The Communists' Tet Offensive
and The Marines' Counter Attack
in February and May 1968
Colonel Hoang Tich Thong
I. The Military Situation in 1967
1967 was a year of tumultuous fightings in South Vietnam with numerous large scale operations organized by the ARVN, the Americans and Allied Forces, especially in 3 Corps Tactical Zones 2, 3, 4. General Westmoreland's initative of “Search and Destroy” was in full swing. Up against American Troops and Allied forces from Australia, Thailand, The Phillipines, and South Korea, the VC were anxious to avoid confrontation. As time went by, more and more NVA reinforcements were sent through the Ho Chi Minh Trail into the south, to support the VC regional forces.
Originally, North Vietnam hid their agenda behind the National Front for the Liberation of the South. But after the US started sending troops over, North Vietnam blatently entered the War under the slogan of “Fight USA to save the country”. In reality that was a pretext so that they could violate the Geneva Pact - their aim was to always invade South Vietnam.
From then, the fighting escalated. In the early stages, the Americans nearly always won the big battles because of their strong airpower and superior ground and air forces. The Communists, switched tactics to a war of “attrition” - the aim was to drag on the confrontations, to wear the Americans down and sap the US Army's man power and supplies by subjecting them to sapper ambushes, raids and shellings. The US did in fact lose many of its men in the attempt to eradicate the NVA regulars.
Although tactical air-crafts and strategic B52 bombardments continuously raided the HO Chi Minh Trail day and night, the enemy continued to make the risky journey down South. Intelligence sources, deserters and released POWS from the North reported that about 50% of infiltrating troops were killed before reaching the Viet-Laotian border.
On the American side, reinforcements swelled to half a million troops, but still, the war dragged on. Back in the USA, public support for the war began to wane. To force North Vietnam into negotiations, the Americans bombarded around the clock, the crescendo and decrescendo of bombardment tailored to North Vietnam's reactions. These air raids caused heavy losses and remarkable damages. Several Aircrafts , including B52s were shot down by Soviet Land to Air missiles. The pilots were captured. Despite the bombings, North Vietnam were still unwilling to sit down for peace talks.
During that time, the ARVN and the Marines Corps took part in joint ventures with the US or Allied Troops, which were organized by the US Army or ARVN.
The Marine Task Force “A” participated in Operation “Junction City”, which was organized by the 25th American Infantry Division led by Lieutenant General Weyand. This operation was the largest in 1967, with about 10,000 troops involved. It took place close to the Vietnam-Cambodian border in Tay Ninh Province. The results however, was not worth the effort of such a large scale operation because the Communists were able to retreat across the Cambodian border. After the operation, Lieutenant General Weyand gave an AR15 to the Marine Task Force “A”. A later model - the M16, was supplied to the ARVN to replace the Garant M1's, which were slow and held fewer bullets. The M16's could counter the enemy's sophisticated AK 47 much better.
II. Tet Mau Than
1. The move from Qui Nhon to Saigon
At the end of 1967, the Marine Task Force “A” reinforced the 22nd Infantry Division stationed at Mt Ba Di (Qui Nhon). Later on, the Task Force “A” was ordered to move and deploy south of District Bong Son. Helicopter supports came from the American Air Cavalry Division positioned at Nhong Pass, which was 5km from the Task Force Headquarters. The Task Force's area of activities expanded essentially east and west of District of Hoai An. The Military situation was rather calm, and was well within the capacity of the regional forces. Thus the Marine Task Force “A” had a leisurely time getting ready for the coming Lunar New Year in February of 1968 (Tet Mau Than). It was rare that the Marines had the chance to enjoy the one of the most sacred holidays with their families. Generally, they had to celebrate by themselves somewhere out at the fronts.
Each year, no matter what the conditions were, the South Vietnamese and the “National Front for the Liberation of the South” would agree to 2-3 days of ceasefire so that the people could celebrate Tet. Units at the front would stop fighting, but were always ready to to react if the Communists violated the cease-fire. In 1968, this problem did arise.
