The 7th Marine Battalion
Withdrew on 23/3/1975
Major Pham Cang
Marine Division was always present in MRI from 1971-1975. At the beginning of March 1975, the Division Headquarters and 2 Brigades 258 & 369 moved to Da Nang. In Quang Tri there were only the Forward Headquarters of Marine Division, Brigade 147 with Battalions 3, 4, 5 and Marine Artillery 1st Battalion - the 7th Marine Battalion had reinforced 1st Armour Brigade since August 1974 to form a defensive line west of Phong Dien district. The 1st Armour Brigade was put under the Command of Marine Division Headquarters. On 19th of March, 1975, two Ranger Battalions 78 and 79 replaced the 7th Marine Battalion. The latter moved to replace the 6th Marine Battalion which then moved to Da Nang. The 7th Battalion positioned at Pho Trach Bridge. A company of it moved north to position at Hoi Yen and Village route 555. On the 20th of March, 1975, the 7th Battalion received an order from the executive officer of Marine Division to move to Danang to replace Airborne Battalion 11 at Hai Van Pass. On the 21st of March, 1975, the Battalion was going to board a convoy when it received a cancellation of the order to go to Da Nang. It was then ordered to form a defensive line from Van Trinh Bridge to the seashore and was put under the command of Special Task Force Tango, the commander of which was Colonel Nguyen Thanh Trò
1. Forces participating in this defensive line were composed of:
* The 7th Marine Battalion.
- Commander: Major Pham Cang.
- Executive Officer: Major Le Quang Lien.
* The 121st RF Battalion of Quang Tri sub tactical zone.
- Commander: Major Minh.
* A M113 APC Battalion (-),
a M48 Tank Company,
a 4.2 Mortars Company.
* Marine Artillery Company B.
- Commander: Captain Luu Van Phuc.
Company B positioned at Huong Dien. A platoon of it, at Dien Mon 2.The mission of the aforementioned forces was to block enemy advance, from Van Trinh Bridge, along Pha Tam Giang, to Thuan An.
2. Friendly forces were composed of:
* Regional Forces Group 913 of Quang Tri sub tactical zone. This unit just withdrew from Quang Trò It positioned on the other side of Van Trinh Bridge, along My Chanh River, southern Bank to National Route 1.
At that time, Special Task Force Tango was the unique force defending the northern most defensive position of South Vietnam.
It deployed as follows:
* RF 121st Battalion temporarily positioned 300m north of Can Trinh Bridge.
* The 7th Marine Battalion, from Van Trinh Bridge, to the sea shore, about 4 km long. Its companies positioned in the following way:
Company 1 (of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Nien, at Village Dien Mon 1)
Company 2 (of Captain Ngo Kim Anh) and a M41 Tank Company were at Van Trinh Bridge
Company 3 (of Captain Tang Ba Phung) and a M48 Tank company were at the seashore
Company 4 (of 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Minh) was behind Company 2 and Company 1 about 100 metres
The Battalion Headquarters, Commanding Company (of Captain Nguyen Huu Binh) and M113 APC Battalion(-), 4.2 Mortars Company, and an Artillery Platoon at Dien Mon 2
On the 22nd of March, 1975, a NVA unit marched in 2 columns, without any camouflage along Village route 555 to the southern direction. The Commander of Company 2 informed the 7th Battalion Headquarters and waited until NVA were in the range of firearms. Then the company simultaneously opened fire. The enemy were terrified, since they thought ARVN had left this region like in Quang Trò The Artillery platoon fired and destroyed their formation. They ran back in the northern direction. 7th platoon was put in 100% alarm.
