1966 - The Counter-Ambush
at Pho Trach
Colonel Ton That Soan
Contributors :
- Colonel Co Tan Tinh Chau
- Colonel Ngo Van Dinh
- Majors Dinh Xuan Lam, Tran Kim Hoang, To Van Cap, Tran Van Thuat, Pham Van Tien, Lam Tai Thanh and a number of other crazy buffalos.
A. Historical Background :
On 1-11-1963, a number of generals lead by General Duong Van Minh, usurped President Ngo Dinh Drem. They killed the two brothers, Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, and abandoned the national project of Strategic Hamlets. A number of officers who had failed in a coup of 1-11-1960 were allowed to return to Vietnam and were reinstated in their former ranks and/or offices.
On 30-1-1964, only 3 months later, Generals Nguyen Khanh and Tran Thien Khiem made another coup, imprisoned pro-France generals, and wanted to centralize powers on two positions of Prime Minister and Head of State. Khanh rewrote constitutional amendments in Vung Tau.
On 13-9-1964, Generals Duong van Duc and Lam Van Phat unsuccessfully organized a showdown. General Khanh was finally forced to leave the country on 21-2-1965. The position of Prime Minister was occupied successfully by 4 civilians; Mr Nguyen Ngoc Tho, Tran Van Huong, Nguyen Xuan Oanh, and finally, Phan Huy Quat who had an irremediable disagreement with Head of State Phan Khac Suu. Quat gave the power back to the ARVN on 19-6-1965. An army committee was formed:
- Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, President.
- Major General Nguyen Cao Ky, President.
- Lieutenant General Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary.
Demonstrations temporarily ceased but not completely stopped until 11-3-1966. General Nguyen Chanh Thi, who had been MRI commander and at the same time the representative of the government in Central Vietnam, was sacked and forced to go abroad under the pretext of seeking treatment for his Nasal condition. (It was noteworthy to say that General Thi and Lieutenant Colonel Vuong Van Dong had been co-conspirators in the failed coup on 1-11-1960).
On this occasion, Thís sacking was the result of his opposition to the central government. General Thi originated from central Vietnam and was a Buñhist. That's why he was supported by a number of Buñhists in Hue (among these were a number of students and soldiers), and especially by An Quang Pagoda monks like Thich Tri Quang and Thich Nhat Hanh. (In Buñhist in 1963, Thich Tri Quang was named by Times magazine as "the man who changed the political scenario"). And after 30-4-1975 he kept silent because he had accomplished the mission given to him by the Vietnamese communists, but his colleagues such as Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do were still oppressed by the communists. Thich Nhat Hanh has remained an antiwar activist.
The two monks Thich Tri Quang and Thich Nhat Hanh exploited this situation to create political and social imbalances and to cause disorder in local areas, there aim being to diminish the South Vietnam government's credibility.
The Buñhist united block led by Thich Tri Quang, organized numerous demonstrations in Danang. They intentionally created what was dubbed "The Buddhist crisis in Central Vietnam in 1966" to challenge the central government. On 14-4-1966, the government decided to send troops to these areas to solve problems and to restore order. Airborne and Marine units were airlifted by VNAF C47 and by civilian Air Vietnam because US refused to interfere in the South Vietnam political crisis.
In streets, from the airport gate to I Corps Headquarters, innumerable altars and Buddha statues were erected on road surfaces as obstacles. These alters and statues were surrounded by an immense number of people of the opposing folk who had heard of the arrival of General Reserves. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Thanh Yen (the Executive Office of the Marine Brigade) and major Major Ton That Soan (the commander of Tast Force B, composed of the 1st and 2nd Marine Battalions) participated in this anti-riot campaign.
The situation was perceived as incredibly urgent, as if there would be imminent fighting between the two opposing forces. Propaganda banners smelled of Communism: "Thieu Kyùs soldiers should return to Saigon". Uniforms and weapons from logistics warehouses in Hue and Danang were captured by opposing forces and distributed to their members. Colonel Dam Quang Yeu (Da Nang city’s Chief Officer) formed "Tran Hung Dao Corps". Da Nang Mayor Nguyen van Man attracted a number of followers from Buddhist soldiers, functionaries and polices.
General Ton That Dinh who was designated by the Military Committee to replace General Thi, switched sides and began following the opposing force. Even General Phan Xuan Nhuan, who had been commanding officer of Rangers and had been designated to replace General Nguyen Van Chuan as commanding officer of 1st Infantry Division, declared that he had followed monks.
Major General Huynh Van Cao was then assigned as I Corps Commander. He was transported to Hue by a US helicopter so he could administer the situation. When this helicopter was about to land, a man from the crowd shot at it with a carbine. Consequently, it's US machine-gunner shot dead the man in the crowd who had shot at the helicopter. The US then recognized that all these riots gave benefits to Communists and agreed with the South Vietnamese government to use force to solve this chaotic situation.
Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the National Police Chief, was assigned as the commander of forces responsible for overcoming and suppressing the civil unrest on the streets. On 15-5-1966, C130 and C141 cargo aircrafts airlifted more Airborne and Marines as reinforcement, while a cargo ship transported tanks from Saigon to Da Nang.
Before this critical situation, Colonel Nguyen Thanh Yen was appointed as Da Nang city’s Military Chief. A 24/24 curfew order was issued. Many anti-demonstraition operations were preformed, principally intended to capture riot leaders. Nearly all of them were seized. With help from civilians' information, Dam Quang Yeu, Nguyen Van Man and even 1st Lieutenant Ton That Truc of 11th Ranger Battalion were arrested right inside Pho Da pagoda of Da Nang. Three weeks later, the city returned to normal life.
Leaving Da Nang, Task Force B moved to Hue. The GMC convoy had to advance very slowly, and with great difficulty, in order to pass through the fish village Lang Co.
VC circulated the area, mixing with civilians and incited them, by all means necessary, to stop or greatly hinder Marine movement. Numerous altars and statues of Buñha were placed on National Route 1 as obstacles. Most of the civilians were women and children who had been forced by VC to kneel on the surface of the route to pray for Thich Tri Quang. This monk had organized most of the rioting demonstrations and subsequently as a result, much discontent between religions in 1963-1965. Finally, the convoy manager was to arrive in Hue at dusk. Hue city was sadly desolate, showing no living human beings - There were banners on walls, parks, corners of streets, all showing "Down with Thieu Ky’s soldiers".
After alighting on this side of Trang Tien Bridge, Marines advanced on Tran Hung Dao Street, Gia Hoi and Phu Van Lau. Some small groups of demonstrators, were strewn throughout, carrying banners and Buñhist flags. They claimed that "Buddhist Confederation had been in danger, and they called in help from ARVN", however, when ARVN arrived, they denoucnced "Down with Thieu Kyùs soldiers".
ARVN entered Hue Old citadel to disband the opposing force and to clear all obstacles lying anywhere on the streets and roads. Numerous operations were performed in successive days. Several riot leaders were arrested, while a number of them evaded and ran with VC into communist sanctuaries. Marines also escorted Colonel Ngo Quang Truong (Deputy Commander of Airborne Division), in order for him to enter the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and receive the position of the Commander of that Division.
During this period of transition, there were some changes in 1st Infantry Division's personnels:
- Colonel Pham Van Phu, who had been the Executive Officer of 2nd Infantry Division, was transferred and became the Executive Officer of the 1st Infantry Division.
- Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Khoa Nam of Airborne Division became Assistant of the 1st Infantry Division's Commander.
- Lieutenant Colonel Tran Van Cam was assigned as 1st Infantry Division's Chief of Staff.
- Major Ngo van Chung replaced Major Le Thien Phuoc as G2 Chief of 1st Infantry Division.
- Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ba Hoa, who had been 3rd Regiment Commander at An Lo, was transferred and became the Executive Chief of Staff of Operations/Logistics and, at the same time, the G3 Chief of 1st Infantry Division.
- Lieutenant Colonel Phan Van Khoa held the positions of Chief of Thua Thien province and also Chief of Thua Thien Sub-tactical Zone.
- Brigadier General Hoang Xuan Lam became I Corps Commander after having handed over 2nd Infantry Division to Colonel Nguyen Van Toan.
After safety and order were restored in Hue, Task Force B received orders from I Corps to participate in Operation Lam Son 283 at the "sad street Phu Luu, Gia Dang, along the coast between Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces". This operation was in conjunction with M113 APC's from 21 to 23-6-1966.
Vietnamese communists had exploited the political turmoil and had moved closer to this area. Firstly, VC Battalion 808 sent troops to occupy remote villages, which had been defended by Regional Forces companies. The 1st Marine Battalion fought at Bich La Hau hamlet to the north direct the 2nd Battalion at Gia Dang. Violent fighting occurred on that same day. The 2nd Battalion advanced from Gia Dang I to Gia Dang II along inter-village Route 555 and dislodged the enemy from their positions. Marine Task Force B obtained victory in this operation. Details were reported in daily newspapers such as Tien Tuyen, Song.
All parcicipating units were then transported to Hue to celebrate the triumph. Fighters who had achieved, performed well were rewarded correspondingly. Among them was Major Le Hang Minh, the 2nd Marine Battalion Commander. Dong Khanh high-school girls hung wreathes of flowers around heroes' necks. The ceremony was organized on a bank of Perfume River at Phu Van Lau, under Hue’s flagpole. People hoped that there would be serenity and order in the miserable land following the solemn ceremony.
Task Force B continued performing operations. The Task Force B headquarters and the 1st Battalion moved south to reinforce the 2nd Infantry Division at Quang Ngai. At that time, Major Pham Van Chung was Task Force Chief of Staff. The 2nd Battalion remained in An Hoa, north of Hue city, in order to be prepared for reinforcing the 1st Infantry Division in operations in Quang Trò.
