Campaign: Song Tinh Thuong
Colonel Ton That Soan
I. Overview :
The South Viet Nam Navy organized an operation in the southernmost area of the country called the "Nam Can of Ca Mau" province.
This operation was named Campaign Song Tinh Thuong. Its goal was to reoccupy Nam Can and pacify it. To bring back peace to the villages was the main objective. The campaign was commanded by Colonel Ho Tan Quyen, a Commander of the Navy. The mission started on the 3rd of January 1963, coinciding with a birthday of President Ngo Dinh Diem.
II. Participating Units :
The participating units included an array of Navy, 2nd and 4th battalions of the Marine Corps. The Navy consisted of:
1 Landing ship Tank
4 Landing ship medium
2 LSIL
1 LSSL
1 Changing riverine force
2 Coastal Groups
The Marine Corps consisted of two separate parts:
Firstly, the amphibious force of marine group was composed of:
- Headquarters of Marine Group
Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Nguyen Khang (of Class 1 Nam Dinh Military School). Major Nguyen Ba Lien was the Executive Officer and at the same time the Chief of Staff.
The second Marine Battalion was made up of:
- Commander: Captain Nguyen Thanh Yen (Class 6 of DaLat Military Academy)
- Executive officer, and at the same time Company 1 commander: Captain Co Tan Tinh Chau (Class 5 Thu Duc Military School).
* Company Commanders:
- Captain Nguyen Van Hay (Company 2)
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Nang Bao (Company 3)
- Captain Hoang Van Nam (Company 4)
- 1st Lieutenant Ngo Van Dinh (Chief S3)
* Finally, the 4th Marine Battalion:
- Commander: Captain Bui The Lan (Class 4 Thu Duc Military School)
- Executive Officer and at the same time Company 4 Commander: Captain Ton That Soan (Class 4 Thu Duc Military School)
* Company Commanders:
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh Tri (Company 1)
- 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Hoan (Compan 2)
- 1st Lieutenant Truong Van Nhat (Compan 3)
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Anh (Chief 3)
- 75mm Artillery Battery A Commanded by 1st Lieutenant Doan Trong Cao (Class 13 Dalat Military Academy).
- An Engineering Company Commanded by 1st Lieutenant Bui Van Pham along with 2nd Lieutenant Cao Van Tam (Class 12 Thu Duc Military School) as his Executive Officer.
III. Concept of the operation :
The duration of the operation would last about one month. During the first period, the Marine forces were to land at Ca Mau promontory (Xom Moi) to perform operation "search and destroy" at south of Cai Lon Rivers. Technically, this meant locating enemies within the province, both who were blatantly present and in hiding and to clear them from the area. During this procedure, the Navy ships and marines were to occupy Nam Can. Another Force was to de-block waterways from Dam Doi to Nam Cam to prevent the enemy from interfering.
The second period would also last about one month. This mission was aiming at the building of Nam Can Base. The purpose was to reconstruct the Nam Can district and once again pacifying the region. The pacification was to be performed by Regional forces that were not listed above. During this operation Navy Major Nghiem Van Phu was to be in charge of protecting the waterways.
IV. Sequence of Operation :
* Day N the 3rd January 1963
A. The 2nd marine battalion was transported on a LSM, The HQ 402 Lam Giang of Navy Captain Dung. It was escorted by a fleet of river boats, along Bo De River towards Nam Can during this transportation. The 2nd Battalion was to land on a bank of Nam Can River at 6.30 am, then move southwards near the Ca Mau promontory.
On another LSM, The HQ 404, was to sail behind about 300m carrying the operation staff commanders by Navy Major Ding Manh Hung and Marine Group Headquarters, Marine 75mm Battery A, Marine Company of Engineers - These Marines units would land after the 2nd battalion had landed and protect safety on the shore. A patrol craft PC HQ 04 and LSSL HQ 226 were to sail behind HQ 404 slowly to protect the convoy with 76mm and 40mm cannons and 12.7mm machine guns. A delicate 3 way protection system between the ships was to ensure the safety of the first few groups.
The landscape was still deep in its sleep on the wide river. On both banks, forests of water-coconuts trees were stationary like the shadows in darkness. The sky was still obscene and the Sun had not risen. Standing on the deck of HQ 402, sailors had to observe carefully in front of its bow to detect fishnets extending across the water surface, so as to warn pilots in time to steer away from them. It was a difficult job in the pitch darkness and required a lot of attention on the behalf of all the crew on board.
Meanwhile a coastal fleet was advancing to occupy a "blocking knot" south of landing zone "Charlie", and then it was deployed and waited for orders.
