The cease-fire night on
Cai Thia canal
31-12-1967
Colonel Ton That Soan
I. Topography of the area of operation :
Dinh Tuong province lay on Tien Giang River. In the north was Saigon, the capital city. Kien Hoa province was to the south. Kien Phonand Long An provinces were to the west. In the east was South China Sea. Its main city was My Thoï From Dinh Tuong, one can travel to Saigon or Phnom Phenh by river. National Route 4 passed through Dinh Tuong province, joining Saigon with western cities.
In the south of the province was Gram Canal, Xoai Mut of Kim Son village where Quang Trung emperor had smashed 30,000 Siamese troops on the night 19-1-1785. It was a famous battle in Vietnamese history, successfully fighting against foreign invaders. The battle took place on a canal. In Tan Thuan village of Cho Gao district, east of My Tho, archeologists have discovered vestiges of Oc Eo culture of Phu Nam nation which had existed since the beginning of the 1st Century to the 6th Century. Inside Cho Gao district there was Nguyen Huu Huan's tomb. He was a hero who had fought the French for fifteen years.
Giao Duc was a district close to My An district of Kien Phong province. Giao Duc district had intertwining canals, was completely desolate and was flooded in the north. However, in the south it was close to Tien Giang River, which equated to fertile rice fields, gardens and prosperous rice and fruit crops. Dinh Tuong was one of the rich provinces and was the main rice “barn” of the western region. Cai Thia canal originated in the north, crossed National Route 4 and together with Ba Tau Canal and Ong Ve Canal, fed water directly into Tien Giang River.
Dong Thap Muoi region had an area of 70,000 hectares, occupying a large section of four provinces: Dinh Tuong, Long An, Kien Tuong and Kien Phong. This region was full of water. In rainy seasons, water from Me Kong River poured into the region and sunk it entirely. In some areas the water level was higher than a fully-grown man. In bordering areas surrounding Dong Thap Muoi region, people could plant "floating rice", but in other areas cultivation was rendered impossible due to the salty water.
In 1959 and 1960, with a plan of developing Dong Thap Muoi, the government of South Viet Nam sent two ferries and an infantry regiment to maintain security so a canal from Gay Co Den to An Long could be successfully dug, leading salty water into Tien Giang River. Tram Chim district was then established on a bank of this canal.
Cai Thia Canal was situated on the border of Dong Thap Muoi, in continuation with Bui Canal and then met Tong Doc Loc Canal (Cai Thia Canal). It was between Giao Duc district (of Dinh Tuong province) and My An district (of Kien Phong province). Cai Thia Canal flowed southeast, crossing National Route 4, and finally entering Tien Giang River.
II. Situation at tactical region Tien Giang :
Large ARVN units in MeKong delta positioned as follow:
- IV Corps headquarters at Can Tho.
- 9th Infantry Division at Sa Dec.
- 7th Infantry Division at My Tho.
- 21st Infantry Division at Bac Lieu.
- US 9th Infantry Division and US Mobile Riverine Force at Dong Tam Base, My Tho.
According to IV Corps' G2 map, VC forces in the region were organized into Battalions of two kinds: regular and mobile. In December each year, VC military activities increased. The enemy exploited ceasefires in Christmas, New Year and Lunar New Year by attacking remote or isolated outposts or by blocking circulation in main routes. That is why the 7th Infantry Division frequently organized search and sweep operations with two goals:
- The first was to push back VC units, which had tried to escalated activity in populated areas.
- The second was to give civilians safe and peaceful days so they could enjoy the sacred traditional ceremonies on Lunar New Year.
On 28-12-1967, the 7th Infantry Division organized an operation named Song Than 73, with participation of Marine Task Force B. The operation ended on 31-12-1967 without a remarkable skirmish in the area of operation. However, reliable sources from the 7th Infantry Division G2 gave intelligence that two VC regular battalions (261 and 262) and their logistics units had been present at Cai Thia Canal area, Giao Duc district, Dinh Tuong province. Hence, Operation Song Than 809 was organized with Task Force B and its two battalions, the 1st and 2nd Battalions.
III Organization of Task Force B :
Marine Task Force B was composed of the 1st and the 2nd Battalions, and Battery B of Marine Artillery, 105mm Howitzer.
1. Marine Task Force B :
- Lieutenant Colonel Ton That Soan, Commander.
- Major Nguyen Kim Phuong, Chief of Staff.