B. Topography of area of operation.
Quang Tri and Thua Thien were two most northern provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. North of these provinces were very important strategic positions, with the DMZ (established since 20-7-1954). Ben Hai River was the line dividing North and South Vietnam. The South China Sea was in the east, while the Truong Son Range was in the west. In 1965, when US troops entered Vietnam, US military high officials had known the importance of these provinces at the border. Many US elite units were given this area of responsibility, such as the 3rd US Marine Corps commanded by General L.W.Walt and Air Cavalry Division 1. They positioned in a series of bases at the north and east areas, such as C1, C2, C3, Con Tien, Caroll, Rock pile, Khe Sanh. The were also positioned at Special Forces camps near the Laotian-Vietnamese border, such as A Shau, A Luoi, Ta Bat and Lang Vei. Bloody fighting occurred at these locations.
North Vietnam developed Ho Chi Minh trail in Truong Son Range to send troops and equipment to the south. They established important sanctuaries in western mountainous areas and even in Laos. NVA forces in the region were their regular Divisions 324, 320 and the clearest proof of their presence was Regiment 808 which Task Force B had first encountered.
Thua Thien province had an area of 5,009 square kilometres, composing of Phong Dien, Quang Dien, Phu Vang, Huong Tra, Huong Thuy, Phu Loc, the Hue citadel and Hue city aka old capital Hue. Pha Tam Giang stretched along the coast from Phong Dien and Quang Dien. It was also called Vung Tau and had high waves. In the olden-days, people from the North wanting to reach Hue had to use boat to cross this "Pha": "Love you, I wanted to go southwards but I am afraid of Truong Nha Ho and Pha Tam Giang".
Truong Nha Ho was a stretch of sand about 1-2 kilometres long, north of Vinh Linh. Since Hung Vuong (king of most ancient Vietnam) time, Thua Thien belonged to Viet Thuong. In 1070 in the reign of King Ly Thanh Ton, Vietnam occupied three provinces (Dia Ly, Bo Chinh and Ma Linh), with Thua Thien situated within the area of these provinces. In 1722 its name was Phu Thua Thien. In King Gia Long's lifetime, its name was changed into Quang Trò Under King Minh Mang it changed into a town and then into a province. National Route 1 runs from North to South Vietnam, with railroad running parallel to it. From Quang Tri southwards, Pho Trach was at twenty-five kilometres. The bridge at Pho Trach has a name of Cau Nhi, lying in Phong Dien district, Thua Thien province. The bridge was across O Lau River which ran in My Chanh direction. The Pho Trach Bridge lay between two other bridges: An Lo bridge across Bo River and My Chanh bridge across Thac Ma river in the north.
C. Process :
1. Movement:
On 29-6-1966, a convoy of twenty-seven GMC trucks was supposed to commence transporting the 2nd Marine Battalion at 7:30am from An Hoa, Hue, further along National Route 1 to Quang Tri, and finally Dong Ha. The Battalion was to participate in some operations organised by 1st Infantry Divison. The Order of movement was as follows: Company 1, then Company 3, The Battalion Headquarters, Commanding Company, Company 2 and finally Company 4.
This plan was then delayed for a single day for unknown reasons. There would be a VNAF L19 in the sky to observe rather than a US L19 as pre-planned.
Officers of the 2nd Marine Battalion were:
- Lieutenant Colonel Le Hang Minh, Commander, from 5th Class of Thu Duc Military School.
- Captain Nguyen Van Hay, Executive Officer and also Company 2 Commander.
- Captain Thomas E. Campbell and 1st Lieutenant G.E Carlson, Advisors from USMC.
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Dang Tuc, S3 Chief, of Thu Duc 10th Class.
- 2nd Lieutenant Thai Bong, S3 Chief's Assistant, of 19th Class of Dalat Military Academy.
- 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Huong, S2 Chief, 17th Class of Thu Duc.
- 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Cau, S5 Chief.
- 1st Lieutenant Pham Huu Hao, the Ba/ttalion surgeon.
- Sergeant Major Tsan (of Nung ethnic minority), special bodyguard platoon leader.
- Captain Tran Kim Hoang, Company 1 Commander, 17th Class of Dalat Military Academy.
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuat, Executive Officer of Company 2, 19th Class of Dalat Military Academy.
- 1st Lieutenant Dinh Xuan Lam, Company 3 Commander, 17th Class of Dalat Military Academy.
- Captain Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Company 4 Commander, 16th Class of Dalat Military Academy.
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Kim De, "Commanding Company" Commander, 8th Class of Thu Duc Military School.
