Marine Task Force B
in Tet Offensive 1968
Colonel Ton That Soan
After the victory in Cai Thia Canal, Marine Task Force B continued to reinforce the 7th Infantry Division in performing operations aimed at protecting National Route 4. Its area of operations composed of Giao Duc, Cai Be and Cai Lay. There were no big battles. Task Force B then positioned along National Route 4, from Cai Lay to Giao Duc. The Marine Task Force B headquarters and the 2nd Battalion positioned at Cai Lay, along both sides of Cau Doi and the two end of Ba Rai River. The 1st battalion positioned at Binh Phu, on Ba Ton Canal, 7km from Cai Lay, in the direction of Giao Duc.
To support the movements of their battalions Tay Do 514, 263 and 264 (VC regional regular forces) across Cai Lay, the enemy exploited the thick network of canals in Binh Phu. They used sampans and boats and dressed in civilian clothing to pretend to be civilians returning home to celebrate the coming Lunar New Year. They intended to attack the 1st Marine Battalion headquarters and its companies positioned in hamlets and villages along National Route 4. However, they were detected by 1st Lieutenant Ton That Tran, the executive officer of Company 1, and 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Tri Nam. The Marines of 1st Battalion repulsed the enemy out of Binh Phu. Many of them were killed. The Marines seized many personal weapons and VC battalion Tay Do 514 documents. The Lunar New Year was approaching. Marine Task Force B continued to position itself at Cai Lay.
Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang visited Task Force B and told us to be wary of current ceasefire period. The Marine Battalions decided to celebrate the New Year in the area of operation. As usual, the Military Police group 202 of 3rd Lieutenant Le Van Nuoi set two control posts on National Route 4, to keep all of the soldiers within their units. This year, the ceasefire was for a period of 36 hours, but nobody could trust the VC.
According to the Vietnamese tradition, friends and relatives go visit and wish each other well in the New Year. Major Ngo Van Dinh (2nd Battalion) and Major Phan Van Thang (1st Battalion) invited me to their units headquarters on New Year's Eve so that they could wish me well. Before going to the 2nd Battalion, I opened a few Ngu Gia Bi liquor bottles and invited the officers of the Task Force B to have a drink with me in celebration.
At 11:00pm, I drove my Jeep with my American Advisor next to me. In the back seat sat Sergeant Tat, my bodyguard, Corporal Thanh, my RTO and Corporal Tam, my driver. We arrived at the 2nd Marine Battalion headquarters. We sat there, conversed and waited for the New Year to come.
About half an hour later, the American Advisor, a Major, went out and used his radio to make contact with relevant authorities as scheduled. He then returned and told me with a tense face: "Sir, the Thanh My Tay outpost and the CIDG Mike Forces camp, about 10km north of Cai Lay, have been attacked by the VC." My sixth sense told me that something really bad was about to happen.
I hurriedly spoke to Major Dinh:
Let me return to make contact with the 7th Infantry Division and learn about the present situation. I will then return and welcome the New Year.
At the Task Force B headquarters, I ordered captain Doan Trung Uong, Chief of S3 and 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Vien, Chief of Signal Team, to make radio contact with the 7th Infantry Division and Cai Lay district to learn about the situation of Thanh My Tay Outpost. After all the radio calls, the two officers reported that there were neither battles nor gun sounds at the outpost. I was filled with wonder. The discrepancy raised a query. It seemed an inconvenient matter to discuss with the American Advisor. I then decided not to return to the 2nd Marine Battalion for the New Year's welcome. I radioed Major Dinh and told him so. The midnight was approaching. Suddenly there were some gun sounds coming from afar. Some manual flares soared up into the dark sky. Some Marines on duty in Task Force B headquarters said to each other: "It is likely that the soldiers of the RF and PF were recklessly shooting to welcome the New Year".
At that time, Captain Uong turned on the Saigon Radio to listen to the New Year Welcoming Program. It was a custom that at midnight broadcasting, when the National Anthem finished, there would be a New Year Speech by the President of South Vietnam. However, tonight, there were only repetitions of the Saigon Radio Musical and nothing else.
Captain Uong told me:
Lieutenant Colonel, it is probable that a coup is occurring in Saigon because the President is not speaking.