- Captain Doan Trung Uong, Chief of S3
- Chief of Sections:
a. 1st Lieutenant Bui Cang (S1).
b. 1st Lieutenant Nguyen van Tam (S2).
c. 1st Lieutenant Tran van Loc (S4).
d. 2nd Lieutenant Tran van Vien (Signal).
- Artillery FO, 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Duc Van.
- Commander of Artillery Battery B, Captain Doan Trong Cao.
2. The 1st Battalion :
- Major Phan Van Thang, Commander.
- Captain Nguyen Van Da, Executive Officer
- Company Commanders:
a. Captain Huynh Van Luom (Company 1).
b. Captain Phan Cong Ton (Company 2).
c. 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phan (Company 3).
d. 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan Tong (Company 4).
e. 1st Lieutenant Quach Ngoc Lam (Commanding Company).
3. The 2nd Battalion :
- Major Ngo Van Dinh, Commander.
- Captain Nguyen Kim De, Executive Officer.
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Kim De, Chief of S3.
Company Commanders:
a. 1st Lieutenant To Van Cap (Company 1).
b. Captain Dinh Xuan Lam (Company 2).
c. 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuong (Company 3).
d. 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Hop (Company 4).
e. Captain Tran Kim Hoang (Commanding Company).
IV. Sequence of operations :
* Day N
1. The 1st Battalion :
The 1st Battalion was helilifted to Dia Bong, Dia Oi, about ten kilometres northwest of Giao Duc district to push VC regular battalion 262 towards National Route 4. Group B was composed of Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phan and Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan Tong. Group B was commanded by the Executive Officer, Captain Nguyen Van Daï Group B jumped down north of Loi Nhon hamlet then divided into two prongs and advanced southeast along both sides of Co Co Canal in order to occupy Target 1 (Loi Nhon hamlet) and Target 3 (T junction of Bang Man Canal and Co Co Canal).
Group A, commanded by the Battalion Commander, Major Phan Van Thang, consisted of Company 1 of Captain Huynh Van Luom and Company 2 of Captain Phan Cong Ton. Group A also landed at Dia Bong. This group divided into two separate prongs and advanced southwest along the two banks of Rach Ruong canal to occupy Target 2 (Hung Loi hamlet) and Target 4 at one end of Kinh Cung Canal.
The terrain of the operation was predominantly desolate ground, inundated with salt water. Marines waded with great difficulty through mud and water up to their knees. Interlacing canals were everywhere. There were very few scattered villages along those canals. Due to a lack of security, residents abandoned their villages and such positions were therefore utilised by enemy troops to hide, congregate in great numbers or to establish stockpiles of weapons and ammunitions in warehouses.
From a landing zone in a rice field, Group B moved towards the banks of Co Co Canal. VC at water-coconut trees forest edges fiercely opened fire on Company 4 spearheading platoon. Three were killed and six wounded in this attack. The Task Force Commander, who was aboard C&C helicopter, directed two gunships to support Group B at Target 1. Rockets and machine guns 50 pounded the VC positions accurately, forcing them to emerge from bunkers and land trenches and hectically run for better cover. About one platoon of VC escaped, with a number of them using sampans to flee to the north. Helicopter rounds sank three of them at the beginning of the canal.
With great eùlan, 1st Lieutenant Tong let his boys charge in a row towards Target 1. Most VC were shot dead. Two wounded VC were captured. Rockets killed others on the spot. Aboard the three sunken sampans were long wooden boxes and plastic bags. When marines retrieved and opened them, they found numerous K54 pistols, AK 47 rifles and RPD machine guns made in China. All these weapons were brand new and still coated in gun grease to protect them against rusting. There were about 220 weapons of all types, including a number of B40 and B41 rockets and explosives.
This was a VC logistics unit. It was caught while attempting to supply VC units in Giao Duc, Cai Be and Cai Lay districts. Group B continued to search along Co Co Canal to Target 3 that afternoon.
Meanwhile, Companies 1 and 2 of Group A engaged the enemy when they advanced to Target 2. However, facing our strong firepower, VC ran southwards. Group A searched both sides of Rach Ruong Canal and then proceeded to Target 4. Company 2 had four wounded (all attributed to mines) during this advance. The two groups of 1st Battalion made contact with each other at Target 3 and then positioned there overnight. On 23-12-1967, the 1st Battalion had two new officers from Class 22A of Dalat Military Academy - 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Tri Nam (Company 1) and 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Dinh Ninh (Company 4).
2. The 2nd Battalion :
The 2nd Battalion also received three new officers:
- 2nd Lieutenant Huynh Vinh Quang, leader of Platoon 14 (Company 1).
