The "Divine Crossbows"
at Hong Ha Base
Lieutenant Colonel Tran Thien Hieu
At the beginning of 1971, the whole Marine Division participated in Operation Lam Son 719. The 3rd Artillery battalion gave supporting fire to the 258th Marine Brigade, which was led by Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri. When the Brigade moved across the border to station on Mount Coroc, there was only enough space for one Artillery Company. I voluntarily accompanied Artillery Company I, although I could have stayed in Khe Sanh. I had, for the second time, turned down an opportunity to attend a higher training course in the USA, in order to participate in the operation. So despite the danger at Mt Coroc, I had no intention of being left in Khe Sanh.
The situation at that time, was unfavourable for the ARVN. The Communists had gathered huge units and were ready for confrontation. The Armour Brigade had to make a tactical retreat from Hill 30, and both the Brigade Commander and the Airborne Artillery Battalion Commander had been captured by the NVA. I never forgot the anxious expression on my driver's face as he watched me tending to my steel helmet and flak jacket - they had never been worn before and had been sitting idle in my jeep for a long time.
Immediately after leaping from the helicopter onto the Hong Ha Fire Base, I scaled to the highest point on Mt Coroc, which had previously been occupied by a 155mm Howitzer Company. Of the four gun positions, I chose the highest one to settle the Battalion headquarters and the Artillery Company I fire tower. We placed two 105mm Howitzers in each of the remaining 3 positions, having no time to build more. The main direction of fire was to be westwards to avoid being an obstacle to the fire supports of friendly forces.
Ten minutes after we landed, the helicopters airlifted six 105mm Howitzers to our position. In the dust storm created by the huge helicopter propellers, the artillerymen struggled to unload the six batteries. Half an hour later, Artillery Company I was ready to fire.
Mt Coroc was small, only about 100m long and less than 100m wide. The headquarters of the 258th Brigade and 3rd Artillery Battalion was stationed there, as was Artillery Company I and the 8th Marine Battalion. More than a thousand people were crammed on to the site. Despite the overcrowded conditions, we had to make room for another 155mm artillery company and its four guns. Fortunately, a small bulldozer was airlifted in, enabling us to prepare for the four 155mm guns and a small helicopter pad as well. We were thus able to receive supplies and ammunition directly, rather than have to carry box by box, shell by shell up the incline.
Though we crossed the border, all American Advisors remained at Khe Sanh, on standby for radiocontact. With the help of an American colleague of mine, we had enough supplies, and occasionally had enough water to spare to wipe our bodies. It was thanks to him that we had quick supplies and efficient medevacs during the entire operation. So concerned was he for our welfare, that on the last day, he even organized lifts back to Khe Sanh to save us the walk.
When the forward observer squad which accompanied the 1st Marine Battalion jumped out of the helicopter, it immediately became the target of enemy fire. One artillery man was so badly injured we had to call Khe Sanh for a replacement. Our job was to provide supporting fire to the 1st and 3rd Marine Battalions, and the Airborne units as well. Our friends the Red Berets, were an extravagant lot who complained continuously of insufficient support, no matter how lavish we were with the ammunition. But to be fair, they were indeed locked in fierce combat with the NVA. Towards the evening, we were forced to be economical with the ammunition, until fresh supplies came in the morning. I felt sorry for the artillery men who had slaved day and night. Many collapsed from sheer exhaustion - shell in hand, but, unable to load the guns.
The first week at Hong Ha Fire Support Base was relatively quiet, with little damage from enemy shellings. The 1st Marine Battalion column, moving southwesterly, was targetted by a few enemy shells, but suffered no direct combat. The 3rd Marine Battallion advanced unchallenged westward.
At the base of Mt Coroc, we could see the continuous barrage between the American 200mm Artillery Battalion and the Communists' 130mm Artillery. Each time the Americans arranged themselves the enemy would immediately fire, leading us to suspect that enemy observers were positioned on nearby hilltops. We tried to jam their radiofrequency, but they merely shifted position. Day in day out, our signalmen and theirs exchanged insults over the radio.