I did not have the time to answer, before 2nd Lieutenant Vien rushed in and said:
- Lieutenant Colonel! Major Do Ky, Chief of G3 of the Marine Brigade wants to speak to you on An/GRC 106 Radio.
Major Ky informed me about the general situation: the VC violated the Cease Fire and have attacked a number of cities including Saigon. Marine Task Force B is to be ready to be helilifted to Saigon tomorrow.
It was 1.00AM. This was the official news. The VC had violated the Cease Fire. I gave orders to the Task Force headquarters, the 1st and 2nd Battalions. (It is noteworthy to mention that, some days after the Tet, I realised that the System of American Advisors had been previously informed about the imminent attack of VC in Tet Mau Than. However, I still wondered why Task Force B's American Advisor had not clearly spoken to the Commander of the Task Force, but had only vaguely and indirectly warned me by inventing the story of the battle at Thanh My Tay Outpost)
On the first day of the Lunar New Year (30-01-1968) Task Force B was helilifted by US Chinooks, in pairs, from a dry rice field next to Cai Lay Market. The order of movement was as follows: the 2nd Battalion, Task Force B Headquarters and finally the 1st Battalion. The first helicopter transported a platoon of Company 1 of the 2nd Battalion in the direction of Saigon. It lifted off at 8.00am.
Looking down from the helicopter, one could see the Tan Son Nhut airport and around the JGS fence. There were also scattering fires and billowing smoke from some areas.
1. Activities of the 2nd Battalion
Company 1 of the 1st Lieutenant To Van Cap landed first on the Flag Square of the JGS, then the 2nd Battalion headquarters. Colonel Ngo Du, of the JGS G3, informed Major Ngo Van Dinh about the situation and asked the 2nd Battalion to dissolve the enemy pressure at the General Management School, the Military English School and Gate 6. Companies 1, 2 and 3 replaced the Airborne units to occupy those targets. In a short period of time, the VC Special Groups 6 and 9 of the VC Battalion F100 were annihilated. The 2nd Battalion then positioned at important places of the JGS and of residences of High Rank Officers. Platoon 42 of 2nd Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu protected the Main Gate of the JGS.
The next day, the 2nd Battalion received orders to reinforce the National Police Capital headquarters. Meanwhile, the VC Battalion 508 Long An had infiltrated the Catholic area Binh An and continued to advance towards the Sixth District. The VC Battalion 2 of the Dong Thap regiment had appeared in the Le Quang Liem riverport. The VC Battalion 3 Binh Tan had occupied Ba Hat, the An Quang pagoda area of the Tenth District.
Major Dinh divided areas of responsibility as follows:
Company 2 of 1st Lieutenant Tran Kim De: from Y Bridge to Phu Dinh
Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuong: from Binh Tay alcohol factory to Le Quang Liem Riverport
Company 1: in Tran Nhan Ton and Minh Mang areas (District 10)
Company 4: An Quang pagoda area and Nguyen Duy Duong, Ba Hat streets
Company 2 advanced slowly because there were many VC blocking cells. Company 2 had four wounded when advancing to the Y Bridge. Marines had difficulties because they had to restrict fires to limit civilian human losses and property damage. Sometimes, Company 2 had to use the 57mm recoilless rifle to destroy the enemy's B40 or machine guns set up in high buildings. Companies 1 and 3 repelled the VC out of their areas of responsibility. In the An Quang pagoda, the situation was much more complicated. The pagoda was situated in Su Van Hanh Street. It was big and had a solid construction. At the front, there was only one entrance, through a steel door. On either sides of that door, there were thick and high walls. On either sides of the pagoda, there were two bell towers. The VC had occupied these two towers where they set up machine guns and so they controlled the complete entrance.
Platoon 41 of 2nd Lieutenant Phan Ngoc Vieng intended to enter the pagoda but was blocked by VC fires from inside it. A marine body lay in front of the entrance. Platoon 42 of 2nd Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu deployed at the back gate of the pagoda, at the Nguyen Duy Duong and Ba Hat T-junction. It was here that this platoon captured a VC cadre who had an operation map and also a K54 pistol. He was shot dead by General Nguyen Ngoc Loan when he used the rudest words to speak to the general. Section 5 of 2nd Battalion urged the enemy to surrender, but to no avail. Finally, the Battalion had to allow 1st Lieutenant Vu Doan Doan to use a 57mm recoilless rifle to create a hole in the wall and used .30-calibre machine guns to fire continuously into the two towers. These fires supported Platoon 42 and helped it charge into the pagoda.
