The fighting at Rach Ruong
of the 5th Marine Battalion
6-12-1967
Colonel Ton That Soan
Contributors:
Lt. Colonels Pham Nha, Cao van Thinh
and Ho Quang Lich
1. Overview :
On 4-9-1967 Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu was elected as President of South Vietnam, ending the political turmoil that had been present for several years.
This allowed General William C Westmoreland, Commander of US armed forces in Viet Nam, to become optimistic:
"Until 1967, ARVN had made such noteworthy progress that I thought about a US withdrawal plan. With a considerable increase in numbers in the last three years, although there had been a shortage in commanders, ARVN was capable of protecting the integrity of national territory despite the nation's political difficulties and the increasing strength of the enemy. There were very few organizations in the world which could perform at such a high standard!"
NVA instigated serious fighting in Con Tien, close to the DMZ (MRI), surrounded Special Forces Camp in Dakto in the mountainous area of Kontum province (MRII) and encircled Phuoc Long town (MRIII). The battle at Ba Rai Canal in the Mekong Delta was in MRIV.
A new strategic concept was proposed with cooperation between the Infantry and Navy. That was a basic plan to organize a US Mobile Riverine Force composing of:
- Brigade 2 of the 9th US Infantry Divion was formed on 1-2-1966 at Fort Ripley (Arkansas), commanded by Major General G.S. Eckhart. This Brigade was commanded by Colonel W.B Fulton and then Colonel David. It consisted of three Battalions, the 2/47, 3/47 and 4/47, Artillery Battalion 2/4 and Armored Regiment 3 of the 5th Armored Brigade.
- Charging Fleet 1, belonging to the 7th Fleet.
Navy Colonel Salzer commanded this US Mobile Force. It was performing an operation named Coronado 9, from 1-11-67 to 22-1-1968, aiming to destroy all VC infrastructures located at north of Tien Giang River in Dinh Tuong province.
The 5th Marine Battalion was reinforcing that unit in a combined operation in Rach Ruong at the beginning of December 1967. Rach Ruong was at the border of Dong Thap. It belonged to Hamlet Hung Hieu, Thanh Hung village, Giao Duc district of Dinh Tuong province. It was close to Cao Lanh (Kien Phong) province. It was a moderately long canal, from Canal Tong Doc Loc to My Tho River. It ran in a southwest/northeast direction, extending to Kinh Mot, Kinh Tu. On both sides of it were ramifying canals running in an east/west direction. Counting from Tien Giang River, successive canals were: Dau, Cai Coi, Gong, Huyen Vu, Ong Bo, Nga Muong, Bo Treï
The 5th Marine Battalion commanding officers were:
- Major Pham Nha, Battalion Commander.
- Major Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Executive Officer.
- Major Do Ky, Liaison Officer.
- Major Carlson, US advisor.
Company commanders were:
- 1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich (Company 1)
- 1st Lieutenant Co Tan Tinh Chau (Company 2), the younger brother.
- 1st Lieutenant Doan Duc Nghi (Company 3)
- Captain Do Huu Tung (Company 4).
- 1st Lieutenant Huynh Van Phu (Commanding Company).
2. Sequences of events :
a. Day N-1 (3-12-1967).
At 5:00pm, a briefing was organized at the 5th Battalion headquarters with participation of all Battalion officers. Major Nha informed that, according to combined reliable intelligence sources, VC regular Battalion 267 and Mobile Battalion 502 had been present in the area and hiding along Rach Ruong Canal. The goal of this operation was to search and destroy. The plan of this operation was as follows:
- The 5th Marine Battalion and US Battalion 3/47 were to be transported by boat from Dong Tam Base (My Tho) to Rach Ruong canal.
- US Battalion 4/47 was to be a reserve, a reinforcement ready at a helipad in Dong Tam base.
- In addition to US Mobile Riverine Force’s own weapons, there were aircraft, artillery and an Artillery Battery that was set up on 3 barges, which were towed behind the landing river boats. Each barge was able to carry 2 105mm and was tugged by LCM-8. Due to the operation terrain and firing range, the US 9th Infantry Division Artillery also used portable firing platforms. Each platform was used for one 105mm Howitzer.
