Victory Flag over
the Old Quang Tri Citadel
Colonel Pham Van Chung
Developments Prior to the Battle of Quang Tri
In US, the tolerance of the American people was reaching its limit. When the tactics of “Search and Destroy” was applied, in the Vietnam War, it proved immensely effective. This active way of fighting, involved seeking out the enemy in deltas and highlands, flushing them out of hiding and pursuing them to their jungle sanctuaries. Helicopters would airlift troops, who literally leapt upon the enemy. Regular NVA units were pursued, hunted down and destroyed. There was nowhere safe for them to go. So in order to rest, restore, and resupply, they fled to Cambodia. To search and destroy the enemy day and night was difficult as well as risky. As a result, there were many casualties. I recall that on one occasion, the Americans lost up to three hundred men. That shook the American public to the core. The pro-leftist media, meanwhile, was churning out biased reports on the war, thus the public was further disillusioned and dissatisfied with the war. They forgot the raison d'eâtre of the war - which was to ensure freedom in South Vietnam, and prevent the cruel regime of the Communists from taking hold. The slant created by the media incited students at American universities to hold anti-war rallies all over the US. Having promised to end the war during the election campaign, and being well aware of the publics negative sentiments, President Richard Nixon shook hands with Red China and ordered the withdrawal of American units from Vietnam. Only American advisers to the larger units and a logistical team stationed in Saigon stayed behind. He declared his decision the “Vietnamisation of the war”.
South Vietnam enjoyed an ephemeral prosperity due to the presence of more than half a million Americans and Allied soldiers. After their withdrawal, economic problems emerged. Political opposition parties started organizing anti-government activities against the 2nd Republic of Vietnam. This caused a great deal of social unrest. A portion of the population was busy making fortunes out of the war. The majority had a poor understanding of Communism, and were indifferent to the need for the internal national defense. The reponsibility rested solely on the shoulders of the troops making up the ARVN.
In North Vietnam, the regular NVA units were continuously pursued and had lost much of their operating ground.In the Tet Offensive of 1968, they failed to stir the South Vietnamese into a general upheaval to further their cause. In the South, all aspects of the Communist infrastructure were practically destroyed. Guerillas, regional forces, logistical bases, and sanctuaries were almost completely wiped out. Without a fifth column to support them, the NVA units heading south were unable to get supplies, support or directions. This was at the height of the “Search and Destroy” initiative, and the ARVN and Allied Forces were able to make incursions into Cambodia and Laos in pursuit of the enemy.
As a result, from 1968 to 1971, the military situation in South Vietnam was relatively calm. In the North, the people's endurance was at breaking point and was not helped in the least by a severely depressed economy. All attempts to build the economic infrastructure was quickly bombarded by the Americans. North Vietnam struggled to keep up the war - the weak economy made it difficult for them to finance their troops half of whom were guerillas and the other regulars. There was a great deal of disagreement between the top Communist leaders in North Vietnam. Finally, they resolved to achieve the invasion of South Vietnam by conventional warfare, and associated political tricks. They had several trump cards which favoured their cause politically and military-wise. In shaking hands with Communist China, the Americans were conceding that they no longer saw South Vietnam as an invaluable stronghold against the Communist. The pro-leftist media had succeeded in fostering an anti-war attitude in the American population, and the US government was seriously considering withdrawing from the embarrassing quagmire in which they were stuck.
Well aware that circumstance was on their side, the NVA had ample time in the three years after the Tet Offensive, to recuperate and prepare. Their objectives were:
a) To expand and improve the Ho Chi Minh Trail to became the main route for supplies and transportation for Russian tanks, artillery and infantry vehicles
b) To build an oil supply system leading to Military Regions 1 and 2 of South Vietnam
c) To improve and prepare the tactics and manoeuvres of their troops.
As mentioned before, the Communists started Campaign Nguyen Hue at noon of the 30th of March 1972. They mobilized ten infantry divisions, thousands of tanks, rockets and artillery, against Military Regions 1, 2, 3 of South Vietnam. Their plan was to occupy at least one province, either Ban Me Thuot, Binh Long or Quang Tri, to set up the Provisional Revolutionary Government, which was made up of Communist Party members.
Some weeks later, all three advancing columns were blocked by the strong resistance of the ARVN. Knowing that it was difficult to occupy Ban Me Thuot and Binh Long, which were closer to Saigon, the North Vietnamese Politburo decided to change tactics. The aim was to invade Quang Tri, which was located next to the sea, and near enough to the North for supplies and reinforcements.
