Company 5, 2nd Marine Battalion
in Operation Lam Son 719
Major Pham Van Tien
When I finished the "4/70 Company Course" at Thu Duc Military school, the 2nd Marine Battalion was resting after a three month operation in Duc Duc Quang Nam. This was the first time the battalion was able to hold Lunar New Year celebrations at its Rear Base.
Suñenly, when most of the soldiers had been on leave, an operation for the Battalion was issued. A hundred percent restriction was applied and Company Commanders were ordered to gather their subordinates as soon as possible. A great number of soldiers, living in the dependent camp, were called back to be re-equipped in preparation for the operation. My Company, with all efforts, successfully gathered nearly 100 soldiers. The remaining would join the Company in the next re-supply. A GMC convoy from the Transport Company brought us from the Rear Base Tam Ha to the military airport Bien Hoa. We were then airlifted by C130 aircrafts to Hue. Being the last Company of the Battalion to be airlifted, we arrived at Phu Bai airport at dusk. My Company was positioned overnight in a park next to Perfume River, opposite Thuong Tu gate. The next morning, we were transported to the area of operation. The convoy passed An Lo, then Pho Trach Bridge of the Phong Dien district where there had been the heroic counterattack of the 2nd Marine Battalion on 29-06-1966, when the Battalion Commander and more than ten others had sacrificed their lives. The convoy continued and passed by My Chanh, Quang Tri, Ai Tu and Dong Haï The latter being a small town. It was often full of different soldiers from different units hurrying through the town. After passing Cam Lo, the convoy turned left into National Route 9, leading to Savanakhet, South Laos and then straight to Khe Sanh where the Headquarters for the coming operations had been located.
Khe Sanh was a familiar name. It was a fertile area and had many coffee plantations during the French Colonisation. It has become a very important strategy point in this Vietnamese War. It was famous for several bloody battles between the NVA and the US Armed Forces late 1967 and early 1968. NVA had encircled Khe Sanh for 77 days attempting to bury the US soldiers there and naming it the 2nd Dien Bien Phuï Fortunately, the NVA failed and was crushed by bombs dropped by the most powerful army in the world. On average there were 45 B52 Arc Light operations and 300 air strikes for daily tactical support. The number of bombs dropped on the Khe Sanh area was at least double the amount used in World War II against Germany.
This time, in order to prepare for the operation across the border of Laos and Vietnam, the US Armed Forces was responsible for opening and clearing the routes as well as protecting the safety of our soldiers for two months. The bridges and roads were meticulously repaired. The Khe Sanh military airfield, desolate for a long time, was restored to enable cargo and Medevac aircraft landings. A number of field dispensaries were set up, ready to heal any wounded soldiers. This was an urgent and essential preparation as this operation involved many participating units as well as not being kept secret. Trucks and heavy vehicles frequently moved back and forth. Noises of aircrafts, bulldozers and such reverberated day and night. Since the beginning of the war, there was not a single operation which had been so tumultuously prepared. Participating units were composed of regiments of the 1st Infantry Division, Brigades of Marine and Airborne Divisions, Ranger Group 1 and the Armor Brigade 1. There were also US Advisors in those units and US Air Liaison Officers (ALO).
Since 1970, after the Vietnamisation of the war, the US reduced its troops. There were no longer operations performed by the US ground forces. There was only US air support, coordinating with the VNAF. The system of Advisors became smaller. The Advisors were not accompanying the ARVN units in the operations close to the border. The Vietnamese Marine Division sent three brigades for the Lam Son 719 operation. They were assigned to be reserve forces for I Corps and would only be used in the decisive period.
In the first period, there would be airlifts by helicopters to the high points of the north and south areas of National Route 9. Airlifts were also employed to transport from the border to Tchepone and in the limited Ban Dong area. The plan was to establish fire bases which would support the following "search" operations. Air strikes would be used to a maximum, especially the B52 where it would pound the targets before infantrymen could jump into Tchepone.
The operation officially commenced at 8.00am of 08-02-1971 through the declaration of President Nguyen Van Thieu. On Saigon Radio the President announced, "This operation has a limit in time and space, with the single goal to destroy the NVA logistics line established in Laos. The NVA have used this route to supply, infiltrate and attack South Vietnam for many years. The ARVN has not a single interest in the Laotian territory because South Vietnam had always respected the independence and the sovereignty of Laos”.
Airborne Battalions 1 and 8 of the 1st Brigade and the 1st Armour Brigade advanced first along National Route 9 and in the direction of Ban Dong to establish Base A Luoi. This was the biggest base of the operation and it was also the 1st Brigade Headquarters. In the north, Airborne Battalion 2 and its own artillery batteries established Base 30, about 8km from the border and National Route 9 on a 500m high hill. Airborne Battalion 3 was airlifted to hill 456 to establish Base 31, where the 3rd Airborne Brigade Headquarters would be positioned.
