The 2nd Marine Battalion
in Hoi Dong Sam operation
24-11-1963
Colonel Ton That Soan
1. General Overview
Since 1957, the US already had a plan to train a special force for ARVN to fight against VC guerrillas activities. Members of this force were trained for parachuting in Saigon, for signalling in Vung Tau, for special raids in Nha Trang. Dong Ba Thin was a training centre of Special Forces, south of Nha Trang city.
Their first commanders were Colonel Le Dinh Thu (Lam Son) and Colonel Doan van Quang. Since 11-1961, the US CIA organised Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG). Its aim was to attract ethnic minorities living in tribes in plateaux or jungles, namely Rhade, Bana and Stien, to participate in South Vietnam defence and to watch and report all VC activities.
Very slowly, the US combined US Special Forces, Vietnamese Special Forces and CIDG companies to form Special Forces camps located along South Vietnamese borders. Fierce fighting was noted at those camps at Duc Co, Plei me, Dakto, Ben Het, Lang Vei, Kham Duc, Dong Xoai, Bo Duc, Hiep Hoa, Suoi Da, Thien Ngon, Trang Sup…
The VC attack on Hiep Hoa camp was to raise the curtain for following forays into other Special Forces camps. Hiep Hoa was west of Duc Hue district, Hau Nghia province. This camp occupied a strategic position to block an infiltrating route of NVA from secret sanctuaries in Cambodia such as Ba Thu, Mo Vet and Canh Thien Than. Through this Route, they might enter Cu Chi district of Duc Hoa, only thirty kilometres away from Saigon as the crow flies. From Hiep Hoa, people used Province Route 7A to go to Tan My, Trang Bang and Province Route 10 to go to Loc Giang Khiem Cuong. North of Hiep Hoa Camp there was La Cua outpost. In the west of the camp, it was Hiep Hoa Sugar factory, situated on the northern bank of Vam Co Dong River. This factory had a small airstrip, which was ten metres wide and three hundred metres long. National Route 1 joined Saigon and Phnom Penh passing by Go Dau Ha, north of Thay Cai Canal.
Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp was established on 3-2-1963. Its area was approximately one square kilometre. There were two defensive lines. The outer line was a system of fighting positions reinforced by many concertinnas. The inner line was set in concrete, with each side extending one hundred metres. The camp was under protection of Team A21 of US Special Force Group 5, commanded by Captain D. Horne. The troops of the Camp were composed of:
* 12 Officers
* 195 soldiers
* 47 CIDG Trainees (most of the CIDG Trainees were Cambodian Vietnamese)
At the beginning, the organization of the camp was very loose. Careless recruitment caused a disordered co-existence of different contingents. VC faked surrenders so they could live inside the camp, thoroughly investigating the defensive positions, warehouses, habits of Special Forces troops and their sentry schedule. Those VC always waited for their opportunity to become "invaders from inside".
At the end of 10-1963, a number of VC surrendered and were allowed to stay right inside the camp. That was the time for them to collect information and to prepare for becoming "invaders from inside". Colonel G.C Morton, MACV Special Force Commander, in one tour of inspection ascertained the surrendered VC's plan and subsequently reprimanded Captain Horne and ordered him to send all those surrendered VC out to live in another place. Unfortunately the Colonel's order was not executed.
2. Sequence of the attack at Hiep Hoa camp.
On the night of 22-11-1963, Captain Horne led a patrol group consisting of seven US Special Forces troops, three Vietnamese Special Forces troops and thirty-six CIDG to leave the camp. 1st Lieutenant J Colby, four US and nine Vietnamese Special Forces troops, and two hundred and six CIDG stayed inside the camp.
At approximately 1:00 am on the 23-11-1963, with the help of Platoon 5 which acted as "invaders from inside", VC attacked suddenly. VC forces, commanded by Huynh Cong Than (Chief of VC forces in Long An province), consisted of:
* 2 infantry companies.
* 1 sapper platoon.
* Duc Hoa district local force.
Only a short time after the attack commenced, VC succeeded in occupying defensive positions of the northern side of the camp. They managed to seize a machine gun position and used the weapons to fire at troops inside the camp. When 1st Lieutenant Colby noticed that nobody had been fighting in that defensive side, he ran towards the mortars bunker where ARVN, Special Forces Officers and US troops had been fighting.