At the beginning, the NVA sent five Infantry Divisions, two Artillery Regiments, one Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment and other units from the B5-Front (the communist Military Command operating in the two most northern provinces of South Vietnam i.e Quang Tri and Thua Thien). The latter’s two Infantry regiments, one Artillery Regiment, one rocket Regiment and one sapper Regiment made up another division.
They used the armour-infantry combination and the prongs always followed a heavy barrage of indirect artillery fire. All of our fire support bases south of the 17th Parallel, from the sea to the Laotian border suffered the same method of attack.
Finding itself being attacked by a force three to four times it size, the 3rd Infantry Division and a few National Reserve units had to slowly relinquish their positions. Dong Ha was lost first, followed by Ai Tu Combat base, which was the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division, then the Thach Han River and Quang Tri City. The ARVN had to retreat to south of the My Chanh River.
It was at the My Chanh, that the greatest and most momentous battle took place. The advance of the NVA was stopped on May 3rd 1972. The My Chanh became the temporary border between North and South Vietnam, where the ARVN would later make a stand and launch a counter-attack to recover Quang Tri.
Recovering Quang Tri
At 1:00pm on May 5th 1972, a helicopter landed at the 369th Brigade Headquarters in the Phong Dien District of Thua Thien province. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, accompanied by Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Colonel Le Van Than (who was later promoted to Brigadier General) and Colonel Pham Van Pho, Chief of I Corps G2, were paying us a visit. The visit surprised us because at the time, he was the IV Corps Commander. With a thoughtful expression, he slowly said: “I was just assigned by the President to replace Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam. Chung, tell me about the present situation.”
Afterwards, as we accompanied him to the helipad, he waved the others forwards so that we could have a private conversation. His voice and eyes were sincere, and he spoke to me with brotherly affection. “Chung, don't hesitate to tell me the truth,” he said, stressing the word “truth”, “Let me know whether we can hold our ground.”
“We can definitely hold it, Lieutenant General.” Hearing my firm answer, his eyes flashed decisively. Then he added reflectively: “Chung, have you any further advice you want to give me?”
“Sir, please keep an eye on the staff at I Corps...they have a bad attitude and their performance has been rather poor. In addition, the regional forces in Thua Thien Province have a tendency to withdraw.”
He answered: “You can count on it that I will reprimand the I Corps Staff, and tell Colonel Ton That Khien, [the Chief of the province and the Thua Thien region] to discipline his troops.”
* * *
That May, a number of reshuffles took place, in addition to the replacement of the I Corps commander by Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Division, Colonel Bui The Lan, replaced Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, who became Operation Assistant to the Joint General Chief of Staff. Later on, Colonel Bui The Lan was promoted to Brigadier General. Colonel Le Quang Luong was also promoted to Brigadier General and replaced Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong as Commander of the Airborne Division a month later.
Inside the Vietnamese Marine Corps, there were also changes: Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri became Assistant Commandant of the Marine Division, replacing the already promoted Bui The Lan; Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen The Luong (who later went on to become Colonel) took over from me as Commander of the 369th Marine Brigade. I was assigned to the higher position of Chief of Staff/Forward.
Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong was a Field General. It was a habit of his, that after every promotion, he would fly out to verify Staff officers' reports with those of the units fighting at the front lines. He liked to observe the situation personally.
This time, he identified three political and strategic points that ought to have been fulfilled. They were:
1a) To resupply manpower and equipment to units which had suffered recent losses
1b) To re-arrange deployments of the remaining units to stop the enemy from attack the city of Hue from the north (i.e by crossing the My Chanh river, or from the west “i.e via the Ashau-A luoi Valley”).
2. To re-occupy the areas recently lost to the NVA
3. To bring back order to society: to incite the confidence and boost the morale of soldiers, civilians, and public servants.
In previous years, he had been Commander of the 1st Infantry Division. Thus he understood the geography and the mentality of the people in the region. He easily restored everyone's confidence and faith in the ARVN.
At the same time, he immediately prepared for the recovery of Quang Tri. In my opinion, it was likely that for political reasons. President Nguyen Van Thieu had urged him to accomplish this task as soon as possible. He appointed Colonel Le Van Than, an excellent artillery officer who had followed him from IV Corps, to head a group to plan the recapture of Quang Tri. I Corps officers included Colonel Pham Van Nghin, Chief of G3 and Colonel Pham Van Pho, chief of G2. From the Airborne Division, there were Colonels Le Minh Ngoc and Le Van Phat. Marine Division Officers involved, included myself, Colonel Pham Van Chung, and Lieutenant Colonel Do Ky.