The 5th Marine Battalion was to be divided into two groups:
- Group B, commanded by Executive Officer Captain Nguyen Xuan Phuc. It had Company 4 of Captain Do huu Tung and Company 2 of 1st Lieutenant Co Tan Tinh Chau.
- Group A, commanded by Major Pham Nha. It had Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Doan Duc Nghi, Headquarter Company of 1st Lieutenant Huynh van Phu and Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich.
b. Day N (4/12/1967).
At 3:00 am, a US fleet of river boats left Dong Tam Base, carrying the 5th Marine Battalion and US Battalion 3/47 upstream to the west. After having passed My Thuan Ferry, the fleet entered a small branch of the river in order to sail northwest for about three kilometres.
It changed direction to the north, heading towards Huong De hamlet, and then eastwards along Dau Canal. When it reached the beginning of Cai Coi Canal, the fleet headed north and entered Rach Ruong Canal. Although it was named as a canal, its width was about sixty metres to one hundred metres. It was also very deep, which allowed the military boats to pass through with ease. At 7:00, the first boat of US Battalion 3/47 began entering the Rach Ruong Canal. Meanwhile the first boat of Company 4 (carrying marines), under Captain Do huu Tung's command, reached Cay Sap Canal T-junction.
When the last boat transporting Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich passed Ong Bo Canal intersection, it fell into an enemy ambush. VC from the western bank of Rach Ruong Canal used 57mm recoilless rifles and other weapons to inflict maximum destruction to the boats of Company 1.
1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich (radio code name Quang Dung) reacted swiftly to the ambush. He sprang to a .30-caliber machine gun fixed on the side of his boat and released the trigger. His boys immediately turned their weapons to either side of the canal, west and east, and fired continuously. It is worthy to mention that this kind of transporting boat had its body covered with steel and was equipped with a net protecting against B40 and 57mm recoilless rounds. Furthermore, that boat had a very intense firepower of machine guns 50, 30 and automatic M79 grenade launchers.
On the leading boat, Zippo, there was a flamethrower M10-8, using napalm. When it was fired, it was like a dragon breathing out fire, effective within a range of fifty metres. On the boats there was a flat platform being used as a helipad. This platform was also used as a solid top like the roof of a bunker, protecting soldiers when the enemy shelled or fired. This kind of boat was called a Tango boat.
1st Lieutenant Lich reported to the Battalion Commander and requested an order to land his company. He also told his boys to be prepared for landing. After a quick assessment of the situation, the Battalion Commander ordered the whole battalion to land on the western bank where the enemy had deployed. Major Carlson reported to the US Mobile Riverine force CP about the situation and also transferred the request of the 5th Marine Battalion Commander to have boats approaching that riverbank.
The fleet immediately fired all available weapons at both sides of the canal and dashed to the western bank. Marines overflowed that riverbank with audaciousness and eùlan. The enemy reacted strongly, with the VC ambush becoming defensive fighting. Not wasting a single moment, 1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich sprang forward with the 1st squad. AK 47 rifles crackled at the boat bow, killing his RTO. He grabbed the radio and called 2nd Lieutenant Ngo Dinh Loi, the companyùs Executive Officer:
"Order everybody, including the wounded boys who are still able to fight, to jump onto land immediately."
About half and hour later, Company 1 was deploying in a row, approximately two hundred metres long and parallel to the canal. 1st Lieutenant ordered to simultaneously fire all company firearms and all boats weapons at the VC ambush line. The counterattack of Company 1 cut VC forces into small segments. They were dislodged out of their bunkers, trenches and foxholes. Flamethrowers from Zippo boat transformed the VC into human torches that emitted chilling shouts and cries. Marines charged like a tidal wave.
Another heroically scene was that the battalion commander and the US advisor, Major Carlson, stepped on board a C&C helicopter, which was on the helipad of his landing boat. He didn't care that the enemy was firing directly at the boat from both sides of the canal. Major Carlson directed gunships to air strike VC positions, causing them to flee into open fields. A great number of VC bodies lay on their ambush line and on the edges of rice fields. Major Nha directed Company 2 of 1st Lieutenant Tinh Chau to move south and deploy on the left flank of Company 1. He then ordered Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Doan Duc Nghi to move north and deploy on the right flank of Company 1. Company 4 and Commanding Company stayed at the back with the fleet.