On the 23rd of March, 1975, Commander of company 3 informed me that 5 NVA/amphibious ships with red flags and yellow star had been moving south, very close to the sore and had passed the position of Company 3. I ordered M48 to run in the direction of their movements, and fired. NVA, once more surprised, and ran back towards Cua Viet. Their intention was to land at Thuan An and block our retreat by sea. At noon, the Forward Headquarters of Marine Division summoned me to Tran Ba base for a briefing. Facing a serious situation, I could not go, and let the executive officer take my place. An hour later, Major Lien returned and reported to me the plan of withdrawal. Meanwhile, the RF Battalion 121 which had moved to the back, received orders to go first.
An Engineers Unit would destroy Van Trinh Bridge and Huong Dien Ammunition Dump. The withdrawal would have 3 periods:
1. From the present position to Green line.
2. From Green line to Brown line.
3. From Brown line to Gathering Point.
The withdrawal would start at 6:00pm.
* At Green line
The Battalion Headquarters and reinforcement forces went to Huong Dien Stadium, 300 metres from companies positioning in the north. The new defensive line was already organised at 8:00pm.
On the 24th of March, 1975, forefront companies reported NVA appearances, with five T54 tanks. Although Company 1 had been supported by M41 tanks, I knew that they would not be able to confront the T54's. I ordered M48 from the seashore to come, and with the Battalion Headquarters, moved to the forefront. The enemy tanks were running on the sand, and when they were in range, the M48's fired. Two T54's burst into balls of flame. Another one stopped, probably due to broken steel tracks. The other two hid behind natural sand mounds. A platoon of artillery fired from Huong Dien, and then moved to Thuan An. The enemy did not continue to advance and the 7th Battalion had no order to attack at this moment.
* At Brown line :
By 6:00pm, the 7th Battalion moved south of Huong Dien district.
Group A, with the Battalion Headquarters, commanding company, Company 4, M113 APC Battalion (-) moved to Brown line.
Group B, with Company 1, 2, 3 commanded by the executive officer. A platoon protected an Engineers team to destroy Huong Dien Ammunition Dump of the Marine Corps. The Engineers team was so hurried that they did not attach detonations, so their attempts to destroy the dump failed.
At 10:00 pm, the Battalion left the Brown line to go to the Gathering Point. The distance was more than 10km from south Huong Dien District to Thuan An. Group A moved first. Heavy equipment and rucksacks were put on the M113's. Group B moved half an hour later. There were no illuminating flares during this movement.
* At Gathering Point :
On the 25th of March, 1975, at 8:00am the whole Battalion arrived at Gathering Point. The only incident was that of a soldier who fell from a M113 during the night. The body was buried north of Thuan An.
At ferry Thuan An, the situation was extremely tense. Soldiers of other units mingled with civilians. Here, people fired to call a ferry, and others shouted asking to cross the river. I ordered all companies to position separately, not permitting anyone to infiltrate. I asked Colonel Tri to give my Battalion a means of transport across the river.
Twenty minutes later, a fleet of canoes arrived and transported us to Tran Ba base. All M41, M48 tanks and artillery guns were destroyed before the crossing of the river. Five M113 APCs succeeded in reaching the other side of the river, those that remained sank. Base Tran Ba (named after a Marine Lieutenant Colonel) had been used as a base to store supplies, for rest, to train the Marine Division, and was situated in the south of Thuan An. There was an airstrip for light aircraft such as L19, L20 and helicopters. At this base, the Battalion Headquarters gathered each company and strictly controlled to find any foreign people. Many radios and weapons thrown away by other ARVN units were gathered and were used as spare parts for our own firearms. I reported to Colonel Tri that the river crossing had been accomplished. He ordered me to stop there because at that time, innumerable soldiers of other units and civilians were running back and forth searching and shouting. My Battalion was in that area and I ordered company commanders to apply strict discipline to keep bad influences away from Marines.
At 10:00am, on frequency air-ground, I heard the voice of a military class mate from a radio. It was Major Tran Van Thao, and he was in charge of a fleet of LCM ordered to go from Da Nang to Thuan An, in order to pick up some Ranger Battalions, but he could not make radio contact with them. He asked me whether I had seen them. Looking around, I told him I only saw 3, 5 Ranger soldiers. He said "So! I will transport you to Da Nang. Be prepared and use smoke grenades to mark pick-up point." Thao had five LCM's.
