The Third Marine Battalion
at Dong Ha
Defensive Line, from 29.3.72 to 8.4.72
Lieutenant Colonel Le Ba Binh
The 3rd Marine Battalion had an uneasy wait at Base Song Than (Tidal Wave), not far from Saigon. According to information provided by intelligence, a large scale assault was predicted across the all fronts. The battalion was put on full alert and had 100% restriction*, which meant that the soldiers were not permitted to leave the camp at any time. Although soldiers who had families living in an adjoining camp were allowed to stay with them. The 100% restriction insured that all marines could still visit their loved ones without the logistical problems of calling each soldier to return to his camp from home during an emergency, hence allowing them to be called quickly into action during such an occurrence. Celibates, having no families of their own were not allowed relatives to stay near the Army Camp, but were allowed to invite guests and relatives to the Battalion's club.
This wait however did not last. The 3rd Battalion received orders to move north to Quang Trò The 3rd was put under command of Brigade 258, replacing the 5th Battalion of Major Ho Quang Lich. The latter retired to rest in Saigon.
The area of responsibility was in the centre of Brigade 258's area of operations. The 3rd was to be placed at this critical position, to protect Brigade Headquarters, Marine Artillery Companies, Bridges on the National Route 1, as well as a reserve force. The Battalion officers comprised of
* Commander: Major Le Ba Binh.
* Executive Officer: Major Tran Kim De, who replaced Captain Duong Van Hung who was attending a training course.
* Chief of S3 : Captain Tran Cong Bang.
* Chief of S2 : 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Hao who also was the Commander of the Commanding Company.
* Signal Section: 2nd Lieutenant Cac.
* Company Commanders:
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Kim Chung (Company 1).
- Captain Giang Van Nhan (Company 2).
- Captain Le Quy Binh (Company 3).
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Duong (Company 4).
After the Companies had occupied their positions, search operations were organised focusing on the positions to the west, along both sides of the main logistics route. This route had major importance to the 2nd and 9th Battalions, stationed at Bases Barbara and Jane respectively, as this was their main route of supply. Other companies scattered across the Truong Phuoc mountain ranges also depended on this road for survival.
When these search operations ended, I received orders to report myself to Colonel Ngo Van Dinh, the 258 Commander, at Base Nancy to receive new directives. Before my departure, I radioed executive officer Major Tran Kim De, telling him to lead Group B comprising of Company 3 and 4 to move close to Base Nancy (about 3km away from it). Here they were to resupply.
Colonel Dinh set an outline of his plans for the 3rd Battalion:
- After having received supplies on the 29/3/1972, (supplying itself with as many recoilless rifles as possible), the 3rd Battalion was to leave Nancy Base by a GMC convoy.
- The Battalion was to camp temporarily at Dong Ha airfield which had once been an US combat airfield which had been abandoned after the US withdrawals.
- On the 30/3/1972, the 3rd was to secure National Route 9, from Dong Ha to Cam Lo, up to positions held by the 20th Tank Regiment. The Battalion was to keep close contact and cooperate with Dong Ha district authorities, as well as the 20th Tank Regiment's Headquarters, to set up control posts to stop infiltration by communist sappers.
- The rear units of the 3rd were to move with Brigade 258.
Since it was a matter of great urgency, after receiving that order, I returned immediately to my unit to rush my subordinates off their feet, and to solve any difficulties so that my unit would be armed 100% as directed before moving.
A convoy, with cat eye lights on, carrying the 3rd Sea Wolf battalion, plunged into the darkness of night in the hilly region of Quang Tri, still blanketed in the winter coldness, which inspired the local idiom, "In March, when the elderly women die of the cold" The convoy, like a python, seemed to slowly wind along the path to Dong Ha, which was a haze of muñied white, due to the strange mix of winter fog and stirred up dust. At 11.00 pm, the convoy successfully transported the 3rd battalion units through the gate of the airfield. Looking to the east, one could see the small town of Dong Ha covered in the curtain of night, the weak yellow lanterns from a distance looking like will-o-the-wisps. All town activities had ceased now, the streets once alive at night were now sullen and quiet, the war making the residents ready to seek refuge in their bomb shelters. However the citizens were too accustomed to the daily happenings around them, the ARVN harassment-and-interdiction-artillery at night, or of the enemy 130mm rounds falling onto the town.
