Marine Artillery
in the Battle of Quang Tri 1972
Lieutenant Colonel Tran Thien Hieu
After Operation Lam Son 719, the year passed quickly. The situation in the DMZ abated, and the Americans continued their withdrawal out of Vietnam. The NVA retreated to the North to recuperate and recruit. The Marine Corp maintained their presence at Quang Tri. It was rumoured that President Nguyen Van Thieu was afraid that Nguyen Cao Ky was plotting with the Marine Corps to overthrow him. It gave the President some relief that the Marine Corps was in “exile” in I Corps.
The marines had to spent two lunar New Years in I Corps, enduring long, cold drizzles, and humid, wet bunkers. The artillery men were luckier. They didn't have to move around and had trucks to go to the market every three days.
By the end of March 1972, the 3rd Artillery battalion and the 258th Brigade were allowed to shift to Fire Support Base Nancy, north of the My Chanh. The 147th Brigade and the 2nd Artillery battalion went to the Fire Support Base at Mai Loc. On the 28th of March, I asked Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao, the 147th Brigade commander, for permission to bring Artillery Company J back from Camp Carroll, to join the 3rd Artillery battalion. The commander of Company J was Captain Nguyen Van Ty, a former centre forward of the Joint General Staff soccer team. He ran and kicked aggressively, but as an artillery company commander, he was rather timid. So I decided to keep him close at hand. Forty eight hours after he returned to “Nancy”, the communists launched their general attack on Quang Tri province.
After a year of preparation, the NVA, at the end of the monsoon season, had gathered more than thirty thousand soldiers, five Artillery regiments, and five tank regiments. They charged across the 17th parallel to attack Quang Tri province.
At noon of the 30th of March, Lieutenant Colonel Do Ky, the chief of Marine Division G3, coming back from the 258th Brigade, informed me that there had been a confrontation between the 147th Brigade and the enemy. I thought it was merely a skirmish with guerillas or regional infiltrators, but after dinner, the 3rd Artillery battalion reveived the order to move urgently with the 258th Brigade to Dong Ha. It occured to me that the field situation was serious, as there was no briefing as usual. We waited for the convoy from the rear station in Hue to come and transport the guns and ammunition. As he watched the artillery men packing their bulky equipment, the Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the Brigade, asked: “How can you transport so much paraphenalia?” But we were accustomed to such preparations, and within the hour we were ready for the road. Dusk was approaching... it had been a while since we last mobilized at night. The only information given was our destination; an uninhabited old camp site at Dong Ha. Further orders were pending.
The convoy of trucks finally reached our destination, and as I organized the positions for the artillary companies, artillery rounds from 130mm guns flew noisily above us. The enemy forward observers had seen the head lights of our convoy of trucks. We immediately switched off the head lights, forcing the drivers to slowly follow the lead of a guide with torchlight. My american adviser and the battalion staff set up temporary quarters in a small tin-roofed house, around which were ready dug trenches to leap into if needs be. We did not build bunkers, as we were unsure whether we would have to move on or not.
Where we were, was right in range of the enemy artillery. The rounds which flew high, found targets in Ai Tu - those that flew low, fell onto us. It was everyman for himself when it came to leaping in the trenches. My american adviser thought it best to dig a deep hole for himself, and laid low all night wearing his steel helmet and flak jacket.
The Artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division requested us to counter-fire, but we only had short coordinates. In the end we had to use powder bag number 7, which wasn't very effective at all against the enemy's 130mm guns positioned 27,000 metres away. Unable to do anything else, we were force to endure the barrage. I estimated that there were around 10 enemy 130mm artillery companies harrassing us that night. The encounter was very damaging to our morale. Fortunately our losses were light for though the 130mm explosions were loud, their destroying capacity was relatively low. None of our artillery men were lost.
The following morning, we realized that the Communists had opened a general attack on Quang Tri. In the north, all fire bases and out posts south of the DMZ had been heavily shelled.
All patrol groups reported sightings of the enemy advancing south. In the west, outposts within the tactical area of responsibility of the 147th Marine Brigade were shelled. Mai Loc Headquarters was also targetted.
At noon on April 1st, Company J along with the 3rd Artillery Battalion Staff and the 258th Marine Brigade Staff were ordered to Ai Tu Base. Headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division retreated to Quang Tri Citadel.
