Marine Task force B
Operation in An Lao, 1967
Colonel Ton That Soan
I. General Overview
An Lao valley lies past Vinh Thanh valley in the province of Binh Dinh, and continues towards Tam Quan in the Bong Son district. The valley finally comes to an end in the far east of Vietnam where it meets the seashore. It has very significant strategic values, which was why Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) established a subdistrict in An Lao, 25km northwest of the Bong Son district. The purpose of this subdistrict was twofold: to block North Vietnam Army (NVA) infiltration from secret sanctuaries in the three-borders area and from Do Xa sanctuaries into the fertile delta and populated area of Binh Dinh province.
Following the directions that were given on 11th of October 1964 by their Political Committee, Viet Cong (VC) forces opened the Dry Season Campaign (Autumn-Winter Campaign), which lasted from 1964 to 1965.
On the night of June 12th 1964, in parallel with the battle in Phuoc Tuy province by Binh Gia, VC forces in Binh Dinh simultaneously attacked Hill 193 (where there had been 2 ARVN 105mm Howitzers) and the Regional Forces' outposts at Van Khanh, Hoi Long and My Thanh.
On the day following the attacks, Infantry 22nd Division organised a reinforcement operation with 3 prongs: Helilift, APC (Armoured Personnel Carrier) accompanied by Infantrymen, and Infantry advancing from Bong Son. All three prongs were engaged in heavy fighting and both sides suffered profound casualties. When it became clear that the situation would not bring any benefits for them, NVA withdrew their forces on December 9th 1964. ARVN, knowing that they lacked sufficient manpower to protect such an isolate area with complicated terrain, abandoned the An Lao subdistrict.
Marine Task Force A, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Thanh Yen with Major Co Tan Tinh Chau as his Chief of Staff, which comprised of the 1st Battalion, lead by Major Ton That Soan and the 3rd Battalion with Major Nguyen The Luong as their leader, participated in a “Search and Destroy” operation at An Lao valley in the middle of 1965. The 1st Battalion advanced and occupied Hill 193, which had been renamed by local residents as Holy Cross Hill, in respect of the monumental white concrete Holy Cross erected on the hill against the dark green mountains looming ominously at the back.
In late January 1966 another joint “Search and Destroy” operation was launched by the ARVN and US forces. Officially it was named Mashes/White Wing but was also known by many as the Bong Son campaign. The operation lasted a total of 42 days, most of the fighting being in the Duc Pho district located in Quang Ngai province. US Marines occupied An Lao valley, while the US 1st Cavalry (CAV) were at Kim Son valley in Binh Dinh province.
The operation led to the deaths of 1,342 NVA fighters and the capture of 635 more. 1,087 dubious persons were arrested and 3,421 civilians became victims of the fighting.
II. The Structure of Marine
A. The Task Force Headquarters :
* Commander: Lt Colonel Ton That Soan
* US Chief advisor: Major Larry Gaboury
* US Vice advisor: Captain John Grinalds
B. The 2nd Battalion :
* Commander: Major Ngo Van Dinh
* Executive Officer: Captain Nguyen Kim De
* Company Commanders:
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Kim De (Commanding Company)
- Captain Tran Kim Hoang (Company 1)
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuat (Company 2)
- 1st Lieutenant Dinh Xuan Lam (Company 3)
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Hop (Company 4)
* US advisor: Captain Thomas Campbell
C. The 3rd Battalion :
* Commander: Major Nguyen Nang Bao
* Executive officer: Captain Pham Van Sat
* Company Commanders:
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Cong Bang (Commanding Company)
- 1st Lieutenant Duong Van Hung (Company 1)
- 1st Lieutenant Le Ba Binh (Company 2)
- 1st Lieutenant Hoang Don Tuan (Company 3)
- 1st Lieutenant Vu Mong Hung (Company 4)
* US advisor: Captain Mac Dube
D. 105mm Howitzer Battery :
* Commander: Captain Tran Thien Hieu
III. Supports
* Artillery :
- Marine Artillery Battery of 105mm Howitzer were provided and positioned at De Duc airstrip
- Two 155mm Howitzers of the 22nd Infantry Division were also located at the Bong Son airstrip
- US 105mm Howitzers of the US 1st CAV were scattered along the high points of operational areas
* Aircrafts :
- L-19 US-FAC (Forward Air Controller) in the sky, directing US aircrafts and helicopters when asked to by the US advisors system.