The three companies advanced in a solid line with VC still clinging to their positions because there was no way of escape. At 11:00 am, Company 2 encountered strong VC resistance in the south, but eventually gained control of the situation. This company continued to wade across a rice field, which was full of water, in order to attack VC who had been positioning at Ong Bich Canal.
Company 2 occupied that target but the company commander, 1st Lieutenant Co Tan Tinh Chau was moderately wounded in the process. 1st Lieutenant Chich, the Company’s Executive Officer replaced him as Commander. However, only a few minutes later on the radio, Ho Quang Lich heard a report saying that 1st Lieutenant Chich had sacrificed his life. The Battalion Headquarters immediately designated Captain Nguyen Xuan Phuc to command Company 2.
Quang Dung recalled that the previous afternoon, 1st Lieutenant Chich (who was offering him a beer) said, as a bad omen:
"I don't know why I have been so anxious! People used to say that if the wife is pregnant with the first child of the couple, then the husband goes out on an operation, there will be bad luck!"
Now that Chich had been killed, Lich felt desolate and apprehensive. Chich had been his fighting friend and had combated alongside him in several operations over several years. Moreover, Lich's wife was pregnant with their first child.
All emotions were ephemeral, coming suñenly and disappearing only moments later. Lich's mind returned to the combat situation. He led one platoon across a barren field and advanced towards a guava garden edge where VC had been positions in solid trenches and bunkers in order to give intense resistance.
A number of his boys were killed in the flooded rice field. Finally he succeeded in occupying that target. A small number of VC survivors ran across bare rice fields and were gunned down. Another group ran and split into two small groups: the one first rushed in Company 2's direction, only to be shot dead by that company, while the others escaped towards the Canal, only to be killed in the same fashion by Companies 3 and 4 and the fleet.
Some ran onto open fields and became prey of the gunships, while a number of VC surrendered. Quang Dung threw smoke grenades to mark positions and requested that Battalion direct gunships to fire rockets at the solid bunkers near the banana trees. After accurate air strikes, Company 1 charged forward. Corporal Tran Dinh Hieu pointed his M16 rifle inside a bunker and opened fire. Quang Dung lobbed several more grenades and the explosions reverberated until the very last bunker was cleared or destroyed. All VC positions were dead quiet, without any sounds of retaliating gunfire. There were only cheerful shouts of marines filling the air. It was such a rare moment of tranquillity in Vietnam battlefields. At this point, it was only 5:30 pm of Day N.
In other areas however, fighting continued. Company 4 of Captain Do huu Tung received orders to overtake Company 1 to pursue some VC still scattering across the rice fields. Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Doan Duc Nghi moved forward to join Company 2 and advanced in an unbroken row. After rocket and machine gun fire from gunships, the two companies simultaneously charged and stormed the last remaining targets. At 7:00 pm, the 5th Marine Battalion had completely neutralised the situation. It proceeded to search the battlefields, collecting enemy weapons.
Since the moment the 5th Battalion had been ambushed in the morning, the US Battalion 3/47, having passed Goc Canal at Hamlet Hung Hieu (about one kilometre south of the 5th Battalion), received order to land on the west bank of Rach Ruong Canal. This battalion experienced harsh resistance. With significant support from the fleet and gunships, Battalion 3/47 crushed the enemy in a very short period of time and then progressed northwards to join the 5th Marine Battalion.
On the same morning, the US Battalion 4/47 was helilifted to the west of Rach Ruong battlefield, about five kilometres away and began trekking southwest. They established a blocking line on the west bank of Ba Du Canal, designed to annihilate any enemy unit attempting to retreat to Kien Phong province to the northwest. However, there was no surviving VC to use that escape route.
The three battalions positioned at the battlefield to perform medevac operations to military hospitals and to transport bodies of "killed in action" to nearby bases.
3. Summary :
* The 5th Marine Battalion:
- 25 killed.
- 70 wounded in action.
- Weapons conserved.
* The enemy:
- 30 VC captured
- 266 VC bodies scattered across the battlefield. All of them belonged to VC mobile Battalion 502
- Weapons seized: 10 collective weapons, 50 AK 47's, some others.