In the operation in Laos, the Communists chose specifically to attack by daylight, and virtually stopped their sorties at night fall.
In the second week, the situation turned serious. The Communists advanced, and besieged us at such close proximity, that we could see them cook rice at the foot of the mountain. It was useless to throw grenades as Mt Coroc was too high - most exploded midway down. They hid in foxholes and caves when we shelled them, and patiently waited out bombardments from tactical aircrafts. We watched helpless as they reappeared after each of our endeavours. Though the bombs and fire, transformed the hill into a bald one, they were still able to use their antitank weapons when the American tanks tried to open a logistical route. Our aircrafts tried once again after the tanks were forced to retreat, and though the area was reduced to rubble and fire, the column of tanks was still unable to approach with the supplies.
The situation at Dong Da Fire Support Base was also serious. Helicopters were unable to medevac or off-load supplies. I only had one Artillery Company and four 155mm Howitzers, which were unable to provide sufficient support. I contacted Major Dat, the Commander of the 2nd Marine Artillery Battalion, who whispered the obvious over the radio:
“Too much rain and sun my friend.” Through binoculars, I could see for myself the billowing smoke and explosions. The enemy had concentrated all their firepower at Dong Da. Late that evening, the aircrafts stopped flying. The occasional B52 flew by, but was unable to mute the enemy artillery, which was securely positioned in the crevices and cracks of the surrounding mountains. The Communists launched an attack on our own position, but thanks to the height of Mt Coroc, many of the shells fell short. A few found their targets, and we were forced to call in medevac helicopters for the wounded of the 8th Marine Battalion. One shell struck the artillery ammunitions bunker, but we managed to extinguish the fire in time. Below, the NVA regiment continued to burn wood, cook rice, and block our retreat.
Though unused to marching, all of the artillery men prepared their rucksacks. I predicted a lot of difficulties, and ordered them to bring the bare essentials. Over at Dong Da, the situation became hopeless after three days without supplies or medevac. Aircrafts, including B52s, could only temporarily delay the enemy attack, but was unable to paralyze their artillery. Ammunition petered out, and the most of the batteries were flattened. All the troops could do was lie low in bunkers and endure the NVA's relentless artillery pounding. The helicopters carrying the supplies had to drop the undelivered ammunition nets on our mountain instead.
When the enemy's T54s charged at Fire Support Dong Da, we opened maximal firing upon them. Unfortunately, during the barrage, contact was suddenly lost with Dong Da - Major Dat was silent, as was the radio frequency of the 147th Brigade. I immmediately guessed that they were in tactical retreat. Searching through all frequencies, I managed to contact the sergeant of a platoon belonging to the 2nd Battalion. Not using radiocode, he hurriedly spoke his name and requested directions to contact his unit. I gave it, and promised to help him join them.
One hour later, I caught Dat's radio frequency. He was panting from exhaustion. I was glad he had eluded the enemy encirclement, but there was still a long trek ahead in NVA infested country. I promised to lead them through the night by firing flares to where the 3rd Marine Battalion - “The Sea Wolves”, would pick them up. Listening carefully, I was relieved to here the voices of all the Artillery Company Commanders and Dat's executive officer. Throughout that night, the whole Marine Division stayed up to follow via radio, the retreat of the 147th Brigade.
Colonel Bui The Lan in Khe Sanh, repeatedly encouraged everybody to report on the latest developments. The level of anxiety was high, for a confrontation with the enemy would mean heavy losses. I continued to shoot flares, and for a long time, I didn't hear Dat's voice.
Finally, Major Dat's voice came weakly across. They were running across the fields, and Dat, exhausted, was being supported by his troops. At about 3.00am, the 3rd Marine Battalion reported that they had encountered a group from the 2nd Artillery Battalion, and that there had been no fighting during the retreat. At 7.00am I was informed that Dat had reached the rendezvous point, faint from exhaustion. Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the Commander of the 2nd Marine Battalion - “The Crazy Buffaloes”, deployed his soldiers to protect the landing zone allowing helicopters to airlift the 147th Brigade to Khe Sanh.