As daybreak approached, the time for clearing had come so that the landing zone was made for the ships to anchor. Machine guns 50, Bar, submachine guns, grenades launchers on river boats simultaneously fired. The explosions caused birds to soar up into the dark blue sky.
Through the radio of the river boat approaching landing zone "Charlie" a reporting voice was heard. "To the right, the right. Viet Cong were running and one was carrying a sub machine gun. Yes, they were hit. Three of them were hit”. Bloody wounded and limp on the floor, the three men died. In the distance, river boats sailed up and down stream to protect the other ships. The atmosphere was tense and dramatic, filled with gun fire shots.
Navy Captain Vuong was the operation vice chief of staff and he had ordered river boats to leave Charlie area toward the south to give space for HQ 402 to approach landing zone Charlie. Its 40mm cannons and other weapons started firing at mud, broken the tree trunks, splashed everywhere. Viet Cong defending positions built with wood and mud collapsed under naval heavy fire power, in a large area exploding from that river bank to about 300m further in land.
At 6.30 am when HQ 402 lowered its mouth gate, Marines jumped down on shallow water and allowed to occupy the landing zone, then moved further forwards inside water coconuts forests to protect that landing beach. VC guerillas only perfunctorily fired their weapons then ran away into the immense mangrove forest. Then the 2nd Battalion left Charlie and moved southwards as preplanned. Navy and Marines on HQ 404 successfully landed to establish position for the operation staff and for Marine 75mm Battery A.
At 9.00am, when Group A of Company 2 had first occupied a target about 1km south of Charlie, VC fired their 60mm mortars. Most of mortars rounds fell onto mud, on mangrove forests causing no casualties to the 2nd Battalion Headquarters. Captain Yen the Battalion Commander, the US advisor, Captain Richard B. Taylor and 1st Lieutenant Ngo Van Dinh, Chief of S3 were luckily unscathed. The Battalion moved and searched slowly because of the muñy terrain. Marines moved along the edges passing the thin tree trunk used as a bridge spanned on the mangrove branches. Underneath the high flooded muñy terrain impeded all wading - At noon all marines stops to have lunch. The old white haired man (Captain Yen) was sitting on a mine camouflaged by hay and dead leaves. Fortunately it was a VC made mine, very difficult to detonate, and it was in time detected - then the battalion continued to search. The battalion seized some VC - made personal firearms, "praying mantis" bazooka, mines and grenades hid in huts inside water coconut forests. Five suspected guerillas were captured.
B. 75mm Artillery Battery A : the Forerunner of Battery A was the heavy Artillery 106mm Company which was formed in My Tho in 1955. To adapt to the needs for fire supports, 75mm guns were replacing heavy 106mm guns in 1956. After training, a Platoon of that Battery A supported the 1st Marine Battalion in an operation in Rung Sat, Quang Xuyen District on the 23rd of December 1961. At the end of 1962, another Platoon gave fire supports to the 4th Marine Battalion in an operation into VC secret sanctuary Le Hong Phong, Phan Thiet province.
In this campaign Song Tinh Thuong, this was the 1st time that the whole Battery A participated. On such a muñy terrain as Charlie, and without instruments, battery A marines had handed work to set guns in positions to be ready for fire support.
C. Marine company of engineers. This was the 1st time the company of engineers participated in an amphibious operation. The goal of this unit in this campaign was to establish a settlement camp for a Regional Force unit, about 1km south of Nam Can district.
For some days, 1st Lieutenant Pham, US MC advisor, Captain John and 2nd Lieutenant Tam tried to find a place to build that camp, but it seemed difficult to accomplish. They found a flat, dry area - On two sides, there were canals - On the other two sides, there were mangrove forests, about 200m away - Underneath this area, there still was mud. It was impossible to build solid foundation. The plan had to be delayed, waiting for higher authorities to decide another place. That company of engineers positioned next to the 2nd Marine Battalion headquarters at Vam Tan An. One day, at about 11.00 am, VC shelled on Marine positions. In front of a tent, there was a low brick wall. 2nd Lieutenant Tam put on his helmet then wore his belt with his colt 45 and was running toward the tent door when a round fell on the other side of that low brick wall. The blast pushed him back and as a reflex he ran to the other opening of the tent on the other side - When he was a few meters from that opening, another mortar round fell and exploded close to the river bank, only a few meters away from him. That round had gone deep inside the mud and although exploded, its shrapnels did not fly in all directions and did not hit 2nd Lieutenant Tam. Only mud went splashing everywhere, then falling down on the river water in front of him.