I ordered companies to form a circle of safety and restrict any intrusion of other people to be ready to throw the smoke grenade. But before long, Colonel Tri ordered me to move south to meet Colonel Nguyen The Luong to board the Navy ship 801 to sail to Da Nang.
I told Thao to cancel the arrangement. The 7th Battalion missed an opportunity to go to Da Nang by LCM!
Marine Brigade 147 was composed of Battalions 3, 4, 5, the 2nd Artillery Battalion and a Long Range Patrol Company. They moved from An Lo by foot across Hue city, passing by Nguyen Hoang Bridge, along Parfume river in the north direction then along Village route 551 to Phu Vang district. From there they reached a gathering point at Tan My ferry, and then crossed by ferries to Thuan An shore. The whole distance travelled was more than 30 km.
While going south to meet Colonel Luong, the 7th Battalion marched with full weapons and ammunition along immense sandy strands. I had the impression that this image was like the scenery of US marines landing on Iwo Jima in films. Each of us had an M72, rucksack, helmet, flask and jacket; morale was high. Through the Air - Ground radio frequency, I heard Lieutenant General Lam Quang Thi, The I Corps Forward Headquarters Commander who had been on a helicopter, speaking to Colonel Luong. "You should use M113 to form a bridge to board the ship." It was probable that Colonel Luong did not recognize the voice of Lieutenant General Thi, and thought that it was the voice of the Captain of the ship, so he answered "It's not that easy, my friend!".
Catching their conversation, I ordered five M113's to run towards Brigade 147. Brigade 147 divided into groups to board. Since 801 was a large ship, it was anchored 200 metres from shore. There was of course, no pier. That distance of 200 metres with rough waves were quite difficult to board although Marines had been trained and were experienced in boarding and landing. Each group of twenty marines swam, holding each others hands. Yet they were still pushed back by waves to the shore. It was a miserable sight. All groups tried but no one could reach the ship. I suggested to the Brigade 147 Commander Colonel Luong to use M113’s to form a bridge, but because the distance was too long and the waves were very strong, he did not use my method.
Although the 7th Battalion had met Brigade 147, it did not gather at the seashore, but deployed on high Pine Hills to keep safe the pick up spot. It was already 5:00pm, yet no one had succeeded in reaching the ship.
Colonel Luong summoned all Battalion Commanders for a briefing. Units were to position in place and he informed us about a plan of boarding; the "Alpha" Plan.
The 7th Battalion, still having full equipment, was to occupy high hills on the west to block any enemy attack on boarding troops.
After my unit finished its deployment, the enemy started shelling and attacking from Pine Hills. They were not in great numbers, but were armed with anti-tank weapons, 82mm mortars and 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns. In this time, within the 4th Marine Battalion, Major Nguyen Tri Nam, the executive officer, Captain To Thanh Chieu and a company commander were killed while deploying units.
Our defensive lines were very difficult to control during this time, as so many soldiers from all units as well as civilians followed the marines. Friend and foe were too close to each other. Battalions 3, 4, 5 and Long Range Patrol Company had finished a lengthy retreat, and so had very little equipment, weapons or ammunition. Mortars had no more base plates. Soldiers used helmets as makeshift base plates to continue the battle. Marines then had to fight in poor conditions, lacking all supports. They still had high morale, so they ran back and forth to fetch ammunition. The 7th Battalion still had internal close contacts. A number of enemy positions were destroyed, and marine platoons occupied them.
Although still under the command of the Brigade 147, battalion commanders now directed their own units according to the conditions and coordinated to extend the circle of safety.