The convoy stopped, and the Marines quickly moved to into their positions, which were determined at Base Nancy that morning. While S3 Chief, Captain Tran Cong Bang and I ere following up the positioning of Companies, I suñenly heard departing sounds of enemy 130mm artillery from the north. Everybody shouted "incoming artillery!", and sought shelter. After a brief spell of artillery, the companies reported "unscathed". It was likely that the enemy had not known exactly where we had our positions, and had just shot a few rounds to adjust their artillery fire. Suñenly I had the suspicion that the Battalion's movements were being watched. Turning to Captain Bang, I told him it was likely that the enemy had had artillery scouts, who were reporting our positions and requesting artillery barrages. We then decided to order the Battalion Headquarters and the Commanding Company to disperse into small groups, secretly abandoning the present position and moving to the distant end of the runway and regrouping there. At the same time all the lights at the present position were to be left on, which was to mislead the enemy artillery scouts into thinking we were still stationed there. As expected, moments after the repositioning, the enemy began shelling with greater accuracy and ferocity onto the old positions decided at Base Nancy. Having experienced similar situations, we were able to avoid a NVA artillery attack, without notable damage.
However the Battalion was not out of danger yet, due to the watching enemy artillery scouts. I immediately ordered the companies to by all means detect enemy artillery scouts who could be hiding near the Companies' areas of responsibility, especially in the sewers, canals or abandoned blockhouses. Despite this, enemy artillery continued to rain down. The 3rd Marine Battalion was still unscathed but it was only a matter of time before there were casualties. In the darkness, Captain Bang's warm southern voice, joked with meï
"Sir! What did Major Tran Kim De do to make old Ho’s play girls clap their hands so much?"
(Major De had recently replaced Captain Duong Van Hung, making Captain Bang joke about what he might have did after getting this position, to stir the enemy so much).
Not long after the laughter had died down, Major De’/s voice echoed through the PRC-25 radio, requesting Captain Bang to let him to talk to me. With a voice, mixed with joy and pride, he reported that Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Duong, had captured a group of NVA artillery scouts, and that they were taking the captives to me. I immediately radioed Company 4 and praised their good work. Chief of S2 and Commander of Commanding Company, 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Hao, lead the captured North Vietnameses to me. I discovered that they were equipped with a Chinese Radio, two AK47, six grenades, and a small notebook containing signal codes. I was very happy to be holding that notebook in my hand, because it would enable me to know parts of the vital information concerning the enemy and their artillery targets. I reported the capture to Brigade Headquarters and asked permission to keep this group for further interrogation. From the North Vietnameses we obtained crucial information. This group of artillery scouts we discovered had intruded inside the airfield three days ago. It was the only artillery scout group the enemy had in the Dong Ha Airfield area, frequently reporting ARVN activities, pin-pointing and adjusting the coordinates for their artillery to the north. They belonged to the NVA Division 304, and said that there would be a coordinated attack on the town of Dong Haï They did not however know the exact time and date of the assault. After thorough interrogations, we gathered all information needed, wrote down all radio codes, then transported this group to Brigade 258 Headquarters.
Using the captured radio codes, we took turns following enemy activity by listening to their wavelengths, pending for a possible NV advance. At 6:00am the next day, we received orders from Brigade 258 Headquarters to patrol and secure National Route 9 from Dong Ha to Cam Lo We were quite familiar with this type of road security operation, having had to secure several sections of National Route 19 (from Binh Dinh to An Khe) and National Route 1 over many occasions in the past. Receiving areas of responsibilities, the companies were deployed, searching all areas around the important artery, which the enemy could use as a launching point for their attack. In coordinated efforts with the local police, regional forces, and locals, we manned check points and screened for enemy forces who sought to infiltrate the town, usually to collect information or direct artillery onto the town. The town of Dong Ha was previously a village in Trieu Phong district, lying between the Mieu Giang River to the west and the Bo Dieu River to the East. Dong Ha was also fortunate to be a centre of commerce, as it was built on the meeting points of two major roads, the National Routes 1 and 9. The town continued to prosper and grow with the arrival of US troops, who had manned the fire bases north of the town along the McNamara Electronic Fence. Although US troops had withdrawn, ARVN still protected this forefront town. Its proximity to the DMZ meant that Dong Ha was a prime target. It would become the first casuality of the renewed North Vietnamese offensive.