To keep the operation an absolute secret, a special room, off limits to all other I Corps staff officers was reserved for the group.
* * *
After they succeeded in capturing Quang Tri Province and Quang Tri City, the NVA built a deep defensive line. The city and the old citadel of Dinh Cong Trang were occupied by a NVA division reinforced by tanks, a sapper regiment, and enormous artillery and rocket firepower. Four other divisions took up defensive positions at La Vang Church to the west, along the coast in the east, along the Thach Han in the north, and close to our own My Chanh defensive line in the south. The last two NVA reserve divisions (320 and 325) were moved to the south of the Ben Hai river.
The political role of the North Vietnamese was to stubbornly occupy Quang Tri city to set up their party members as government.The move was suppose to be a trump card to use in the negotiations at the Paris Peace talks. Thus I Corps had to recapture Quang Tri at all costs. Thus the essence of the battle of Quang Tri was fierce, tense, and ferocious from the very beginning.
* * *
In the preparation phase, the following took place...
1. The Airborne Division came to reinforce I Corps on May 22nd 1972.
2. The Marine Division from the My Chanh defensive line organized lowscale probing attacks to maintain an active defensive role.
a) In Operation Song Than 5/72 on May 12th, two Marine Battalions from the 369th Brigade were airlifted to Hai Lang district, and another crossed the My Chanh to join them. They met the NVA's 66th Regiment from the 304th Division.
b) In Operation Song Than 6/72 which took place on May 24th, two Marine battalions of the 147th Brigade were airlifted to North east of the Hai Lang district while another battalion performed an amphibious operation at My Thuy Seashore. They confronted the 18th Regiment of the NVA 325th Division.
3. The 1st Infantry Division positioned itself west of Hue City: On May 15th 1972, two regiments expanded their perimetre to the west, occupied support fire bases Bastogne and Checkmate. They confronted regiments of the NVA's 324th B Division.
The NVA had also been busy in the preparation stage.
May 21st 1972, NVA Infantry and Armours attacked an area defended by the 369th Marine Brigade, pushing through the defensive lines, but were eventually repelled.
May 22nd, the enemy sent 20 tanks and the infantry at 3:00 am for a second attack on a Marine Battalion and the 369th Marine Brigade headquarters. They were repulsed at daybreak.
May 25th, the enemey changed direction to the west and assaulted the 258th Marine Brigade. Both sides deployed and fought throughout the day, but the NVA were once again driven back. Our artillerymen and aircrafts inflicted severe casualties.
May 26th, the enemy fiercely assaulted the position of Ranger Group 1, and nearly succeeded in approaching the command post, but was repelled by the Rangers' counterattack.
* * *
In June 1972, in preparation for the counter-offensive to recapture Quang Tri, four Marine Battalions involved in Operation Song Than 8-72 simultanously crossed the My Chanh with the help of artillery and air support. The enemy resisted strongly, but the Marines continued to advance on newly gained ground. Combat engineer units followed and immediately built defensive line northwards. On the 18th of June, Operation Song Than 8A-72, started. Many Marine Battalions, moving in parallel prongs, advanced, occupying hundreds of metres. The enemy was repelled 4km northwards from the My Chanh. The Operation ended on the 27th of June.
* * *
With Operation Lam Son 72, I Corps officially started the counter-offensive to recapture Quang Tri. The participating units of the ARVN consisted of: the Airborne Division, the Marine Division, Three Ranger Groups, the 1st Armour Brigade, I Corps' Artillery and supporting units, and air and naval forces.
In comparison, the NVA had more in the infantry, and more tanks. Their artillery were four times more powerful than the ARVN's, but we had the advantage of air and naval firepower (See the Comparison table at the end of the article.)
Concepts of Operation
On the 28th of June, at 7:00am, ARVN forces advanced from the Line of Departure (the My Chanh) towards Quang Tri city. The Airborne Division reinforced by the Armour Brigade and Ranger groups, moved along Route 1. Their TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility) extended right to the far west. The Marine Division, also reinforced by tanks and reinforcement units had a TAOR extending from the east of Route 1 to the sea. American naval forces patrolled the coast. Further to the east, there were ships from the 7th Fleet. They were to provide naval fire supports on request. Aircrafts were to give firepower when needs be.
* * *
The segment of highway from My Chanh to Quang Tri was about 15 km long. It was considered by our forces as “15km of Blood”. The NVA had built strongholds and fortified bunkers rigged with booby-traps surrounded by mine fields. They were protected by heavy artillery batteries and sophisticated rockets.
