Friday 25 July 2014

The 2nd Battalion
in Tet Mau Than Offensive, 1968

Major Pham Van Tien

Task Force B was protecting Cai Lay in preparation for the New Year. On Lunar New Year's eve, in parallel with other attacks in different provinces, the VC Battalions 514, Tay Do, 263, 264 exploited the dense canal network at Binh Phu village (10 km south of Cai Lay, near National Route 4) to use boats and sampans to attack the position of Battalion 1 at night. They were disguised in civilian clothes. Battalion 1 fought back. The battle ended at 5.00am the next morning. Both sides had remarkable losses. In areas surrounding the Cai Lay market where Battalion 2 had been in charge of, there were no attacks, except a NVA reconnaissance group that was captured by one of our outposts. The atmosphere of Cai Lay became dismal. Local residents were anxious about battles which could break out at anytime. Streets were empty. All houses were closed. All the local residents relied on the protection given to them by the Marines who were present.
At about noon on the second day of the New Year, Battalion 2 received orders to gather at an empty place near the market, to be helilifted by giant helicopter Chinook 47 to Saigon to dislodge the enemy out of the Capital.
From the helicopters, we saw smoke billowing here and there from the areas of battle in the capital. Saigon Cholon had been sinking in a sea of flames. Battalion 1 reinforced Range r Battalion 30 to fight at Bien Hoa highway and Hang Xanh intersection. Battalion 3 engaged in fierce battles at the Binh Loi Bridge. Battalion 2 was in charge of removing enemy pressure on the JGS. The military English school and an Ordnance store were occupied by the VC. According to orders, each company of Battalion 2 was in charge of a gate of the JGS. Brigadier General Ngo Dzu directly commanded us in this deployment for protection. The night of the second day passed without any events, although guns sounds could still be heard everywhere else. The city sky was illuminated with flares and tracing bullets crisscrossing in all directions. The enemy continued to advance and shelled at densely populated areas. Early in the morning on the third day, Battalion 2 started deploying to reoccupy areas which had been lost to the enemy. We recovered them rather easily. VC troops, confused, strayed due to losing contact with their higher command. They did not know where to escape and resisted very weakly. Most of them were captured alive in large sewers, public toilets and rubbish dumps. They were young and were from VC units in the south.
At noon, Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Vu Doan Dzoan moved by a convoy to Le Quang Dinh and Ngo Tung Chau intersection to repel VC out of Xom Ga, Go Vap district. The targets were a three storied building and a Buddhist pagoda which had been occupied by the VC. Policemen and civilians were very cooperative with us. To reduce damages to civilians to a maximum, we were ordered to use 57mm Recoilless rifles and M72 only when absolutely neccessary. Artillery and airstrikes were not allowed. After crossing the departure line for about 50m, 1st Corporal Nguyen Van Thanh, a Squad Leader and some other Marines were killed. This squad was from Platoon 41 of 2nd Lieutenant Phan Ngoc Vien. Our M60 machine guns were positioned at suitable high positions for retaliation.
Marines, in small groups of two to three, moved quickly from house to house, with grenades in hand. M79 grenade launchers were used to a maximum to support advances. Platoon 42 of 2nd Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu destroyed a VC "city sapper cell", captured all six of them and all the explosives which they had no time to use. Platoon 43 of 3rd Lieutenant Cao Manh Cuong mastered a thick bushy cemetery and the pagoda, liberated about 40 civilians which had been tied in hands by VC. The enemy bodies scattered here and there, lying across walls or in the bushes. Outside the wall surrounding the building, Platoons 41 and 42 had come close. However, my Company paid a high price. We had to spend nearly an hour to advance 2km, with eleven killed and about ten wounded. Corporal Nhi, Private 2nd Class Tuong, Sergeant Kha, Private 1st Class Nam, Private 2nd Class Huynh Den were killed. The saddest event was related to Corporal Tran Sang who had spoken to me: "Master, this is the area of my house. Be free of anxiety. Let me voluntarily spearhead…"  However, Sang's head was hit by bullets coming from the high building he spoke of.
This was the first time we had to perform operation in such a complex terrain-like this. Firing field was limited. The VC wore civilian clothes. We could not recognise them except when they fired first at us. They clung to their positions. With all efforts, we succeeded in blowing up a hole in the wall. Through this hole we used two M60 machine guns to fire inside and ran forward to the ground floor of the building, shouting "charge…" It was 10.30 pm on the third day of the Chinese New Year. A number of the VC were killed on the spot while two were captured. The remainder was stuck in the two upper floors. We kept them at bay. On the fourth day, they surrendered. On the fifth day, the Go Vap district was completely free.
Then Battalion 2 moved to another place to continue to repulse the VC. It was An Quang pagoda, Vinh Vien, Ba Hat area in Cho Lon. The enemy had been isolated by Riot police for many days. This district was full of high buildings and small lanes and paths. Most of residents had been kept there. The VC did not let them to flee. All these factors greatly impeded our advances. We had to move from house to house, on alert of any VC machine guns already set up at higher places nearby.
After two days, we managed to repel them out of this district at the cost of some more human losses. We, then we pursued the VC in a wider area in Cau Kinh, Dong Ong Co and Binh Quoi…
On 4-5-1968, the VC opened a second wave of attack in a number of cities and provinces in the south, with lesser intensity.
In Saigon Cho Lon, they just aimed at creating an echo in the world public opinion.
The enemy attacked with two prongs. The first prong originated from the Iron Triangle passing through An Phu Dong, Saigon river, Binh Loi bridge area, to enter Dong Ong Co and Gia Dinh. The second prong started from the Duc Hue pineapple forests, Go Den, Long An in Hau Nghia, and advanced to Phu Lam, Cho Lon at night.
Battalion 2 which had been in Dong Tam base, My Tho, moved to Cho Lon. Our battalion advanced along two main axes which were Hau Giang and Luc Tinh Streets. We pushed from the outside of Cho Lon city and drove the VC to the centre of Cho Lon city where the Ranger Battalions had been waiting to annihilate them.
Learned from previous experiences, we moved more carefully from district to district depite their strong resistance. Most of our attacks were in the day time, but the VC exploited the darkness to retreat, evade, or counterattack. From an outpost on the first floor of a house in the "Residence Phu Lam A", Corporal Thau, Private 1st Class Thong and Private 2nd class Hong, bravely and confidently used grenades to a maximum and annihilated a VC platoon which had encircled them.
Like in the previous attack of Mau Than 1968, all the VC efforts resulted in plunging into death.
Hundreds of the VC were killed. Tens of them were captured from their hideouts, such as basements or wells.
After a week of battle, the VC had heavy losses, in human lives and weapons. It was a military failure for them. However, no one could deny that they harvested some psychological and political influences on the US policy in South Vietnam.
As an executive officer of the Company 4, I escaped death twice. The first time, an AK47 bullet pierced through my left forearm when I had been commanding my boys in An Quang pagoda area. The second time, another bullet skidded on the top of my helmet when I was standing next to 1st Lieutenant Vu Doan Dzoan, the Company Commander observing the battlefield.
Major Pham Van Tien











No comments:

Post a Comment