Marine Brigade 147
Pulled Out Of Mai Loc
Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao
Lieutenant Colonel Cao Van Thinh
I. The enemy situation in March 1972
Before 30/03/1972, the US military intelligence services noted the activities of NVA in the DMZ. The US Advisor to the Third Infantry Division reported this information to Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, the commander of this unit.
At 11.00am on 30/03/1972, two outposts of the Fourth Marine Battalion at Sarge and BaHo detected the NVA advancing towards them. The Fourth Marine Battalion called in the Marine Artillery. At the same time, Marine Battalion 8 at Fire Base Holcomb was shelled. At noon, two NVA Regiments 38 and 24 of Division 304 attacked Holcomb. Regiment 36, Division 304 charged towards BaHo and Sarge.
On the first day of these attacks, the NVA shelled more than 5,000 rounds of mortars, artillery and rockets at the ARVN bases.
Fire Base Carroll (Tan Lam) of Infantry Regiment 56 and Fire Base Mai Loc of Marine Brigade 147 received continuous and heavy bombardments. That was why the 105mm and 155mm Howitzer Batteries at these Bases could not be used for fire support to the friendly units in this tactical area of responsibility (TAOR). USAF and VNAF air supports were also limited because of the low cloud ceiling, heavy rain and strong winds. Helicopters could not land to resupply units and medevac due to the continuous rounds that the NVA were raining on the bases from the mountains in the west.
At 6:00pm on 30/03/1972, the two positions of Marine Battalion Four at Sarge and BaHo were pounded by 600 NVA rockets and artillery rounds which destroyed 70% of the defensive trenches and bunkers. A number of Marines were either killed or wounded. Fire Base Carroll was encircled and heavily driven on by the NVA. The 105mm and 155m Howitzer Batteries in this camp had to lower their gun barrels to fire point blank at the communists. However, the NVA pressure continued to increase and worsened the intense fights in the west of Ai Tu Combat Base. On 31/03/1972, I corps Headquarters sent Marine Battalion Seven to reinforce Brigade 147 at Mai Loc. At the same time, Third Marine Battalion of Brigade 258 received the order to move from My Chanh to Dong Ha to retain the National Route 9 from Dong Ha to Cam Lo. Marine Brigade 258 Headquarters moved into where Ai Tu Combat Headquarters had been.
The Third Infantry Division Commander and his staff then moved to Quang Tri Old Citadel.
On 01/04/1972, the NVA intensified their pressure on the DMZ Fire Bases such as A4, C2 and Fuller. Khe Gio Base of Third Infantry Division was overrun. Sarge and BaHo was then abandoned. The Fourth and Eighth Marine Battalion retreated and temporarily positioned themselves in Mai Loc Village. These two units then defended the eastern flank of Mai Loc Base.
II. The plan to pull of Mai Loc
a. Period of preparation (from 02/04/1972)
The situation from the last twenty four hours was received.
Immediately after Camp Carrol was lost to the NVA at 2.30pm on 02/04/1972, due to the surrender of the 56th Infantry Regiment, Mai Loc Base became the main target of the NVA. During the six hours of fighting, the 105mm and 155mm Howitzers artillery men had lowered their gun barrels to fire at point blank range in order to stop the waves of attacks from the NVA regiment. Finally the Mai Loc Base was surrounded, facing the enemy on three out of four sides. Before Camp Carrol was lost, Brigade 147 Commander, Colonel Bao and his US advisor, Major Jim Joy discussed the situation. Both came to the conclusion: "If Camp Carroll was lost, Mai Loc will be unlikely to continue"
The Seventh Marine Battalion of Major Hue, a newly arrived reinforcement, participated in defending the eastern flank of Mai Loc Base with other pre-existing units of Brigade 147. Ammunition gradually dwindled. Artillery rounds became in shortage. The helicopters could not aid us in supplies either due to the low cloud ceiling and the windy rains. The NVA's AAA around Camp Carroll were very dense. They threw a thick net of anti aircraft bullets into the sky, thus hindering all resupplies and medevacs by the helicopters. Aircrafts were unable to give air support.