The very moment our convoy arrived at the TOC of the 3rd Infantry Division, the enemy artillery rained down. Followed by my troops and american adviser, I sprinted to a Conex used as a guard post. Only ten of us could fit - the rest were forced to lie flat in depressions in the road. A hundred yards away, houses and vehicles were being razed, and the prospect of our suffering the same fate was very high. One hour later, the shelling paused, and we emerged unscathed. But as we entered the TOC bunkers, a second round of shelling started. A jeep was hit, injuring an artillery man.
The TOC bunker was the target of the enemy artillery. I had never seen a bigger or more well-fortified bunker. It had dozens of rooms to house hundreds of soldiers. Situated well underground, it had two layers of wooden beams over which were at least some tens layers of sandbags. A 130mm gun would only manage to tear up three to four layers of sand bags.
Annoyingly, all the antennas had collapsed, so we had to use substitutes. The range was limited, but was enough for our purposes. I chose a position to the west of the defensive line for Company J. It proved a good choice, and we were safe for quite a few weeks. Returning back to the TOC, I heard Captain Kinh complaining over the radio: “Are you going to sacrifice my old body?” First Lieutenant Dung, chief of S3 handed me the microphone. “Kinh Do, Hanoi is calling.” I said. “Kinh Do hearing you, Authority”. “I'm not forgetting you at all. The 3rd marine Battalion Sea Wolves is still with you. I am going to visit you and give you orders to move at the appropriate time.” “Understood, but the “rain” here has been very heavy. We can't do anything.” “I'll take care of you right now.” I knew that Artillery Company I, positioned right at the defensive line of the 3rd Battalion, was in an unfavourable site to supply supporting fire. But without orders from the Brigade, I had to temporarily leave it in Dong Ha. I mounted the jeep with the intention of driving there, but on reaching the National Route 1, I encountered thousands of civilians fleeing to Hue. The Communists were shelling at Ai Tu Airfields, and at the civilian refugees as well. The route to Dong Ha was jammed, so I warned Artillery Company I to be on standby for immediate mobilization.
Back at TOC, my request was approved by the Brigade and Artillery Company I was allowed to retreat to the south of Ai Tu Airfield. By chance, I also found out that Fire Support Base C1 was to withdraw on the same night. Artillery Company C, reinforcing the 57th Infantry Regiment was there. On a separate frequency, I radioed Captain Hao and said: “It is very likely that you will have to move tonight. Prepare the trucks to pull back all the guns, but if there is not enough room, you may abandon some of the ammunition.”
That night, staying in the fortified bunker, I wasn't worried in the least about the shellings. News from the front line were more of a concern. Under enemy pressure, the battalions were withdrawing from the outposts one by one. The 4th battalion had retreated from Ba Ho and Sarge, and two companies of the 8th Battalion had abandoned Holcomb. The enemy was concentrating their firepower at Mai Loc and Camp Carroll.
The next morning, while I was lying listening to the enemy artillery, Major Hart, my adviser came in and asked me why the 155mm and 105mm companies of the 3rd Infantry Division did not move their guns as the marine artillery company had, but were, instead, requesting the bombers to destroy their guns. I told him: “I am not responsible for the artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division. As it happened, I overheard the order to withdraw out of C1, so last night I ordered trucks to be driven out in readiness to evacuate Artillery Company C. No one gave me an order specifically! All the same, Company C had to abandon one 105mm Howitzer for lack of a truck. The Company Commander had to use his jeep to pull a gun.” That afternoon, both Artillery Companies I and C were safely inside the fence of Ai Tu base.
At about 10.00am, an american adviser asked me to concentrate fire at a T54 tank column 3km north of Dong Ha bridge. The Marine Brigade countered the request, telling me to wait for confirmation in case they were ARVN tanks which had not retreated. The adviser insisted that they were indeed T54s, and that the reconnaissance aircraft could not be wrong. First Lieutenant Dung looked expectantly at me for orders. I said: “We have to trust the Americans... fire quickly before they storm across Dong Ha Bridge.” In battle, some decisions just had to be made on the spot.
I was unable to make direct contact with the 2nd Artillery Battalion at Mai Loc, and was particularly anxious for Dang Ba Dat. I had a feeling that he would have to destroy his Howitzers in order to retreat. Then news came that the 56th Infantry regiment at Camp Carroll had surrendered, and that Mai Loc was increasingly under heavy pressure. How could a reinforcement of the 7th Battalion possibly stop an entire NVA Division? Company B of the 1st Marine Artillery Battalion positioned at Camp Carroll shared the same fate as the 56th Infantry Regiment, being forced to surrender at Carroll.