On the very first day of the Mau Than Lunar New Year, I was aware of a strange silence which was in contrast to the other days. The Helicopters and American Air Calvary were grounded, which was unsual. I had expected them to be up and about, carrying out their duties. The American advisor was himself, ignorant of what was going on.
Suddenly, the Marine Task Force received orders from the 22nd Infantry Division to prepare truck transportation to the city of Qui Nhon. The VC had infiltrated into the city and were occupying the radio station and near-by areas. At the headquarters of the 22nd Infantry Division, the Marine Task Force A was told that a South Korean Tiger Division had intervened and had quickly dislodged the enemy. Practically all the VC involved had been captured. The Task Force waited for new orders. At mid-day it was moved to Qui Nhon airfield to be airlifted. The 6th Battalion was airlifted first by C-130 to Camly airfield in Da Lat. The Task Force Commanding Staff and another battalion awaited further orders. The VC had apparently seized the area around Camly, and anti-aircraft weapons were preventing the planes from landing. Instead, they had to land at Tuy Hoa Airfield. From there, the 6th Marine battalion was under orders to fly to Saigon and landed at Tan Son Nhut Air base. The situation in the Capital was already safe, because the Marine Task Force B, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ton That Soan, which had been performing military activities in My Tho was sent to deal with enemy detected around the Joint General Staff Headquarters, the Hang Sanh area, and the Cay Thi T junction in Gia Dinh province. The 6th Battalion was ordered by the Marine Corps Headquarters to advance to Thu Duc District and to the vicinity of the Marine Training Centre close to Di An district. The Marine Task Force “A” Staff and the remaining battalion were airlifted to Saigon.
The Communists were completely routed, and the security in the capital and its suburbs was guaranteed. A few VC manged to make to their sancturies.
2. The Marine Task Force A's participation in liberating the Imperial Citadel.
Only two days after arriving in Saigon, the Marine Task Force A was orderd by the Marine Corps Headquarters and the Joint General Staff to reinforce I Corps' First Infantry Division, stationed at Mang Ca, within the Imperial Citadel. With help from the US Air Force, the whole Task Force was airlifted by C-130 to Phu Bai Airbase (Hue). The force was composed of three Marine Battalions, one 105mm Howitzer Artillery Company, and supporting unit consisting of Signal, Combat Engineers and Logistics. The Artillery of the 1st Infantry Battalion was to support the Marine Artillery. The number of participating troops numbered 3,000 soldiers. The 1st Marine Battalion was commanded by Major Phan Van Thang, the 4th by Major Vuong, the 5th by Major Pham Nha.
At Phu Bai, the Task Force temporarily stationed close to the Dong Da Military Training Centre. The Staff positioned inside the Training Centre were waiting for orders frorm the 1st Infantry Division. During the waiting time, the Task Force let Marine Battalions practice with the new M16 and M60 machine guns. It was like sharpening swords before the duel. The weather in Hue at the time was cold and drizzly. The sky was heavily overcast. I was told by the Training Centre's Officers that the situation was rather bleak.
The Communists had occupied areas from the Govenrnent Building to the Phu Cam. They were also on one side of Perfume River and the inner Citadel as well. Only the stretch from Fort Mang Ca to Lake Tinh Tam in the South and the airfield west of the Citadel were still in the hands of the 1st Infantry Division and an Airborne Battalion. I contacted several refugees from Phu Cam who told me that the Communists had massacred many people suspected of working for the Government. Numerous young adults and teenagers asked me to let them follow the Marines to fight the enemy. Everybody was happy to see our arrival as reinforcement. This time, there was non of the unco-operativeness that the Marines encountered in Hue when they came to suppress the Buddhist Rebellion in Central Vietnam. Facing such a situation, I found that the assigned task was not that easy to fulfill. The terrain in and around the Citadel made it difficult to to attack. The enemy could utilize the wall for defence. The bad weather was not at all favourable for aircrafts. The main psychological obstacle was the Citadel, which was an important historical and cultural monument. Thus fire power was held back to limit the damage to the monument.