Further in the north, Ranger Group 1 with its two Battalions 21 and 37 were airlifted to the landing zone "Ranger South" about 5km from Fire Base 30. Three days later, the Ranger Battalion was airlifted to "Ranger North". These two bases were set up as observation posts to follow up on the NVA movements and to delay their attacks onto the main advancing axis. Regiment 3 of the 1st Infantry Division was airlifted to the southernmost bases Blue and Hotel, while Regiment 1 of the 1st Infantry Division was around Base Delta.
Targe 604 in Tchepone town had been thoroughly bombed and so the ARVN units landing met no resistance. The enemy seemed to know our plan beforehand and had thinly dispersed in the distance to avoid losses before concentrating many elite Divisions to attack us.
The counterattack of the enemy started on the 18 of February. They encircled and attacked Base Ranger North. Regiment 102 of the NVA Division 308 pushed on this base. The weather was so bad and the NVA AAA was so strong that the ARVN air supports were ineffective. In the afternoon of the 19th of February, the Base Ranger North was overrun. The Ranger Battalion Commander was captured. The remaining Rangers were led by the executive officer to Base Ranger South. The NVA continued. They assaulted Base Ranger South. The 21st Ranger Battalion was able to resist only for two days with serious losses. They were then airlifted to Phu Loc Base after arriving at Base 30 of the Airborne Division. Continuing their eùlan, the enemy poked Base 31 with sounding raids. They then stormed the base with tanks. Airborne Colonel Nguyen Van Tho and a number of officers were captured. Some officers heroically committed suicide, namely Major Hien, the Brigade 1 Chief of Staff and Captain Duong, and Artillery Battery Commander. At 6:30am of 25-02-1971, Base 31 was completely in the hands of the enemy. On 26-02-1971, two NVA regiments of Division 304 attacked Base 30. The Airborne unit positioned there was forced to retreat. All the Artillery Batteries were completely destroyed.
While the enemy was recklessly attacking in the north direction, Regiment 3 of the 1st Division in the south east was also under pressure. Although being sufficiently supported by Aircrafts and Artillery, this unit was still unable to resist the attacks and was forced to withdraw to a safer location. They were then airlifted back to Khe Sanh. Facing such violent conditions of the battles, the ARVN units were in terrible shape, no one could rescue each other any longer. Despite the Airborne Division sending another Battalion for reinforcements during the attacks on Base 31, they could not land due to the heavy NVA fire.
The media had exaggerated our retreats as tragedies. The most damaging announcement was the premature English news broadcast of our soldiers arriving at Tchepone when we were only halfway there. The enemy had discovered our plan and prepared an encounter. As a result, Regiment 2 of the 1st Division, would have to, at costs, occupy Tchepone. Even if only one battalion were to be airlifted there, they would have to carry out the mission and then withdraw immediately after a short time.
Regiment 1 was to move to the South of Tchepone River for reinforcement. Knowing our strategy, the enemy deployed in the distance, out of our bombing range.
On the 6th of March, 120 helicopters transported Battalions 2 and 4 of Regiment 2 from Khe Sanh to landing zone Hope, 4km North of Tchepone. The NVA’s fierce AAA only shot down one helicopter during the large scale transport. The next day the ARVN entered Tchepone without encountering any resistance. The situation was peaceful until near midnight when the NVA shelled us with heavy artillery and utilised a division to attack the ARVN with waves of soldiers. Our helicopters only managed to pick some small groups of soldiers at the beginning of the attack but then could do nothing more due to the heavy fire from the NVA AAA. The remainder of the infantry had to open a bloody path to withdraw towards the where the Airborne Division was positioned. The 1st Regiment Headquarters positioned at Base Lolo on hill 723 suffered the same fate and finally had to withdraw after ten days of resistance. Battalion 4 of the 1st Regiment was rear contingent used to protect the retreat. When it arrived in Khe Sanh, out of a total of 432 soldiers, only 63 appeared. The rest were either killed, missing or wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Le Huan of Class 18 Dalat Military Academy, the Battalion Commander, sacrificed his life in this retreat.
In early March 1971, Marine Brigade 147 which was commanded by Colonel Hoang Tich Thong and was composed of Battalions 2, 4 and 7 were airlifted to Base Delta. The base looked much like a sañle, 550m high and consisted of two parts. The Brigade was positioned on the northern part. The southern part had barely enough room for the two 155mm and four 105mm Howitzers from the 2nd Marine Artillery Battalion. In the west, there was a vertical slope while in the east there were desolate staple fields with interlacing paths.