At 9:00am 30.3.1972 Brigade 258 Headquarters informed that VC would simultaneously attack all positions held by the 3rd Infantry Division and Marine Divisions. Using the traditional North Vietnamese tactic of "Artillery preparation, then human wave attacks" the enemy attacked the 8th and the 4th Marine Battalions at Holcomb, Sarge and Ba Ho bases, followed by an another attack on Regiments 2, 56 and 57 of the 3rd Infantry Division. Under the onslaught the area enclosed by the five points, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Con Tien, Khe Gio, Mai Loc, was in flames, covered by a haze of smoke and dust. The reports from the front suggested that the Marines of the 147th Brigade fought decisively, whilst the 3rd Infantry Division resisted strongly with support from the US and South Vietnamese Air Forces. Explosions shook the air, reverberating the whole region. Being accustomed to the daily artillery attacks of the North, the citizens of Dong Ha did not understand the severity of the attack, seeking shelter from what they thought was an unusually heavy bombardment. Even after realising the gravity and ferocity of the North Vietnamese attack, the citizens of Dong Ha remained in the town, choosing to defend their ancestors' lands. They were also confident that peace would return, due to the presence of the 3rd Infantry Division, Tank units, the Marines and other forces. Decisively, yet respectfully Lieutenant Colonel Dinh ordered:
"We have to stop the enemy at Dong Ha at all costs".
With his advice in mind, I would find that Dong Ha transformed into a very important strategic point. The Mieu Giang River, which formed a natural border for the town's western flank, ran parallel to National Route 9. It was along the banks of this river where Captain Ripley, an American Advisor to the 3rd Marine Battalion, helped identify the strong and weak points of this line of defence. In these critical opening hours of the offensive, the captain contributed ideas to my subordinate units to help establish defensive lines, maintaining the lines, by calling in and directing air strikes on enemy units. In añition to this, he determined a target line for Artillery and Naval guns. To further secure the defensive line, he coordinated with the 20th Tank Regiment to direct fire on suspicious locations, where NVA units could gather for an attack. Even with the strengthened positions, we still had concerns about two bridges on the National Route 1, the first being a railroad, and the other being a highway bridge. Hence plans were made to protect these strategic points at all costs, and in precarious circumstances the destruction of these bridges if the need arose.
Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Kim Chung was the main defensive force along the South of the Highway Bridge, found east of the Railway Bridge defended by Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Duong. Whilst these links to the south and reinforcements were kept open and defended by the two companies, the complicated stretch of highway named National Route 9 was secured mainly by Captain Giang Van Nhan of Company 2. Lying in a North-South direction between Quai Vac Mountain and Cave, the low hills found south-west of the bridges was held by Company 3 of Captain Le Qui Binh. The Battalion headquarters and the commanding company were positioned south of the old Dong Ha airfield, on a hill in Dai An village. I ordered the companies to perform search and destroy operations to annihilate NVA reconnaissance groups, and at the same time quickly establish principal and collateral defensive lines. The Marines were also instructed to set these defensive lines with trenches and mine fields, as well as scouting and organising positions for antitank weapons.
On the way to defensive lines of Group B, I was informed through PRC25 radio, that a squad from Company 1 manning a checkpoint had detained four suspects claiming to be Dong Ha subdistrict soldiers. Company 1 checked with relevant units, and then deftly interrogated the men. Under interrogation they admitted to being communist reconnaissance, ordered to observe our defensive positions, especially the tank positions surrounding the Highway Bridge. This task was to be completed and reported back within two days, before they joined sapper units to raid and cling onto the northern end of the Highway Bridge, until the main NVA could arrive. This main army consisted of better trained troops, composing of tank and regular infantry units. The captured men also revealed that NVA would concentrate their units to attack in the following days, this and all other gained information, I reported back to Brigade Headquarters.
On 2.4.1972 the 3rd Marine Battalion was ordered to reinforce the 1st Armored Brigade in operations with the 20th Tank Regiment Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tran Quang Lî This combined force was to bear the full brunt of the NVA attacks, if A1, A2, A3, C1 fire bases became overrun by the overwhelming numerical strength of the North Vietnamese. I was organising this secondary defence, when Group B asked my confirmation about a Dodge truck that was carrying a full load of TNT along with 4 ARVN soldiers and 1 American Advisor (COVAN), who said they were to mine the two bridges. My American Advisor was Captain Ripley. He informed me of the truck's origins, that it had belonged to the 3rd Infantry Division. Once informed I notified Group B that the Captain was to mine the two bridges.