2. The Ambush :
At 8:30am, the GMC convoy which had just passed over Pho Trach pontoon, two kilometres north of Phong Dien District, fell into a VC ambush. The speed of the convoy was about 35 km/h. The ambush line extended from a part of Company 3 to between Company 2 and Company 4. The truck of 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuong of Company 3 was hit by a 75mm recoilless rifle bullet , burst into flames and stopped dead on one side of the Route, blocking all other trailing vehicles in the convey. The convoy had to stop. VC had used two old French blockhouses, which had been abandoned before 1954, effectively utilising their position very low on the hill, covered by trees on the west of National Route 1. From there set-up heavy weapons and fired directly onto the convoy from a distance of 400 metres. One battalion of enemy forces established an ambush line on National Route 1 and western hills, while reinforced by a heavy weapon, Company C16 and an anti-aircraft Company 15. The L19 observing aircraft did not detect them and the 2nd Battalion was not informed by 1st Infantry Division G2 about VC presence.
A barrage of 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles and machine-guns was unleashed ferociously on the convoy. At least three trucks were hit and burst into flames, resulting in human losses. Machine-guns, B40 and AK 47's then opened fire along the line of ambush. The Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of the Battalion ordered the convoy to stop. All units dismounted their vehicles, took position on either side of the convoy and returned fire to both sides of National Route 1.
However, the enemy remained advantageous with hiding places for cover compared to the open convoy. As a result of this, the 2nd Marine Battalion received more losses.
From his position, the Commander saw jets of black smoke emitted by the barrels of recoilless rifles, which had been positioned on hill slopes to the west and were directly firing on the convoy. At the same time, he noticed camouflaged groups charging toward National Route 1.
Lieutenant Colonel Minh ordered the Battalion Headquarters and the commanding Company to move sixty metres eastwards where there had been a rather low area due to a railroad dug into the hill slope. They never knew it had been a second spot of ambush. As they were approaching, only ten metres away from it, camouflaged VC hiñen along the South East slope of another nearby hill opened fire with an assortment of weapons including grenades and Beta (an explosive). The 2nd Battalion suffered heavy losses at this point of the ambush.
Lieutenant Colonel Minh was hit in the chest by two bullets. Others were killed or wounded. About twenty survivors charged forwards and fired a storm of bullets at the enemy troops in order to establish a defensive line at the low area, no matter how heavily the VC machine guns had been spraying bullets along the railroad to support their charging company. VC of this company emerged from camouflaged foxholes on the west of National Route 1 and ran towards it. The VC company then crossed over it, passing burning GMC in order to continue running eastwards. Survivors of the Commanding Company of the 2nd Battalion simultaneously combated and retreated to the south where Companies 2 and 4 had been positioning themselves to join them. Some were killed and others wounded after being caught in mines or traps positioned on the railroad.
Meanwhile Companies 1 and 3 had established a defensive line in the north and had reacted very quickly to the situation. Five minutes after the ambush commenced, 60mm mortars and 57mm Recoilless rifles began firing at VC positions on the nearby hillsides to the west. At that moment, the 2nd Marine Battalion had established two separate areas of defence (one in the north and one in the south), five hundred metres away from each other on barren ground. There was no radio contact and no coordination between these two contingents because signalmen were either killed or wounded. Only US Captain Campbell still possessed the ability to radio his assistant 1st Lieutenant Carlson, although Campbell's Radio telephone operator had been killed in the attack. 1st Lieutenant Carlson was with Company 2 in Group B commanded by the Executive Officer of the 2nd Battalion.
Captain Tran Kim Hoang, who was the highest ranked officer outside the area of ambush, temporarily directed and coordinated all 2nd Battalion activities, because Captain Nguyen Xuan Phuc of Company 4 was also wounded. Utilising Captain Campbells' US radio system, fifteen minutes after the fighting had broken out, a US L19 Reconnaissance airplane with a Vietnamese Artillery FO on board, appeared in the sky above Pho Trach. He ordered artillery positioning in Phong Dien district to bombard enemy positions. Another L19 arrived with an ALO (Air Liaison Officer) on board, ready to guide aircraft that were approaching to strike. VC anti-aircraft artillery batteries began firing into the sky from hilltops in the west.
The fighting was relentless for the two sections of the 2nd Battalion, with the group of Company 1 and Company 3 being fired at by VC mortars, recoilless rifles and machine guns from hilltops in the west. Although Companies 2 and 4 were spared from the mortar and recoilless rifle fire, they were attacked by two VC Infantry Companies with direct personal firearms and grenades. Marines provided incredible resistance, holding their position by preventing several waves of VC charges and were responsible for heavy VC casualties. After twenty minutes of combined firing had hailed, the enemy started to retreat. VC to the east of National Route 1 toward O Lau River, squeezed through rows of trees and empty houses. The more abundant VC forces in the west left their positions on hilltops and ran west to nearly mountainous area. Before their retreat, they fired a whole range of weapons simultaneously at all marine positions.
3. Detailed reactions of each Company of the 2nd Battalion :
a. Battalion Headquarter and the Commanding Company.