IV. Mission of Marine Task Force B :
March, 1967. Marine Task Force B received orders to organise a “Search and Destroy” mission to find a NVA battalion hiding in An Lao valley following the evacuating of the US 1st CAV the year before. In addition to locating enemy forces, Task Force B had an alternative mission: relocate all the local An Lao residents to refugee camps in Bong Son.
V. Process of Operation
Day N, 4:00am. Marine Task Force B departed from its position north of Bong Son, unheard and unseen, covered by the early morning darkness. They made their way northwards along the An Lao River, the 2nd Battalion, which included Task Force headquarters, moving along the right bank of the river and the 3rd Battalion on the other side. The two prongs advanced, directly parallel to each other and alert to help the other if anything were to go wrong. When the two contingents were about to enter their 1st target area, FAC Larry Pritchett on an US L-19 contacted Captain Mac Dube. “Be careful! There were just people moving on the slope right in front of you!” Almost as if the warning was the initiation signal, immediately following Pritchett's cautionary words, the 3rd Battalion received heavy fire from an invisible enemy force on high ground. Major Bao bellowed out orders for his companies to hastily seek shelter among the trees and recesses near the base of the mountain and to avoid any barren sand strands along the riverbanks.
At that moment the 2nd Battalion was 400m away from the 1st target and 600m to the east of the 3rd Battalion. With that much distance between the two battalions, and the river separating them, the 3rd Battalion called in aid in the form of artillery to attack the high points where the enemy fire had originated from. Just moments following the cry for help sent by the 3rd Battalion, FAC guided propeller aircrafts took off to perform air strikes on the enemy.
The 3rd Battalion quickly approached the foot of the mountain, while still constantly being sprayed by enemies with machine guns and personal firearms on the high points of the mountain. The enemy had immediately gained the upper hand as they could hardly be spotted hiding in the caves, recesses and behind rocks near and on the mountain. To add to the desperate situation that faced the 3rd Battalion, the artillery help that was called for was largely ineffective, the shelling and air strikes causing very little damage to the enemy.
Meanwhile, on the other side of An Lao River, local residents were spotted by the 2nd Battalion fleeing from their villages. In the villager's arms lay as much of their belongings as they could humanely hold, with their children following behind them, running southwards towards the safety of Bong Son. Major Dinh deployed a platoon to control and interrogate the escaping civilians for any information on the enemy. The soldiers who reported back told the Major that a NVA regular unit had deployed in the next village of the 2nd Battalion's route. With all they knew about the situation handed over to the 2nd Battalion, the fleeing villagers were allowed to escape so that they could reach the safe zone and avoid further civilian casualties.
At the base of the mountain, the 3rd Battalion although never breaking formation during their advance, still received heavy fire from enemy blocking cells hiding on the high ground. So the 3rd Battalion was ordered to find shelter and hold position until nightfall. At that time, under the cover of darkness, they could advance without being spotted by the enemy, so that they could manoeuvre their way around the mountain and attack the NVA forces from behind. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion received an order to hold their position. They were to wait for aerial support that would help them reveal the new enemy's positions, so that they could be annihilated while suffering less casualties.
Lieutenant Colonel Soan put in a request for Major Gaboury to ask for an air strike by US aircrafts on the 2nd Battalion's targets. US L-19 FAC conscientiously guided 20 aircrafts to bomb and destroy any suspected enemy spots. Night fell onto the battlefields once again and by this time the FAC had directed Specter gunship AC-130 to fire mercilessly at the target with fully equipped machine guns. On top of the heavy artillery, illuminating flames were dropped so that the enemy could be easily found and recognised even in their hiding positions. When the last of the air supports ceased, US artillery finish by firing "Harassment and Interdiction" shellings throughout the night to block any NVA soldiers who might have survived and tried to retreat northwards to safety.
