen in order to trick the southern troops and also the fleeing civilians.
The 3rd Marine Battalion deployed two companies at the southern end of Dong Ha Bridge. One small contingent was positioned at the northern end to observe the movements of the North Vietnamese troops, and two other companies were sent to reinforce the 1st Armour Brigade.
On 2 April 1972, the two companies at the southern end of the bridge sighted an enemy convoy accompanied by more than 20 tanks. The two tanks in the lead were a T54 and a PT76. As soon as the advancing T54 reached the northern end of the bridge it was hit by a LAW M72 stopping it dead in its tracks. The PT76 manoeuvred to overtake the other tank on its left flank and head for the open road but was also hit and destroyed. The two tanks lay parallel blocking the progress of the entire convoy. Perhaps sensing that this was not going to be a walk-over, the enemy troops retreated and dispersed to both sides of the road.
Seeing this, the 3rd Marine Battalion requested the Artillery of Brigade 258, Naval Artillery and jet fighters to alternate between themselves in attacking the enemy convoy. Flames and smoke erupted throughout the area destroying the enemy troops. A significant number of the tanks were destroyed, and the remainder took to the road back to the north with a number seeking shelter in the nearby villages. The northern infantry was severely attacked on this stretch of the road by our air force (VNAF), Artillery, and naval forces. Thanks to the powerfully effective support of the Naval Artillery and the 3rd Marine Artillery, the 3rd Marine Battalion and the 20th Tank Regiment were successful in stopping the advance of the VC troops.
Having stopped the VC troops from crossing the Dong Ha Bridge and taking Quang Tri, the bridge was subsequently destroyed through the valiant efforts of Captain Ripley and the marines of the 3rd Battalion. In actual fact, the bridge should have previously been destroyed by the 3rd Infantry Division which had sent one of its engineering units (along with an American adviser) to the site. The engineering unit of the Infantry had abandoned the site before accomplishing their mission, leaving behind the American adviser, the TNT explosives and the detonators. Captain Ripley, the American adviser to the 3rd Marine Battalion gathered the abandoned explosives, and set about the task of destroying the bridge, a task which they successfully completed by 17:00 that day.
To the north bank of the river was the North Vietnamese Army; on the south bank were the 3rd Marine Battalion and the 20th Tank Regiment. The invaders shelled the area of Dong Ha with about 1,000 rounds of 130mm Artillery daily, and continued this momentum day after day. The Commander of the 3rd Marine Battalion was Major Le Ba Binh, who had been previously wounded in action a total of nine times - which made it highly possible that he was the officer in the ARVN who had cheated death the most number of times. Nine red stars, each one signifying each time that he was wounded in action, lay rather appropriately on his left breast beside the medals for bravery.
Despite being hopelessly outnumbered the 3rd Marine Battalion held the enemy at bay for seven continuous days. At the beginning of the battle the Battalion had 700 fighters. By the time they left Dong Ha, they numbered slightly more than 200. It transpired that many soldiers who had been wounded had refused to be transferred to hospital, choosing instead to fight alongside their fellow marines despite their injuries. For their courage and honour, instead of being considered “wounded in action”, they earned the epitaph of “killed in action”. Captain Ripley, the battalion's senior American Adviser witnessed an act of extreme self sacrifice when a marine who had sustained a serious back injury laboriously assisted a more seriously injured fighter to a safer place. Captain Ripley recalled that the pair died at dusk the same day.
Looking at the disparity in numbers between the two armies, it was virtually impossible to believe that the 3rd Marine Battalion had managed to stop the advance of two North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regular divisions (Divisions 304 and 308) and two tank regiments (Regiments 203 and 204) with only the assistance of the Naval Artillery, the Marine's own Artillery and some air support.
As the enemy headed southwards to try to cross the line into Dong Ha, in the fighting that ensued, the 3rd Marine Battalion captured a symbolically significant Russian AT3 rocket battery. To make this even more special, the capture was achieved in a single shot with a 105 Howitzer which previously belonged to one of the Infantry units and had been abandoned when the unit fled southwards. The marines of the 3rd Battalion destroyed numerous enemy tanks with their own M72 LAW’s and with M48 tanks’ of 20th Tank Regiment.
During the night of 2 April 1972, a column of 20 NVA tanks rolled towards Cam Lo. Naval Artillery ceased and B52s swooped in, dropping more than 250 bombs on the column. The rumbling of tank engines petered out to be replaced by the moaning of those inside. For the three to four days after the battlefield was quiet.
