Wednesday, 23 July 2014

The Coup of 1 November 1963

Colonel Hoang Tich Thong
Before November 1963, the political situation in Saigon was very tense. Buddhists held daily demonstrations against the Government, whilst the opposition parties were biding their time. The political unrest also reached the army. Within the ARVN, there were military men who disagreed with the policies of Ngo Dinh Diem's government. These elements gradually coalesced, and a military coup was on the secret agenda.
Despite facing such hostility and disapproval, the government refused to change its policies. Instead, it sank further into the molasses of mistakes and political faux-pas. Rumours of a coup circulated daily, but no one knew for sure when it would occur and which groups would be involved. From my own observations, the people of Saigon were all for the Coup, for their belief in Ngo Dinh Diem had all but disappeared.
After the Communists announced the birth of the “National Front for the Liberation of the South” at Mocay, Giong Trom, in Kien Hoa Province, the military situation in all four tactical zones became serious. Skirmishes at the platoon level that had taken place since 1959, soon ballooned to warfare at the regimental level by 1963. Practically all the remote hamlets and villages fell to the Communists. Pacification was a failure. It was obvious that regional and regular communist forces were receiving more and more reinforcements and equipments. Thus, it was crucial to settle the political unrest that was unsettling South Vietnam. For the sake of security in South Vietnam, the army stood up, and participated in the Coup.
Two months before the Coup, the 4th Marine Battalion was appointed to participate in the National Day Parade on the 26th of October. It moved into position at Saigon Zoo. The 1st Marine Battalion Commander was Captain Tran Van Nhut. I was the 1st Company Commander. We practised the drills for the parade twice a day. I was aware that the battalion was secretly detailed to nip any coup in the bud. In the failed Coup of 1960, two Companies of the 3rd Marine Battalion, commanded by Major Le Nguyen Khang, had been moved into the Independence palace to protect president Ngo Dinh Diem. It was that act of loyalty that had earned the Marines the President's trust. But at the zoo, I knew that the Marines were plotting to overthrow the government. It was planned that during the parade, the Marines would unexpectedly capture the President, and then force him to dissolve the Government. The new Government would be one that had the full support of the ARVN and the Vietnamese people. The plot was the brain child of the triumvirate of Major Nguyen Ba Lien, the Marine Group Chief of Staff, Captain Tran Van Nhut, 1st Marine Battallion Commander, and Captain Nguyen Phuc Que, the Medical Chief of the Marines. This organization was led by the director of the Army Intelligence Service, Colonel Do Mau. But at the last minute, the plot was abandoned - the ringleaders preferring to wait for a general action from the ARVN.
In mid-October of 1963, the 1st Marine Battalion was ordered to perform an operation with the 4th Marine Battalion, which was commanded by Captain Le Hang Minh, at Ben Soi, in the district of Ben Cat, Bien Hoa Province. Both units were under the direction of Major Nguyen Ba Lien, The Executive Officer and Chief of Staff of the Marine Group. The movement was the decision of the General Ton That Dinh, Commander of III Corps, who was also the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military Governor. Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu, Commander of the 5th Infantry Division was in direct command of us.
At Ben Soi, the 1st Marine Battalion was ordered to search and destroy the enemy in the enclave of Ho Bo, which was on the other side of the Saigon river. It did not meet any enemy resistance. Many secret underground tunnels were detected and then subsequently destroyed. A number of important equipment the enemy had brought from Saigon to Ben Soi were seized. After more than a week, the 1st Marine Battalion was ordered to cross the river and gather at Ben Soi where the Marine Task Force Headquarters had been. It was the 1st of November, and shortly after 12 noon, the whole Task Force - composed of the 1st and 4th Marine Battalions, and a 105mm Marine Artillery Company - boarded trucks that took it to Bien Hoa, to await further orders. On arrival. the Company Commanders were summoned to a briefing in the private home of Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu.