Lieutenant Colonel Le Han Minh and the Commanding Company bore the brunt of the 2nd ambush at the low area. After a moment, Lieutenant Colonel was hit in the chest by two bullets. He could not continue to command and his RTO was also killed. VC threw several grenades and Beta down to the low area. Lieutenant Colonel Minh's bodyguard, Caporal Thu, and Captain Campbell's RTO, Private 1st Class Den were then killed. Sergeant Major TSAN's special bodyguard platoon fought with determination and sacrificed their lives. The body of Sergeant Major TSAN lay beside the Battalion Commander's body. Captain Campbell was slightly wounded at his wrist by a grenade shrapnel. He and 1st Lieutenant Tran Dang Tuc, 1st Lieutenant Tran Kim De and some marines rushed towards the north east but then were forced to swiftly return because a VC group on a hillside to the north east were storming towards them.
When Captain Campbell returned to the low area, he found that Lieutenant Colonel Minh had died, probably due to another grenade fragment in his head. 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Cau and 6 Artillery FO’s of 1st Infantry Division were also killed. Major Pham Van Tien who then was a platoon leader of Company 2 recounted the case of 3rd Lieutenant Cauùs death:
"The death of 3rd Lieutenant Cau, S5 Chief, has always been an obsession in my memory. He was severely wounded by multiple wounds on his body but when my platoon came to the rescue, he was still extraordinarily lucid. He asked me to transfer his thick wallet full of personal papers and photos to his family whenever the 2nd Battalion would return to its rear base and tell them his last words of farewell. He continued to mumble phrases out of the Bible. His mouth was holding a string of beads and he returned to God's nation some seconds later. I suñenly thought of his strong sentimental feelings towards his family. He was alike a sudden flash of fire of a lamp which was to going to extinguish. He was the artist who had designed the Trau Dien (Crazy Buffalo) insignia for the 2nd Marine Battalion. Everybody should think of him when bearing this insignia on the left sleeve and think of the Commander, Lt Colonel Le Hang Minh who died bearing that insignia".
The Battalion's Doctor, 1st Lieutenant Pham Huu Hao was also wounded. A medic carried him piggy back and ran south to meet Company 2. He is living with family in South California.
Captain Thomas EÏ Campbell, the Battalion advisor, was a very courageous and calm officer. When his RTO was killed, he carried his own radio. He radioed 1st Lieutenant Carlson, who had been with Group B, and informed him about the desperate situation of the Battalion Headquarters. He requested Carlson to coordinate Air and Artillery support from the USAF. Captain Campbell said:
"From Point A, we received order of Lieutenant Colonel Minh to move to Point B where there had been a group of VC who attacked us with small firearms and grenades. Lieutenant Colonel Minh was hit at the first wave of enemy attack. All signalmen were either killed or wounded in the first two minutes. All fighters of the special bodyguard platoon took positions at the low area of the railroad and fought with determination. None survived. VC moved along the eastern side of the low area and fired at the railway. Lieutenant Colonel was shot at Point B with most members of the Battalion Headquarters. I was also wounded by grenade shrapnels at the forearm, hand and neck. We continued to dash in the north-easterly direction, towards Point C. There was about one hundred VC at the east low area. I saw 1st Lieutenant Tuc (S3) throw grenades onto their positions before running back to Point AÏ VC from the south west fired so violently in this direction that we had run back towards the north-west, along a big road (Point D). We became targets for firearms and grenades again. I was wounded the second time. We ran back to Point A once more. About six minutes later, VC withdrew in the direction of a riverbank in the north east and disappeared in groups of houses. I quickly ran back to Point B and found that Lieutenant Colonel Minh had died. VC had also withdrawn. I made radio contact again with 1st Lieutenant Carlson and then joined Company 2."
He redrew the detailed map of the ambush. His handwriting was very difficult to read but it showed that the ambush at Pho Trach had deeply imprinted on his memory. He retired in 1988 as a Colonel, Regiment Commander. He is presently a lecturer about Leadership, Command and Management at Texas University, Austin, USA.
b. Company 1 / 2nd Marine Battalion :
2nd Lieutenant Lam Tai Thanh, of Class 17 of Thu Duc Military School, was a platoon leader, sitting in the first truck of the convoy. When he had just passed Pho Trach Bridge he saw that the jeep, which carried the officer and chief of the military convoy was turning from the pontoon bridge to National Route 1, with its headlights on. Thanh's continued for another two kilometres before he heard many loud explosions behind his vehicle. A number of vehicles of 1st Lieutenant Dinh Xuan Lam's Company 3 stopped because they were being hit by 75mm recoilless rifle rounds.
Captain Tran Kim Hoang, Company 1 Commander, ordered his Company to stop and ordered his boys to jump down and position themselves on both sides of the route. They fired southwest direction to allay the enemy pressure, which had been applied onto the Battalion Headquarters. Then Company 1 changed positions and had not suffered any casualties at the time.
c. Company 3 / 2nd Marine Battalion :
A truck of Company 3 was hit by a recoilless rifle round. It tried to drag another twenty metres then stopped. Consequently, all vehicles behind it became blocked. The first two trucks of Company 3 had evaded the ambush. The next vehicle carrying 2nd Lieutenant Tran Van Thuong, the Executive Officer of the company, was also hit, but he managed to escape the vehicle. Everybody humped down, and positioned themselves on both sides of National Route 1. They fired to support and lessen the enemy pressure for the remaining section of the company caught inside the ambush. This part of the convoy had also quickly dismounted the vehicles when trucks were unable to move forward anymore. Their quick reaction was to fire on both sides of the route inside the ambushed segment.