Sergeant Camacho, an expert in heavy weapons, grabbed his carbin and sprinted towards the mortars position. He used mortars to stop VC waves of attack towards the center of the camp. He continuously fired, without a single pause for almost a whole half hour. During this time, 1st Lieutenant Colby attempted to arrange the remaining troops to defend. Brave Special Forces troops counterattacked and reoccupied the machine gun position. Under flashing streaks of light as bullets sailed across the camp, 1st Lieutenant Colby saw a number of CIDG running out of the camp. The enemy pressure increased.
Colby realized that if Special Forces continued to fight, it would not produce any positive results, especially considering he had been wounded. Colby tended grenades to Camacho, to hinder the enemy from advancing. He then ordered remaining troops to withdraw from the camp. He also told Camacho to withdraw.
Camacho begrudgingly obeyed Camacho's order to withdraw since he knew that there were US troops still fighting inside the camp. Once outside the camp, Camacho couldn't distract his mind from those US troops and decided to return alone to the camp, throwing himself into an area of fierce combat where mortar rounds were deafening. Camacho suddenly encountered a group of VC and discharged an entire clip of carbin to those black shadows who returned fire. Camacho lobbed a grenade towards them to cover his run to the nearby machine gun position to hide. However, VC had seen his hiding place and had also found Sergeants George E. Smith, Claude MC Clure and K.M Roraback. Torches shined in their faces as the VC firearm nozzles pointed directly at them. The four US Special Forces troops were disarmed and captured.
At some later stage, VC transferred these POWs to Region C, Tay Ninh province. 1st Lieutenant Colby hid in a sugarcane field and was rescued the following day. One hour after the beginning of the attack, US fighter aircraft arrived, dropping illuminating flares and napalms and firing machine guns at the fence of the camp and suspected areas. The enemy suffered heavy losses and began to retreat to the west by crossing Vam Co Dong river.
Concurrent with the attack at the camp, VC shelled the Hau Nghia sub-tactical zone headquarters about one kilometer away and also other units positioned in Hiep Hoa sugar factor, La Cua outpost and more in order to block reinforcements.
3. ARVN Reaction:
Early in the morning of 23-11-1963, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Thieu (commander of the 5th Infantry Division and commander of the 32nd tactical zone), Major Pham Quoc Thuan (his division Chief of Staff) and Major Lo cong Danh (his S3 Chief) used a helicopter to fly to Hiep Hoa. The purpose of their trip was to meet Major Sam Tan Phuoc, the Chief of Sub tactical zone Hau Nghia.
After having briefed about the attack, human and weapon losses on both sides, Major Phuoc suggested commencing an immediate operation utilizing helilift, to VC secret sanctuary Hoi Dong Sam of Due Hue district to the right side of Vam Co Dong river. This was to pursue the enemy and rescue prisoners. Brigadier General Nguyen van Thieu approved his idea. The operation began the following day with the 2nd Marine Battalion as the primary force.
4. The 2nd Marine Battalion pursued the enemy :
Colonel Nguyen van Thieu who had just been promoted to Brigadier General after the Coup of 1-11-1963 immediately ordered the 2nd Marine Battalion, which had been protecting the security belt of Saigon, Gia Dinh, to perform that "pursuit" operation. The commander at that time was Major Co Tan Tinh Chau who had replaced Major Nguyen Thanh Yen. A convoy transported the battalion to Bien Hoa airport to be then helilifted to Hoi Dong Sam of Duc Hue district close to South Viet Nam / Kampuchea border.
The terrain of the operation was muddy, with tiger grass and reeds spread throughout. The area was also riddled with interlacing canals and river systems. Civilians lived on small elevated grounds like those in oases scattered across the landscape.
A. Sequence of Operation :
Group A
At 7:00 am on 24-11-1963, the helilift began. Groups A, commanded by the Battalion Commander, consisted of:
* Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Pham Nha
* Company 3 of 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan Phuc. (Phuc was temporarily the Company Commander while 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Nang Bao had been attending a course in Okinawa).
From Bien Hoa airport to Hoi Dong Sam required approximately twenty minutes by helicopter. The helicopter fleet was composed of eight H-21s. They landed Company 1 to the north of Target A, under the escort and fire support of eight UH-1Bs. There was also a O-1B "Bird Dog" reconnaissance plane of the USAF present.