Fortunately, no one was harmed after this shelling.
* Day N +1, 4th January 1963.
The 4th Marine Battalion was on the LST/HQ 500 Cam Ranh and was to land east of Ca Mau promontory on the side of South China Sea at 7.00 am, under fire support of a river force. The latter was forming a blocking knot in a river near Ca Mau, and was composed of monitors fighting boats, armed with 40mm cannons and of LCVPs (landing, craft, vehicle and personal) with recoilless rifles 20mm. About 1 hour before the landing time, a group of Navy Frogmen secretly intruded into the territory to investigate and to set the mines for sabotaging VC position if any.
After having accomplished the landing, the 4th Marine Battalion moved north, and so with the 2nd Marine Battalion pushing the enemy from Nam Can southwards, formed a pair of pliers.
The 4th only had small skirmishes with the VC guerillas in that kind of terrain full of water coconuts. This region was famous for their abundance in anopheles.
In the afternoon, the 4th Battalion searched targets, found and destroyed a VC factory manufacturing mines and traps. Then the 4th positioned overnight. In the following days the 2 Marine Battalions continued the operation as preplanned. VC logistics establishments were detected and destroyed. Local guerillas were either killed or captured. A number of them, exploiting nights and their thorough knowledge of the area, escaped to surrounding areas. Marines had only some wounded either by mines and traps or by shelling.
In the area of Bai Bung (Pointe De Ca Mau), residents had to walk on monkey bridges formed by twisted "cham" tree trunks which were spanned on branches of mangroves considered as pillars of the bridges. The ground was not hard enough to become a road. Houses and schools were built on pillars above the swamps.
After the operation general Le Van Ty, chief of JGS, visited the battlefield. When he passed by a marine company position, he saw a big pig being tied by a string in the nearby area. He asked about it. Marines answered: it was a seized item from a VC hut in a mangrove forest. The general recommended "You should tie that pig back to its original place for it may have belonged to local residents”. He also expressed his view about South Viet Nam Navy: “South Viet Nam had numerous rivers and canals. Operations Dinh Tien Hoang, Hoang Dieu, Nguyen Hue might not have been so successful if without supports of the Navy"
This operation extended to Ong Doc river, Bo De river mouth, Cua Lon river, Bay Hap river, Ong Trang hamlet, Dam Doi etc.
HQ 500 Captain was Navy Major Nguyen Ngoc Quynh. It was the Flagship. This ship had a surgical operating room and helipad. Later on, Navy had 2 more hospital ships, namely HQ 400 and HQ 401. Navy Medical unit was commanded by Dr Major Tran Nguon Phieu. It performed medical care for civilians, especially at Bo De river mouth, Ong Doc river and Nam Can. Although this region previously was controlled by VC who also collected taxes, civilians were still able to use waterways to go to Saigon whenever they had severe diseases. Near Hoc Nang, on the map, one could recognize a canal named "Mr Phieu Canal".
A high Navy authority recommended the Navy not to let Dr Phieu to follow river boats in these areas to avoid bad luck because of that coincidence in names.
* Day N+7, (10-01-1963)
On Day N+7 a delegation composing of representatives from JGS, Psy War Department, Chieu Hoi Department and Navy Psy War Group arrived to set up South Viet Nam administration system in Nam Can. Following that delegation, Colonel Ho Tan Quyen - Navy Commander, visited and praised all participating units in this campaign.
* From N+10 to the End.
During this time the 4th Marine Battalion performs activities in Ong Trang Canal area. One afternoon a Platoon of Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Thanh Tri went to search. 2 Marines were wounded by a booby trap, 1 by a "praying mantis" bazooka. They were transported to the 4th Battalion Command post. Dr Ho Ngoc Chan, 1st Lieutenant treated their wounds. I arrived to visit those wounded marines and also visited the Battalion Commander in a neighboring house. While we were conversing, 1st Lieutenant Anh, Chief of S3 came and reports that new officers were coming to present themselves to the Battalion commander. There were 10 new graduates from class 16 of Dalat Military Academy, having chosen marines as their unit. The 4th Battalion received 1st Lieutenant Tran Ngoc Toan, Nguyen Dang Tong and Do Huu Tung. The 2nd Battalion received 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Kim, Nguyen Xuan Phuc. The latter two presented themselves to the white-haired old man (Captain Yen). The Commander told 1st Lieutenant Dinh, his S3 Chief: "You send one to Company 2 of Captain Hai, and one to Company 3 of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Nang Bao. 1st Lieutenant Dinh said "yes sir" then sent Kim to Company 2, Phuc to Company 3”.