- 2nd Lieutenant Le van Le, undertaking OJT (On the Job Training) in Company 3 of his older brother, 2nd Lieutenant Le Van The.
- 2nd Lieutenant Kieu cong Cu, leader of Platoon 42 (Company 4).
After Christmas, the Battalion started an operation on 27-12-1967. Early that morning, the 2nd Battalion reached Tan Son Nhat airport via convoy. From there, it was airlifted by C130 to Vinh Long airfield. It temporarily stayed along National Route 4, in Tan Ngai village, Vinh Long province.
The next morning 28-12-1967, 2nd Battalion was helilifted from a pick up zone right on National Route 4. Military Police 202 stopped all civilian vehicles on both ends of that segment of the route.
The area of operation was Tong Doc Loc Canal, the border between Kien Phong and Dinh Tuong provinces. After three days without confrontation, the Battalion moved to an open rice field to be helilifted.
Group A, commanded by Major Ngo Van Dinh, was composed of Companies 2 and 4. Group B, commanded by Catpain Nguyen Kim De, consisted of Companies 1 and 3.
Group B :
Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuong landed south of My Nghia hamlet to occupy the western bank of Xeo Trien Canal. Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant To van Cap landed north of Canal 10, moving southwest towards Rach Muon Canal and then to Target aù (alpha) at the T-junction of Xeo Trien and Cai Thia canals.
Platoon 14 of 2nd Lieutenant Huynh Vinh Quang landed first with 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Quoc Chinh (the executive offer of Company 1) accompanying them. This area was an uncultivated rice field, full of tiger grass and reeds, which in some places grew to the chest level of the soldiers. On the right hand side it was completely barren, however, on the left there were some slightly elevated small canal edges. Approximately one hundred meters in front, there was a row of "tram bau" trees.
2nd Lieutenant Quang let his boys advance in a row. 1st Lieutenant Chinh informed Quang that L19 Reconnaissance plane had spotted VC in front of them. Chinh waved his map, ordering his troops to advance to occupy that row of trees. On that day, 1st Lieutenant Chinh was wearing a broad brimmed hat, two brand new silvery shining “lon” (galon) on his shoulders. He had just been promoted to 1st Lieutenant.
VC from that row of trees opened fire. Quang was running forward with his platoon when he heard the voice of Private 1st Class Gioi shouting, "Lieutenant. wounded!" Quang believed that he himself had been wounded, checking his body for wounds but he was unable to find any. When Quang looked at 1st Lieutenant Chinh, he realised that Chinh had fallen on his back, his face full of blood. His two eyes were still blinking. Quang held Chinh's shoulders and told Private 1st class Gioi to lift his legs. The two men tried to carry Chinh to the back but 1st Lieutenant Chinh was dead.
Quang used his fingers to close Chinh's eyes before he hurriedly ran back to the foremost line only to find that he was alone there. A machine gun clip was being unleashed directly towards him. He swiftly lay down and observed his surroundings; a part of his platoon on the left hand side was completely silent. They were probably all killed or wounded. Next to Quang was 1st Sergeant Nhi, a squad leader, with a severely wounded abdomen. Quang recounted:
"Truly, I did not know how to react at all that moment. All I could do was take my personal bandage from my helmet, give it to Nhi and tell him that he should try and endure and that I would run back to call a medic. I raised my head and was going to run back to the company when a clip of AK 47 crackled past my head. I had my rucksack and an M16, but VC probably recognised my officer rank because the “lon” silvery shining on my shoulders. I tried to crawl to the right. Bullets followed me, hitting the ground in front of me. Mud splashed over in all directions. When I was about ten metres from the row of trees, I heard the voice of 1st Sergeant Phan Thanh Manh, the vice leader of Platoon 14. He ordered 1st Class private Mai to fire his machine gun to the left in order to help my advance. Exploiting that barrage, I sprang towards my platoon. I then realised that while I had been carrying 1st Lieutenant Chinh to the back, 1st Sergeant Manh had led the platoon to occupy this end. My RTO, 1st Class Private Gioi was still stopped on the back. Fortunately, at that time, the 1st Platoon of Company 3 was not very far away from us."