First Lieutenant Dinh Xuan Lam had a very quick judgement of the situation. He ordered his troops to advance in order to occupy a low hill north east of National Route 1. Then he observed the part of the convoy where the Battalion Headquarters and Commanding Company had been. He saw a group of Communists, camouflaged with twigs and leaves, running towards National Route 1. Another group of VC from a hill to the west were firing to provide cover for their quickly advancing comrades. Company 3 concentrated all 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, .30-caliber machine gun and miñle sized machine gun BAR to achieve "Annihilation fire" as an attempt to lessen the VC advantage over the Battalion Headquarters. He then radioed Captain Hoang, a classmate of his, and suggested the following:
"We had no radio contact with both the commander and the executive officer of Battalion. So, now, you are of the highest rank. You coordinate and give orders, please!"
Company 1 and Company 3 quickly formed a defensive perimeter to prepare for the counter attack and to assist Companies 2 and 4.
d. Company 2 / 2nd Marine Battalion :
1st Lieutenant Tran Van Thuat, the Executive Officer of Company 2, was sitting on a GMC truck behind the Commanding Company. When his vehicle had just passed the Bridge and was progressing up a low hill, he heard a loud explosion at the forefront part of the convoy. He firstly thought that ARVN Artillery had been supporting some friendly forces somewhere and that the artillery round had erred. But then he heard all kinds of weapon noises, eg. machine guns and B40. When some of the trucks burst into flames in front of him, he immediately ordered his driver to stop. The truck running behind bumped into the rear of his vehicle. He looked to both sides, only to recognise that his driver, sitting next to him, was hit by bullets and had already died and his head resting against the steering wheel.
The enemy, from slightly slanted hills to the west were firing continuously at the convoy, with an array of different weapons. With quick reflexes by nature, everybody jumped down from their respective vehicles and fought immediately against a group of VC in close combat. This group of VC had only just emerged from camouflaged foxholes and trenches on the railroad, approximately fifty metres from National Route 1.
After the first wave of close combat, Platoon 1 of 2nd Lieutenant Vu Doan Doan, Platoon 2 of 2nd Lieutenant Vo Tan Tai and Platoon 3 of 2nd Lieutenant Pham Van Tien, advanced to occupy a hill in the northeast. When 1st Lieutenant Thuat arrived at the hilltop, he found that members of the Commanding Company, the Battalion Headquarters and the special bodyguard platoon were either dead or wounded, their bodies scattered across the hillside. Among the dead:
- Lieutenant Colonel Le Hang Minh.
- 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Cau.
e. Company 4 / 2nd Marine Battalion :
1st Lieutenant Tran Van Hop, the Executive Officer of Company 4, and 2nd Lieutenant To Van Cap, platoon 3 leader, were from the same Class 19 of Dalat Academy. They were sitting in the same truck leading Company 4 vehicles. When they passed the bridge they heard a loud explosion and thought some friend unit had been practicing manoeuvres in the vicinity. The reasons for this initial thought was that, near the bridge, there had been two Regional Forces and Local Forces outposts where soldiers (of these forces) had waved their hands at marines when the trucks passed by. However, when the 2 Lieutenants saw that there had been some burning GMC trucks in the head position of the convoy and that there were camouflaged VC running towards the convoy, they quickly recognized that they had been caught in an ambush.
The head of their vehicle exploded after they had just jumped out of the truck to the right-hand side; a B40 rocket had most likely hit it. Everybody, by natural instincts, ran to the right side towards the railroad and, using it as a defensive line, then proceeded to return fire to the VC. Immediately after having left the vehicle, 1st Lieutenant Hop received a bullet in the leg, and 2nd Lieutenant Cap was hit in the elbow. However, the two remained calm and directed the platoon effectively to fire back at the VC.
Company 4, which was behind Company 3, was not inside the area of ambush. Captain Nguyen Xuan Phuc ordered Platoon 1of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Quoc Chinh (of Class 20 Dalat Military Academy), and Platoon 2 of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Doi to advance and occupy a hill on the west of National Route 1. He also ordered heavy weapon platoon leader, 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Lo and his assistant, 1st Sergeant Tuan to fire furiously in the northwesterly direction in order to support Platoon 3. However, the enemy also detected the positions of these collective weapons and shot back. Captain Phuc wounded by a bullet in the chest that travelled from front to back, while he was standing to observe and give orders.
