The 369th Marine Brigade
at The My Chanh
Colonel Pham Van Chung
Overview
The Marine Division, a national Reserve of the ARVN was until the beginning of 1972, composed of 3 fighting Brigades; 147, 258, 369. Although the 147th Brigade had suffered moderate losses in Operation Lam Son 719, it recovered its fighting spirit and bravado within two months of receiving replacements. After the South Laos campaign, two of the three Marine Brigades were always in rotating shifts to assist the 3rd Infantry Division defend the northern-most territories, south of parallel 17. The third brigade served as a reserve for the Joint General Staff whilst on R & R.
The 369th Brigade spent 4 months operating in various places in the notorious sanctuary of Ba Long in Quang Tri province. These places included the Fire Support Bases at Mai Loc, Holcomb, Sarge (on Route 9 leading to the Khe Sanh Valley) and Lao Bao. They were scheduled for three weeks at base camp at the end of March 1972. However within a fortnight, the Communists initiated Campaign Nguyen Hue. At noon, March 30 1972, the NVA utililized over 10 Infantry divisions, a thousand tanks, heavy artillery, and rockets to launch simultanous attacks on three tactical zones; I,II, and III Corps.
Early in the morning of April 1, the 369th Brigade was on standby for immediate mobilization. Colonel Bui The Lan, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Division estimated that within I Corps alone, five NVA Infantry Divisions and tanks had crossed the Ben Hai river and the Truong Son Range from the west, their target being the fire support bases. The Joint General Staff subsequently sent the Marine Division Headquarters to I Corps to command the 147th, 258th, and 369th Brigades as the commanding capacity of the 3rd Infantry Division had been exceeded with too many reinforcement units.
On the morning of April 2, the Division Staff and supporting units, battalions 2, 5, 9, of the 369th Brigade, the 1st marine Artillery Battalion and the brigade supporting units were successively airlifted by C130 to Phu Bai Airbase, Hue, and transported by military trucks to the operating area.
As we descended from the aircraft on April 3, the Brigade Staff was welcomed by a Division G3 officer who led us immediately to the Marine Division Field Headquarters stationed inside the Citadel of Hue. Here we were informed more thoroughly by Colonel Bui The Lan of the militiary situation in I Corps. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang and also the Division Staff were there. Of the fire support bases in the west, Holcomb was overrun and Ba Ho was abandoned due to pressure from the enemy.
Mai Loc, the headquarters of Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao's 147 the Marine Brigade, had suffered heavy artillery and the enemy was closing in. In the north, A1, A2, A3, A4, C1, Fuller, Khe Gio fire bases, previously defended by the 3rd Infantry had all been taken by the enemy. Bases Carrol and C2 were heavily shelled and attacked.
The 258th Marine Brigade commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Van Dinh was moving forward to confront enemy tanks and infantry which had overrun base C1 and was approaching Cua, Cam Lo and Dong Ha via the National Route 1.
Tactical Area of Resposability
The TAOR of the 369th Brigade was the district of Hai Lang south west of the city of Quang Tri. Its task was to prevent the enemy from attacking the left flank of the 3rd Infantry Division and hinder enemy troops from advancing along the National Route 1, which was the main arterial from Hue to units operating north of Thach Han River.
The zone of operation of the 369th Brigade was an area covering approximately 200 km2. It was limited in the north by the Nhung river (5km from Quang Tri city), and in the South by the My Chanh river, which delineated Hai Lang district of Quang Tri Province from Phong Dien district of Thua Thien Province. The zone encompassed 1 km of the National Route 1 in the direction of Hai Lang. Beyond bases Barbara and Jane, the area was unlimited - the terrain for 2 km was composed of bald hills with scattered bushes. Further west ran high mountains covered by thick forests with numerous brooks and streams. East of Route 1 were white sand dunes with thick scattered bushes and water coconut palms bordering sinuous brooks.
The important tactical points at which to block enemy advancement were the bases Barbara and Nancy, and the Nhung, Okhe, and My Chanh rivers and their bridges. All of these bridges were situated on the national Route 1, and all three rivers ran from west to east.