Marine Brigade 147 Commander, its US advisors and Battalion Commanders gathered for a briefing. Everyone agreed to withdraw to avoid further human losses. The Seventh Battalion was chosen to be the rear contingent during the retreat. After a thorough discussion about the method of retreat, Brigade 147 Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao and his US advisor chose the north west route leading to Mai Loc Village where the Fourth Battalion was positioned. The latter was to prepare for the link up with Brigade 147 and to support the Eighth Battalion during its withdrawal to Route 1 and on to Quang Tri.
On 04/04/1972, at 10.00am, Lieutenant Colonel Bao reported to Brigadier General Vu Van Giai about the situation in the area and the same time requested permission to withdraw Brigade 147 out of Mai Loc. Brigadier General Vu Van Giai ordered: "Try your best to stay there, but when you can't endure anymore, then withdraw". Colonel Bao, the Marine Brigade 147 Commander, recognised that:
1. This Brigadier General, who had been the Field Commander, had no plans for reinforcements or any counter attacks.
2. Staying back in Mai Loc would mean receiving more and more NVA Artillery rounds.
3. The enemy was driving on closer and closer towards the base.
4. Resupplies and medevacs were absolutely impossible.
At 2.00pm on 04/04/1972, the last communication signal aerial of the Base was destroyed by NVA attacks. More defensive structures (bunkers) were also erased.
Colonel Bao informed his US advisor of his decision to withdraw out of Mai Loc according to the pre-determined plan. The retreat would start at 6.00pm on 04/04/1972 and although the NVA tanks had not appeared, their infantry were surrounding three sides of the Base. Only on the eastern side that there was the Seventh Marine Battalion ready to support the Brigade's withdrawal.
Colonel Bao ordered everything that was unable to be carried away to be destroyed.
At 6:00pm, after having fired their last rounds, the Marine Artillery men destroyed their Howitzers.
b. Process of the retreat
At 6:15pm, the sky was already dark. Brigade 147 left Mai Loc Base under the enemy's heavy fire. The NVA 130mm artillery followed the retreating column. After the last company had exited the Base, the Seventh Marine Battalion received orders to retreat. While positioning in the eastern surrounding area of the Base, Battalion Seven had battled with the enemy to the south east for the entire day of 04/04/1972. The NVA used "hugging tactics" to cause difficulty to the silent retreat of Battalion Seven. Major Hue ordered all company commanders to let their units withdraw in formation, and to carry all wounded soldiers with them. During the process of pulling out, Group A of the Battalion had to destroy and overrun a NVA 82mm mortar team.
Brigade 147 did not use a shortcut route from Mai Loc to Ai Tu. Had it used this route, the Marines would have crossed numerous fields, mountains, hills, deep creeks and certainly would have encountered NVA blocking forces.
The latter had previously deployed there two days ago. According to the predetermined plan, Brigade 147 travelled in a north westerly direction, entering Mai Loc Village (Hung Hoa) and then turned east, towards National Route 1. The night was deeply dark with light rain. All units of Brigade 147 silently retreated. Arriving at Dinh River, three hours had to be spent in crossing the river.
As the rear contingent of the column, the Seventh Marine Battalion had to carry all wounded and exhausted Marines of the Fourth and the Eighth Battalions. It was a burden. That is why the Seventh Battalion reached Ai Tu one day after the other units had arrived. The next day, Brigade 147 moved to Hue for supplies and for much needed rest. Only the Seventh Marine Battalion, with its fighting capacity still intact, was positioned in Hai Lang to protect the road between My Chanh and Quang Tri. After the week's rest, Marine Brigade 147 returned to Ai Tu to replace Marine Brigade 258 and defend the Combat Base in the west until the end of May of 1972.
Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao
Lieutenant Colonel Cao Van Thinh
No comments:
Post a Comment