I was returning to the main town of Dong Ha, when sounds of NVA 130mm artillery were heard. Captain Bang advised us to stay where we were and not return to the town, as NVA artillery was falling on Marine positions. He also informed me that an ARVN Infantry unit had begun to mix with fleeing civilians, and was chaotically crossing the bridge in an attempt to flee to Quang Trò Major De gave the order "Alarm", an order for a complete lockdown which closed all fences. I then radioed and reminded that all Companies what to do
"Absolutely no exit and no entry!"
All units were to remain clear of the bridges, with the bridges forbiñen to all persons as anti-tank mines and Claymore mines were to be laid in rows across the bridges and on the sand islands in the Bo Dieu River. Anti-tank groups under Sergeant Luom and Sergeant Phuoc, who defending these points, were to be equipped with M72 LAW. As the situation further deteriorated to the north of the bridges, my presence was an absolute necessity. Since the tank we were using had stalled, I told Lieutenant Colonel Ly that we would use my escorting jeep, armed with a machine gun in order to return to our unit. Despite Captain Bang telling me not to risk my life, I was determined to see the defence personally. Years of combat had taught me that every one had his own destiny, even if we did not want to believe it. I had known as case where an unexploded mortar had pierced a soldier sleeping in his hammock. Despite the luck of it not exploding, the soldier had died instantly when it impaled his chest. Hence I was inclined to think that destiny would manifest itself at a predetermined time in life, in any form and utterly impossible to prevent. This in mind, if death was to take me at the bridges, it was my fate. I continued on towards my unit.
Lieutenant Colonel Ly and I managed to reach the defensive line of the 3rd Marine Battalion. Upon arrival I found Captain Ripley and Major Smock rushing towards the Dodge that Group B had stopped the day before. Seeing their dedication, I urged Marines near the truck to help them put boxes of TNT at the base of the pillars under the bridge. Although exhausted and under an increasingly dangerous situation, with North Vietnamese just across the river on the opposite bank, Captain Ripley was ever dedicated and jovial. Shouting encouragement whilst carrying the explosives.
"3rd Marine Battalion! Number 1! Hurry up!"
His attitude made me laugh. Major Smock, advisor to the 20th Tank Regiment, not being close to Marines in life, did not understand what it meant, turning to Captain Ripley for explanation. After understanding it, he pointed an index finger to a marine, and then to the other end of the Bridge, shouting:
"Vietnamese Marine, Number 1! VC number 10!"
When US troops first arrived in Vietnam, they brought with them the "thumbs up" To many Vietnamese this was understood as "Number 1" or "The Best". As the human hand usually accommodates 10 digits, the Vietnamese according to logic thought that if one digit meant "the best", then all ten digits would have to signify "the worst". So from then when ever a complement was made "Number 1" would be said, whilst "Number 10" would be used to denote something of very poor quality.
The jokes kept spirits high and within a short time, all the explosives had been transferred from the Dodge to the bridge supports. I then ordered 1st Lieutenant Hao, the S2 Chief, to move a 105mm Howitzer into point blank range, with artillery rounds ready. This piece of artillery had been left behind by an Infantry Artillery unit, and was rendered unusable as an artillery gun. However Marine Artillery men quickly trained an 81mm mortar platoon to use it for a direct shot. This platoon was led by "Hanh the Bearded". All units reported back to me that they had completed all preparations needed to help them to deal with the "bandits" in what the soldiers called, a "duel of life and death".
Cavalry also cooperated with us in the defence. Two M48 Tank Squadrons under Captain Anh and Captain Doan Van Sanh occupied important positions behind Company 4 and Company 1. The 20th Tank Regiment's Headquarters and the 3rd Marine Headquarters also organised a second defensive line 2km south of the bridges, which served as a reserve and also served to protect the two flanks of the 1st Defensive line.
After having set the explosives and detonators at the bridges, Captain Ripley and Major Smock connected the detonators to the wires, and then disabled the safety locks. The task they undertook was very arduous and dangerous, having to scale under the bridge and set the explosives. Luckily their task was aided, by fences that had been set at the northern ends, and the constant and accurate 130mm enemy artillery, which had deterred many fleeing refugees from the bridges, making them instead head west in the hope of getting south of the river. Such a chaotic mass of humanity would have rendered their task near impossible, and even if they were able to set them, blowing bridges with refugees still running across would have been extremely hard. The fact that the bridges were left clear also helped the laying of Claymore mines on their surface. The bridges were now prepared to be destroyed to stop a NVA advance, with enemy gathering on the other bank.