VC Battalion 502 was considered as being effaced.
4. Awards and promotions :
At 7:00 on 5-12-1967, US Navy Colonel Salzer and Colonel David, the commander of US Brigade 47, 9th Infantry Division, arrived in the area of the 5th Marine Battalion by helicopter. They were was preparing to welcome a visit of US and Vietnamese generals. The visiting group was composed of:
- General William C Westmoreland, Commander of US Armed Forces in Vietnam
- Major General Le Nguyen Khang, Commandant of Vietnamese Marine Brigade
- Major General Nguyen Van Manh, the IV Corps Commander.
Vietnamese awards and promotions:
- A number of Marines were decorated with US and Vietnamese medals
- Major Pham Nha was decorated with a US Silver Star with V combat.
- Corporal Tran Dinh Hieu was also awarded with the US Silver Star with V combat.
- 1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich was promoted to Captain "on the battlefield", and was decorated with a US Bronze Star with V combat. (At the end of 1968, Captain Lich was ad ditionally awarded a US Army Commendation).
US awards and promotions:
o Colonel Salzer was promoted to Brigadier General.
o Colonel David was promoted to Brigadier General.
o A number of US soldiers of all ranks were decorated with US and Vietnamese medals.
5. Commentary :
Although the enemy had chosen and prepared their field of ambush, the 5th Marine Battalion performed remarkably and it soon became a successful counter-ambush.
The success was attributed to the following factors:
a. 1st Lieutenant Ho Quang Lich and Major Pham Nha.
The swift decision making of Major Pham Nha who ordered the landing of his entire battalion right on the front of the enemy ambush line.
Also, the quick reaction of 1st Lieutenant Lich who directed his company with determination and cleverness was very beneficial. Major Pham Nha ordered companies to advance directly to the enemy flanks, attack, and pursue relentlessly and resolutely. They were the first factors that led to victory.
b. The coordination between 5th Marine Battalion and US Mobile Riverine force.
This was achieved by Major Carlson and Major Do Kî The simultaneous landing of all boats created a combined force rarely seen in Vietnam. When the 5th Battalion encountered VC, US Battalion 3/47 also landed in the south to reinforce them, and US Battalion 4/47 was helilifted to the west to form a blocking force to prevent VC escape/retreat.
c. Protective mechanisms and firepower of the boats.
Despite the enemy’s initial impact at the onset of the ambush, the 5th Battalion did not suffer heavy casualties immediately due to the protective steel hull of the boats first of all. Also, the protective nets that prevented B40's and especially the platforms used as helipads that protected marines underneath prevented major losses in the early stages of the ambush. Furthermore, the firepower aboard the boats quickly deterred the VC in their ambush attempt; primarily the M79 automatic grenade launchers and flamethrowers from Zippo.
Secret protection was not strict enough prior to Day N (the ambush). One day before Day N, the following occurred that caused the ambush:
d. The US Mobile Riverine Force CP sent L19 reconnaissance aircraft to observe the area of operation and sent helicopters flying overhead to scope out the most suitable landing zones. Furthermore, to enable the fleet to enter the area of operation, ARVN Corps of engineers had dismantled the miñle segment of the Rach Ruong Bridge to avoid blockage to boat bows and equipments fixed onto boats.
e. Because the terrain of this area of operation was predominantly muñy, it was impossible to establish artillery firebases. Also, the previously established Artillery firebases of the 7th Infantry Division, along National Route 4, were too far away. That's why the US Mobile Riverine force had developed incentives to create firebases on barges. Two 105mm guns (category M102) with gunners and artillery rounds could be set up on each barge. Barges had steel legs with adjustable heights, according to the depth of the river, canal or rice field it was to be used for. Three barges were adequate for one Artillery Battery.
After Rach Ruong victory, the 5th Battalion continued to be primary reinforcement of the US Mobile Riverine Force. Every morning, when entering TOC to attend briefing, the commanders of the US Riverine Force and the Infantry Brigade welcomed Major Pham Nha, and accompanying officers, with warm handshakes. This attitude differed completely with previous common opinion amongst US officials.
Colonel Ton that Soan
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