At 2:00pm on April 3, the Brigade summoned officers to a preliminary meeting right north of My Chanh Bridge while a convoy of more than 200 military trucks were transporting and pulling artillary pieces into the area of operation. The dusty air, the noise of running engines, human voices and the clash of weapons, created an overwhelmingly imminent atmosphere of war.
Present at the meeting were the Commanders of the following units:
The 2nd Marine Battalion - which was dubbed by the NVA as the "Crazy Buffaloes” due to its fierce fighting spirit, had been honoured with three fourrageøres, from "gallantry" to "national". In addition to that, two ex "Crazy Buffaloes” held the positions of Commandant and Assistant Commandant, although at that particular point in time the latter had already left the position two years previously. The current Commander was Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Xuan Phuc, a graduate of the 16th class of the Dalat National Military Academy. He was a clever, proficient and highly experienced officer. Though moderate in stature, he nonetheless fought with the agility of a panther. His battalion was assigned to operate the fire support base Barbara, and to cover the 10km to its west and the area to its south, as far as the My Chanh river.
The 5th Marine Battalion, nicknamed the “Black Dragons”, had carried out several heroic deeds, resulting in its being honoured with both the green and the yellow fourrageøres. The Commander was Major Ho Quang Lich, whose parents had been killed by the V.C. Consequently, the hot-tempered major harboured a deep-rooted animosity towards Communists, which was evident in his manner of speech and action - he was always impatient to lead his unit in any charge against the enemy. The "Black Dragon" were to cover the central region of the the Brigade's tactical area of responsibility in order to protect bridges along the National Route 1, Brigade headquarters, and Artillery companies. If needs be, its troops were to act as reserves for the Brigade.
The 9th Marine Battalion, the newest battalion was considered the “little brother” to the others. It was affectionately referred to as being “small as grains of pepper”, the analogy to pepper reflecting the fact that the battalion was hard to grind, but caused many an enemy to cry. Indeed, it had brought the NVA to grief in all four tactical zones, for which it was awarded the "gallantry" fourrageøre. The Commander was Major Nguyen Kim De, a graduate of the 16th Class of Dalat National Military Academy. He was valiant, thoughtful and ingenious, often teased by colleagues for his wry smile and double entendres. His battalion was to be in charge of the area north of the Brigade from Nhung river, and they were to join the Ranger Forces at the north bank to drive the enemy westwards.
The 1st Artillery Battalion was not only an eminent battalion of the Marine Artillery, but also one of the ARVN Artillery as well. On many occasions it had had to level its cannon barrels to fire directly at enemy tanks and NVA human waves. Lieutenant Colonel Doan Trong Cao, a graduate of the the 13th Class of the Dalat NMA was in charge. He was otherwise known by his radiocode name of Can Truong, or socially as “the young gentleman of Thai Binh” due to his softly-spoken, scholarly ways and chivalrous behaviour. His unit was to give fire support to fighting units.
The Brigade staff was composed of the Commander, myself (radio code name Cao Bang); Brigade Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Doan Thuc; Chief of S3, Major Doan Trung Uong; Chief of S2, Captain Bui van Hoc; Chief of S4, Captain Nguyen Quan Dan; Marine Divisions Psyops Training officer, Major Huynh Van Phu and the officers of supporting units stationed at fire support bases 1km northwest of My Chanh bridge.
Concept of Operations
In the first week of April 72, the well established concept of operation was applied as it had been done for years in I Corp. That concept instructed units to defend territories, to occupy fire support bases, to build field headquarters, to supply and to medevac, and in particular to position artillery companies to give direct fire support to Brigade subordinate units operating in the area of responsibility.
This method had limited tactical usefulness against the NVA's “hit and run” policy, using small or medium sized units of “half guerillas, half regulars”. As the war escalated, the NVA dismissed world-wide criticism and used larger scale units such as divisions or multi-divisions.