It was 2nd Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu that recounted: "When my platoon was already inside the Pagoda, I saw a disorderly scene. On the floor, there was a number of VC killed or wounded. There were also blood sports on the way up the stairs leading to the upper floor. I was certain that there were still VC inside the bell towers. Had I ordered my platoon to charge upwards using those stairs, we would have had substantial casualties. I asked the monks inside the pagoda to lead or accompany my soldiers to the upper floor so we could search it. These monks categorically refused. At that moment, the company commander gave me an order to lead my platoon out so the police may conduct a search. This order helped me avoid a difficult situation but also gave the police a great hardship."
From District 10, the 2nd Battalion moved to Binh Hoa District to replace the 6th Battalion. The latter moved to Thu Duc and Song Than Base (Di An). The situation in Binh Hoa had become calmer. The 6th Marine Battalion had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in the previous days. The VC had to slowly withdraw, leaving behind a number of blocking cells on high buildings. Another number of them, having lost contact with their units, did not know how to escape. They weakly resisted and were then captured one after another in the sewages, public toilets or rubbish dumps. Most of them were very young. The most remarkable fighting was to dislodge a VC blocking cell at Le Quang Dinh and Ngo Tung Chau streets intersection. When Group B, Company 4, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Pham Van Tien advanced to Xom Ga (Go Vap), local civilians and police were very cooperative. The informed Group B that VC were on a three storey house next to the pagoda. Due to the VC blocking cells, there were also a number of civilians kept up there with them.
To prevent damage and losses to civilians, Task Force B gave an order to use 57mm recoilless rifles and M79s only when there was an absolute need. Artillery and airstrikes were not allowed.
Platoon 41 of 2nd Lieutenant Phan Ngoc Vieng had just crossed the departure line for about 50m when a VC B40 was shot down. Corporal Thanh, a squad leader and five other marines were wounded. The platoon was ordered to stop and rearrange its formation. The M60 gunners positioned adequately to control the enemy fires. The M79 supported the advance. Platoon 41 moved in groups of three, using tactics of urban battle and hand grenades to a maximum. Platoon 42 of 2nd Lieutenant Kieu Cong Cu turned to the right, shot down a group of VC sappers and captured another six of them, fully armed with explosives which they did not have time to detonate.
Another prong, composed of Platoon 43 of 3rd Lieutenant Luu Van Phan and Platoon 44 of 3rd Lieutenant Cao Manh Cuong, was commanded by 1st Lieutenant Doan, the company commander. The group controlled the thickly bushed area of the cemetery and also the pagoda. They also freed a number of the civilians being arrested by the VC. About fifteen of the VC were shot dead. They were all well armed. Company 4 had five killed and a number wounded. This company needed half a day to accomplish the advance on this segment of the street, less than 2km in length. Corporal Le Van Nhi, Private 1st Class Tuong, Sergeant Kha and Private 2nd Class Huynh Den had sacrificed their lives. The saddest thing was the death of Corporal Tran Van Sang. He had just confidently talked to 1st Lieutenant Tien: "Master! This is the area of my home. You need not worry. Let me lead the way" and Sang was then immediately killed by a VC sniper.
Finally the group of VC occupying the high building was annihilated by the crazy buffaloes. Three of them survived and surrendered. The Xom Go area was then completely freed. After a week of performing operations in Districts 6, 10 and 8, the 2nd Battalion received orders to move to the Hang Xanh T-Junction (Gia Dinh) to replace the 30th Ranger Battalion. The Ranger unit had smashed the VC Battalion Di An 3 which had occupied a Police station at Hang Xanh T-junction, on the night of 01-02-1968. The enemy then withdrew to Cau Son to resist. They used B40s to destroy an ARVN M113 APC which had been supporting the Rangers.
The 2nd Marine Battalion dislodged the VC blocking cells completely from Cau Son to Cau Kinh and swept the VC out of Thanh Da and Binh Quoi areas.
In the following days, the 2nd Battalion protected Government edifices and many other important places, namely the National Radio Station, Saigon GPO and the Phan Thanh Gian Bridge on the Saigon Highway.