As they left the helicopters, Company 1 was immediately attacked by .50-caliber machine guns by VC from rows of trees on high edges of the villages northeast of Target A. The landing zone was in a flooded rice field, about seven hundred metres away from Target A. Marines quickly deployed, using maximum firepower to advance and occupy a row of trees on the edge of a village. From that newly acquired position, Company 1 fired violently at VC hiding places with all kinds of weapons, such as Garant M1, carbine, BAR machine guns, .30-caliber machine guns, 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles and grenade launchers. The FAC (Forward Air Controller) on the 0-1B plane ordered the UH-1B helicopters to observe the VC retreat from Target A.
Due to a limited number of helicopters for helilift, the 2nd Battalion only finished its landing entirely after two hours. Major Chau ordered companies to concentrate their firepower towards VC collective weapons positions to support each other while advancing. At this time a B26 bomber entered the sky above the area of operation to replace UH-1B, which returned for resupply of ammunitions and fuel. Under the guidance of the FAC, the B26 dropped several 250 pound bombs on a group of about forty VC who had been trying to flee from the northwest of Hoi Dong Sam, about five hundred metres west of Target A.
Immediately after that bombing, Company 3, under fire support of Company 1, charged forward to occupy VC defending positions. They shot dead eight VC and seized three .50-caliber Machine guns. Both Companies of Group A which had landed at Giong A Rac and Giong San Ma were confronting the enemy. That proved the accuracy of our intelligence sources as we had landed right on the enemy’s head.
Group B :
Captain Nguyen van Hay, the executive officer of the Battalion and the Commander of Company 2, commanded group B. Company 2 landed at Giong Tram. Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Ngo Van Dinh landed at Giong Mat Cat. The two companies deployed in a wide bocking line to impede the enemy's efforts to retreat towards Kampuchea. From a hamlet of straw houses at Giong Mat Cat, platoons of 2nd Lieutenant Vu Doan Dzoan and 2nd Lieutenant Nguyen Dang Bien of Company 4 reported that they had been surrounding the VC unit and had cut it into segments.
VC started fleeing in all directions. A group of them were withdrawing to a canal, attempting to use sampans to escape. Many VC were killed, four were captured and a number of weapons including a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun were seized. Two marines were slightly wounded. Due to the terrain being too muddy and bushy, it was very difficult to observe.
1st Lieutenant Ngo van Dinh requested a C&C helicopter observe and point out targets. All our units continued to encircle and annihilate the enemy. VC tried to save their lives, leaving behind all heavy weapons and equipment they had seized in camp Hiep Hoa the previous night. They threw themselves into canals or into wells of residents.
Major Co Tan Tinh Chau and Captain Smith (the US advisor) were aboard the C&C helicopter and were escorted by two gunships. The two officers saw VC sampans in Buu No Canal sailing towards Ba Thu sanctuary in Kampuchea. The enemy was afraid that gunships would pursuer and fire at the sampan fleet so they forced US prisoners to take off their shirts and sit exposed on the rears of the sampans. Major Chau ordered gunships to fire rockets onto the sampans, but Captain Smith said that he had reported the situation to higher authorities. The latter requested Vietnamese Marines to stop pursuing the enemy for fear of harming US prisoners' lives. C&C and the two gunships continued to fly in pursuit of the fleet of sampans, sometimes very low above the canals as if they were performing air acrobatics, but neither gunships nor sampans dared fire at each other.
After about one hour of flying in such a manner, Captain Joseph N Smith informed Major Chau that the helicopters would return to Bien Hoa, because they were not allowed to enter Kampuchea skies. The 2nd Marine Battalion was continued its search of all targets and then positioned overnight. The next morning, it received order to attend a gathering area in Duc Hue district in the afternoon. The battalion brought back many seized weapons and captured VC.
B. Results.
The 2nd Marine Battalion:
* Killed 25 VC
* Captured 5 VC
* Seized a remarkable number of weapons, namely two 12.8,, antiaircraft guns, mortars, machine guns, B40 and personal firearms.
* The battalion also recovered many weapons and equipments which VC had seized from Hiep Hoa camp. Among these were several boxes full of US leather on canvas shoes.
The 2nd Marine Battalion had minimal casualties and only eight wounded. Weapons and equipment were conserved.