On April 3rd 1972, the 5th day of the NVA attack, we received encouraging news. The 369th Marine Brigade was to be airlifted urgently to reinforce the Quang Tri front. But late in the afternoon, I was informed that the 147th Brigade was on the verge of retreating from Mai Loc. I was still unable to make direct contact with the 2nd Artillery Battalion, but I knew that Major Dat had been forced to destroy all of his guns and trucks to enable the troops to retreat by foot through the jungle and streams to Ai Tu.
Through out the night we were deafened by enemy artillery. Eleven outposts had been abandoned, four fire support bases were mute, and now practically all of the enemy artillery was directed at Ai Tu. It was relatively safe inside the fortified bunker. A few rounds succeeded in spraying sand everywhere. Electricity was temporarily lost, and the antennas were down. Fortunately they were up to the task of communication after repairs were made. Nguyen Khoa Bao, a mate of mine who was Chief of Staff of the 3rd Infantry Division, lent me his phone so I could reassure my family back in Saigon.
The next morning, I intended to pay each of the artillery companies a visit. I waited for news to pick Dang Ba Dat from the National Route 1 if he made it. The position of Company J was temporarily safe due to the high bamboo fence which hid the tell tale smoke after each gun blast. Meeting Captain Ty, I told him softly: “Do you know how lucky you are that Mr Tam replaced you with someone else at Camp Carroll? They are now all prisoners of war.” All artillery men of Company B were also POWs and nobody knew their fate. The position of Artillery Company C, commanded by First Lieutenant Hao, was relatively good, but I still gave it a second position just in case. At Artillery Company I, Old Kinh Cu complained of being immediately countershelled every time he started firing, although none of his men had been hurt so far. His position at the southern corner, was good because it was away from the enemy, but being in an elevated spot, it was easily observed and targetted. I ran around with Lieutenant Kinh to find a safer station for them.
At 5.00pm, I collected Dat on the National Route 1, 3 km north of Ai Tu. I gave him an uniform, that was rather short for him, but his was in complete tatters after twenty four hours in the jungle. He often complained that he always had to work hard because he was born a horse in the Chinese horoscope.
The following day the 2nd Artillery Battalion and the 147th Brigade which was composed of the 4th and 8th Battalion, were due for R & R. On the morrow, the 7th Battalion reached Ai Tu. Meeting Old man Hue, the battalion commander, I jokingly asked: “Everyone was here yesterday, what happened to you?” Major Hue, in an irritated voice, answered: “We were slow because we moved in formation, not in disarray. And we had to collect all the wounded from other battalions along the way.” In my heart, I felt a deep respect for the quiet old friend who worked with me in Division G3. Back then, I had thought him rather placid. I realized that he had played the sleeping tiger all along, and now he was truly wide awake. I told him this, and we shook hands warmly. That was the last time I saw him. He was later wounded in battle, and after the war, stayed in VN, and did not reach the US by the HO programme.
During the night of April 8th, Ai Tu base was fiercely pounded by about ten 130mm artillery companies. Several rounds hit the top of the bunker, destroying the electricity wires, and sending us into darkness. We were forced to operate by torch and candle light. Sand and dust poured down covering everything. Fortunately, despite being shelled relentlessly with more than 3,000 rounds from the 130mm guns, all companies of the 3rd Artillery Battalion survived the night. However, I suspected that the enemy were going to finish off the attack in the morning.
Early in the morning, the artillery forward observer at base Pedro reported hearing the rumble of enemy tanks to the west. He requested firepower, but his observation was deemed inaccurate. A few minutes later, both forward observers at the 6th Marine Battalion reported sightings of enemy tanks. All three 105mm Howitzer companies and four 155mm guns concentrated fires at the enemy tank column, but the iron crabs continued to savagely storm Pedro. To their bad luck, they drove into a field of antitank mines. Four tanks exploded - the others did not dare advance. The Marine Artillery destroyed the enemy's tank formation, and the NVA infantry men accompanying the tanks scattered. After that, we stopped firing to allow the VNAF to fly in. Through the Air ground frequency, I followed the VNAF's A37 aircrafts bombardment of the enemy. Unfortunately one A37 was hit by an antiaircraft bullet - the pilot ejected, but his parachute failed to open. We later found out that it was Major Tran The Vinh - the “phoenix” of I Corps who finally met his fate when his wings were clipped over Phuong Hoang (the Vietnamese name for Pedro).