2. Activities of the 1st Marine Battalion
The Task Force B headquarters and the 1st Marine Battalion were also helilifted by Chinook helicopters. They landed on the JGS Flag Square. The helilift ended at 4:00pm. Only one platoon and the commander of the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion failed to arrive. For an unknown reason, the Chinook which had been transporting them landed on an L19 airstrip in Ben Tranh and discharged them. Then it changed direction and flew to My Tho. So 1st Lieutenant Phan led that platoon to Ben Tranh subdistrict and stayed there. It was a New Year's present for the subdistrict chief and the PF platoon was protecting it because they had been informed about a possible VC attack on that area.
The next morning, 1st Lieutenant Phan led that platoon to National Route 4 to board a bus to go to Saigon. Finally they joined their 1st Battalion, which had been performing operations in Go Vap.
At 5:00pm, Colonel Ngo Du and Lieutenant Colonel Le Van Than arrived at the Task Force headquarters. They asked Task Force B to protect the Tran Hung Dao Camp that night and to serve as a reserve force for the JGS. It was 1st Lieutenant Vien who immediately set up a hot line between Task Force B headquarters and the JGS TOC. Outside the Tran Hung Dao Camp, and along Vo Di Nguy Street, the VC fired AK47s at Gate 2 and at the high ranked officer's residences. A Marine of the 1st Battalion was wounded by a sniper.
It was noteworthy to mention that on the New Year 's Eve, a group of VC had sneaked inside the back gate of Tran Hung Dao Camp and shouted: "Coup! Coup!" The sentinel thought it was really so and let them in. At the same time, another VC group intruded through Gate 2. The same group had shot at the American Patrol Jeep passing by the place. So the Americans were alarmed.
The camp guards succeeded in stopping further VC intrusions. General Nguyen Duc Thang ordered Artillery to shell on the back gate. Only then, the soldiers inside Tran Hung Dao Camp started to counter attack.
On the second day of the Lunar New Year, President Nguyen Van Thieu from My Tho, returned to Saigon by helicopter. That night, Bravo Command Groups of Captain Nguyen Van Da deployed from Gate 2 to Gate 4 to block the invasion of the VC. This Bravo Command Group was composed of Company 1 of Captain Huynh Van Luom and Company 2 of 2nd Lieutenant Bui Phuc Loc who had replaced the wounded Captain Phan Cong Ton in Cai Lay.
Alpha Command Group was commanded by Major Phan Van Thang. It was composed of Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan Tong and Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Su who was temporarily replacing 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phan, as he was stuck at Ben Tranh. In the sky above Tan Son Nhat airport and the JGS, there were illuminating flares throughout the night. During the night, 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Vang, Chief of the 1st Battalion S3, reported that the VC had attacked three times on the Bravo Command Group. However, the big regular VC unit had not appeared.
In the morning of 01-02-1968, a GMC convoy, led by the Military Police, exited the Main Gate of the JGS, carrying Task Force B and the 1st Battalion. The convoy turned left to Vo Tanh, Chi Lang, Nguyen Van Hoc Streets and then to Nga Nam Binh Hoa and Go Vap. On both sides of the streets, every door was closed. Civilians were afraid of guns fire. The war was really happening right in the Capital and not in the mountains or remote areas. A number of curious civilians stood on their balconies to wave at marines. They convoy stopped at the Binh Hoa district. The companies alighted, stood on both sides of the streets and waited for orders to advance. Task Force B headquarters positioned at the district's main edifice. The Major Commander of the district informed that the VC Battalion Cu Chi 1 and a Battalion of Regiment 101, Division 7 and a mobile reinforcing unit of Sanctuary R, had attacked some positions in Binh Hoa and Go Vap at New Year's Eve (31-01-1968). The enemy had occupied Phu Dong Camp where the Cavalry Headquarters had been. Other places, like the Hoa Lu camp, the Truong Quang Tuan residential areas, a part of the Quarters-Masters camp and the Co Loa camp of Artillery were encircled only by VC blocking cells.
In the north east, the Military Prison and Go Vap ammunition stores were under heavy pressure. The VC exploited the tall buildings and edifices in the capital to set up blocking cells with collective weapons to hinder the ARVN advance.
A very important VC blocking cell on a water tower of the Phu Dong camp seriously hampered all movements of our units from Binh Hoa.
The 1st Battalion successfully and successively dislodged all those blocking cells in a short period of time.
Colonel Ton That Soan
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