After the retreat from Dong Da Fire Support Base, the enemy concentrated all of its firepower on our position on top of Mt Coroc. Fortunately, the mountain was high and from there distant site, the enemy was only able to launch scattered shells. Despite this, we required regular medevac helicopters. I always had the radio frequencies of my American Advisor, and that of the commanding helicopter at hand, thus supplies and medevac came promptly.
Every morning at 6 am I heard from the American C & C, bidding me goodmorning, and requesting the position of enemy antiaircraft weapons. One kilometre south of the Hong Ha Fire Support base, there was an enemy antiaircraft position hidden deep in a fissure, which had escaped destruction thirty times. Bombs and rockets had failed to hit it, and shellings only temporarily disrupted their antiaircraft activities.
One plan was to send riflemen to climb up high above the fissure, and send down some grenades, but the climb the high slope was difficult to scale. It would have taken days to climb up the gnarled trees, and being artillerymen, the undertaking was above our capabilities.
Operation Lam Son 719 entered the final phase when all the ARVN were forced to withdraw. We were the last to leave, being stationed near the border. I received orders to leave an Artillery platoon behind. It was to leave later with the 8th Marine Battalion. I found this order to be completely illogical. Artillery batteries and ammunition were incredibly heavy, and ought to be moved first. Captain Hung complained, and asked me to intervene on his behalf. I knew that the 258th Marine Brigade had had no part in the matter and even Major Truoc, the Division's chief Artillery Commander, would have no say. Nobody dared to disobey Colonel Bui The Lan. So I promised Hung that I would airlift the heavy artillery back with me. I was prepared to be court martialled if necessary, but there was no way I would leave my men, hampered by big guns, to form a rear contingent which really required direct fire. Fortunately, the order was changed at the last minute, and it was decided that all Artillery batteries and the 8th Marine Battalion would be airlifted to Khe Sanh on the following day.
I spent that night very much relieved, but found it difficult to sleep. Hung came over to chat, and our cook prepared a late supper with the last of the ducks. At midnight, I declared the “party” over, and psyched up my troops for the following day. I stressed the seriousness of the situation. If all went well, we would be airlifted safely. However, if the enemy were to pound us heavily and prevent helicopters from landing, the Americans would be forced to leave us to retreat by foot.
I woke up to the voice of my American Advisor yelling: “India 6, India calling.. please answer!”
I called Dung, the Battalion's S3 officer to bid all Artillery Companies to pack as much ammunition in nets as possible, and send them to the first helicopters.
Dung also had to direct all Battalion Staff to a landing zone at the foot of the Mountain to be airlifted first with the 258th Brigade Staff. A PRC25 was to stay with me until all artillery guns had been airlifted. I climbed to the top of the bunker of the Artillery firing tower without helmet or flak jacket (I firmly believed in my good luck!) to survey the situation. It looked promising - there had been no heavy enemy shelling that night, a sign that immediate large scale NVA attack was unlikely. We were only anxious about one thing... if the helicopters were shot down, or heavily damaged, we would be left to confront the waiting NVA regiment at the foot of the mountain.
The C & C helicopter called me as it hovered above: “India 6, this is India 22.”
“India 22, this is India 6, I hear you loud and clear.”
“Give me the enemy anticraft positions...”
“Exactly like yesterday...Beware of the 12.7mm machine gun to the south. It will fire at you... best to approach from the north, then land and go westerly before flying northeasterly. Remember to avoid the south!”
“22, recieve you loud and clear...the grasshopper is coming. Prepare to let the 155mm go first.”
I radioed the 155mm Artillery Company to throw a smoke grenade. The grasshopper, a kind of emergency helicopter, the strongest of its kind, coming from the North East recognized the yellow smoke. It hovered above the 155mm Howitzer and lowered a steel hook. The gun chief quickly hooked the gun hanging rope to it, and jumped clear. The helicopter ascended slowly with its heavy load, its engines straining hard. The pilot, instead of returning by the way he came, flew slowly across the enemy antiaircraft machine gun positioned in the fissure. It opened fire immediately. As soon as I saw the flash, I immediately called the Command Helicopter. Two gunships swooped down and fired copious rockets, but unfortunately the helicopter carrying the 155mmm Howitzer was hit - a long black pall poured from its tail. We anxiously watched as it somehow struggled back to Khe Sanh.