On the second floor of that neat and tidy house, we met Major Nguyen Ba Lien, and the two Commanders of the 1st and the 4th Battalion. Major Lien told us that Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu was not present because he had been called away to a Joint General Staff briefing at Headquarters. At that moment, my sixth sense told me that something special was going to happen. Major Lien laid the map of Saigon on the table and told us that the Marine Task Force was going to participate with the 5th Infantry Division in a Coup led by the Generals. I tried to read the facial expressions of the officers. But everybody was calm and seemed ready to carry out their orders.
The 1st Marine Battalion was to invade Saigon Radio station and Cong Hoa Citadel. The 4th Marine Battalion was to occupy police Headquarters. The Marine 105mm Artillery Company was to station close to the Saigon-Bien Hoa highway and bridge to provide fire support. The Marine Task Force Staff was to command from a moving military vehicle. The Van Kiep Armour Task Force led by Lieutenant Colonel Vinh Loc, which had recently returned from Ba Ria, was to wait at the junction of the highway and the route to Vung Tau. The orders were very precise. No one said a word, and there were no objections.
We all boarded our jeeps and returned to brief our platoon leaders at 12.30pm.
We mentioned the possibility of a coup to our subordinates, without telling them that their superiors were directly involved. The Marines were to move into key Government establishments under the pretext that the normal guards were not up to the task of protecting the Government. In reality this was a ruse to move our troops into position, without confusing the subordinates in the Marines, and to allay the suspicions of the Government.
On the way to the capital, the civilians carried out their daily routines. Occassionally, they waved at the "Sea Tigers", totally unaware that within the hour, a historical event was to take place - an event that was to change the political profile of South Vietnam.
When the convoy reached the designated junction, not a single tank was in sight. The Marine Task Force Headquarters ordered us to continue, as it would have been highly suspicious if we waited for them. We were already beyond the point of no return. Just past the Saigon bridge, the convoy stopped at the Military Vehicle Control Station to wait for orders from the Military Governor's Headquarters. Minutes later, the Military Police arrived and led us through. Everything was progressing smoothly as arranged. The trucks carrying the 1st Marine Battalion crossed Phan Thanh Gian Bridge, then turned left to Nguyen Binh Khiem St to approach the Saigon Radio Station. The 2nd Company of Captain Nguyen Kim Phuong arrived there first, and the trucks rolled to a halt. Following orders, the Marines leapt down and stormed the gates. There was only a Field Police Squad protecting the building, the members of which were taken back at the sight of the Marines. They were informed that the Marines were now taking over. Despite receiving no such order, the Police lacked the power to resist.
The trucks carrying the 4th Company of First Lieutenant Nguyen Kim Thinh turned to Hong Thap Tu St., past the Hoa Lu soccer ground, to reach the rear gates of the Republic Citadel. The 1st Company, under my leadership, advanced along Nguyen Binh Khiem Street on the side of the Citadel to join the 4th Company in the invasion.
The 3rd Company led by Captain Le Ngoc Chau advanced from Phan Thanh Gian Street close to the vicinity of the radio staion, and acted as a reserve. The occupation of the radio station was completed at 1.15 pm without difficulties. Immediately a tape was aired, and the voice of Captain Nguyen Phuc Que could be heard all over the capital, urging the people to support the Coup spearheaded by the Marines.
Meanwhile, the generals were still attending the briefing presided by General Duong Van Minh in the Joint General Staff Headquarters, to organize the specifics of the Coup.
The invasion of the Republic Citadel came to a halt at the gates. Alarm bugles rang out, gathering the soldiers within. But it was just past noon, and many of them had returned home for lunch in the nearby base camps. Thus only a small number were left to defend the citadel. However, the Armour unit managed to rally a few soldiers for a counter attack, forcing the 4th Company to retreat to the Hoa Lu soccer ground. The Armour unit rushed out of the Citadel gates, and turned down Nguyen Binh Khiem St. where my Company was situated. I had positioned a 105mm Howitzer on the road, ready for the approach of the tanks. As the first tank appeared, I ordered my boys to fire directly at it. But the artillerymen were so flustered that they missed the target, and blasted the gate of the Zoo overlooking Doc Lap Avenue. In revenge for being targetted the tank fired a volley from its machine gun. It continued firing as it headed towards the radio station. The 1st Company had to hide behind walls to avoid being fired at by the tanks. Occasionally, we succeeded in stopping the progress of the tanks. However, neither side were willing to kill their own countrymen and brothers-in-arms, so the fighting was less than half hearted. Thus only a very small number were killed or injured.