In the first days of April, the area of responsibility of Brigade 147 (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao) was rife with fighting, shelling and fierce fighting. The Headquarters of Brigade 147 was camped at Fire Base Mai Loc in the District of Hung Hoa in the province of Quang Tri. To the West and North West were fire bases Ba Ho, Holcomb, and Sarge. The elevated position of the bases meant that one could observe the enemies activities and movements from Khe Sanh in the West, to National route 9 to Cam Lo, and Dong Ha.
Brigade 147 came under increasingly heavy pressure from the two NVA regular Divisions 304, 308, their artilleries, tanks and anti-aircraft guns. On 1 April 1972, seven fire bases to the north of Cam Lo belonging to the 3rd Infantry Division had fallen into enemy hands. The following day, Camp Carroll (named after a US Marine killed in action in 1966) which was the responsibility of the 56th Infantry Regiment (and commanded by Colonel Pham Van Dinh) was lost to the invaders.
III. Withdrawal from the area covered by Marine Bridge 147
Recognising the increasing pressure from the enemy on Marine Brigade 147, Brigadier General Vu Van Giai decided to pull the brigade out of Mai Loc and surrounding camps. While the plan to withdraw had been considered and planned from all angles, the actual withdrawal met with many difficulties. The retreating forces were subjected to enemy ambushes. Enemy artillery forward observers had infiltrated further ahead into the South, and from there were able to direct their units to shell on the retreating troops, or to correct their artillery when their aim was wide. Battalions 4, 7, and 8 of Marine Brigade 147 reached Quang Tri on the afternoon of 5 April 1972. Unbelievably, their morale was intact and fighting spirits high. And after barely a few days of rest, and armed with new supplies and more ammunition, they quickly returned to the battlefield.
IV. Movements of the Headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division and of Marine Brigade 258
On 1 April the 3rd Infantry Division Headquarters decided to relocate to the old citadel in Quang Tri, some 5km away in order to avoid the constant heavy shelling from 130mm and 152mm artilleries which rained down daily on Dong Ha and Ai Tu. On the same day, Marine Brigade 258 headquarters was ordered to move from Firebase Nancy, south of Quang Tri, to Ai Tu to replace the 3rd Infantry Division Headquarters. Upon arrival, the marines were greeted with 1,000 rounds of 130mm. Trucks went up in flames and the area of Ai Tu Combat base was enveloped in smoke and stank of burning tyres and petrol. Everything above the ground was wiped out. Soldiers were killed then and there on arrival. All radio aerials on the roof of the TOC were destroyed or cut. The TOC though solidly built was subjected to numerous rounds. The sturdy TOC was 15m high, and on the roof was an 8m thick layer of sandbags, and kept those inside safe. It could have withstood a bomb, albeit not one from a B52.
The TOC was jammed packed to the rafters. There were infantrymen who should have departed with the rest of their division who had not yet departed, plus the new arrivals from Marine Brigade 258 Headquarters. There were about 200 people crammed into this safe house, including 20 American advisers attached either to the 3rd Infantry Division or the Marines, a group from the Naval Artillery, and a group of advisers from the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces.
The intensity of the shelling eventually decreased, and the remaining members of the 3rd Infantry Division and their American advisers left Ai Tu quickly to join their main Headquarters in Quang Tri. But the advisers from the Naval Artillery, Tactical Air Force and Strategic Air force remained to support the two Marine Brigades.
On arrival at the TOC, I had a briefing with other members of my staff. They included:
* Executive Officer Lieutenant Colonel Do Dinh Vuong.
* Major Nguyen Van Chau, Chief of G2.
* 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Sy Toan, Military Intelligence.
* Major Huynh Van Luom, Chief of G3
* Captain Mai Van Tan, Assistant to Chief of G3.
* Captain Cao Quang Do, G4.
* 1st Lieutenant Bui Cang, Chief of G1
* 2nd Lieutenant Ngo Van Nam, Chief of G5.
* 2nd Lieutenant Vu Van Nhan, Communications
* Major Tran Thien Hieu, Commander of the 3rd Artillery Battalion.
The American Advisers present were:
* Major John Easley, Adviser to my Brigade.
* Major David Brookbank, a Former B52 Pilot.
* Major James Parrish, Artillery 155mm.
* 1st Lieutenant Joel Eisenstein, Naval Artillery
* Major JF Neary, in Charge of Communication with Da Nang.
The advisers reported that:
* There were 4 cruisers outside Cua Viet.
* There were 5 destroyers on the way to Cua Viet.