The terrain was too difficult and too far for marines to charge forward. It was very convenient, however, for the range of VC firearms. After having received report of Group B's situation, Major Ngo Van Dinh ordered 1st Lieutenant To van Cap to withdraw his company about one hundred metres to the back so that Lieutenant Colonel Ton That Soan could bomb Target A. However, 1st Lieutenant Cap asked for permission to stay, using rice fields edges as shields and tall grasses and some rice plants to block the enemy observation. Cap also said it would be dangerous to retreat now because of strong enemy firing and his company could be in a chaotic formation. Furthermore, the return to this present position could become much harder in the future.
After accurate VNAF air strikes, only one hundred metres away from marines, the enemy were buried alive in bomb craters. A number of VC heads emerged from ground level, their severed upper or lower limbs scattered here and there. Since he no longer had a radio, 2nd Lieutenant Quang had to rely on Company 3 to choose the colour of smoke grenades. He just threw smoke grenades of the same colour of the ones which had been used by the 3rd Company so that aircrafts could recognise the meaning.
After those air strikes, Captain Nguyen Kim De ordered Company 3 to occupy a village edge on Xao Trien canal to the right in order to support Company 1 in its movement towards Target A. 1st Lieutenant To Van Cap directed Platoon 12 of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Quan on the left side, and Platoon 16 of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Ngo on the right side, to advance simultaneously in a row, maximising the use of all available firearms. The position at that row of trees, which had been previously occupied by 1st Sergeant Phan thanh Manh's Platoon 14, became a springboard for Company 1 to occupy Muon Canal and to push the enemy toward Cai Thia Canal.
An anecdote: 1st Sergeant Phanh thanh Manh, originated from Binh Dinh province and at the age of thirteen he followed his older sister. His sister was a female VC local guerrilla and did some good deeds for the communists. When he was sixteen, his older sister was suspected of betraying VC. They decapitated her. Manh escaped to Qui Nhon city, then moved to Saigon and enrolled himself in the Marine Corps. Since he longed to avenge his sisters death, he always fought relentlessly. Whenever he confronted the enemy, he behaved like a hunting tiger and was swift like a fox. That is why after only five years he was promoted to 1st Sergeant and became vice leader of Platoon 14.
It is noteworthy to añ that during the fighting that morning, 2nd Lieutenant Le van The of Company 3 was wounded in the left upper limb. 2nd Lieutenant Le Van Le replaced his older brother to lead the platoon. In the afternoon, while advancing towards Xeo Trien Canal bank, both of 2nd Lieutenant Le’s legs were wounded. The two brothers were evacuated to Cong Hoa Military General Hospital.
The’s wounded limb was amputated. General Cao Van Vien awarded him with a 5th Grade Nation Protection medal and a palm. He then was demobilized and returned to civilian life as a teacher. As for Le Van Le, after having been treated and then discharged from Hospital, was transferred back to the rear base of the 2nd Battalion. Later on he was demobilized and he presently lives in Saigon.
From the "springboard" of Platoon 14 of 2nd Lieutenant Quang, Company 1 overran that row of trees and pushed VC west of Cai Thia Canal. Company 1 fought so vigorously against the VC that day, in order to avenge the dead marines.
Group A :
Group A, composed of Companies 2 and 4, landed north of Cai Thia Canal. Company 2 and the 2nd Battalion Headquarters landed on a barren field in Dia Ke. From there, they were to move to occupy the eastern bank of that Canal. Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Hop landed on Loi Thuan hamlet to occupy the western bank of that canal and then advance southwards to Target B situated at the T-junction of Cai Thia and Muong Dao canals.
Platoon 42 of 2nd Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu moved first. When approaching Loi Trinh hamlet, close to Target B, the platoon was fired at by VC and some were wounded. Platoon 42 reacted immediately. When Company 2 arrived, VC ran southwards. During their advances, Companies 2 and 4 were fired at several times. VC intended to slow Group A movement.
Fighting continued until night fall. Two prongs of the 2nd Battalion were ordered to camp overnight at Target A and B. At the beginning of the evening, when the light was dim, Group A saw a group of rather crowded troops moving north of Target B, about three kilometres away. After having cleared with Task Force B that there had been no friendly force there, the Artillery FO called in the Marine Artillery for "extermination fire" to annihilate that group at Dia Ke.
* Day N + 1
1. The 2nd Battalion :
On the overlay of the operation map, the two overnight positions of the 1st and the 2nd Battalions were on a horizontal line. The 1st was at Target 3. The 2nd was situated at the two ends of Cai Thia Canal. Its Group B was at the T-junction with Xeo Trien Canal and its Group A at the T-junction with Muong Dao Canal. VC remained between them despite the Marine Artillery and VNAF aircrafts pounding their positions many times in the afternoon.