Our tactics became passive and were greatly damaged by the sophisticated NVA artillery and rockets, whose long shooting range surpassed that of our own weapons. Such weapons were indispensible in the large conventional war which waged fiercely in I Corp. It was clearly seen that the ARVN was in a passive position - its movements lacked the essential element of surprise. Furthermore, its positions were always distinctly exposed to the enemy. Fire support bases, garrisons, headquarters proved to be impediments, being easy targets for the enemy's sophisticated artillery and rockets, tanks and infantry. The tactical area of responsibility of the 369th Brigade could not evade the NVA's preemptive artillery and rocket poundings. The fire support bases Nancy and Barbara, which housed the Brigade Headquarters and 2nd Battalion Headquarters respectively, received shellings day and night. The bases were effectively paralyzed, and the number of casualties escalated.
Recognizing its passive state, the Brigade rapidly changed tactics. It was no longer considered important to keep the bases, though the bridges on National Route 1 were still important stategic sites. Units were ordered to move about rapidly, and to appear and disappear at irregular times in the areas. The FSBs were left virtuallly empty, protected only by one platoon stationed in heavily fortified bunkers. This change, and the tactic of moving about seemed effective. The enemy still pounded down rockets and artillery, but the exercise proved pointless. The mobile position of the Brigade came out of the fixed targets on the overlays of the enemy artillery. The Marine battalions, now highly mobile, were able to search and destroy the NVA in their areas of responsibility.
Cited below is an excerpt from the report sent to the US MC headquarters regarding the 369th Brigade's activities written by Major Robert Sheridan, the American Brigade advisor.
“The Brigade did not allow any unit to stay in a place longer than 36 hours. In the month of April, we moved the position of the Brigade Headquarters 21 times. Being the main targets of the enemy artillery, the Marine Artillery Companies also had to move about frequently. In a period of 24hrs, by the end of April, the Artillery Battalion changed its position 4 times, and there was one company which had to get on its way 6 times. To move in such a way was to avoid the enemy artillery but the fighting units were still effectively supported by Marine Artillery on requests.”
On April 22nd 1972, when the defensive line of the 3rd Infantry Divisions and its reinforcements retracted to Camlo River, Dong Ha, in the north and to FSB Pedro in the west, the area of responsibility of the 369th Brigade was pressed hard from the west.
The 2nd Marine Battalion was fiercely attacked by the NVA's 24th regiment. The enemy followed up the initial artillery fire on the Marines positioned around FSB Barbara with human wave charges. The intention was to occupy Barbara, and use it as a springboard to launch attacks on FSB Nancy, Brigade Headquarters, the My Chanh bridge, and National Route 1.
Battalion Commander Nguyen Xuan Phuc's forte was fighting in mountainous and jungle terrain. In an ingenious move, he rapidly dispersed his soldiers at intervals to deny the enemy targets, only to muster troops moments later for surprise attacks on the weakest NVA position. In this manner he inflicted severe losses to the 24th Regiment of the NVA. Battalion advisors, Major Bill Sweeney and Captain Merl Sexton sent forth requests for air firepower support from the 7th Fleet or Thailand. Thus, each time the battalions of the 24th Regiment sought to attack the 2nd Battalion, they were immediately air-raided.
At one stage during the battle, the 24th Regiment had besieged the 2nd Battalion, succeeding in splitting it into two. However, the NVA was unable to carry through with the rout as the troops of the 2nd Battalion had all been briefed about the terrain - by dispersing to avoid being hunted down, they were able to rally rapidly at pre-planned points.
The 5th and the 9th Battalion were fiercely assaulted by the 9th and 66th Regiments of the NVA's 304th Division, which tried to dislodge them from the elevated positions in the west that permittted access of the National Route 1. Attack and counterattacks were waged daily. The 5th and 9th Battalions persisted with the combination of combat, artillery and air fire power. During the day, heavy bombs were dropped. At night, C130 Spector Gunships were summoned to directly fire upon the ground with a high degree of accuracy. These airstrikes caused remarkable losses to the NVA, and instilled terror in the communist foot soldiers. Thus the two battalions were able to hold the vantage points overlooking the National Route 1. The enemy could not advance.