Captain Ripley was running, holding the two ends of the wires to connect them to the detonators. Now just a push of a lever, and the enemy advance would be stalled momentarily. The two officers remained calm under the hail of artillery rounds falling around the positions. A number of 130mm rounds fell into the river sending water skyward, narrowly missing our defensive lines. Our positions were still intact, although NVA shelling intensified. However one thing was certain; the enemy would never shell the bridges, as they were the only links to the south and their goals, destroying the bridges would mean a halt to their tank advance. Knowing this we clung onto the Southern end to the bridges in this life and death battle. Unlike the bridges, the town wasn't so lucky, as enemy shelling further increased in an attempt to cause chaos and panic within the populace to undermine the defence.
Observation posts reported columns of NVA tanks accompanied by infantry were making their way to Dong Haï. I quickly got into contact with the observing group. Over the radio, they could still mix the usual army humour with their work, reporting to me hurriedly.
"This is Bac Giang calling, answer." I said in the radio code name, "Bac Giang".
There was a pause, before they answered:
"Reporting back to Bac Giang. There are 7 crabs, 6 big and 1 small, accompanied by troops of baboons... advancing toward Song junction".
Receiving this news I was excited and yet at the same time anxious about whether I could cook these crabs or not. Years of searching for an illusive enemy had come to an end; the enemy had finally evolved from guerrilla to conventional warfare. The enemy were no longer ill-equipped and poorly trained peasants, they were now a professional and lethal war machine, equipped with tanks and even SAM. This new face of the North would prove a worthy test for the 3rd Battalion I thought, the enemy would surely show our true strength as a unit. I radioed back to the observing group.
"Keep up the good work, Íll remember to save to two crab claws for you to have with your beer!"
To the other combat units, I warned of the approaching enemy :
"They have come"
I then discussed a defence with Captain Ripley.
"Captain. Should we call in Naval Guns or Phantoms?"
"Phantoms are going to arrive soon. No matter where they run to, to the river or the jungles, the Phantoms are going to drag them out. We won't need Naval Guns yet".
I walked back along the trenches, reviewing all the important points and inspecting the moral. Looking at their determined faces, I was happy to see that they weren't going to allow a single communist to cross this bridge. All the big guns were trained on predetermined targets, in order for an organised and effective defence if the enemy choose to cross the bridge. Everybody was attentively looking across the river, watching for the slightest activity. Some Marines were singing softly the "Marine March" to pass the time and lower the tension.
Based on information gathered from S2 by listening to enemy radio transmissions, we discussed measures to counter the enemy attacks. We came to the conclusion that the NVA, would attempt to occupy these two bridges at all costs, which would serve as springboards for an attack on Ai Tu Combat Base, found just south of Dong Ha. We then swore to transform the bridges into graves.
NVA continued to change coordinates, which now began shelling heavily further south of the bridges, directly into the defensive line of the 3rd Marine Battalion and the 20th Tank Regiment. Observation posts reported back warning of approaching tanks.
"Tanks rushing quickly towards us. three T54 and nine PT76 accompanied by Infantry"
Despite the hail of artillery fire from our Batteries, which impeded their movement, the enemy continued to advance.
* Midday 2.4.1972
Reports came in simultaneously from all units that NVA had been sighted. On the opposite bank on the north end of the bridge, enemy tanks emerged. I gave the order to fire with an old Chinese adage.
"Victory follows pre-emptive attack!"
At the signal, anti-tank weapons, already trained on the masses of steel fired. Some enemy tanks burst into flames. The lead Russian designed T54 tank, growled ferociously and rolled onto the bridge, confident in its heavily armoured steel hull. Having anticipated this moment for a long time, 1st Sergeant Luom, from his trench crept up and pressed his body between two concrete pillars, leaned his M72 on the bridge hand grip to prevent the weapon from moving and aimed carefully. There was a pause, then a press of the trigger. There was the sound of something travelling at high velocity... then a "whoomp" sound. The lead T54 burst into flames and immediately stopped. 1st Sergeant Luom automatically jumped back into his trench like a squirrel. That image of a lone, experienced and courageous Marine facing a rolling tank, caused Captain Ripley to admiringly burst out,
"My God! David and Goliath once again reappeared on this Dong Ha Bridge!"