This was a very difficult battleground, never before met during the war. This was a hard fight, comparing to the complicated situation in Saigon or Hue in the Tet Offensive, Mau Than 1968. There was no clear-cut defensive line. It was unknown among the people who was a friend and who was the enemy. Whenever one heard a gunshot, a number of people ran in all directions, causing great difficulty for the Marines. In an area no larger than a square kilometre, there were approximately three thousand people. When the 7th Battalion moved with M113's to attack, I was slightly wounded by an 82mm piece of shrapnel. 7th Battalion succeeded in occupying a number of high points to protect safety for the beach.
So, that evening, the Brigade was waiting for the realisation of the withdrawal plan "Alpha" at midnight by VN Navy ships. The order of boarding was as follows:
1. Brigade Headquarters.
2. Marine Artillery.
3. 2nd Battalion.
4. Battalion 4.
5. Battalion 3.
6. Battalion 5.
7. Battalion 7.
The battle in the afternoon caused remarkable losses to all Battalions. The youngest and last brother of Major Le Quang Lien was killed.
By midnight, the moon illuminated the surrounding area, since it was the 14th of the lunar calendar. The atmosphere was tense; not a single sound was heard, probably because the roaring waves muffled our voices while we waited. We waited from midnight until 3:00am. No landing ships had arrived. In the distance, the big ship lamps were still there, and everything seemed so immobile. At 8:00am, a LCM arrived to collect wounded marines and the Brigade Headquarters.
During the night, the enemy had crossed Thuan An Mouth to reinforce their units aiming to attack Brigade 147 and hinder it from boarding the ships. When the first LCM suñenly appeared and commenced picking up troops, the enemy used heat seeking rockets and 12.7 guns to fire at the gathering point. The rocket that managed to hit the LCM wounded Colonel Nguyen The Luong. The Navy intended to send more LCM's to the beach, but the firing and shells of the enemy were so intense that the Brigade Headquarters could not achieve the withdrawal plan.
Had the pickup been successful during the night, at least half of the Brigade would have boarded ships and left the region. The reason of the delay was never discovered.
From that day, the 26th of March, 1975, I was appointed by the Executive Officer of Marine Division Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri, as Executive Officer of Brigade 147 to Command Battalions 3, 4, 5, 7 as well as the Marine Artillery 2nd Battalion. At 8:00am VN Navy informed me that Navy LCM's would arrive. I suggested that LCM would land 1km north of us to avoid shellings and attacks. I attempted to contact Major Dinh Long Thanh of the 4th Battalion by radio about the plan, but could not make contact. The 3rd Battalion of Major Nguyen Van Su received my order to board. When the LCM landed, marines of the 4th and the 3rd Battalions boarded, but a number of soldiers of other units struggled with them to embark. They caused a great deal of commotion, as the LCM became overloaded and could not cast off because it ran aground. The ship's captain asked those who had boarded to disembark, so as the LCM could sail. The soldiers were faced with a dilemma; some knew that this may be the last buoy to save their life. A struggle occurred, causing bloodshed by egoism. The captain called another ship coming to pull it out, but hopelessly it sank deeper and deeper into the sand. In the desperation, a number of soldiers committed suicide causing other deaths for surrounding people.
Battalion 3 returned to its previous position to wait. I radioed Colonel Tri, and asked him what was I to do. He answered, just wait, and other ships would come.
Under the hot mid-day sun, the whole brigade had no water. All we could do was chew some dried cooked rice and wait. The enemy shelled sporadically, trying to thwart arrivals of ships.