* A number of F4 fighters were making their way to Vietnam from the US Marine base in Japan.
* On 7 April 20 F4 fighters would arrive in Da Nang, and would be ready to provide support on 9 April.
* B52s were on the ready to bomb the ARVN bases which had fallen under enemy control.
V. Waiting with baited breath to be bombed by B52s
After the withdrawal of 3rd Infantry Division headquarters to the citadel in Quang Tri, the American advisers of the unit reported to their superiors in Saigon that they had withdrawn from Ai Tu Combat base. However, they failed to mention that Marine Brigade 258 had replaced them in Ai Tu, and that many American advisers had remained in Ai Tu to support the marines. Consequently, the rear Headquarters in Saigon thought that there were no units left at Ai Tu base, and planned to have the combat base razed by B52s on the night of 3 April 1972 to prevent our weapons, ammunitions, and trucks from falling into enemy hands.
At 2.40am on 3 April 1972 my American advisers nervously informed me that that they had discovered that Ai Tu Combat Base was to be bombed by B52s in 30 minutes time. Everyone was aghast at this development, particularly the American advisers who were fully aware of the power and devastation of a B52 attack. Only a handful of my staff who were off duty slept through this crisis, blissfully unaware of the impending doom. My American advisers pulled out all stops in an effort to contact their superiors and stop the B52s from bombing us, but to no avail. Thank god for Major David Brookbank, who was in charge of air support for the Brigade. He had previously been a B52 pilot and still recalled the secret codes to call when it came to bombers and their command. He tried non stop to make contact with each of the crews of the B52s on the way to the Ai Tu target. As the minutes ticked by, and the half hour to the B52s' arrival approached, Major Brookbank became more and more desperate. In his calls over the air waves he repeatedly stated his wife's name, listed his children's names, gave his home address in the USA to dispel any doubts at B52 High Command that this call was being made by the enemy. He provided personal information which only he could know and voluntarily submit, to dispel any doubts that the NVA had captured an American POW and was using the prisoner to communicate in English to stop the upcoming bombing.
Major Brookbank's desperate calls were finally received by Strategic Air Force Headquarters which verified the genuineness of his claims, and redirected the fast approaching B52s to other targets. Despite this, the American advisers warned me that we had to continue the backwards count to complete the 30 minutes wait to the scheduled bombing, and only until then would we know that the B52s had received their new commands and been called off Ai Tu. But until then, we could not consider that we were safe. It was cold inside the TOC but as the minutes ticked by we all became intensely aware of the raising temperature inside being generated by all our tense, nervous and sweaty bodies. The 3rd Marine Battalion based in Dong Ha was mercifully unaffected by the previous half hour's B52 bombing scare. The 30 minutes passed, the scheduled bombing did not come to pass, a wave of relief swept over the hot sweaty room. Had it not been for the gallant efforts of Major Brookbank, all the marines of Brigade 258 and I would have been fertilising the soil at Ai Tu, contributing to the verdant green of the grass at Ai Tu.
VI. Movements of the 3rd MarineBattalion to Ai Tu Combat Base.
On 8 April the 3rd Marine Battalion moved to Ai Tu to replace the 6th Marine Battalion. The area of responsibility of the 3rd Marine Battalion was then occupied by the 5th Ranger Group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Minh Hong. On the first day of April all the ARVN units were shelled frequently. Intelligence sources from I Corps and US advisers revealed indicators of NVA Infantry and tank movements to the South from Mai Loc. I Corps' Room 2 and US Intelligence sources confirmed that there would some big battles loomed for my brigade in the coming days. On hearing this I ordered Captain Cao Quang Do to request the maximum supply of anti-tank mines. An engineer unit moved in to establish the minefields. I requested from I Corps a reinforcement M48 Tank Squadron which belonged to Tank Regiment 20, commanded by Captain Doan Chi Sanh who presented himself to me on the evening of 8 April 1972.
On the afternoon of 8 April, Brigade Headquarters received a secret telegram stating that on the night of 8 April the NVA infantry and tanks would attack marine positions in the area of Ai Tu from the south west direction. I informed the American advisers to cooperate to prepare a plan for Air Force and Artillery supports. Meanwhile the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion, commanded by Major Tran Thien Hieu had been shelled continuously. This battalion had to move their Howitzers many times each day and to dig trenches in which to store their ammunitions to prevent them being destroyed in the constant shelling. Compared to the other marines, the artillerymen certainly had a physically gruelling and more arduous job.