Although the lead tank was burning, the others behind it had no choice but to advance. Another two tanks rolled forward, roaring and discharging plumes of dark exhaust. Advancing they discharged all firepower on the southern end against the defenders, expecting to mute our weapons. How wrong they were. Waiting for a lapse in the hail of gunfire, 1st Sergeant Luom and 1st Sergeant Phuoc slowly crept up, their bodies pressed tightly against the bridge steel, took aim carefully, and then fired. There was the high velocity whoosh, then "whoomp, whoomp" One tank burst into flames and was smoking heavily, the other severed it steel track and was also smouldering. Both were immobilised instantly. Hatches opened as several North Vietnamese, jumped out of the tanks, burning like torches. Thankfully these destroyed tanks effectively blocked the bridge, leaving the remaining ones no option but to retreat and seek shelter behind civilian houses on the opposite bank. The advance was stopped momentarily. But their retreat wasn't so easy. Our M48 tanks of the 20th Regiment made sure they didn't retreat so freely unscathed. Our tank gunners trained their turrets and fired. Several enemy tanks lost their turrets, smoking harmlessly on the other bank.
After two hours of fierce fighting, the NVA realised they were wrong in their strategy of using only tanks in such a battle to gain the bridges. Their strategy of "Quick fighting, quick victory" had backfired at the loss of several tanks as the heavily entrenched Marines smashed the attackers to pieces. The remaining NVA were forced to retreat further north in villages, leaving the bridges standing like two attracting baits.
In this fighting, the 3rd Marine Battalion had more than 10 wounded in action, mostly by enemy artillery, whilst the 20th Tank Regiment was unscathed. Major Tran Kim De radioed, informing me that he had pinpointed locations where the enemy were hiding and regrouping, and that he was requesting air strikes from Phantoms to flush them out. Turning to Captain Ripley, I told him of the Major's request. The Captain seemed have been waiting for just that. He smiled and said to me.
"I will fulfil all your requests, Major!"
With that he raised his handset and called in the air strikes. Before long, I heard the sound of jets streaming across the sky, as it was simply a short trip for these fighters, which were based on an aircraft carrier anchored in the Gulf of Tonkin just off shore. Major De adjusted the coordinates and followed the results by observation. Black smoke was seen billowing from a group of houses on the Northern bank. Columns of flames soared up. Major De’s voice could be heard on the radio handset,
"Phantoms struck marvellously ! Wonderful!"
Major De also reported that the Phantom air strikes were so accurate that a number of NVA crabs had run amok, some of them losing some their claws (guns). He proposed to cease the air strikes and asked for Naval and Marine Artillery to pound the area. I found his proposal logical with the enemy probably regrouping after the air strikes. I told Captain Ripley of the request and radioed Brigade 258 to order Marine Artillery to do their erasing artillery.
About 20 minutes later, US Naval Guns and Marine Artillery rounds struck the Northern bank, creating an area of blinding smoke and fire. I further requested VNAF to bomb with napalm. These would be dropped by Sky Raiders, which although not as swift as jet fighters, flew low enabling a very accurate drop. The initial drops burnt a large area. The fierce heat and lack of oxygen forced the hiñen NVA to come out of concealment. Out in the open, we were able to eliminate them with later napalm drops.
Thanks to the effective fire support from the Naval and Marine Artillery, and effective air strikes, the situation had ameliorated by 16:30pm. This lapse in the enemy attacks, allowed us to receive supplies and to take turns resting. Defensive positions were repaired and strengthen further, as we knew that the NVA would attack with greater ferocity in the later days. My entire staff's officers even joined us at the front line to share cigarettes with the Marines, boosting moral and praising the defensive of the bridges which had left the initial VNA offensive in tatters. Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, Commander of Armoured Brigade 1, also came suñenly to visit fighters of the 20th Tank Regiment. Spirits were high.
By the 1.4.1972 the situation in the northern bank had further deteriorated. The previously isolated firebases on the Northern bank, which had been surrounded and attacked constantly, were now occupied by NVA. These lost firebases included 7 firebases of the 3rd Infantry Division at Gio Linh and North Cam Lo. The area of responsibility of Regiment 57 of 3rd Infantry Division was also lost to enemy hands. With their rear secured with the loss of the firebases, the NVA pushed south with all their strength. The Dong Ha bridges again became the target, as the enemy were determined to occupy the bridges. The NVA Regiments of their 304th Division and 203rd Tank Regiment were assigned to taking the bridges from us, if they succeeded the road south would be open to them.