At 2:00pm Lieutenant General Lam Quang Thi who was flying on a helicopter in the open sea, asked me the total number of troops still stranded on shore. I answered there were 5 marine battalions and a number of other friendly units, altogether about 3,000 people. He replied that there would be a big ship coming. At 4:00pm, the executive officer of Marine Division informed me that there would be no ships to come to pick up and that we would have to deal with the situation by ourselves. Then he left, leaving Thua Thien ocean territory to sail to Da Nang. I asked myself: "have we been abandoned?" Not completely desperate, I radioed Major Dinh Xuan Lam, Commander of Marine Battalion 16, which had been positioned on Hai Van pass. But through the radio, I spoke to Major Nguyen Quang Dan, who had been the Marine Division Commander's aide-de-camp. He was in the liaison station between Marine Units in Hue and The Marine Division Headquarters in Da Nang. I told him about the situation here and asked whether there were any orders from the Commandant. He repeated my question. I heard from the other end, the Commandant's voice. But he could not hear me. He said "the situation here is very chaotic. Cam Ranh, let your units to go south, the further the better! Or let them use sampans to row to the sea and to the south. The Division Headquarters can not do anything for you now!" I was stupefied. We had really been abandoned. Brothers in arms around me were watching my attitude to decipher the recent conversation. I then asked Major Lam about the position of his Battalion. Looking on the map of Captain Nguyen Trung Viet, Chief of S3, I saw black dots marking the 16th Battalion position. Very, very far. How could we reach Tu Hien mouth? How could we cross this River mouth while the full moon water was so rough and high? And after that, how could we pass another 100km on mountains to make contact with the 16th Battalion?
Tu Hien mouth previously had been kept by riverine Group 13, and Thuan An mouth by Group 12. But where were they now? I recalled a similar situation in history: "When the Allied forces were pushed back by German force and were encircled at Ardenne Valley, many Allied units were torn. Only one US regiment continued to fight after having hiddn in mountains. But Brigade 147, now in front of us is the sea, behind us are Thanh Lam and Ha Trung lakes, between the sea and the lakes are long sandy beach without any shelter. What could I do now?"
It was already 6:00pm. I had to decide quickly, even with a flimsy hope, to go south. I summoned all Battalion Commanders for a briefing: Major Vo Dang Phuong (of Marine Artillery 2nd Battalion), Major Nguyen Van Su (Battalion 3), Major Pham Van Tien (Battalion 5), and Major Le Quang Lien. Since early morning, we could not make radio contact with Major Dinh Long Thanh (Commander of the 4th Battalion). I informed everyone about the situation and I gave three options:
1. To surrender to the enemy.
2. To declare to dissolve our units.
3. To fight and move south.
Of course, no one accepted the first two options, leaving the third as our choice. Which unit would open the road? The 7th Battalion was the unit still relatively capable to fight.
I told the 7th Battalion to open the road along the seashore and wherever encountering the enemy, just fight and move forward. Departure time was at 10:00pm. It was not yet time, but all units started moving south. Encountering NVA blocking cells, we fired to a maximum and quickly advanced. There was no more determined formation; ten or twenty in rows, according to terrain as long as to be able to avoid NVA bullets coming from high sand dunes. It was so difficult to move on sand with boots. Most of the Marines took off boots and walked in the water to speed up the pace.
It was a brightly moon-lit night. Waves roared. We moved quietly along the long beach, not knowing what we would encounter next, and whether we would reach what we had hoped for. But we just walked. Even if someone wanted to stop going, he could not do so because of the momentum of the others. I could not remember how long I had walked but I had the impression that it was in a trance, because what had happened today I never thought of during my military life.
At about 3:00am many spearheading troops bounced back. One of them reported to me: "Major, VC blocked in the front. Many marines were captured”.
Right at that moment, our capacity to fight was reduced to zero. There was no ammunition anymore. A number of guns were already being thrown into the sea, for they were useless. I asked Lien: "What are we doing now?" and he suggested using civilian dinghies to sail to sea. I replied that it was impossible to sail to the sea in those small skiffs without any oars. I then reported: "We branch off into villages, looking for boats to move to Tu Hien mouth." Everybody agreed. I went off with a small group of about ten people. In fact, from that moment, each person was looking after himself.
The next morning, the 27tth of March, 1975, we were arrested by NVA and were gathered to a school of Ke Sung hamlet, Phu Vang district, about 1km from Tu Hien mouth. At this place, I met nearly all officers and the ranks of Marine Brigade 147
Major Pham Cang
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