Marine Brigade 258 was airlifted to Koroc summit. The Brigade had Battalions 1, 3, 8 and a Battery of the 3rd Marine Artillery Battalion. The main area of the operation was based around Brigade 147.
The 4th Battalion deployed widely in the north east. The 2nd Battalion was in charge of the north west. The 7th Battalion protected the Brigade Headquarters and the Artillery Battery. Captain Nguyen Hoa, of Class 20 Dalat Military Academy and in charge of the S3 of 7th Marine Battalion was killed along with many other soldiers during the first NVA shells that landed on that Fire Base. Two out of four Company Commanders of the 2nd Marine Battalion were wounded in the first week of operation. They were 1st Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu (Company 4) and Captain Nguyen Kim Than (Company 2). The 1st Lieutenant Bui Ngoc Dung, the Executive Officer of Company 2 and 2nd Lieutenant Tran Van Loan were also severely wounded. All of them, however, were evacuated in time. Unfortunately Dung died during the transport and later was considered missing. The Executive Officer of Company 5, 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Dung Tri was then designated as Company 2 Commander. We were like a piece of sugar being dropped into an ants nest. The NVA freely encircled us. After having cleared the northern hills of ARVN units, the NVA concentrated all their forces and weapons, including AAA, into attacking Fire Base 550. Two helicopters were hit but still succeeded in landing on the Brigade Headquarters' helipad. The crews were safe. That was the last helicopter that had successfully contacted the Brigade. After that, all supplies and Medevac landings were blocked. Only one week had passed and there were too many unsolved problems. The number of wounded soldiers increased day after day, but they were not evacuated. Ammunition and food supplies became more and more scarce. Most of the soldiers had a low fighting morale. The Artillery Battery could no longer function. All the Artillery support was supplied by Brigade 258 at Koroc and by the US air strikes.
The 2nd Marine Battalion was attacked when it was performing operations about four to five kilometres from the Fire Base. A bomb of supporting air strike strayed and fell on the position of Company 5, causing a number of casualties. The Battalion received orders to stay in place. The 4th Battalion was not in a brighter situation. The enemy held it in place. The 4th Battalion soldiers decreased in number day after day. There was not a single NVA store of ammunition that was destroyed by us during this period. Facing that situation, Brigade Headquarters called back Battalions 2 and 4 and let them carry out activities around the Fire Base in preparation for a retreat. Knowing our plans, the enemy applied their "Hugging" tactic. Company 5 of the 2nd Battalion was the outpost in the north of the Fire Base. It was nearly daily that it was pressured by the NVA. Meanwhile, all of the 4th Battalion had already withdrawn to the Brigade Headquarters. Major Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the 2nd Battalion Commander and Captain Tran Van Hop, the Executive Officer were also called back to stay with the Brigade Headquarters. A very important event occurred. A NVA sapper platoon succeeded in infiltrating and occupying the positions of the defending unit, aiming to block all reinforcements coming from outside the Fire Base and planning to overrun the Brigade Headquarters. Fortunately, they were detected and hindered in their raid. It was then a Company of the 7th Battalion came to the rescue. A number of those sappers were killed while others surrendered. They were from the NVA Division 324B.
The Brigade then received orders from I Corps to withdraw. However, this order was only known to Battalion Commanders. The reason was simple. The morale of troops must be maintained so there was enough time to arrange a plan of retreat. Long range Patrol Company A of Captain Hien was sent to make reconnaissance about enemy situations. The whole Company had fallen into NVA hands. A number of its members were captured and among them, the Company Commander. The Brigade therefore had received no information about the enemy. The plan of retreat was:
B52 would drop bombs north and south of the Brigade position.
The Brigade would move out of the Base at 8:00pm, in the following order: 4th Battalion, 7th Battalion, Brigade Headquarters and Artillery Company. The 2nd Battalion would protect the rear. All Artillery guns, ammunition and food would be left in place. About 60 wounded marines and many bodies already rotted after many days would also be left behind. A number of capture NVA soldiers, already handcuffed, would be left in the bunkers.
Before the predetermined time of the retreat, the situation extraordinarily and rapidly changed.
Company 5 commanded by myself had been isolated for several days. There were no supplies and no Medevac. All the lower points where we could find water were surrounded and controlled by the NVA.
The March weather with very hot winders in southern Laos and the continuous NVA shelling had not decreased our stamina and determination to survive. No one had any other choice but to survive on his own strength. That was on the 21st and 22nd of March 1971. We then received orders to retreat towards the Brigade Headquarters to avoid any further losses. The leader of Heavy Weapons Platoon, 2nd Lieutenant Kim and Corporal Ngach were killed by a volley of 82mm mortars. Meanwhile, there were loud noises of the NVA tanks approaching our defensive line.