Major To van Cap recounted: "After having received Order from Captain Nguyen Kim De to position overnight in Target A, my orderly found a dry spot for me. It was twilight. I sat on my helmet, drew out a capstan cigarette, covered it with my hand, lighted it and deeply inhaled. I then gave the cigarette to Private 1st class An. After he took a puff, An gave it to another Marine named Cuong, not forgetting to tell Cuong to cover the burning cigarette with his hand. We shared the same cigarette. Its flavoured smoke was so wonderfully deep in taste. Suñenly we heard a sound of gunfire. Cuong shouted, "I am dying" and raised a hand to hold his mouth. Blood spurt out from it. A bullet hit Cuong, piercing through his right cheek and destroying his upper denture. But he survived."
Group A positioned at Target Bravo. Company 4 at the south bank of Cai Thia Canal, Company 2 and the Commanding Company positioned on its north bank. That Canal had a width of about sixty metres. On that day, a cease fire was to be in effect, but we could not trust VC in any cease fire.
All companies prepared defensive lines very carefully. Around our positions and in front of the defensive line there was illuminating devices, grenades and claymore mines. These were also set on approaching routes, which the enemy could utilise. Abiding by the cease-fire, VNAF and Artillery stopped their activities after 6:00 pm that day. As it had been forecast, the enemy violated the cease-fire.
At 11:00 pm, VC mortars were shot from the north. Waves of B40 and B41 rockets followed, aimed directly at Company 2 and Commanding Company positions. At that time, 1st Lieutenant Vu Doan Dzoan, the Executive Officer of Company 2 was controlling the defensive line. He raised the alarm so everyone could make it to their defensive positions. VC followed canal banks from the east to the west but were caught by illuminating devices or grenades of Company 2. They attacked our positions several times but were unsuccessful. At the beginning, wishing to remain faithful to the cease-fire, Artillery Battery B of Captain Doan Trong Cao merely fired illuminating rounds to support. The Battalion and Companies used their own mortars to fire back at VC.
With the help of illuminating flares, marines calmly combated VC assaulting waves. That night, about one VC sapper platoon had exploited the darkness and canals to infiltrate near the 2nd Battalion Headquarters, especially when they heard voice of US advisors talking in radios with Task Force B advisors and with 7th Infantry Division US advisors. When flares burst out in the sky and illuminated, the 2nd Battalion special bodyguard platoon recognised them and shot them dead instantly. Major Ngo van Dinh reported that these sappers had been only four to five metres away from the sleeping places of American advisors and of himself. Searching their bodies, there were beta explosives and grenades around their waists and medals hanging on their necks. Their commanders probably wanted to stimulate their morale or the medals were used to recognise each other in the darkness.
During this time, Marine Task Force B requested Marine Brigade in Saigon to open the radio AN/GRC 106 permanently rather than at the beginning of each hour as it used to be. This proposal was to ensure that the Brigade could understand the situations Task Force B had been in, and consequently would be able to request the JGS to dispatch air supports.
After many hours of resisting VC waves of attack, the defensive line of 2nd Lieutenant Luu Bach Viet's platoon appeared in greatest danger and was going to be broken. Major Dinh ordered the 81mm mortar platoon of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Huong (of Class 17 Thu Duc Military School) to reinforce Platoon 2. The number of wounded and killed in action were high. Only 1st Sergeant Nguyen Van Oanh and some others were remained and most of Platoon 2 was either wounded or killed. That night, 2nd Lieutenant Luu Bach Viet (of Class 19 Thu Duc Military School) was also killed. The Commanding Company of Captain Tran Kim Hoang also suffered some losses.
Group B, which had been positioning at Target Alpha, about three kilometres away, received order to move and come to the rescue. Every body was lightly equipped. Rucksacks buried or hiñen in places. Company 3 marched first, followed by Company 1. Because of the muddy terrain, total darkness and the must for it to follow the canal bank (which had been pounded by air strikes and artillery in the afternoon), the 1st Platoon of Company 3 only made contact with Company 2 at 5:00 am. They made contact with Company 2 at the defensive line of Target Bravo.
As a result of the reinforcements, our defensive line was held and company 4 resolutely hindered VC from crossing Muong Dao canal to escape to the west. Daybreak was coming and Group B continuously pushed forward, causing the enemy to become greatly embarrassed. A number of them tried to flee to the southwest, while other dropped their weapons and surrendered. The enemy force, which had attacked the 2nd Battalion Headquarters, was VC Regular Battalion 261 reinforced by a sapper platoon.