D. Plan of counter attack :
1. The 2nd Marine Battalion :
The 2nd Marine Battalion practically counterattacked immediately with the bodyguard special platoon of Sergeant Major TSAN. Everybody in the platoon sacrificed his life in the counterattack. Companies gathered in two fighting groups in the north and in the south. They were courageous, calm and swift and efficient in their operation, especially the two American Advisors who did not care about themselves and just concentrated on the safety of the unit.
Only fifteen minutes had passed when US aircrafts arrived with FAC's guidance. Bombs and napalm from F4 were accurately dropped on VC running on barren hilltops. Marines jumped out of defensive positions and pursued them. Captain Nguyen van Hay, the executive officer of the Battalion, ordered the companies to expand formations and to advance north and concurrently search the battlefields. Captain Tran Kim Hoang also directed Companies 1 and 3 to move south to join the Battalion (-). After fort-five minutes of pursuit and searching, the two separate contingents made contact with each other.
2. Operation Lam Son 285 :
In the urgent situation of the ambush, Company I of the US marines (positioned themselves south of Pho Trach Bridge) were ordered to move to the ambush area under Captain Campbell's guidance. This company advanced swiftly to the west and pursued the escaping VC. Company travelled a long distance to the west and occupied a number of highpoints before continuing the pursuit with their own weapons.
At 10:00 am of the same day, an operation named Lam Son 285 was organised by the 1st Infantry Division, designed to pursue the enemy. The force was composed of two battalions of Regiment 3 and was reinforced by a light tank platoon and an Ontos platoon. Positioning itself at the seventeenth kilometre route mark, the force crossed Pho Trach Bridge and advanced northwest. Another two USMC Companies and Company 1 also coordinated with Infantry Regimant 3 in order to pursue VC in the west. Two artillery batteries (105mm and 155mm) of Artillery Battalion 12, positioned at Phong Dien, fired to annihilate VC according to an FO’s instruction. The aforementioned FO was aboard an L19 observance aircraft. US Marine F4 phantoms performed intense air strikes on VC retreating routes.
At 12:00 noon, Airborne Battalion 5 was helilifted to blocking positions in the west and northwest at Ho Boi and Canh Doi mountains. Enemy forces were surrounded and most of them killed. A number of survivors managed to escape by seeking shelter and camouflage in dense jungle. The operation ended that same day.
E. Summary :
1. Viet Cong :
VC paid a high price for their ambush:
- 233 killed.
- 9 captured.
- Seized weapons: One 75mm Recoilless rifle, 10 B40, 3 machine guns made in China, 28 AK 47s, 23 personal firearms of all kinds, 3 tripods for the 75mm guns, 1 tripod for 57mm gun, 2 telescope for 75mm gun, 1 base plate for 82mm mortar, 1 radio AN/GRC made in China and many ammunitions.
2. Marines :
According to the request of Captain Campbell, Company 3 of Medevac and Triage of US Marine Regiment 4, positioned at Phong Dien, (about three kilometres to the south) had sent vehicles to collect wounded marines and had transported them to their base to have wounds bandaged. The wounded were then transported to Nguyen Tri Phuong Hospital, Hue.
Killed marines were also transferred there.
Damages of the 2nd Marine Battalion were composed of:
- 42 killed, including 2 officers, Lieutenant Colonel Le Hanh Minh and 3rd Lieutenant Nguyen Van Cau, 6 Artillery FO’s from 1st Infantry Division.
- 95 wounded. Among them were 10 officers, including Captain Campbell.
- Lost weapons, 3 M79, 26 personal firearms, 5 Miñle sized machine gun BAR
- Lost or damaged equipment included 1 Radio PRC10, 1 radio PRC 6, 1 radio AN/PRC 9, 3 burned GMC, 2 damaged Jeep.
At 10:30 am of the same day, the 2nd Marine Battalion received order from 1st Infantry Division to prepare to be ready for being transported to Dong Da Training Centre. At that time, Captain Ngo Van Dinh (Class 4 of Dalat Military Academy) was the Executive Officer of the 3rd Marine Battalion. He was assigned as the 2nd Marine Battalion Commander.
Captain Dinh, from the 2nd Battalion Rear Base at Tam Ha, Thu Duc, received order to fly to the area of operation and started commanding the 2nd Battalion at 3:00pm of the same day (29-6-1966). After a rest, the 2nd Battalion was airlifted to Saigon for two weeks in order to reorganise and then retrain at Van Kiep Training Centre for three weeks. The Battalion then returned to MRI, performing activities at Con Tien and Gio Linh.
F. Commentary :
1. A questioned issue :
Talking about an operation at Mo Duc in May 1966. The 5th Marine Battalion was retained for "another day" by the subtactical zone Quang Ngai. The latter then drew assembled an unachievable plan of operation which caused the 5th Battalion to fall into an ambush. The Battalion Commander, Major Duong Hanh Phuoc, two American advisors, Doctor Le Huu Sanh, and an Artillery FO were killed.