Thwarted in its attempt to overrun the National Route 1, the NVA unleashed heavy artillery upon the overcrowded civilian evacuation-trucks that were fleeing along the route from Quang Tri. Innocent civilians, mostly women, children and the elderly were killed - those who survived suffered indescribable injuries. This viscious act was fine-tuned by the cruellest of strategies: NVA artillery observers in civilian clothes and carrying radios hid near Route 1 to direct the shellings at the hapless trudging column.
From a distance, the column of evacuees was like a river... whenever a round of artillery exploded, people were pulverized, their body parts splashing like droplets. Those who survived the shelling were sent into hysterics by the inferno and horror around them.
In spite of changing positions constantly, the Marine Artillery Companies were continously targetted by enemy artillery, fueling the suspicion that the NVA had stationed forward observers to direct the shelling. The Brigade sent reconnaissance squads to check the situation and did indeed find evidence of enemy observers.
On the 29th of April 1972, at 1.20pm, the Brigade was informed by the Marine Division Headquarters that one battalion was to be withdrawn from the Brigade to reinforce the 3rd Infantry Division in an effort to liberate the segment of Route 1 betweeen the north of Nhung River bridge to Quang Tri province.
The Brigade tried to explain to Colonel Bui The Lan, the Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the Marine Division that in doing so, it would be impossible to hinder the enemy in their attempt to overun the National Route 1 from the west. They were exerting strong pressure on the three Marine Battalions which were mutually supporting each other. Colonel Lan answered that he had previously discussed the matter with I Corp, but to no avail, and that the order had to be obeyed. The move proved to be a clumsy move on I Corps part in dealing with conventional warfare.
It had no active counter attack plans and was passive throughout the enemy's drive of the 3rd Infantry Division from Quang Tri. The Marine Brigade had to remove the 5th Battalion from its position and instead, sent it along the Route 1 to join the Ranger Group in the north. In the Indochinese war between the French and the Viet Minh, the former had built fortified concrete bunkers to protect bridges along Route 1. When the 5th Battalion approached the Nhung River bridge, it was evident that the enemy had taken up position in the blockhouses - B40 machine guns and NVA artillery fired down on the advancing columns of the 5th Brigade. A fierce struggled ensued, but after five hours, the 5th Battalion was still unable to oust the enemy from their position. Finally, the Brigade decided to use air fire power. Under the direction of Major Lich, the Battalion Commander and Major Don Price, the Battalion advisor, many of the blockhouses were razed. Throughout the night, the ground forces of the 5th Battalion, with the close support of the Specter Gunship and C47 Fire Dragon, had to systematically eradicate the enemy from blockhouse to block house. By the following morning they had successfully recaptured the Nhung River Bridge, and 234 enemy bodies carrying the 27th Regiment insignia littered the battlefield. On interrogation, the prisoners of war informed that the bridge had been occupied the previous night (the 28th of April) after the South Vietnamese Regional force had left. On the 30th, the 5th Marine Battalion was forced to camp at the Bridge the entire day, unable to make contact with the 3rd Infantry Division or any other friendly force.
On reporting to the Marine Division Headquarters, they were informed by Colonel Lan that I Corps and the 3rd Infantry Division were in discordance, and that it was likely that the latter would have to abandon Quang Tri province. That meant that the 369th Marine Brigade would have to cope with the situation alone, and be responsible to help withdraw the 5th Battalion. Lan's messsage ended with: “Cao Bang, I have good news for you which is not related to the task here... your wife gave birth to a son on the 24th of April. They are both well - be happy!” We both smiled.
It was decided that the 5th Battalion was to move back to its original position. However, in the interim, the enemy had regained vantage points, and the 5th Battalion was forced to fight hard. Major Tran Ba, the executive officer was killed leading the charge. A number of his faithful Marines also lost their lives in the unsuccessful attempt to retrieve his body. His bones were found six months later. His wife, pregnant and near term, and his infant child had to go to the Bien Hoa Military Cemetery to organise the funeral arrangements. On their way home, approaching Cat Lai, it began to rain heavily - the jeep overturned on the slippery highway, killing both mother and child instantly. It was an horrific tragedy that moved us all.