When the second helicopter came, I told the C & C to stress to the pilot the importance of going via the suggested path, and not to play games with the VC. I was willing to bet that the rockets had failed to knock out the antiaircraft gun. The pilot did as he was told, and flew off safely with his load. The two helicopter gunships returned to fire at the anticraft position, but unfortunately misfired at an outpost of the 8th Battalion.
“Don't fire at friendly forces,” I cried. “They've already thrown their smoke grenade!”
While big helicopters were airlifting artilleryguns, the smaller ones landed at the base of the mountain to transport riflemen. Scores of helicopters swooped down, touching the ground for a split 30 seconds to lift six men, and immediately took off. When the last gun reached Khe Sanh, I turned to Hung, the Commander of Artillery Company I and said: “I'm going now. It will be your turn when the helicopters return to pick up the last ammunition net. Use the radio code name India 6 to contact the helicopters. If anything happens, call me at Khe Sanh.”
I looked around Mt Coroc for the last time. In the west, the Marines of the 1st Battalion - “The Wild Birds”, had been slowly scaling down the mountain to the landing zone. All morning the enemy artillery had tried to hamper us, but fortunately only a few of our troops were wounded, and the helicopters were safe.
The sound of the enemy's 82mm mortar fire became louder and louder as the NVA closed in. The airlift became a race against time. Had the malevolent 12.7mm gun been destroyed, our retreat would have been much faster. I waved to the signal corporal to follow as I descended to the landing pad, where I saw Major De, the executive officer of the 1st Marine Battalion directing his troops on to the helicopters. I raised two fingers requesting two spots. He nodded, waved to a helicopter and pushed us with the other hand on to the pad. The machine gunner extended a hand to help me in, and the helicopter immediately took off as soon as six of us had scrambled in. With such a light load, the hellicopter swerved easily between the gaps of the mountain, and flew directly to Khe Sanh.
Fifteen minutes later, I was on the airstrip, where corporal Thanh waited in my jeep. At headquarters, my American Advisor emerged from his bunker and shook my hand. I thanked him for his support and invited him to dinner. To everyone's relief, we all made it to Khe Sanh, but the rumour that the enemy was planning a siege to block the way back to Dong Ha, disconcerted the Marines. It was difficult to maintain their morale when the 1st Infantry was in tatters, the Rangers dismantled, and the Airborne Division had withdrawn from Khe Sanh. The operation in Laos was not exactly victorious.
In a meeting of unit Commanders, I realized that the older men were very pessimistic, and were even talking of applying for demobilization or transfer from the Marine Corps. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang was present there and spoke encouragingly. I cannot quote him verbatim, but his words were along the lines of: “We have borne hardship, but the enemy has also had difficulties and it won't be easy for them to besiege us, or cut us off. Also, the people of South Vietnam are relying on the ARVN, which in turn is relying on the National Reserves i.e on the Airborne and Marine Divisions. Now that the Airborne Division has retreated, you represent the ARVN. The people are looking to you for help...”
Everyone was silent, weighed down by the responsibility. As it turned out, Lieutenant General Khang was right. The enemy did not have the power to besiege or cut the road off. They quietly withdrew to the north to avoid bombardment. We stayed in Khe Sanh for one week until the 1st Infantry Division had completely retreated, and were the last to leave. The 258th Brigade and the 3rd Artillery Battalion moved to Mai Loc to form a defensive line west of Quang Tri province.
After Operation Lam Son 719, there was always at least two brigades of the Marine Corps present at any one time in I Corps. Battalions were rotated to Thu Duc for R & R every few weeks.
As artillery men, our three companies were never allowed to return to base simultaneously. The cost of transportation was too high. As a result, an Artillery Battalion always “adopted” a company whilst its brother companies were on R & R. There was never any difficulties with subordination in the “adopted” group as all artillery officers always viewed their superiors with the utmost respect.
Lieutenant Colonel Tran Thien Hieu
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