As soon as the sun rose the next morning on Day N+1, 2nd Battalion officers requested a volley of 105mm smoke rounds to create a curtain between the outer edge of the target and their current deployment positions. When the smoke curtain dissipated, Crazy Buffalos charged the enemy in an effort to capture the target. In a one sided battle, the 2nd Battalion easily secured the target area, as it had already been all but abandoned by the enemy. There were only small groups of NVA soldiers scattered inside the target, but they provided little resistance towards a force with far greater numbers and weaponry. Occasionally, a clattering of gun shots, a mixture of AK47 and M16 could be heard, and then explosions would follow, where our grenades had been thrown into NVA bunkers. In some places, Marines had to utilise their close combat training skills against the enemy, simply because they refused to surrender, and lethal force was hardly necessary. After the target area had been secured, a casualty count was taken. The damage to the marines was minimal: just a total of seventeen wounded or killed. One of who was a brave soldier, an officer who had sacrificed his life to protect those of his subordinates.
As the sun reached its zenith, the sound of war finally ceased, yet the smell was still firmly in the air. 3 helicopters from the 1st CAV quickly arrived to pick the wounded and medevac was achieved both swiftly and successfully. The task now began for companies to start thoroughly searching all the NVA bunkers for any surviving enemy forces. A total of 3 wounded NVA were captured and 10 more NVA were killed. 12 personal firearms and a number of documents were seized and taken to the appropriate authorities. Another valuable piece of information that had been found was a diary on the body of a dead NVA commander, who was in charge of the antiaircraft company. Clearly written in the diary was the fact that just a month earlier, his company had lost two of their 12.7mm antiaircraft guns when under attack by US Marines in Duc Pho district, Quang Ngai province. This showed how lucky the 2nd Battalion was, because with those two extra antiaircraft guns, the enemy certainly would have created more serious casualties among us.
The enemy continued to run northwards, yet their numbers were thinning as they dispersed across the land. Seventeen NVA including their company commander were left behind in an effort to delay ARVN advances so that the remaining could escape us. All seventeen NVA were killed. However, when the Crazy Buffalos charged into the rear guard company, the commander stood his position without the slightest hint of fear. He aimed his K54 at one of our Marines, and shot. His shotting was as precise as I had ever seen, and he shot dead one of our men and left two more with damaging wounds before himself being shot dead, his body shuddering like a toy doll with each bullet that entered his already dead body. After the slaughtering, Major Dinh ordered his Marines to bury the NVA bodies.
The 2nd Battalion continued in their search for the fleeing enemy in the last remaining targets further north. Here they were fortunate to meet no resistance, although enemy fighting was hardly likely as the withdraw path was scattered with discarded equipment and blood tinged bandages, testament to the defeat of the NVA. With the enemy retreating with their seriously wounded, they now posed no threat to us, so the 2nd Battalion received their new orders to return to searching previous targets and to deploy and set up camp for their support of the 3rd Battalion.
Meanwhile, on the night of Day N, the 3rd Battalion silently circled around the enemy until they were behind them. As the sun began to peek over the horizon on Day N+1, the 3rd Battalion advanced on the enemy, searching the area which had been pulverized by air strikes and heavy artillery fire the day before. 3rd Battalion officers found in total only three NVA bodies that were more or less fully intact, but parts of human limbs that would have made up roughly an entire squad. None of the enemy's weapons could be found, only metal fragments of personal firearms could prove that they had ever had any in the first place. Two areas on the mountain had been hit so badly that entire recesses had collapsed, making searching these regions almost impossible, so the precise number of dead was never known.
The 3rd Battalion continued in its advance towards target areas that were suspected of containing the enemy. When they finally arrived on the eastern bank of An Lao River, opposite the 2nd Battalion, a singular L19 was spotted in the sky. The pilot was Phil Jones. Captain Mac Dube, the US advisor of the 3rd Battalion, asked Phil to thoroughly search the hills in front of the 3rd Battalion. The L19 completed half a circleAÀthen suddenly the sound of 12.7mm machine gun bursting from the top of the hill filled the ears of every Marine on the ground.
“Lupppp... lupppppp”. The motors of the L19 roared for a moment before all sounds from the L19 motor ceased. A deathly silence followed, which was brought to an abrupt end when the air-ground radio cut through the soundless air, revealing the fearfully quiet voice of Phil. “I've been hit! I have to land. Now!”
Phil crash landed the L19 in an almighty smash on the flat barren sand strip next to the river bank, only metres behind the moving 3rd Battalion. From the height in which he had been hit, not even the skill and experience of Jones could safely land the aircraft. He fell too fast, the two front wheels penetrating deep into the soft sand. Immediately the front of the plane began to sink. The body of the aircraft were thrown upwards and due to the great speeds at which the aircraft had fell, the tail flew forwards, until the L19 was perpendicular to the ground, its front wheels and nose still buried deeply into the sand. Dark trails of smoke began emanating from the motor, but fortunately it had not yet caught fire. The whole spectacular accident had occurred in front of the Marines on both sides of the river, and both battalions stared as Phil climbed out, shaken to his core with shock, yet still lucid and unscathed.