I would like, to digress a few minutes in commemoration of Major Ba and his family. I had shared many memories with the tall, young, handsome officer... we had been through several happy and sad times together, enjoyed victory and endured distress side by side, in battles that include A Shau, Aluoi, Sarge, Khe Sanh, Lao Bao... I remember still, having conversations with him, watching the sun go down with him, while we were stationed in Mai Loc Base in the NVA infested Ba Long valley.
In the late afternoon of the 1st of May 1972, the situation in Quang Tri province worsened. Battalion Commanders, logistic unit Commanders, American Advisors ...etc were summoned by the Brigade. They were briefed on the situation, hypotheses and plans were discussed, and tasks were allocated. The crucial question was whether the 3rd Infantry Division and its reinforcements should withdraw out of Quang Tri province and what measures would have to be taken to stop the enemy.
It was unanimously agreed upon that the My Chanh river would be used as a natural defensive line.
In terms of the defense concept, the Marine Brigade was David against Goliath - the NVA far outnumbered our own. The terrain, the timing, the means of supply did not allow the Brigade to build a thick, fortified defensive line. The tactics dictated that if a small force were to delay the assault of a stronger and more numerous one, while waiting for reinforcements or orders from superiors, it ought to defend on the move i.e to use mobile defensive lines. The aims were to fight in retreat and to choose the battlefield. Action had to be synchronized perfectly with that of supporting forces which provided the artillery, tactical and strategical firepower, and naval guns aimed at positions chosen by the enemy.
This method of fighting demanded high fighting spirit, strict discipline, complete knowledge of the terrain and meticulous planning. We all agreed on this concept.
The Brigade requested the commanders to boost and maintain the morale within the units - a task which was difficult since with the passing of each day, it became apparent to the marines that friendly units about them were in disarray, and troops were beginning to retreat southwards to the My Chanh River.
The 2nd Battalion was to deter the enemy, to employ maximum supporting firepowers to destroy them at preplanned areas operating from North of the bridge to South of the My Chanh River. It was to slow the enemy advance, to prevent them from making attacks on the left flank of the Brigade and then to defend the south bank of the My Chanh river, 2km west from the National Route 1 to the far west.
The 5th Battalion, was to wait for orders to retreat quickly and defend the north bank of the My Chanh River, from 1 km east of the Route 1 to the sea. The barren sand dunes area east of Hai Lang district and the sand strip along the coast were to be the target of concentrated firepower if the enemy were to reach this region.
The 9th Battalion was to fight in short spurts periodically while retreating along the Route 1 from north of the Okhe River to south of the My Chanh. The aim was to evolve a defensive line there to trap the enemy in the would-be area of concentrated firepower. Underpinning the strategy was the supposition that the NVA would be using that particular route to advance its column and tanks. It was thus necessary to form small specialized antitank squads. Half of the LAW (Light Antitank Weapons) of the 2nd, and 5th Battalion had to be transfered to the 9th for this purpose.
The 1st Artillery Battalion was to move all its three companies to south of My Chanh River, where they were to build positions, accummulate ammunition, and be on standby.
A platoon of the Combat Engineer Battalion, led by Captain Nguyen Van Ho, the Commander of Company A, was to await orders to destroy the My Chanh Bridge. The Brigade Staff co-operating with advisors and subordinate units, immediately drew up an overlay of targets for the artillery and supporting powers such as stratofortress B52, tactical aircrafts, and naval guns.
The officers were reminded to use stratofortress B52 only for strategical targets such as the NVA logistical and reinforcement route coming from the North, the northern and southern regions of the Ben Hai river, the Khe Sanh valley, Lao Bao, Ba Long etc...
Immediately after the briefing, all units including the Brigade Staff and advisors, retained only the barest fighting essentials. The remaining equipment was moved to Phong Dien district, 9km south of the My Chanh. Lieutenant Colonel Doan Thuc was assigned to remain there - his role was to command the main part of the Brigade Staff, oversee its supply depots and the radio relay station between the Brigade (the My Chanh Line) and the Marine Division (inside the Hue citadel).
Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Xuan Phuc, the commander of the 2nd battalion, was announced as the the executive officer in charge of the Brigade. He was to co-ordinate and continue the line of command if necessary.
Upon the the closure of the briefing, Cao Bang gave encouragements to the unit Commanders, expressing hope that all units would try their best to carry out the orders. Turning specifically to Major Nguyen Kim De, he said: “Your task is rather heavy. Try to shoot scores of enemy tanks, and I promise to ask the Lietenant General, Commandant of the Marine Division, to promote you to Lieutenant Colonel!” Major De smiled and responded: “Great Eagle, you can relax and rely on me.” Everyone left the meeting in good spirits.
In the art of warfare, once the upper hand has been gained, it is extremely important to pursue the enemy. As soon as the opposing force loses ground, suffers heavy casualties, and fights in a piece-meal manner in order to flee, it is time for the army with the advantage to quickly rally troops for the annihilation of the losing party. As the saying goes, “when beating a snake, one has to crush the head to be on the safe side.” A successful rout is one which breaks the enemy physically and psychologically - by means of incapacitating enemy troops, delaying recovery time, and preventing reinforcement and regrouping... all of which requires Time, which may reverse the situation.
With this in mind, the NVA could not resist pursuing the 3rd Infantry Division, which fled Quang Tri province in disarray at noon of the 2nd of May, 1972.
Judging the imminent danger of the situation, the Brigade ordered the subordiate units to execute the preplanned defense. We had six hours of daylight and twelve hours of night time to race with Death. The units had to change the direction of defense from the west to the north, struggling at times to move into new positions under pressure from the enemy infantry and artillery. The struggle on the night of the 2nd of May, was a matter of life and death - it was a sleepless night splashed with blood, sweat and tears as we strove to complete the defensive line in readiness for the confrontation. Our very survival depended on how quickly we deployed.
Throughout the night, the Specter C130 Gunship and the C47 Fire Dragon were summoned to support the 2nd and the 9th Battalion. Naval guns from the American 7th Fleet fired barrage after barrage to paralyse the advancing efforts of the enemy. The mountains and jungles were eerily illuminated by hundreds of flares that floated in the sky. As expected, at four a.m. on the morning of the 3rd of May, the 2nd and the 9th Battalion suffered the first assaults from the enormous NVA column. The Brigade ordered the 2nd Battalion to execute the plan. It was to make radio contact with brother units and with the Brigade to have the pre-planned fire support. Reports came in from the 9th Battalion of approaching tanks. Soon after came a fierce onslaught from the NVA Infantry. The style of the attack was similar to the Russian method, in that both concentrated heavily upon artillery fire to substitute for weakness in airpower.
The 2nd, 5th and 9th Battalions and the Brigade Staff were heavily pounded by the NVA's infernal artillery. Bob Sheridan's account of the shelling read: “The enemy opened the most devasting artillery barrage that the Brigade had ever received. We thought the whole world was falling apart around us. Our vehicles, bunkers, villages and guns were being demolished. We wondered if anyone would live to fight. All we could do was dig deeper - and pray.”
My own recollections include the reverberating thunder of gun fire, the screeching of tank tracks, the rumbling of tank engines, and voices everywhere - yelling orders, screaming “Charge”, and uttering swear words. Above us, the jets roared and the bombs dropped - the sky was ablaze with flares.
Both sides fought along a line of about 10km - each thwarting the attempts of the other to advance, and neither was willing to retreat even half a metre. It was indeed a ferocious battle that shook the mountains and boiled the rivers.
At 5.30am the 9th Battalion reported that the Marines had successfully hit two enemy tanks with their M72 Light Antitank Weapons. The morale of the Marines soared. As the dawn came, and the battleground became brighter and brighter, the Brigade ordered the C130 Specter Gunship and the C47 Fire Dragon to leave the area, clearing space for tactical airpower, artillery, and naval guns.