After two days, and American Marine Chinook airlifted me to Fort Mang Ca to meet Brigadier General Ngo quang Truong, commander of the 1st Infantry Division. The helicopter had to fly eastward out to sea, then turned in the Bao Vinh direction. The anti-aircraft firepower wasn't particularly strong, and so the helicopter landed on a helipad north of Fort Mang Ca safely. Jumping out of it, I saw that another helicopter had not been as fortunate, and was grounded. Close by were a number of wounded Airborne soldiers awaiting medevac to Phu Bai. On seeing me, their faces lit up with joy. The Chinook then took them back to Phu Bai, from which they were transported back to Saigon.
A waiting jeep took me to the Infantry Division Headquarters. Entering the two-storied house build by the French colonizers, I immediately met Colonel Pham Van Phu, the executive commander of the Division. An old friend, he hugged me cheerfully and said: “Now that you've come, I feel much more confident.” Before we could continue with the conversation, enemy 122mm rockets exploded in the yard, a mere 100 metres away. It was a welcoming salute - or rather a preemptive slap in our faces. I went upstairs to report to Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong. He too was pleased to see me, but being the reticent type, he did not show it. We were not strangers, as the Marines and the Airbornes were very close and met often. It usually happened that as one group alighted from aircrafts, the other would be ready to board it. Moreover, when he was the Commander of the 5th Airborne Division, I commanded the 2nd Marine Battalion and the two use to rotate in areas of responsibility. We were also classmates in Thu Duc Military School for Reserve Officers.
After enquiring about my unit, he briefed me on the situation of the enemy, and gave me the order to liberate the area southwest of the Citadel from Tay Loc to the Imperial Palace. Then I went to see the Division Staff to collect other important information before boarding the helicopter to go back to Phu Bai. The anti-aircraft activity was much less intense.
Back from my trip, I explained situation to the Marine Battalion Commanders. I gave them orders to move to the old French Governor's Building the following day, where they were to board landing-crafts that would take them to Bao Vinh Port, north east of Fort Mang Ca.
The next day, the Task Force was transported by military trucks to the boarding area of the landing craft units. The enemy on the other side of the Perfume River near Dong Ba Market did not react. The Fleet sailed to sea, then turned towards Port Bao Vinh, which was still in ARVN hands. From there, the Task Force advanced along the north of the Citadel wall to enter the North west gate of the Mang Ca Fort (next to Nguyen Tri Phuong Military Hospital), which had previously been occupied by the Airborne unit. The Task Force was then to exit via the fort's main gate.
Once through the gate, the 4th Marine Battalion turned right to the north-west of the Citadel - close to gate Tay Loc. The Task Force Staff and the 1st and the 5th Marine Battalions moved past Tinh Tam Lake to turn right, in the direction of the Ordnance camp, which was situated southwest of the airfield inside the Citadel.
When we approached the South Gate of the Imperial Palace (where the King had lived), it was my intention to use artillery to destroy the locked gate to allow a unit to enter. I pondered over it, finally abandonning the idea as the terrain and the high walls were in favour of the enemy. We reached the military mechanical camp without incident. The Task Force Staff set up camp there. The 1st Marine Battalion was to fight along the Wall to the main target: the Palace Gate. The 5th Marine was to fight along the Citadel Wall to occupy the southern corner which looked onto the Kim Long T-junction. The weather was still bad - overcast and rainy, greatly hampering our movements.