In the confusion that followed the crash, Captain Mac and Corporal Cuoc, the RTO (radio telephone operator), rushed towards the crashed L19. However, Major Nguyen Nang Bao, as collected and rational as ever, quickly ordered a squad of Marines to chase after the two to protect them, Phil and the downed L19. Enemy cells from the hill continued to shoot from the hill, but the distance was too great and their bullets became harmless, never striking their intended targets. But to make sure it stayed that way, Major Bao and Major Dinh instructed their Marines to periodically fire back into the hills with their M60 machine guns and mortars, a standard procedure drill, which left the NVA with the relatively easy decision to either keep their heads down or lose them.
When Captain Mac reached the destroyed L19, he told Phil to remove his white cap, since it stood out like a fluoro marker for the VC snipers. Mac then immediate busied himself; dismantling four rockets from the L19, which if were to land in the enemy hand would be a major military disaster. The rockets could still be saved and later used for manufacturing mines and bobby traps for unsuspecting enemies in the future. Half an hour after the L19 accident, news had spread and a CH47 arrived to recover the aircraft; Captain Mac and Phil, who had more or less recovered from the initial shock, helped hook the cables onto the body of the half buried L19. The fallen aircraft was then carried away towards the safety zone of Bong Son where it could either be repaired or harvested for its spare parts. Not long after, a helicopter arrived to medevac Phil, along with Mac who had received a permit from Major Gaboury. Their helicopter followed the L19 back to the protection of Bong Son.
Captain Mac's tour of duty had arrived at an early and unexpected end one day before Task Force B had even started their operation. Since there had been no other advisor who could serve as a replacement, Mac had voluntarily followed the 3rd Battalion during their operation. But under the new circumstances, another US advisor had been found who could join the 3rd Battalion and replace him. It had been both an honourable and unforgettable day for USMC Captain Mac Dube on his tour of Viet Nam. He is admired for his zeal and courage, the total disregard for his own safety from NVA sniper bullets. Without hesitation, he ran to save the pilot, Phil, dismantled four rockets, which not only hindered enemy knowledge but also increased their own arms and calmly yet efficiently hooked the cables onto the L19 so that the CH47 could carry it safely away. Although Captain Mac did not stay with Task Force B, his actions on that day make him a man who was held in the highest esteem by his Task Force B Marines.
After the departure of Captain Mac, Task Force B continued with their mission, requesting air strikes on highpoints where enemy blocking cells had been located. In addition, they requested time-fused artillery rounds and smoke rounds to conceal their movement from the enemies. The 3rd Battalion continued their advance, moving northwards while searching for remaining NVA, but they were to receive no more enemy fire.
The 2nd Battalion also continued to search other targets in villages and simultaneously urged the remaining villagers to leave the An Lao region, which was the second part of the order of operation, mentioned earlier, given to them by the 22nd Infantry Division.
Most of the villagers, after being herded into safety areas by Marines, were transported by US CH47 and taken to Bong Son airstrip where they were met by Bong Son district administrators, ready to welcome the new villagers into their “War Refugee Camps” and help them settle back into their lives. However, not all the villagers were happy to be relocated, and some resisted and put up quite a fight. The case that stood up above the others was that of an elderly woman who constantly chewed a betel nut mixture. She wept, cried and screamed as she refused to board the helicopter. “I'd rather be shot dead, right here on the spot than be pushed inside a horrible refugee camp!” Her shrieks were unbelievable loud for a lady that age, and could even be heard above the roaring helicopter blades. Although she had no more living family or relatives, she still did not want to leave her native village, the place where all her family and friends had lived and died, where the tombs and remains were still buried in the village. Eventually, two Marines dealt with the situation, explaining the need for them to leave, and helped her, with a certain amount of force, board the helicopter because it was their “duty to do so, but not at all enjoyable.”
Task Force B's operation officially ended on Day N+2, after they had successfully achieved both parts of their mission, to 'search and destroy hiding NVA forces' and “transfer all residents in the An Lao Valley to the safety refugee camp in Bong Son”. Marine Task Force B then moved out of An Lao Valley by foot, searching for more villagers along An Lao River, moving southwards on their own way to Bong Son district.