The Airborne and Marine Units had to destroy these strong points and bunkers to advance. After three days battling in unfavourable conditions from all aspects, the Airborne and Marine forces took over the road, and closed in upon Quang Tri City. As mentioned before, the city was defended by a NVA division reinforced by tanks. The Citadel was held by a regiment and a sapper group.
Brigadier General Bui The Lan seriously considered the possibility of airlifting Marines to the rear of the enemy several times.
July 11th : the 1st Marine Battalion landed 2km north of Quang Tri city, cutting off the supply route via Route 560.
July 24th : the 5th Marine Battalion was airlifted to the area 10km northeast of Quang Tri City, to harass the enemy to their rear. This greatly demoralized them.
All these movements were carried out to help the main Marine attacking force dislodge the enemy from their bunkers. The purpose was to save time, and minimize losses.
Usually, if a target was on the advancing axis of a particular unit, that unit wound be the one responsible for the assault of the target. That was the customary military approach. In this situation, the target was to be the Marines'. However, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, a former Airborne officer, decided instead to let the Airborne division capture most of the targets. He wanted to give the Airborne Division the honour of being the first to take over an enemy position. His favouritism deeply saddened Brigadier General Lan.
Within the vicinity of Quang Tri City, the enemy strongholds were much denser. The ARVN had to fight hard every inch of the way. They had to resort to hand to hand combats, bayonets, and hand grenades to gain ground. Advancing units would gain 100m, only to be driven back. And still they advanced, and still the enemy resisted. It was a deadly tug of war that went on for days. Around the clock attacks were launched by both sides.
Seen from a distance, the sky above Quang Tri was filled with dust and smoke. The noise of bombardments, shellings, and gunfire created a fearsome thunder. It was as if Quang Tri was shaking from an earthquake. The ground literally shook...
On the body of an NVA a note was found. It read: “Mother, I am sure I will not survive to see you again. Day after day, friends around me are dying. I have been in this bunker for a month, without having been out once. Artillery shellings! God save my soul! There are shellings day and night. My head is aching so terribly it's going to burst; I can't sleep, I can't eat. Blood pours from my ears. Many die with blood gushing out of their ears and noses. I think I am going mad. I can't endure it anymore. For certain, I'll never make it back to the North to see you again.” So wrote a victim of two to three waves of “Thunderstorm” - a period of intense shelling. Each wave would last from 24 hours to 48 hours. All sources of supporting fire would take turns concentrating fire power at the targets. Not a single moment was allowed to fall silent. It was hell on earth.
To the east and north east of Quang Tri City, the Marines had captured all targets, and it was up to the Airborne Division to capture the city and the citadel. Their vanguard had trouble capturing the citadel, despite managing to raise a flag on its walls. Having suffered heavy losses in the Central Highlands and at Binh Long An Loc, and already seriously mauled at Quang Tri, the ferocity of the Airborne Division had decreased considerably. Thus on the 27th of July, Lieutenant General Truong, decided to transfer the arduous task of winning back Quang Tri City and Citadel to the Marines.
Upon receiving the order, Brigadier General Lan was thrown into deep thought. It seemed to me he was under considerable strain. He was very tense - well-aware that the outcome was critical to the honor of the Marine Corps and that of the ARVN. His own military career was at risk. The staff planned thoroughly, and finally, the Brigadier General decide on the tactic of the “rotating wheel.”
The 258th Brigade commanded by Colonel Ngo Van Dinh, was in charge of the west of the Citadel. The 147th Brigade commanded by Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao was to take care of the east. The 369th Brigade, under Colonel Nguyen The Luong, was to be on reserve. All Marine Battalions from 1 to 9, were to fight in rotating shifts - spearheading at times, and “resting” and recuperating at others. The recuperation time allowed troops to regain their morale.
During the entire battle, Brigadier General Lan flew daily at 6:00am from the Marine Division headquarters stationed at Huong Dien to the front lines. He would sit right beside Brigade Commanders and direct the fighting. He entered into every detail thoroughly, which was not surprising as he was known to be an excellent Chief of Staff. Thanks to his thoroughness the Marines were able to avoid needless losses.
The Battle of Quang Tri has been ranked as one of the world's most ferocious and most bloody confrontations. Professional military critiques go so far to say that the ferocity of the battle was indescribable. According to one Marine Platoon leader, “getting wounded was easy. Just raise your hand out of the bunker door, and you would be riddled with bullets.” For about fifty days in an area of 15km square, about ten divisions from either side battled under the artillery rain.