Immediately after Pedro fell under fire, Colonel Dinh, commander of the 258th Brigade ordered the M48 Tank squadron and two companies of the 1st Marine Battalion to launch a counter attack. At that time, the 6th Marine Battalion was still able to hold its defensive line. During fire, the Marine Artillery were directed by an L19 reconnaissance aircraft to target a T54. After fifteen minutes of shelling, the plane reported the tank was incapacitated, but not burning. First Lieutenant Dung jokingly wondered whether we would get all of the 30,000 piasters as a reward, or whether we would have to share it with L19. “Just report to the Division Artillery Officer and the 258th Brigade, and we'll worry about the prize later”, I replied. After Quang Tri was regained, the 3rd Artillery Battalion was rewarded with 270,000 piasters for having knocked out and burned nine enemy tanks.
Late in the afternoon, the 6th Marine Battalion and the M48 tank Squadron and two companies of the 1st Battalion started the counter-attack. Altogether, twenty one T54's were destroyed and two were captures. At 8.00pm these two tanks were pulled to Ai tu. I was informed by an armour soldier that one was driven back and one had to be pulled. I climbed into the undamaged one, and found two spent 100mm shells. It had fired only two rounds and then sank in a trench the crew ran away when we counter-attacked. I could see that the NVA armour soldiers were well treated; there were many cans of food made in China. I took a writing pad that had a T54 logo on it and read the printed line. It read: “Victory on Route 9”.
The enemy attack on Pedro was broken, but the Communists still continued to shell and increase pressure on our defensive lines, to the north and west of Quang Tri.
The 369th Brigade and two Ranger Groups were assigned to reinforce the 3rd Infantry Division for the counter-attack. But counter-operation “Quang Trung 729” was an unsuccessful one. From the 12 to 17th April not a single unit participating could advance further than 1 km. It seemed that the enemy was quietly gaining reinforcements for another attack, and during that period, we were relatively safe from the shellings.
I visited Artillery Company K which had come at the same time as the 369th Brigade. At Nancy, I told 1st Lieutenant Vu Quang Vinh, the commander of Artillery Company K the importance of finding a good place to shelter from enemy shelling, even if there were difficulties in organizing its defensive lines.
On the way back, reporter Nguyen Tu, from the Chinh Luan newspaper, stopped my car and gave me a bottle of wine. He had sheltered in my bunker for a number of days. I admired his professionalism. On several occasions, he risked his life for an eye-witness account of the battle field.
On the 22nd of April, I heard news that the 147th Marine Brigade, and the 4th and 8th Marine Battalions, all of which had been re-equipped and supplied, were to replace the 258th Brigade. The 6th and the 3rd Marine Battalions, after three weeks of having tried to stop the enemy, needed to be relieved. The 3rd artillery Battalion was practically unscathed, with only two artillery men slightly wounded. I thought I was to stay in Ai Tu but that night, I received orders to return to Hue. Meeting me the next day, Dang Ba Dat told me that he had decided to follow Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao because his unit had recently received full replacements of trucks and guns. On the 23rd of April, the 3rd Artillery Battalion moved to Phu Bai for R & R.
We temporarily forgot the shriek of the shells we had endured for twenty one days at Ai Tu. The future was so uncertain. I asked my wife to buy an air ticket to Hue immediately. As a soldier during the war, we were allowed to have two week-long leaves a year.
In the evening of May 2nd, 1st Lieutenant Cuong who was signal officer, approached with a sombre face, and in hushed tones said: “We've lost Quang Tri.” Hearing this, I asked Cuong to summon all the company commanders for a briefing at 8.00am the next morning, and to prepare their men for mobilization. In reality my men were always ready, for we did not have the privilege of being in Song Than Base in Saigon!
Had Dat the dare-devil, not chosen to stay in Ai Tu, I would have had to stay to blow up our guns. But Dang Ba Dat, “work horse” that he was, was fated to be “The Artillery Executioner.” On two previous occasions, he had had to destroy the batteries of two companies. This time, he had to blow up the whole battalion's eighteen 105mm Howitzers and four reinforced 155mm Howitzers!