That same day, the 3rd Infantry Division withdrew to the old Quang Tri Citadel, about 12km southeast of Dong Ha, whilst Ai Tu Combat Base transferred to Brigade 258 Headquarters.
In the afternoon of 2.4.1972 the 56th Infantry Regiment surrendered to the enemy, with the defeat of this unit, the enemy were able to concentrate their fire onto defensive lines held by Marine Brigade 147. Mai Loc fire base was continuously pounded by artillery. Marine Battalions 4 and 8 also left bases Holcomb, Sarge and Bao Hoï The situations in the western area were becoming increasingly serious. Group B of the 3rd Battalion, Company 3 of Captain Le Qui Binh and Company 2 of Captain Giang Van Nhan with a tank squadron of the 20th Tank Regiment prepared to confront the advancing NVA.
At 4:00am of 3.4.1972 the enemy led a full-scale attack from the Northern Bank. Amphibious PT76 tanks with infantrymen crossed the river under cover of darkness. With strong, intense firepower they were able to temporarily cross the river and pierce the defensive line held by a platoon of the 4th company, which was lying close to the southern bank. 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Duong managed to direct his Company, with tank and Artillery support to dislodge the NVA who under constant fire had to retreat and ford back across the river. At the defensive line of Company 1, NVA tanks attempted to recross the Highway Bridge, but unsuccessfully. Our M72 gunners and M48 Tanks made sure they had to cross under constant fire, under such an assault several were destroyed, their burning shells impeding other advancing tanks. The remaining tanks were forced to retreat.
Then came the call from Brigade 258 Headquarters gave the order to blow up the two bridges. Captain Ripley and Major Smock were then requested to detonate. The bridges were destroyed at 18:30pm on 3.4.1972.
At 7:00am on 4.4.1972, 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Kim Chung, Commander of Company 3, reported the roaring sound of tank engines from the East. At the same time, Captain Ripley informed me that, through an American source, a column of tanks was also seen to the East, and asked me to check whether they were enemy or friendly forces. After checking repeatedly with Brigade 258 and Armored Brigade 1, it was confirmed that there had been no friendly tank units in that area. These were enemy tanks approaching.
The previous attempt to cross the river with the amphibious tanks and infantry had been a faint. The NVA tried to distract our attention from other sectors, by launching that more violent attack on the bridges. Thinking that they had distracted us sufficiently, they launched an attack on our Eastern flank, using the tactic "Manoeuvre in the east, but attack from the west" They never doubted that we would eventually discover the advance, but they were taking risk, hoping that we would discover the tank column only at the last fatal minute.
Captain Ripley requested Naval Artillery for continuous shelling for twenty minutes. From Le Xuyen village of Trieu Phong district, the enemy retreated, leaving the burnt out shells of five PT76 tanks. To adjust to the enemyùs change of tactics, all ARVN defensive units were directed to defend positions and at the same time have units searching and eliminating enemy forces. NVA advances were halted with supporting firepower and artillery, whilst on the ground we organised tank-hunting groups, which consisted of three lightly equipped soldiers. Each of these soldiers were equipped with two anti-tank M72 LAW. These small groups were used under cover of darkness to infiltrate enemy lines and destroy tanks. This tactic proved quite successful, causing chaos in the enemy, thus temporarily halting their offensive from north of the Dong Ha Bridge.
We were informed by Brigade 258 that we were to avoid misinterpreting troop movements to the West, because Brigade 147 would be falling back to Dong Haï With our left flank open due to the withdrawal of the 147th Brigade, we were in a very dangerous situation. I then moved Group B to the west defensive line because I knew for certain that the enemy would be following the heels of Brigade 147 as they withdrew and attack. At 18:00pm on 5.4.1972 Brigade 147 arrived in Dong Ha.
As I expected on 6.4.1972 the enemy violently shelled our defensive lines, especially the southern end of the bridges, as if they were determined to launch a final assault here. They were wrong to use the "Manoeuvre in the east, but attack from the west" tactic twice. It would be impossible for them to cross this point effectively since the bridges were already destroyed. Thus we predominantly prepared for a more violent attack from the West, and not from the northern end of the bridges. As expected the attack came from the west. I asked Captain Ripley to radio for Naval Artillery.