VII. The Battle at Pedro Base
The 1st Marine Battalion served as a reserve unit for the Brigade, performing activities in north west Ai Tu. Its commanding officer was Major Nguyen Dang Tong, and its executive officer was Major Doan Duc Nghi. On the afternoon of 8 April 1972, the 1st Marine Battalion and the I Corps Engineer unit established an anti-tank minefield with more than 500 mines tactically placed on the potential approach routes which the NVA tanks could use to advance to Ai Tu and Quang Tri.
On 8 April 1972, Marine Brigade 258 Headquarters decided to replace the 6th Marine Battalion with the 3rd Marine Battalion to protect Ai Tu Combat Base. The rationale behind this decision was that, until then, the 6th Marine Battalion had sustained less damage than the other Battalions and its capacity to fight was still high. The Marine Brigade Headquarters ordered Major Do Huu Tung, commanding officer of the 6th Marine Battalion, to move his unit by road to Pedro base, located 9km south-west of Ai Tu base and replace a Ranger Battalion. The American advisers attached to his unit were Major Bill Warren and Captain William Wischmeyer who had joined the unit on 21 June 1971 and fought with it through their period of duty. Captain Wischmeyer was in the unit when NVA attacked it a Ba Ho mountain and Sarge Fire Base near Mai Loc, in the district of Hung Hoa, Quang Tri.
Marine Brigade 258 sent a bulldozer to assist the 6th Marine Battalion build a defensive system. During this month, the ground was wet from the heavy rains and caused countless difficulties for the trench diggers. Major Do Huu Tung decided to station the Alpha Command Group (composing of two Companies) on a high position 1km north east of Pedro base. Bravo Command Group, headed up by the executive officer Captain Nguyen Van Su (and composed of one Company) was positioned along village route 557, 1.5km south east of Pedro base. The remaining Company was positioned inside Pedro base itself. One platoon of this Company was stationed on the east side, some 600m north west. Because of the way the 6th Marine Battalion was deployed, both American advisers were in Alpha Group.
That night in the cold wind and rain, the marines conscientiously prepared fighting and defensive positions, digging trenches, fox holes, and bunkers. Throughout the night, the NVA artillery shelled our positions. At dawn, the 6th Marine Battalion was shelled by Artillery batteries. Major Tung reported that his unit had been attacked but that they had been ready to defend. Before long, he and the American advisers heard the noise of heavy vehicles which they recognised to be the ominous rumbling sounds of tanks. This too was reported to Brigade Headquarters.
Fierce fighting commenced at 0645 on 9 April 1972. Major Tung saw two NVA tanks heading towards Pedro base. Another seven tanks rolled towards Pedro base from the direction of village route 557. There were approaching at the speed of 15km/h and were the western prong in a multiple-pronged assault on Pedro. This was the first time the 6th Marine Battalion had encountered such a numerous and powerful NVA tank force.
The Battalion's anti-tank platoon was armed with LAW M72. The fire support scheme had been meticulously planned by Brigade 258 Headquarters and the American advisers. And as a result, the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion (commanded by Major Tran Thien Hieu) was able to shell exceedingly accurately on enemy targets. Twelve enemy tanks (T54 and T59) flanked by columns of infantrymen were advancing towards the defensive line of one of the platoons. Shells rained down on them exceptionally accurately. Their formation disbanded in a matter of minutes. Our Artillery used time fused rounds to destroy the tanks and air bursting ammunition killed the infantrymen. The regiments accompanying the tanks suffered heavy casualties. A great number of infantrymen lay dead or dying. The survivors dispersed and ran to hide in the nearby forest. Of the 30 tanks involved in the battle, more than half were destroyed by either the anti-tank mines or the artillery. The remaining tanks closed their turret hatches to avoid the shelling. At 0715 two tanks approached our defensive line but were stopped in their tracks by the anti-tank mines.
From their elevated position on the higher ground, Major Tung and the American advisers saw some enemy tanks breaching the position of a platoon, and crushing a number of marines in the outpost under their steel tracks. The dark clouds overhead made it difficult for the US Air force to provide effective support. Eventually the skies cleared and the aircraft A1 of the VNAF flew to Ai Tu and immediately fired upon some NVA tanks. The 23mm anti-aircraft guns on the tanks spat back in response, downing the A1 piloted by Captain Tran The Vinh. The aircraft broke in half as if fell out of the sky in a blaze of flames. Brigade Headquarters sent a small unit from the 1st Marine Battalion to retrieve the Captain's remains, and though they searched long and hard, could not locate his body.