Not even a full month later, this phenomenon was repeated, with a decision to "delay the movement of the 2nd Marine Battalion for one day". The ambush at Pho Trach led to a tragedy. So what kind of influence had the "Buñhism crisis in the Center" had on these two events? Until now, that issue was never illuminated. Only those killed in action and their families recognized the result and suffered because of it.
2. 1st Infantry Division staff had not effectively kept the movement of the reinforcing unit (namely the 2nd Marine Battalion) secret.
It was very clear who the VC's target was. They wanted to destroy the head of the 2nd Battalion. The proof of that speculation was as follows:
At 6:30 am on the 29-6-1966, a US Convoy and a Jeep carrying US Infantry advisors from Quang Tri moving south, and also a platoon of Regional Force from Phong Dien, opening the route, had passed this segment of National Route 1. Nothing happened. The VC waited until the arrival of the 2nd Battalion to start firing.
3. The enemy had known about the movement of the 2nd Marine Battalion previously :
In a document of NVA about "The Victory of Cau Nhi" they confirmed that their ambush line had been prepared 1 day before the 2nd Battalion movement. "In the morning of 29-6-1966, after a night without sleep, the fighters of liberation forces were still sober in their positions. Their eyes looked in the direction of the enemy, and followed each of their steps".
4. Although VC had thoroughly prepared the ambush, they committed two mistakes :
The first mistake was that they never could estimate the resolute reaction and the traditional bravado of the 2nd Marine Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Minh calmly ordered movement from Point A to Point B. 1st Lieutenant Tuc threw grenades at the VC. Captain Campbell, wounded twice, still made radio contact with 1st Lieutenant Carlson. Sergeant Major TSAN and his special platoon fought until the last person had been killed. Captain Hoang and 1st Lieutenant Lam quickly organized defensive groups in the north, and in the same fashion, Captain Phuc and 1st Lieutenant Thuat organized defensive groups in the south. Captain Hay ordered the whole battalion to counterattack and pursue the enemy when Company I of US Marines arrived to reinforce. This was not the first time that marines had met ambush or suñen encounters. In the past, Ba Gia battle of the 3rd Marine Battalion (30-5-1965), Mo Duc battle of the 5th battalion 5-1966. And after 1966, Rach Ruong fighting of the 5th Battalion (3-12-1967), MeKong River counter ambush of the 8th Battalion (1-1970), and Vam Co Dong river counter ambush of the 9th Battalion (3-1970), and numerous others.
The enemy had not expected the quick reaction time. After only fifteen minutes, observing L19 was in the sky. Artillery and fighters aircrafts shelled and bombarded VC retreating routes thoroughly. Only ninety minutes after the ambush had commenced, operation Lam Son 285 was organized and began with participations of two Infantry Battalions of Regiment 3 / 1st Division, three US Marine Companies, and the 5th Airborne Battalion. The latter was helilifted and then landed at 12:00 noon. VC had to retreat by crossing barren hills about three kilometres west of National Route 1 and because easy targets for artillery and air strikes.
5. Interrogations of prisoners revealed that the ambush unit had belonged to regular Battalion 802, reinforced by heave weapon Company C16, anti-aircraft company C15, signal Company C13:
Their combined force totalled to about 600, and ambushed along a line of seven hundred metres. They emerged from camouflaged foxholes and fired to a maximum in the first period. Their infantry companies' goals were to kill marines, capture weapons and take prisoners (especially US advisors).
However, they met violent resistance of the Crazy Buffalos from the beginning, and consequently, they were forced to withdraw twenty minutes later. They then dispersed into the trees and houses near O-Lau River to avoid observation and fighting aircrafts.
6. Newspaper and press reports :
In the two daily newspapers SONG and TIEN TUYEN, reporters wrote:
"We visited the battlefield. VC bodies painted with blood lay everywhere along the railroad. Next to them were Marine bodies of the 2nd Battalion. It showed that Marine had fought close combat when VC were charging towards them. In the west, barren hills extend to mountains. VC retreated in that direction. But a combined operation between US forces and 1st Infantry Division did not allow them to evade. They were surrounded and then annihilated. VC had surely paid high prices. Also, people who had been "back stabbers" to ARVN should be ashamed of themselves".
7. The 2nd Marine Battalion :
Ngo Quang Truong, the commander of 1st Infantry Division honestly commented: "In my military life, even during French presence, I have never seen an ambush which had turned into an extraordinary counter ambush like this Pho Trach battle".
8. Lieutenant Colonel Le Hang Minh had died at a very young age of 31 :
His sacrifice left an immemse grief in everybody. Colonel Pham Van Chung rewrote some very emotional lines:
"I recall the moment he shook our hands and said ”good bye” at An Hoa Bridge. He told Nguyen nang Bao and I, You are going south. Beware of ambushes. Quang Nam and Quang Ngai are terrible territories! We never doubted that "shake hand" was the last of his. We went south, unscathed. He marched north and he himself was caught in a VC ambush."
Colonel Ton that Soan
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