It was 5:00pm on 22-03-1971. The Brigade Headquarters had withdrawn earlier than the predetermined time. My Company received orders to retreat one hour later, at that moment, the first NVA T54 tank was shot down by the 57mm Recoilless rifle from the hands of 1st Sergeant Nguyen Te. The voice of Major Phuc, through the radio, ordered me: "You should let your boys move down south urgently".
Jumping out of my bunker, I shouted, "I am Captain Tien, Commander of Company 5 of the 2nd Marine Battalion, everybody follow me" I repeated and repeated. The position where the Brigade Headquarters had been was desolate. The odour of rotting bodies packed in ponchos was horrible. "This is Captain Tien, follow me" The weeping voice of Corporal Bau who had been wounded the day before shouted, "Sir how can I run with my broken leg?" Sheñing tears, I mumbled, "Try to endure it, there isn't a solution". The headlights of the NVA tanks were beginning to switch on and they pounded the Base with their big guns. The NVA shouted, "Surrender and you live! Resist and you die!"
My two RTOs, Dang Phuoc Thanh and Nguyen Van Chuc and I, without hesitation, simultaneously grasped a bramble tendril on top of a vertical cliff and swung like Tarzan had done in films. The tendril was overloaded, ruptured midway. We fell to the ground, one on top of another. Each of us groped for any fractures in our limbs before we sat down and stood up to make sure were still able to adequately move. Chuc smiled showing a few golden teeth. "Our ancestors had saved us" I gathered on that place, about ten Marines, from different units. I ordered them and told them that if they wanted to survive, they would have to follow me and keep strict discipline about our movement. Major Phuc, the Battalion Commander and Captain Hop, the Executive Officer, continued to guide us through radio, towards the bright flares fired into the sky from Koroc. Not needing to use a compass not a map, we just head towards the bright flares. Passing midnight, we walked into the position of the NVA. A NVA sentinel shouted, "Comrades! Why do you come back so late in the night?" The spearheading group terrifyingly bounced back. I quickly directed Marines to another direction. The next morning, the sky was dark blue, full of the sun's beautiful rays. We came out of the thick forest and saw a range of hills covered by tall tiger grass, pockmarked by numerous bomb craters extending into the distance. Corporal That, with his radio still on his back, ran towards me and wept, "Sir, 2nd Lieutenant Lac had died last night".
Dinh Hong Lac was a young officer who had served the longest time in my company. He was handsome with a white and smooth girlish complexion, originated from Can Tho and sang the six phrases of the old Southern Folk Song very well. I saw him falling down after I had shouted the order to retreat last night. He had just jumped out of his bunker and had been hit by a tank machine gun bullet in the head. His body had been lying across the path.
A L19 and some US helicopters were appearing in the sky, this was very assuring. Rounds of Artillery continued to explode leaving a white phosphorus smoke in the air, showing us the gathering point. The 3rd Battalion was sent from Koroc to come and rescue us. The enemy dashed towards the gathering point and attacked it fiercely. US helicopters could only Medevac some but not many. Thanks to the brave soldiers of the 3rd Battalion however, we could move to a safer location. We gathered. When we nearly reached Khe Sanh, my company had only tens of soldiers. Nearly a week later, US helicopters retrieved a few straying groups of marines. My Company had lost half of its total number, a too big of a loss.
The I Corps Headquarters celebrated a "South Laos victory" by a troop's parade at Phu Van Lau. Many medals were distributed. Participating soldiers were promoted, among them were unit commanders such as Major Phuc and Captain Hop of the 2nd Marine Battalion. Captain Lam Tai Thanh, Commander of Company 1 and I received a 5th National Protection Order.
Today I sat recalling the South Laos battle. Images of the unit soldiers were all around me. The 2nd Lieutenant had always dreamt of being able to return home the night his first child was born. Dinh Hong Lac was no longer alive, leaving Miss Kim Oanh, who had been waiting for his return, on a Kien Long riverbank. The 3rd Lieutenant Le Van Que and 1st Sergeant Te strayed somewhere in a forest in South Laos. They were absent when we arrived in Khe Sanh. Corporal Bau, Sergeant Duoc, 2nd Class Private Ngo Van Le and many other wounded Marines, how are they now since the continuous bombing at Delta Base after our retreat.
The ARVN have won many victories on the battlefield in Kampuchia, An Loc, Quang Tri but we clearly did not win in South Laos.
It is time for us to reveal the truth and put it into history, even if it is a tragic truth. I permit myself to write down the "infamous" phrase of Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam who was responsible for the general command of operation. He asked Colonel Hoang Tich Thong, the Commander of Marine Brigade 147:
"How can the Marines return in such a great number?"
Major Pham Van Tien
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