When our units approached the walls, the enemy started to open fire. Simultanously, some NVA 122mm rockets launchers positioned at Phu Cam fired salvos at the Task Force's Location. We answered with the Artillery, but held ourselves in check for fear of damaging the monument. Our units advanced very slowly, as there were many open spaces. We had to traverse through citizens houses surrounded by barb wire. The enemy hid in deep trenches under the foot of the wall and within fortifications. Individual rifles could not cause any harm to them, so we only used hand grenades , M72 grenade launchers, and 57mm recoilless rifles. The artillery was ineffectual. After a short engagement, the 5th Marine Battalion succeeded in climbing up to the wall.
It was captured a number of enemy weapons including mortars and machine guns in the first few hours. The Battle dragged on for days, during which units of the Task Force moved ever so slowly, held back by strong enemy resistance.
The 5th Marine Battalion was once dislodged from the upper part of the wall but it managed to reoccupy it again. Sometimes NVA from Phu Cam fired 122mm rockets on request from their comrades inside the Citadel. Their radio communications were intercepted by the Marine Task Force which knew exactly when salvos were expected and duly warned the units. To paralyze the enemy artillery batteries positioned at the foot of the wall, a US Marine Unit which had come to reinforce in Thuong Tu and Dong Ba, sent us an “Ontos” car equipped with six 75mm cannons. As a result, we could partly limit the enemy firepower. Helicopter gunships could not intervene because of bad whether and anti-aircraft activities. On a number of occasions, american advisers suggested seeking support from american artillery positions at An lo. However, this was only sought a couple of times - the main reason being that the long distance led to inaccurate firing, and the Vietnamese Marines were sometimes hit by accident.
Meanwhile, at Gate Tay Loc, units of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Phan Ba Hoa, and the 4th Marine Battalion in the north-west were in similar situations to ours. Fighting progressed like a tug of war, and they were unable to dislodge the enemy from the wall. The number of wounded soldiers increase day by day, overloading the Mang Ca Hospital. It was impossible to evacuate those killed-in-action (KIAs), so they had to be wrapped up in ponchos and buried in a cemetery outside the Citadel.
At Gate Thuong Tu and Dong Ba, US Marine forces with their strong firepower had partly destroyed the gates and pushed the NVA back in the direction of the palace's main gate. It was likely that the NVA had received orders to retreatwesterly to avoid being isolated if the Nha Do Gate was occupied. Beside the US Marine forces, the Black Panther Company of the 1st Infantry Division participated in the push towards the flagpole.
After a week, the NVA at the Tay Loc Gate fought back fiercely and repulsed the 3rd Infantry Regiment to the airstrip inside the Citadel. Eventually the regiment, supported by a reserve unit of the 5th Marine Battalion managed to drive them back to the initial position. The pressure exerted by the 4th Marine Battalion and the 3rd Infantry Regiment increased steadily, forcing the enemy to flee through the gate toward Kim Long. Under strong fire support that included firepower from the heavy recoiless rifles of the US Marine Forces, the 1st and the 5th Marine Battalions tightened the encirclement, by advancing slowly towards the wall towards the Nha Do Gate. The aim of the attack on this target was to block the escape route to the NVA forces, who were still struggling against the US Marines in the east of the Citadel.
Finally, all enemy forces gathered to Nha Do to avoid being totally annihilated. Early in the morning, the enemy deceitfully intensified their fires as if they were forging a counter -attack. Anticipating the trick, I had given an order to my units to storm their positions at daybreak. Most of them had fled to the outside through the Nha Do Gate. Their rear contingent was decimated or captured. Many weapons were seized. When the 5th Marine Battalion overran the Nha Do Gate, they saw several dead NVA still holding their machine guns, full of unspent ammunition.
In the meantime, the Panther Company of the 1st Infantry Division and the US Marine units moved towards the Flagpole of the main gate. The Republic of Vietnam's flag was raised to replace that of the Communists.
The battle to liberate the Citadel ended. About one enemy regiment managed to flee to Van Thanh. About 100 NVA were killed, and 15 captured. After about a month and a half of fighting, the Marine Task Force A had more than 100 wounded and killed in action.