VI. Commentary and Anecdotes
1. An Lao Valley :
An Lao Valley has always been the site of military struggle between the enemy and us during the Vietnam War. It was almost perfectly fortified by two high mountain ranges on both side, and consequently the major infiltrating route used by secret sanctuaries from Do Xa, 3-borders areas in western highlands, through Tam Quan to the sea shore that laid in the east. V.C. forces often used to boast over the fact that during nine years of vicious fighting between the Viet Minh and French army, An Lao had always been their safest secret sanctuary.
While V.C. forces were in control of the An Lao district, local residents were often reminded that "He who crosses the Red stream would die!" Despite the warning, in the beginning An Lao River poured with gushing red water.
2. Battle of An Lao :
In this battle of An Lao, on their way towards their 1st target, Major Dinh sighted in the distance what looked like an enemy unit moving down a slope. Major Dinh immediately requested Lt. Colonel Soan to provide artillery fires on the enemy. However, because the mountain was so filled with recesses, artillery was not very effective against the enemy. So air strikes were also requested by Task Force B through their US advisors. But that request was never granted on reasons that FAC did not ever see the enemy firing up into the sky!
After their operation in An Lao, while occupying the district, the 2nd Marine Battalion found and captured without resistance a number of NVA regular infantry men close to where Major Dinh had spotted enemy troops before the battle of An Lao.
3. Binh Dinh :
At the beginning of the Viet-France war, Binh Dinh was considered as a part of Region 5. It was commonly known that it was under the influence of North Viet Nam's communist party. Even the 1st CAV soldiers who passed through the area said that An Lao Valley and Kim Son Valley had been dangerous places where there had been numerous violent battles between ARVN and VC forces, both of which sustained heavy military losses.
4. Phung Du :
Following the very successful victory at Phung Du on April 7th 1965 by Task Force A (composed of the 1st and 2nd Battalions), Marine Task Force A and Marine Task Force B continuously rotated in operations on Hill 10, Tam Quan, An Lao and Bong Son. These rotations occurred consistently for two years beginning in 1967 with Task Force B in Duong Lieu and Dam Tra O of Phu My district with abundantly available support from helicopters, artillery and air strikes by 1st CAV.
5. After Phung Du :
The NVA Division 3 - Gold Star was defeated by the Marines in Phung Du 1965. The following year NVA chose to avoid contact with Marine Task Forces B in the operation to remove remaining V.C. pressures in the Hoai An District.
6. Major Dinh's lucky escape :
On the night of Day N, the 2nd Battalion set up their headquarters inside a small hamlet. After the initial search for enemy forces in the village by military units, Major Dinh spread his poncho out on the floor, to lie down and sleep inside a hay cottage after a hard days work. During his deep sleep, he was woken by a strange noise, emanating from under the ground. His first thought was that it was just a mouse scurrying around under the floor. But after the weariness of sleep began to fade, he suspected other things. Calling his bodyguards to help him search the place for the unknown source of sound, they found a brilliantly camouflaged door right under his bed! Lifting the lid, they revealed a NVA personal carer dressed in green military uniform hiding in the cave below Major Dinh's bed! How fortunate the Major had been! If the NVA soldier had had just a simple gun or hand grenade, it most certainly would not have ended in the harmless way that it did.
7. Crazy Buffalos :
On Day N+1, after the 2nd Battalion were in control of the targets where the enemy had previously occupied, Group B of the Battalion received supplementary orders to search additional villages further north. Just moments later, Crazy Buffalos stormed chaotically southwards. Major Dinh was more than a little bit surprised, so he lifted his radio handset and asked Captain De what was happening. The executive officer replied “Wasps had been attacking the Crazy Buffalos.”
8. After An Lao :
The “Search and Destroy” operation in An Lao valley aimed at transferring all civilians in that region to Bong Son refugee camps did not receive as high praise as was expected. Although there was a US budget that was set aside for the program, the funding was both limited and only available for a short period of time. After the financial support was exhausted and local administrative care was all but non existent, many villagers tried and successfully escaped from the refugee camps to return to their native village, although those who did escape knew that in the future they would have to live with both NVA and South Viet Nam.
Colonel Ton That Soan
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