The VNAF paralysed the fighting capacity of the remaining tanks, and eased the pressure on the 6th Marine Battalion considerably. Two NVA tanks successfully evaded the bombing and entered Pedro Base, and advanced towards the defensive line of Alpha Command Group. When the pair were 300m from Alpha Command Group, the first tank rolled over an anti-tank mine and exploded in a giant fire ball. For some reason, the second tank did not continue the advance and headed off in another direction.
Another enemy force comprising of several tanks and infantrymen skirted around the side of Pedro base to attack Ai Tu Combat base where Marine Brigade Headquarters was stationed. Once again, the anti-tank mines proved invaluable and caused the explosive demise of the advancing tanks. The infantrymen were dealt with by the 3rd Marine Artillery's shelling. Major Tran Thien Hieu had ordered the marines to shell more than three hundred rounds of Howitzer 105 in a condensed period of time. The infantrymen not killed immediately by the shelling, ran amok confusedly and a number were taken prisoner.
The meticulously prepared fire support plan which strategically aimed to shell all potential approaching routes meant that we were able to successfully destroy a great number of tanks by either Artillery or anti-tank mines. The marines also used LAW M72 to eradicate all still movable tanks.
VIII. The Counter attack at Pedro Base.
While the NVA tanks were embroiled in the anti-tank minefield, preparations for a counter attack plan were underway by 0730. Bravo Group of the 1st Marine Battalion (composed of two companies, twelve APC and eight M48 tanks) commanded by Major Doan Duc Nghi left Ai Tu Combat base bound in the direction of Pedro. The American adviser, Captain Larry Livingston, was with the group. (Captain Livingston has since been promoted to the rank of General and is still serving in the US Marine Corps.)
The counter attack commenced with M48 tanks firing on enemy tanks. Three T54 tanks were hit and burst into flames. Others exploded while rumbling across the minefield. Major Tung and two of his companies and some APC joined the 1st Battalion. When the counter attack group was 800m from Pedro base, the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion commenced shelling to block the enemy's retreat route. In the rain of shells, the NVA infantrymen scattered and sought refuge in a nearby forest, leaving the dead and dying behind. Their tanks fell prey to the A1 sky raiders of the VNAF. Others were felled by 90mm cannons on the M48 tanks. The marines also used LAW to destroy the enemy tanks. More than 400 NVA infantrymen were killed, and another number captured prisoner.
In total 30 tanks were destroyed. The crewmen and gunners of the two tanks which had evaded the bombing and navigated the minefield to advance towards Marine Brigade 258 Headquarters abandoned their tanks and ran away when they were some 500m from Ai Tu Combat Base. One of the tanks was completely intact, the other had sustained only minor damage. Captain Doan Chi Sanh, Commander of the M48 Squadron, ordered the intact tank to be driven to Ai Tu TOC on the morning of 9 April 1972. The following day, this captured enemy tank was taken to Hue for a public viewing, as per the orders of Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps. After some time, this T59 was transported to Saigon to be exhibited in front of the capital's town hall. After the public had had the opportunity to view the captured enemy tank, it was later donated to the US Army to be studied with the Korean War in mind. The US Army had expressed a desire to examine this type of tank but had until that time not had the opportunity to capture one for closer examination.
On 13 April 1972, I went to Hue by Jeep to attend a briefing in the Vietnamese Marine Corps Headquarters. On the way, I saw the convoy of the I Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam headed for Quang Tri. As I saluted him, his Jeep stopped and I left my vehicle to approach him. He shook my hand, took out a map, and literally asked me “Can you tell me the details from start to finish of the battle which took place here?”. I briefed him on what had occurred during the battle, after which time he continued on his way to Quang Tri. I went back to my Jeep and continued on to Hue for the briefing, puzzled. Throughout the drive there I kept on mulling over how he could have asked such a question. How could the Commander of I Corps (no less) be completely ignorant of the important military manoeuvres and events which had been going on for an entire week?
On 3 May 1972, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong replaced Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam in the position of I Corps Commander. I did not see General Hoang Xuan Lam again until 1980 when we were both in the USA. His ignorance of the goings on in the major battles for Quang Tri has never ceased to puzzle me. For my own curiosity, I would have liked to ask him why he was completely unaware of the events in Quang Tri, but I refrained and told myself to let sleeping dogs lie.