As I forsaw, the 3rd Artillery Battalion received orders to move to Base Evan. One artillery company moved to an area near Phong Dien. Entering the TOC of the Marine Division headquarters, I saw Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang standing in front of the map of the operation. He was pointing at the My Chanh River and was speaking to the newly appointed Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, who had just replaced Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam as I Corps Commander. (Lam later went on to become II Corps commander). “The Marine Corps will organize a defensive line south of the My Chanh. Let the 1st Infantry Division handle the West. As soon as the Airborne Division arrives, we will launch the counter-offensive.”
This time, the 3rd Artillery Battalion was to back up the 369th Marine Brigade with its fire support. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen The Luong replaced Colonel Pham Van Chung as commander of the Brigade. Luong “the Eagle” was airlifted along with two Marine Battalions to Hai Lang to initiate Operation Song Than 5/72. Two companies of the 3rd Artillery Battalion were moved close to the My Chanh bank to provide supporting fire. At this stage the Operation was only a defensive move, not an outright general counter-attack.
The following day, the 369th Brigade Staff and the Artillery Battalion returned to station in the village of Chinh An. It was here that Artillery Company K, led by 1st Lieutenant Vu Quang Vinh, won a memorable victory. (See “I am fighting hand to hand with them.”)
On the night of May 21st, a NVA regiment and a battalion of PT 76 amphibious tanks dislodged the ARVN regional forces, and crossing the O Lau river, assaulted the 3rd and 9th Marine Battalions. Another prong penetrated deep to attack the 3rd Artillery Battalion and the 369th Brigade Staff. But we lowered the 105mm Howitzers and the four 155mm guns and fired directly at the tanks. That paralyzed the attack. The bodies of the enemy tanks littered the dry fields. Between 1973-1974, the battleground was to become a frequent visiting site for Allied military strategists, who came to study the tactics of the ARVN.
On May 24rd, the 147th Brigade started Operation Song Than 6/72 with three Marine battalions. The 7th Battalion used american Landing Crafts to land. The 4th and the 6th Battalions were airlifted. The 2nd Artillery Battalion was to give fire support, but during the briefing, Colonel Bui The Lan ordered me to help organize. I was slightly surprised and wondered why he had chosen to suppport three battalions with only just one 105mm Howitzer company and four 155mm guns. In my opinion, it was insufficient support, by I did not dare voice my thought. It would have seemed as if I were asking for more than my share. My troops were already working hard as it was.
In the afternoon, I pointed the positions out to Captain Truong Cong Thong, the Executive Officer of the 2nd Artillery Battalion and informed him that I would be leading the movement with the 155 mm Artillery at the fore. As the positions for the guns had been used in previous operations, there was no need to inspect the sites.
At 5,00am the next morning, sitting in a jeep, I lead a convoy of trucks pulling the guns of two companies that did not belong to me. We met a column of M41 tanks clearing the way to the banks of the My Chanh. My convoy was impeded. An hour passed as we awaited the M41's and the accompanying marines to move on. It became brighter - the 7th Battalion was scheduled for the amphibious landing, yet we, the Artillery were not even ready to provide fire support. Recalling LangSon's orders, I began to get rather agitated. I called to Captain De who was on top of an M41: “Please clear the tanks from the route... I need to get through urgently. We'll be in trouble if the 7th Battalion doesn't get fire support.” He immediately gave us right of way without further ado.
Confident that a battalion of Rangers had moved forwards the previous afternoon, I ordered the convoy to drive fast. The 155mm company reached its position safely. But barely had the 105mm company unloaded its guns, when the enemy started firing AT3 rockets from a village 300m to the east.
Grabbing the microphone, I yelled to the two 105mm Artillery companies: “Hong Ha 21, Hong Ha 31, fire 102 and 105.” The enemy responded with rockets. “I'll rectify the co-ordinates,” I yelled. Turning my head I called to 1st Lieutenant Cam who was seeking shelter behind a truck: “Cam, lower the guns and fire directly! Quick... and tell the truck drivers to dodge as they go to avoid the shelling.”
I stood looking at the flying rockets exploding in the surrounding field - it was lucky none fell on us. One exploded between two GMC's, but caused no damage. My artillery started pouring down around the village, where the enemy hid to fire at us. Our forward observers were sent to coordinate the firing, and to direct our 105mm Howitzers to the bamboo hedges. The enemy guns were silenced immediately. Two of our guns were still firing directly when I heard from a pilot flying above in an L19 ...