On the morning of 1-1-1968, the 2nd Battalion found forty VC bodies while searching the area surrounding its defensive line. Ten VC were captured, while comrades carried wounded VC away. After two days of operation, the 2nd Battalion had thirty casualties out of 650 soldiers.
2. The 1st Battalion :
On the night that the 2nd Battalion was attacked, Task Force B ordered the 1st Battalion to be ready to reinforce. After being informed that the enemy was trying to withdraw westwards, the 1st Battalion received order from Task Force B to leave Target 3 and move to a blocking line in order to prevent VC retreat. With previous preparation on advantageous terrain, the 1st Battalion deployed at the beginning of Muong Dao and Co Co Canals. The VC retreating groups were caught one after another.
At 7:00 am, the 1st Battalion counted thirty VC bodies scattering the flooded rice fields and seized twenty firearms. After two days of operation, the 1st Battalion had four killed and sixteen wounded in action. Weapons were conserved.
V. Ending the operation :
At noon on 1-1-1968, after wounded and killed in action had been helilifted, the 1st and 2nd Battalions searched as they moved to a gathering area on National Route 4. The 1st Battalion moved along Co Co Canal to Thai Ho Hamlet. From there, a GMC convoy transported it to Binh Phu village on Ba Ton canal.
The 2nd Battalion travelled along Cai Thia canal to My Nghia hamlet. There was no conflict. Only one marine of Company 2 of the 2nd Battalion lost his M16 personal firearm when he waded across Ba Nai canal due to the strong water flow and the canal bed being full of mud. It was impossible for him to retrieve that dropped firearm.
In the afternoon, Marine Task Force B Headquarters and the 2nd Battalion were transported via convoy to Cai Lay district to have a rest, and at the same time, to protect civilians who were preparing to welcome Tet Mau Than. Major General Nguyen Van Manh and Brigadier General Nguyen Viet Thanh, the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division, came to visit Task Force B at Giao Duc district and to a look at seized weapons. Heroes of both Battalions were decorated with medals and promoted to higher rank "on the battlefield".
The 2nd Marine Battalion flag was proposed by the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division to be awarded a Bravery medal with palm for its deeds at Cai Thia Canal and its combat at the cease-fire night. This was the sixth time that the 2nd Battalion flag was praised before the whole ARVN. Since then, the 2nd Battalion was allowed to wear a fouragere with the "Nation-protection" colour.
VI. Commentary :
1. Betraying, crafty and treacherous - that was the nature of Communists - President Nguyen Van Thieu had a very famous saying about VC: "Don't listen to what Communists are saying, but you should thoroughly look at what the had done and what they are still doing."
In the world, there was not a single paper which the communists had signed and obeyed its items! From 1945 onwards in Vietnam, VC violations were innumerable; their infringement of the Paris Pact signed on 27-1-1973 were the most severe. They invaded South Vietnam on 30-4-1975.
2. Factors of expectation - The enemy suffered heavy losses both in human beings and in weapons because they never expected a helilifted operation of Task Force B after the 7th Infantry Division operations.
3. Beware and brave - When landing on flooded ricefields, marines were in disadvantageous positions, but they fought courageously in order to occupy targets. The 2nd Battalion combatted calmly to repel the enemy on the cease-fire night and pushed the enemy into blocking lines of the 1st Battalion.
4. When 2nd Lieutenant Huynh Vinh Quang carried 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Quoc Chinh's body back to the Company positions, 1st Lieutenant To Van Cap wept. He recalled: "I could not utter a single word; there was a long, complete radio silence with the Battalion Commander”. After thirty-six years, when I wrote these lines, my throat still felt strangulated and my eyes blurred. Chinh was a junior officer of mine and the one I always especially liked. And at that moment I had wept, had cried right on the radio, so that the Battalion Commander Major Ngo van Dinh had to scold me, "Don't demoralize our troops!"
5. Major Huynh van Phu, wrote about the love of Miss Luu and 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Quoc Chinh in a short story titled "Mornings of Miss Luu":
"Luu never felt that her love offered to Chinh was a whiff of smoke but why was she so afraid that it may disappear out of her heart and memory? The common path of life had separated into two worlds, different from each other. Luu heard some steps sounding back from some remote area, which led her memory flying back through a spacious sky where there had been a stone house. That house buried a body with a drooping head, melting away. Luu saw wide opened eyes which were very, very close and which swallowed her in the great emptiness, and a voice was reverberating back from the other world."
Colonel Ton That Soan
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