After, the Marine Task Force A Staff moved to a school in Quoc Tu Giam to station. All units had a few days of rest and restoration. At the new position, the Task Force was visited by General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff who came all the way from Saigon. As usual the battle conditions and the losses were related. In the presence of General Cao Van Vien, Lieutenant General Lam, and Brigadier General Truong, I raised the question of promotions for the soldiers. I made this special request as the process was dreadfully slow. Sometimes, it took 5 to 6 months for the decision to be reached, by which time, many of the would-be promoted soldiers would be dead. In my opinion, the process could be improved; soldiers ought to be promoted on the spot, the paper work could come in due course. In that way, the fighting morale of the combatants could be vastly improved. General Vien took it into account and promised to order his subordinates in the Joint General Staff to rectify the process on his return to Saigon.
There was a tendency for unit staff at base camps to work perfunctorily in their bureaux, while the troops at the fronts struggled and sacrificed all they had. The ARVN was weakened by internal dissent. It is undeniable that many people were promoted because they were well-connected to the right factions, rather than because of their skills, fighting capacity or valour. This caused a great deal of discontent amongst the soldiers.
After a few days of rest, the Task Force received orders to move and search the area north of Phu Bai Airbase. The enemy forces there were mostly regional ones, which had thinly dispersed westward from Phu Bai when Hue was liberated. As a result., the Task Force met no resistance at all. Civilians had returned to their daily routine. A number of mass graves were discovered, holding the bodies of those executed by the VC when they held the position. They were only some of the many mass graves made by the VC. More were discovered around the Schools at Dong Ba, Gia Hoi, the road between the Temple of Van Thanh and Ashau Aluoi... Civilian properties in Tran Hung Dao Street and Gia Long Street were severely damaged. Some days later, the Task Force moved to the Temple of Van Thanh in a “Search and Destroy” operation. The enemy suffered heavy losses and retreated to the mountainous areas of Ashau Aluoi. After a week, of performing military activities, the Task Force was ordered by the Marine Division Headquarters to return to its base in Saigon.
III. Tet II - Second Wave Of Attack
Although the VC had suffered heavily in the Tet Offensive, the first wave of attack, they were supported by the NVA in a second wave of attack on some cities, especially in ChoLon, Saigon in May 1968. They dis not seem to mind the outcome of the battle, and did not seem to care about the toll on themselves at the end.
They just wanted the world to know that the Communists were still strong and still causing a lot of trouble on the battlefield. The aim was to contradict the assessment made by the US Army - that we were winning the war, and that the Communists were no longer able to fight in the South.
Before the 2nd wave of attack broke out, Intelligence did not yield any information, as they had in the Tet offensive. The inefficient administration and management of the South Vietnamese Intelligence Agencies added to their subjectivity. Their tendency to underestimate and dismiss the craftiness of the enemy allowed the VC to easily infiltrate into Saigon. It would have been better to detect the enemy in good time so that they could be nipped in the bud. People in charge of security and intelligence services at all levels did not fulfil their duties from the Tet Offensive to the 2nd Wave of Attack. A number should have been disciplined rather than be promoted. The result was that civilians became victims, and soldiers had to sacrifice their lives.
The attack was a two-pronged drive. The first prong started from the Iron Triangle, passed through Lai Thieu District (Binh Duong Province) and across the Saigon River (at Binh Loi Bridge) to invade surrounding areas of subdistrict Gia Dinh and Dong Ong Co. The second one began in the Pineapple Forest (District of Duc Hue) and headed towards Cho Lon. Exploiting the darkness, and inattention of the defensive forces outside the capital perimeter, one prong successfully infiltrated deep inside Cho Lon, the other to Cay Thi T-junction in the subdistrict of Gia Dinh.
The next morning, the Marine Task Force A was sent to repel the enemy. The Task Force Brigade A Staff had been in R & R after coming back from an operation in Can Tho in IV Corps Tactical Zone.