Artillery rounds pounded the enemy in the West. They were forced to retreat. They waited until nightfall when our observations became less effective, before using a whole regiment to attack our defensive lines held only by the 2nd and 3rd Companies. Under cover of darkness they were able to cause remarkable damage. The next morning showed that we had 37 killed in action, 11 severely wounded, 35 lightly wounded, and 4 M113 APC destroyed. Enemy losses only numbered 27 dead, 1 T54 tank destroyed and a severely damaged PT76.
After a day and a night of heavy fighting, the enemy seemed reluctant to continue the attack, bringing a lapse to the fighting. And even if they planned an attack it would certainly be at night to avoid our observation posts. I therefore exploited this opportunity to survey the outermost defensive lines to keep spirits up. The Marines were exhausted due to days of continuous fighting, and had taken turns to sleep and recover strength needed for the night offensives. I ordered units at the rear of the front, such as the Commanding Company, 81mm Mortar Platoon, personnel from Battalion Headquarters and engineers to come to the front. They would help the Marines repair bunkers, trenches and defensive points, clear away and bury enemy remains, lay mines and stick fluorescent patches on destroyed NVA tanks so we be able to recognise them under illuminating flares at night. Despite the losses we suffered under the waves of enemy attacks, the moral in the 3rd Battalion was still high, due to Battalion's strong spirit as an experienced and battle hardened unit.
At 11:30pm on 7.4.1972, the enemy recommenced the offensive, attacking simultaneously on all fronts. Unable to use the bridges anymore, the enemy began to shell the southern end of the bridge relentlessly. NVA infantrymen had forded the river that evening and in a combined pincer attack with their western forces, attacked our flank and back at the same time. Pressure was mounting on all fronts. We were nearly overrun several times. The 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Duong reported that his foremost front was pierced. He retreated to the 2nd Defensive line, reorganised his troops and asked for more powerful fire support to land closer to his men. I knew that his decision was extremely dangerous, as even though it would pound NVA close to his troops, one misguided shell could prove deadly to the Marines. I was reluctant to give the order, but I knew he understood the situation better than we did. I weighed the risks and confirmed his request a final time, before heartbrokenly calling in the artillery to bombard the Lieutenant's recently abandoned defensive line.
1st Lieutenant Duong reported that the artillery was extremely accurate and had caused no harm to his troops. He requested continuous fire support. After thirty minutes of incessant shelling, 1st Lieutenant Duong requested an end to the barrage, before advancing forward to reoccupy the lost territory. The battered NVA soldiers were dislodged easily, a number jumped into the river, whilst others ran chaotically into defensive lines of Group B and were annihilated. Once more the enemy offensive was stalled, and fighting abated until 1:30am on 8.4.1972. Thanks to effective and strong fire support from Armour units, ARVN Artillery, US Phantoms and US Naval Artillery, the 3rd Marine Battalion successfully stood firm against the assaults. The next morning, the Battalion changed from a defensive to an offensive stance. Marines chased NVA who ran amok under the sudden counter attack, leaving dead scattered in all directions and a number of destroyed tanks. The 2nd Company of Captain Giang Van Nhan also captured for the first time since the Renewed North Vietnamese offensive, two Russian made AT3 surface-to-surface missiles. We also seized a number of varied munitions: a recoilless 75mm, eight machine guns, two 61mm mortars, twenty-seven AK47 assault rifles, two B40 and four B41 rockets. Our loss was rather heavy with 8 killed, 32 wounded in action. Tank Regiment 20 had 2 killed and 5 wounded.
In the morning of 8.4.1972, second in command of the Operations and Logistics of the Marine Division, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen The Luong came to visit the Dong Ha defensive line. He passed on the praises of the Marine Division Commandant, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, and of Executive Officer of Marine Division, Colonel Bui The Lan. The Battalion also received orders to hand over defensive lines to Ranger Group 5 and to return to join Brigade 258 at Ai Tu combat base. From there the 3rd would be transported to Hue to be resupplied with more equipment and given more men to boost the Battalion's manpower. In spite of this temporary break from the fighting, it would not be our last battle.
The 3rd Marine Battalion was able to hold its ground at Dong Ha due to one crucial factor; all ranks had closely cooperated with each other. It was this as well as the Marines endurance, toughness, their readiness for self sacrifice and most of all their acceptance of all conditions that made the defence of Dong Ha possible. Yet it wasn't only the Marines efforts that contributed to the defence, it was the combined efforts of the South Vietnamese troops fighting at Dong Ha that halted the momentum of a North Vietnamese campaign of conquest.
Lieutenant Colonel Le Ba Binh
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