“Ha Noi, I'm going to direct you to an enemy tank.”
“Ready... give the directions.”
“Left 200 from the last shelling.”
“Shells coming up ...”
We were informed that the tank was a direct hit. An american television reporter asked me whether I intended to enter the village, and if yes, if he could accompany us. I shook my head, said it was not my duty, and that he would have ask the Marines coming with the M41.
Meanwhile, helicopters carrying the 4th and 6th Battalion flew across the My Chanh. Operation Song Than 6/72 was well under way, and we were ready to provide support. I spoke to Captain Thong. “You stay here with Cam, I shall return to my place. Tonight I will ask Chuong to join you.” I wanted my Executive Officer participate because I knew the 2nd Artillery Battalion's fighting spirit was low after being forced to abandon guns and retreat twice, but my responsibility did not lie with Operation Song Than 6/72.
The Operation at this stage was still a defensive one. The Communists already knew that the Marines could land anywhere along the coast from My Thuy and Cua Viet. They were cautious, not willing to drive home their attack - choosing instead to protect newly captured land e.g. Quang Tri. According to a document from an american Marine adviser, 29,000 Communists were killed, 1080 weapons and 64 tanks were hit or seized.
On May 27th, three Marine battalions met south of the My Chanh, to wait for the Airborne Division to initiate the general counter-attack for the purpose of recovering Quang Tri.
At the beginning of June, a communist sapper unit raided Artillery Company J, stationed 1km west of Chinh An village. Company J was supposed to be protected by a company of regional forces. Enemy infiltrators were detected within the defensive lines. A sapper squad was wiped out with the support from Company K. A TOW-rocket soldier of the 369th Brigade was killed and a few regional soldiers injured, but everyone else was unhurt.
An attempt by the Communists to extract revenge on artillery men at Chinh An village was thwarted by a barrage from the “No Than” (Divine Crossbows) Battalion.
The general counter-attack really began on June 28th, 1972, during Operation Song Than 9/72. The “9” meant that we had to recover Quang Tri by September, after three months of counter -attacking. According to an American adviser, 1515 Communists were killed, 15 captured, and 4 tanks and 550 weapons were destroyed 6/1972. The Airborne Division, advanced as a right prong, reached the Gates of Quang Tri city within three weeks. They were stopped 200m from the old Dinh Cong Trang Citadel. Having suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of An Loc, they did not have sufficient man-power to bear the brunt of the counter-attack. Thus, I Corps Headquarters ordered the Marine Corps to accomplish the task of regaining Quang Tri in ninety days.
The 258th Brigade was given this responsibility, and the 6th Battalion Than Ung (which had twice landed behind enemy lines) was appointed the main force. During this time, the 369th Brigade and the 3rd Artillery battalion were reserves. Occasionally, I had the opportunity to return to Hue.
On July 11th, the 1st Marine Battalion was airlifted to the District of Trieu Phong, to block the enemy supplying route for NVA forces clinging to their positions inside the Dinh Cong Trang Citadel. A medical platoon and crew were killed when a CH53 helicopter was shot by a AT3 rocket.
Throughout August, the marines advanced very slowly under the artillery rain. Four battalions had been attacked on three sides of the old citadel. One fifth of the Marines had been wounded. The NVA even threw its 325 Reserve Division, into battle, but finally had to retreat, scattering from Quang Tri Citadel.
On September 9th, some small marine units started to reach the foot of the citadel, and by the 16th, the yellow and tri-striped Southern Vietnamese flag was aloft above Quang Tri.
That day, I followed Father Tuyen Uy as we entered the ruined citadel to attend a religious service. Before we forded the stream, which had had become progressively shallower, we had to endure another round from 130mm guns.
Some shells exploded very close by, but we all escaped being hurt. It was very emotional looking at Father Tuyen Uy, wearing his flak jacket and helmet, holding mass for the Marines while the enemy artillery took pot shots at us. The counter attack stopped at Thach Han river.
Even now, I still wonder why the ARVN did not continue the recover Dong Ha, Gio Linh and banish the NVA to the other side of Ben Hai river.
I guess both the ARVN and the NVA were in defensive mode, right up to the day the Paris Treaty was signed.
Lieutenant Colonel Tran Thien Hieu
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