My 1st Company then withdrew to take up position in some high buildings behind the radio station. We were supposed to support the 2nd Company and Captain Tran Van Nhut, who was within the radio station. The Armour unit, led by Captain Xuan, besieged the radio station. Both sides reluctantly exchanged fire for about an hour, but the infantry men accompanying the tanks failed to enter the gates. Both sides then adopted a waiting attitude: one awaited orders to storm the station, the other, hanging on for reinforcements.
From the balcony of my building, I saw that the Infantry - most probably the 5th Division - were already at the Truong Minh Giang Bridge, having just arrived from Bien Hoa. But they did not advance further. All units were immobile, including the Armour Unit of Captain Ngai. It seemed that they wanted to avoid confrontation with the Marines. Seeing the stalemate, I had a feeling that the Coup would fail in the same way the 1960 one had. The organizers back then, anxious to avoid bloodshed, were reduced to indecision. We were now very anxious, as not a word had been heard from the headquarters of the Joint General Staff.
Late in the afternoon, desperate to safe guard himself and the unit, Captain Nhut ordered the Captain Chau's 3rd Company to advance at all costs to the radio station to dislodge the Armour unit of the Presidential Guards. Finally, the 3rd Company approached the unit. Captain Chau, in a courageous and intelligent move, managed to hold Captain Xuan hostage, and demanded the armour men to leave their tanks. The Marines immediatedly took over the tanks, and broke the siege. Captain Xuan was released late in the evening. With the radio station free of the siege, the Coup was half way to being a success.
News of the progress of the Coup was broadcasted continuously, and gradually, generals from all Corps voiced their support. The supporters of President Ngo Dinh Diem were systematically captured. The citizens of Saigon gathered in the streets to support the Coup. They brought food and beverages out to the Marines, expressing their support. We were very touched by the gesture, being unfamiliar with such rapport and understanding between civilians and troops.
Late in the evening the Coup entered its final phase. President Ngo Dinh Diem refused to surrender and to go aborad. In response, the Coup organizers ordered the attack on the Republic Citadel (where the Presidential Guard Brigade was located) and on Gia Long Palace itself, where the President resided. The 4th Battalion, under Captain Le Hang Minh, attacked Gia Long Palace with the support of Captain Ngai's Armour unit. The Airborne units assaulted the Republic Citadel, with the support of other tanks. Aircrafts and the Artillery provided further firesupport. Despite facing such a dangerous situation, the units protecting and defending the President refused to surrender.
At Gia Long Palace, the attack was limited to a siege with minimal fighting for fear of damaging an important national building. It was unnecessary to launch a full scale attack as the President and his brother sooner or later would have to relinquish power. The entire ARVN had stood up and supported the decision of the Vietnamese people.
Early in the morning of 2 November, the gunfire from the defenders within the Palace fell silent. The Marines of the 4th Battalion entered the Palace and ended the Coup. During the night, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother had been secreted out of the Palace to Cho Lon. They sought shelter in Cha Tam Church, but were finally killed on their way to the Joint General Staff Headquarters. The attack on the Republic Citadel also ceased the next morning.
Thus the Coup, led by the ARVN, with the support of the people and the opposition came to an end, with minimal loss of life. I was very happy to see the release of my friends and colleagues who had opposed the policies of the Ngo Dynasty.
On the 2nd of November, when everything had returned to normal, the 1st Marine Battalion was ordered to move back to Base Yet Kieu, in Thu Duc. The civilians came out with presents and food, pressing them into the hands of the Marines. The mood of the Marines lifted, and once again, they were proud of fulfilling one of their many tasks and responsibilities.
Colonel Hoang Tich Thong



No comments:

Post a Comment