After the battle for Quang Tri, the Political Warfare Department wrote to all the units announcing that it would be awarding 30,000 dong (the Vietnamese currency at that time) for each of the NVA tanks that were destroyed. I decided that I would file a report stating that between them, the 6th Marine Battalion and the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion had destroyed 30 tanks. I felt that the extra money would at least provide some financial assistance to the families of the marines who had been wounded or killed in action, and Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang concurred. I reported that 50% of the tanks had been destroyed by mines, 30% by the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion, and the remaining 20% were destroyed by the VNAF, the M48 Squadron, and the marines of the two Battalions, the 6th and the 1st, using LAW.
After that battle, every unit in the area was heavily shelled by NVA Artillery day and night. The situation was dangerous but it appeared that the marines were on top of things. The three remaining units in the area were the Marines, the 5th Ranger Group and the 1st Armor Brigade. Fighting continued throughout the area of responsibility of Marine Brigade 258 from 10 until 12 April 1972. On 10 April, Bravo Command Group of the 1st Marine Battalion collaborated with the 6th Marine Battalion to pursue the enemy westwards. On their way back to Ai Tu on 12 April, Bravo Command Group (with eight M48 tanks and 12 APCs) spotted NVA troops some 2km to the west digging foxholes and trenches on the route between Ai Tu and Pedro. The Artillery was called in, and Marine Companies and tanks rushed the NVA positions. The fighting was fierce. There were about two NVA Battalions armed with recoilless rifles and anti-tank cannons. The close combat saw exchanges of hand grenades and it was not until sunset that we had mastered the battlefield. There were NVA bodies strewn everywhere, in the foxhole, trenches... everywhere. Judging from the position, the NVA troops were digging in to ambush the Bravo Command Group on its return to Ai Tu. About 200 NVA were killed in action, some of their uniforms and weapons still new. We seized many personal and collective weapons. During this battle, Major Doan Duc Nghi, commander of Bravo Command Group, was killed in a hail of machine gun bullets. A number of marines were wounded. Amazingly, a South Vietnamese television crewman, Nguyen Cau, managed to record this battle and subsequent victory of the 1st Marine Battalion from start to finish. (Nguyen Cau is currently living in California, USA).
On the night of 12 April 1972, fighting continued and the units were shelled constantly by NVA Artillery. That night, American advisers reported to me that an American fighter had been shot down north of Cam Lo. The pilot, a Lieutenant Colonel, had managed to parachute to safety. A rescue mission to find him was launched, and until he was found all Artillery was to cease. Four American helicopters (2 Cobras and 2 Hueys) were dispatched to the area where the pilot might have landed in the night. One Huey was shot down, without survivors. The Cobras were also hit but managed to fly to the safety of the sea shores. The pilot was eventually rescued via the Cam Lo river. The rescue lasted 24 hours and during that entire period we were not permitted to use any artillery for fire support. Despite being attacked and heavily shelled we could not retaliate with our own fire power because of the on going rescue mission, and as a result suffered high casualties.
On 22 April 1972, Brigade 258 was ordered to leave Ai Tu to be replaced there by Marine Brigade 147. The 3rd and 6th Battalions, the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion, and my Brigade Headquarters moved to Hue for R & R. The 1st Marine Battalion remained with Brigade 147 and a number of other Battalions: the 7th, the 8th, and the 2nd Artillery Battalion.
IX. Summary
Brigade 258 (comprising of the 1st, 3rd and 6th Battalions) were victorious over the enemy on this occasion, a victory which was only possible thanks to:
* The rapid and accurate fire support provided by the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion, commanded by Major Tran Thien Hieu.
* The M48 Tank Squadron whose power was capable of destroying NVA T54 and T59 tanks from a distance.
* The gutsy and battle-hardened marines whose courage and experience ultimately gave them the edge over the NVA.
* And the untiring work of Brigade staff officers, day and night, especially that of Brigade Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Do Dinh Vuong.
A parade to celebrate the victories at Dong Ha and Ai Tu was organised for 23 April 1972. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, praised the efforts of the Marines. 52 Marines took part in the parade, including Major Le Ba Binh, the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Marine Battalion and his Adviser, Captain John Ripley.
This paper was written in memory of:
* VNAF Captain Tran The Vinh, killed on 9 April 1972 in combat against NVA tanks at Ai Tu, Quang Tri.
* The Marines of the 6th Battalion who lost their lives on 9 April 1972 defending Pedro Base.
* Major Doan Duc Nghi, the Executive Officer of the 1st Marine Battalion, killed in action on 12 April 1972 while leading Bravo Command Group into battle against two regular NVA battalions, some 1km West of Ai Tu.
Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
No comments:
Post a Comment