That night, the 2nd Battalion positions were shelled by VC with 81 mm mortars, Captain Nam - Company 4 Commander was heavily injured. The 1st Lieutenant Dinh replaced him in his position. Group B of 2nd Battalion, commanded by the executive officer. Captain Co Tan Tinh Chau, positioned about 2km away from Tan An canal T - junction. In this area, there were some shops, enough to supply daily consuming goods to this remote hamlet.
After a meal, to show his hospitality, the owner of a Chinese noodle shop offered Captain Yen a strong Vietnamese “water cigarette" (thuoc lao) - Captain Taylor, seeing the strange shape of the pipe, wanted to have a try.
After that smoking, both officers had nausea. They both vomited numerous times because the strength of that "water-cigarette". Captain Taylor had extremely pale face, and Captain Yen incessantly rubbed his head which had very short hairs.
Captain Richard B. Taylor was the first US MC Oficer to participate in an operation with Vietnamese marines - the 2nd Battalion, in this campaign. He was later awarded a Silver Star by the President of the United States. He was the 1st US MC Officer who was decorates a US medal in Viet Nam.
While the campaign Song Tinh Thuong was continuing at Nam Can, the 1st Marine Battalion which was commanded by Captain Tran Van Nhut performed an amphibious operation, inside U Minh Ha, Hon Da Bac Island in Thailand Bay and gained a victory. President Ngo Dinh Diem promoted Colonel Nguyen Khanh - The commander of the operation, to the rank of General "in the battlefield".
In the Campaign Song Tinh Thuong, one day, after a raid, the river force 22 of Navy Captain Le Huu Dong was returning when an ambush occurred, on Bo De river, near Tan An, at T - junction Tam Quan. Before then river force entered Cai Nhap Canal a LCM - 6 was hit by a 75mm recoilless round. The craft landed immediately at position of the recoilless rifle and sailors' charged forward, killed 5 VC, captured 2 personal firearms and that 75mm recoilless rifle.
* End of campaign :
After 1 month, Marines transferred the responsibility to regional forces, left Nam Can and returned to Rear Base to have a rest, preparing for an operation inside Do Xa Sanctuary between Quang Ngai and Quang Nam province in April 1963.
* Commentary :
1. The Campaign Song Tinh Thuong was the 1st and biggest operation, with combined Navy and Marine forces, since the day North Viet Nam violated Geneva Accords 1954.
Its goal was to recover and occupy Nam Can, Ca Mau province. Ca Mau had been under VC control for a long time except Ca Mau subdistrict and Hai Yen special district of the catholic priest Nguyen Lac Hoa at Cai Nuoc.
2. In Nam Can, potable water was a major problem for everybody. Although Navy had many big ships with water tank, but their use was limited. Later on, when Nam Can base was established, Layne type wells were drilled deep into the ground. Before that time people had to fetch drinking water from Hon Khoai Island, or from other distant regions and then transports it back to Nam Can by sampans.
When marines searched VC bases inside mangrove forests, they had to destroy VC's containers full of drinking water inside.
Another problem was mosquitoes and insects. People used to say that, there was a kind of very poisonous mosquitoes. They could bite and suck blood from a cow and cause it to die after only 1 night. Pigs, chickens and domestic animals had to stay in stalls with mosquito net - people also used to hang a bunch of dried banana leaves inside which the animal would sleep - those dried leaves swished as the animal moved and so chased mosquitoes away
Soldiers were given insects repellents to apply on hands, feet. Even when they were wearing steel helmets, there still were mosquitoes net around the helmets, covering completely the soldiers necks and faces.
3. After the coup on 1st November 1963, the strategic hamlet plan was abandoned, and ARVN had not enough troops and means to maintain long term activities in this remote and isolated Nam Can.
That's why Campaign Song Tinh Thuong and the pacification at Nam Can ended at the end of November 1963.
4. Only after US troops had entered Viet Nam, US Navy and Vietnamese Navy opened operation Sea Float 1966. Rafts were bound together to form a floating base, served as landing places for armed boats or helicopters. From there frogmen were used to land to occupy Nam Can. Then a bigger operation - "Solid Anchor" extended and pacified a large area.
Nam Can was transformed into an important administrative and military district.
Navy helped 40,000 residents to build houses with corrugated iron roofs along river sides - From then, people works in safety and lived in prosperity. They established coal manufacturing place, cut down mangroves for burning sticks, fishing and catching prawns - They transformed Nam Can into a prosperous district.
Colonel Ton That Soan
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