C. Awards.
Immediately after the operation had ended, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Thieu arrived by helicopter at the gathering area in Duc Hue district to praise marines. He ordered to transfer all seized weapons to the 32nd tactical zone headquarters' flag square for exhibition so foreign and Vietnamese reporters could see and photograph them.
The 2nd Marine Battalion received one hundred different medals including:
* 10 Bravery medals with palm.
* Company 4 of 1st Lieutenant Ngo van Dinh achieved the largest number of deeds and received the most medals.
* The battalion was granted a sum of money to celebrate its tremendous victory.
5. Commentary :
i. In 1963, there were three large battles in South Vietnam, namely at Ap Bac, Dam Doi and Hiep Hoa. All three regions were remote, desolate and close to the border. The fighting at Hiep Hoa was a prelude for other attacks at Special Forces camps located in remote areas that were difficult to resupply and to reinforce. The organization of the camps was too slack, and the commanders lacked in strict control and following-up procedures. Its recruitments of CIDG were reckless. It was a severe error of Captain Horne to allow surrendered VC to living amongst the troops. Due to the help of "invaders from inside", VC had the upper hand from the very beginning of the attack, but they never expected the resolute fighting of the remaining defending force.
ii. Although they were suddenly attacked, US and Vietnamese Special Forces troops were calm and fought courageously, especially the hero Camacho, who single-handedly inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in their primary push towards the center of the camp. Other Special Forces troops managed to recover important positions despite their disadvantageous circumstances.
iii. US aircrafts intervened just in time by dropping illuminating flares and napalm and firing their machines guns at VC positions. Their support caused heavy losses to the VC aggressors and forced them to retreat. VC could no longer continue their attack to occupy remaining targets.
iv. Intelligence sources of Hau Nghia district of Major Sam Tan Phuoc were accurate. The decision of Brigadier General Nguyen van Thieu to use the 2nd Marine Battalion as a pursuing force was reasonable, quick and effective. The helilift operation of this Battalion was a fatal blow to VC. They chaotically fled their positions, leaving behind the weapons that they had so successfully seized the previous day. Had the four American prisoners not been exposed, the entire VC sampan fleet would have undoubtedly been destroyed, with all VC would have been annihilated in the process.
v. US Sergeant Isaac Camacho was captured on the night 22-11-1963. After 14 months in VC prisons in Kampuchea, close to Tay Ninh province border, he successfully escaped on 13-1-1965. He was the 1st Special Forces soldier who managed to escape from prison in the Vietnam War. In 9/1965 he returned to USA to reunite with his family. He was welcomed as a hero in El Paso, Texas (his home town). He was promoted to Sergeant Major and was duly awarded with a Bronze star and a silver star with "V" combat and in 1999 he received a Distinguished Service Cross.
vi. At the beginning of 1965, that VC prison in Kampuchea received Corporal Craft of the US Army and Captain Cook, the US advisor of the 4th Marine Battalion, who were both caught by VC in Binh Gia battle. Out of the four prisoners of Hiep Hoa camp, two were released to the US, the third Sergeant Kenneth M Roraback was executed by VC, and the fourth, Sergeant Camacho successfully escaped.
vii. The author of this article had a period of about one and a half years as Chief of Hau Nghia sub tactical zone. This region, close to Saigon, was dubbed by VC as their "copper citadel", because it was next to the Kampuchea border, with many secret sanctuaries and numerous interlacing underground tunnels. Big communist cadres were nourished and protected in this area.
The following is a paragraph written by a Ranger officer that discusses Loc Giang village, which was situated on inter-province Route 10:
"In Loc Giang, there were not only VC guerrillas. Here, most families had members who had moved to the north or to secret sanctuaries. The remaining people had legally obtained ID of South Vietnam and therefore were able to secretly aid the VC while still being a citizen of the south. Old women were not less dangerous; they used to be mothers of communist fighters. If a woman was carrying a pumpkin and offering it to another person, there would be a letter inside the pumpkin containing information and details about the ARVN. A strong piece of nylon could be a resupply being set to a VC who would then use it as a hammock. A bag of MSG (Monosodium Glutamate) was also a gift to a sanctuary. All simple objects, no matter how innocent they appeared, could be beneficial to VC forces. A handicapped ice cream ambulatory vender who used to chat with ARVN soldiers could collect data about some ARVN units. A bottles buyer, who used to ride bicycles around the village, could report changes in situations in that village to the VC. All people were difficult to trust".
Colonel Ton That Soan.
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