Reports came in of enemy tanks and PT76 moving towards the sea on the stretch of sand east of Hai Lang district. The Battalion Commander and his advisor, Major Don Price, immediatedly sent air tactical sorties to quash the column. At around 8.00am the enemy shelling began to diminish.
Major Bob Sheridan, a serious expression on his face, addressed the Brigade Commander: “Sir, everybody else has retreated to the south. What do you think of our Brigade?”
I answered: “Ours is an excellent Brigade, and with the help of your fire supports, we will stop the enemy right here. We will not be moving anywhere. Not a single NVA solder will cross this river".
“Sir, take heart, as you are the man with the strongest firepower behind you in South East Asia!”
“What do you mean?”
“I have received orders that you are to have at your disposal all 30 sorties of stratofortress B52, all tactical aircrafts of the 7th fleet, all Airbases in Thailand, and all naval guns. All you have to do is tell us where you want to strike.”
(During the Vietnam War, the American Pacific Command had thirty B52 sorties per day to use in three countries: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos).
Having priority use of such strong fire supports, the Brigade chose without delay about 20 targets for the B52s to bombard. These included suspected logistic dumps, garrisons, enemy command headquarters in and around the vicinity of the National Route 1, north of Ben Hai River. Also targetted were places close to the National Route 9, the route which the enemy took to move from the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos to high spots west of Quang Tri Province.
Tactical aircrafts had to seek confirmation of targets within villages and districts north of the Thach Han river to the Ben Hai river, but otherwise were given free reign to target any moving object on the ground. From the south of the Thach Han to the Okhe bridge, they were to raid on request, directed by friendly ground troops.
At around 10.30am, Major De of the 9th Batttalion reported that more than twenty enemy tanks had been burnt by the combined efforts of the M72 Light Antitank Weapons and airpower directed by Major Jim Beans, the advisor of the Battalion.
Meanwhile the battle waged on, sometimes reaching a crescendo, othertimes, diminishing... as if the enemy were stopping to take a breath. The 2nd and the 9th Battalion wanted to stop fighting in order to retreat, but the enemy proved to be more tenacious than expected. Finally, the Brigade ordered a continous barrage directed close to the defensive lines to allow the two battalions to stop fighting and retreat to the south of the My Chanh. At 3.00 pm, the 2nd and the 9th Battalions managed to retreat, crossing the My Chanh two hours later. Captain Nguyen Van Ho, the Commander of Company A of the Combat Engineers Battalion was ordered to destroy the My Chanh bridge.
The boundaries for the Free Zone of Striking for the tactical aircrafts was shifted northwards from 1km north of the My Chanh to the Thach Han instead. The NVA, caught unawared by the Brigades's devasting firepower, and convinced that the ARVN was not going to retreat any further, grudgingly abandoned the pursuit. As blue mist rose to darken the tragic sky, the sound of gunfire became scarcer and scarcer, and eventually faded into echoes. A few enemy 122mm Rockets were shot, defiantly but pointlessly over the My Chanh, but the impetus of the NVA invasion was truly stopped. The 369th Brigade, after more than 30 days of being marked in Quang Tri, was able to stand its ground in the summer of 1972.
A month later, having moved on to another post, I had the opportunity to shake hands with the newly appointed Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Kim De, the Commander of the 9th Battalion. In a briefing for plans to recapture Quang Tri city, the Airborne Division reported a slow advance as the bridge had been completely burnt. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Tuong, who had just been appointed as the new I Corps commander, smiled at me and said : “Why so thorough?”
I smiled and said: “To be on the safe side, Lieutenant General!”
Everyone in the room burst into laughter. Indeed, the job had been well done, for when I ordered Captain Ho to do so, I had threatened: “If you allow the NVA to use the bridge, you should just disappear and don't bother to report back to me.” For his own safety, Captain Ho carried out his work meticulously. He soaked the bridge in gasoline, and then strapped explosives to the supporting columns. The result were irreparable stumps which caused great difficulty for the ARVN Combat Engineers!
Colonel Pham Van Chung
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