To win a battle, the attacking force usually has to be three to five times the size of the defending army. But at Quang Tri, the enemy outnumbered us four to one, and were four times as powerful. It was a miracle that we won. We had placed honour before all, thus we enjoyed a psychological advantage.
As the battle was being fought, the world's eyes watched closely. Regardless of the spectators' sympathies, the outcome was undeniably great. After Quang Tri, the ARVN was considered one of the world's best armies.
At 12:45pm on the 15th of September 1972, the Marine Corps completed their mission - they recaptured the old Citadel, the last target in the Quang Tri battle. Two small yellow flags carrying three red stripes were raised by the front line units of the 258th and 147th Brigades. They flew proudly on either side of the main gate. Quang Tri lay in ruins. Not a single inch of ground lay unfurrowed by shells and bombs. Everything was scarred, and most of the city lay in rubbles.
The official flag-raising ceremony took place on September the 16th, 1972, witnessed by Marines whose eyes brimmed with tears. Quang Tri was finally theirs.
Twenty years later, in an American Military Academy, a general asked a class of two hundred he had just been lecturing:
“Which army was the best this century has seen?”
Some said the “US”, others yelled, “the French”, “the Brits”, the “Israelis”... The general smiled and said: “No... the Vietnamese National Reserves which included the Marines, Airborne troops, and Rangers, fought the best... One division of theirs was as good as five other divisions. But, unfortunately, they no longer exist. Are any of you ethnic Vietnamese?”
A voice from the back of the room yelled “Present.” A Vietnamese American Airborne Captain stood up proudly as hundreds of eyes stared. His surname was Luong.
The general added :
“If I'm not wrong, your father was a veteran in the war, was he not?” Captain Luong answered: "Yes Lieutenant General... my father was a Marine major in the ARVN.” Every one in the room exclaimed in awe. Captain Luong sat down, but from then onwards, his classmates looked at him with a little more respect. In many allied countries today, the Battle of Quang Tri is still taught as a study model in top military academies.
Captain Luong once admitted :
“When I was still living at home, whenever I heard my father and his old brothers-in-arms talk about the ARVN and the battles they had fought in, I was always disdainful of the “old men”. At sixty, they looked scrawny and emaciated, and their broken English did not hint at all of their heroic deeds. But now I truly beg for my father's forgiveness for harbouring such disrespectful thoughts. Ever since that day in class, I have seen him with different eyes.”
The Aftermath of the Battle of Quang Tri
Congratulatory telegrams and letters from famous generals of the Allied nations poured into Vietnam. The President, the Senate, and the Congress of the Republic of Vietnam held a session to inform the people of the victory. Quang Tri was to the ARVN what Iwo Jima was to the USA. The fame of the battle surpassed the limitations of the war fought to ensure freedom for the South. In the days following the victory, several military delegations came to study the battlefield. Among them, was the French delegation, led by General Vanuxem. After listening to the number of casualties on both sides (the Marines lost 3,500 men, which meant for every one killed, three wounded) he stood upright and raised his hand in a military salute and said: “I admire Brigadier General Lan and all the Vietnamese Marines.” This, from the man they called “The Grey Tiger of the North” back, when the French and the Viet Minh were at war. Standing in the midst of rubble, the seasoned french general fully appreciated the ferocity of the battle.
The Marines had fought audaciously in unfavourable conditions. They had sacrifice everything for the ARVN and the nation. Saigon Radio emitted special broadcasts of the victory, and played over and over the song: “Victory Flag Flying Over the Old Quang Tri Citadel.”
In North Vietnam, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Chief Commander of the NVA, burst into tears when he was told of the rout. Hundreds of thousands NVA soldiers had been lost, along with them, weapons and equipment. He lost his position shortly afterwards.
I would now like to write a few word in honour of Brigadier General Lan and his men: “History is shaped by natural and human events. The victory at Quang Tri was achieved thanks to the efforts of all army corps. But it was the Marine Corps that sacrificed the last drop of blood required. Twenty years after, I had the opportunity to talk to some NVA survivors. They confirmed how terribly it was to be on the receiving end of such a ferocious and bloody onslaught. The generations to come cannot mention Quang Tri without recalling you and your Marines. To be saluted and praised by General Vanuxem, the Grey Tiger of North Vietnam, is an honour your contemporary heroes rarely enjoyed. The Marines and you carried out your duties and achieved your goals beautifully.”
North Vietnam was dwelt a painful defeat in the Summer of 1972. It took them another three years to plan and recuperate for the invasion of 1975.
Colonel Pham Van Chung