The Task Force Staff was positioned in a vacant two story house, next to the petrol station at the Cay Thi T-Junction. Helicopters could land on top of the house. The 1st Marine Battalion fought house to house along streets where premises were completely occupied by the enemy, right up to the Gia Dinh Sports Stadium. All household occupants had fled the previous night. The 6th Marine Battalion pushed forward in Dong Ong Co and the Bang Ky Bridge area. To minimize hurting the civilians still trapped in the area, and to reduce damage to properties, all units had to fight house by house without calling on the help of the Artillery, Armour or Airforce. A unit of Special Force participated in the battle.
This kind of warfare had been rare, and commanders and soldiers alike had to have an understanding of urban warfare. Most of the Vietnamese marine Officers were trained at Marine Basic School in the USA, so they overcame the situation easily, As a result, we drove back the invaders to the outside perimeter of the capital without much difficulty. In contrast, the enemy lacked experience and were unfamiliar with the roads and streets in the city.
One night, some VC walked straight into the Task Force's location . While they were trying to orientate themselves, they were shot down by Marines protecting the Task Force Staff. None of them were heavily armed, carrying only their individaul AK 47 and a bandoleer of ammunition. They wore shorts without shirts, and had a rubber tube from a bicycle tyre on their shoulders. They had probably been separated from their unit and were trying to rejoin it. In Dong Ong Co, the terrain was clear and had fewer houses, so we were able to use aircraft and helicopter gunships to destroy the enemy fortified bunkers lying deep under ground. Some days later, the 6th Marine Battalion managed to master the battlefield, forcing the enemy to retreat to a village near Bang Ky bridge.
Anticipating their intention to escape in the direction of Binh Loi bridge, the Marine Task Force, ordered the 6th Battalion to block the way and directed the 1st battalion to besiege them. The Task Force Staff used megaphones to urge them to surrender. Finally, after realizing that it was imposssible to escape, they surrendered to us in small groups. They had to hand over their weapons. One kid, barely a teenager, was ignorant of the protocols. On seing him coming out to surrender, I said: “Where is your weapon?” “I'll be right back.” He ran back and delivered his AK47 to the Marines.
I felt sorry for them. Interrogation revealed that all of them were exceedingly young, and had all been recently conscripted in the North. That was why, they had not known what to do during the battle, and behaved in the manner of a country bumpkin in the city. They also revealed that their supperiors had told them to go down South to take over from the people who had already overthrown the South Vietnamese Government. Some of the 150 who surrendered were wounded.
I transferred them over to the Task Force Headquarters to be taken care of - the wound by doctors and medicos, and the rest by G2 for further interrogation. I ordered the subordinates to treat them decently, to feed them, give them cigarettes and allow them to relax. Before handing them over to the Capital Military Zone Headquarters, I let them ride in the military trucks which drove along several streets under Marine Military Police protection. South Vietnamese civilians on both sides of the streets cheerfully applauded us.
Meanwhile, in Cho Lon, Ranger Forces and a Marine Battalion had repelled the enemy out of Phu Lam. On the same day, a tragedy occurred. An American helicopter gunship accidently fired rockets at a house where the Staff of the Capital Military Zone were attending a briefing, and killed some high-ranked officers. Prior to the accident, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, Lieutenant Colonel Dao Ba Phuoc of the Rangers, and a Psywar Team visited my department. As he was leaving, Lieutenant Colonel Khang said to me: “You may come with me to Cho Lon for the briefing if you wish...” I declined since I was too busy. But Ranger Lieutenant Colonel Dao Ba Phuoc was killed.
The 2nd Wave of attack on Saigon ended when the NVA surrendered at Gia Dinh and Cho Lon. Marine losses were considered light after the week of fighting. After being routed, the Communists' strength seemed to wane, and we became masters of the battlefield.
Colonel Hoang Tich Thong
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