Alone in Village Route 555
Captain Luu Van Phuc
I. Mid March 1975
1. Staff of 1st Artillery Battalion:
Major Nguyen Huu Lac: Commander
Major Truong Cong Thong: Executive Officer
Captain Huynh Van Van: Chief of S3
Captain Lam Quoc Van: Fire Coordinator
Battery Commanders:
- 1st Lieutenant Ha Minh Cong (Commanding Company)
- Captain Nguyen Van Thiet (Battery A)
- Captain Luu van Phuc (Battery B)
- 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Tuan (Battery C)
2. An important briefing at Brigade 258 Headquarters :
On 14.3.75, Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri from Huong Dien, Thua Tien province, came to Brigade 258 headquarters at intersection Hoi Yen, Hai Lang Distrinct, Quang Tri province, to have an urgent briefing with Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao, the Brigade commander. The 1st Marine Artillery Battalion Commander was present. I was told about some details of the meeting by a friend: "Two Marine Brigades, 258 & 369, the Division headquarters, all marine Battalions, and Medical, Signal, Engineers, amphibious supporting Battalions would move to Danang to replace the Airborne Division except a battery of the 1st Marine Artillery Battalion that would stay back at Quang Tri. Major Lac chose Battery B to bear that responsibility”.
Personally, I became slightly anxious and embarrassed. Because one week ago, I had asked permission from the Battalion Headquarters to transport my wife and my two children to my place to visit me (one was three years old and the other was nine months old). I intended on waiting until the next liaison flight to send them back to Saigon. How can I solve that problem now?
I questioned my friend again; "Was it confirmed that Major Lac had designated Battery B?" He answered: "Absolutely. You have to arrange for your wife and children to return to Saigon as soon as possible." Right in the afternoon, I asked 1st lieutenant Huynh Thai Son, the Executive Officer of my battery, to help by transporting my wife and children to Hue, and to try to buy an Air Vietnam ticket for them to fly to Saigon.
Thank God, Thank Son. He managed to buy tickets for the last flight Hue-Saigon. The 1st lieutenant Son radioed me with PRC 25 from Phu Bai airport. Receiving the news that my wife and children had been sitting on the plane, I breathed out, relieved.
3. Receiving order :
In the evening of 14.3.1975, Major Lac called me to the 1st Artillery Battalion for a briefing. He said that it was not exactly a briefing, because he ordered me directly, without the presence of any other officers at all; even the Executive Officer and the Chief of S3 were missing. The order was almost the same as my friend had told me. But there were some details, which even now, 28 years later, I had not found the answers. They were:
- "Marine artillery unit would be alone. There would be no fighting units to protect its defensive line or to support to keep security. (Whose order was it?)
- “In the afternoon 16-3-75, Battery B has to transfer all its 7 GMC trucks to the Battalion Headquarters. (So my cannons would have no trucks to pull them! Friendly units are no longer in the area. It was the strangest order, as it has never happened before in the history of the war!)
- Receive money for buying rice and receive batteries for 10 days (From where we can buy rice then?)
4. Other Marine units left Quang Tri :
Early in the morning 17.3.1975, Marine Brigade 258 with three Battalions, Batteries A and C of 1st Artillery Battalion, Armour units left the area of responsibility.
I waved goodbye with an unhappy feeling. All means of transport were removed from my unit which was left alone here.
II. 4 days alone on Village Route 555
1. Supports :
The defensive line of Marine Brigade 258 was transferred to RF group 913 of Quang Tri province. This group had 4 Battalions.
On the defensive line of Marine Brigade 369, there was only the 6th Marine Battalion.
Battery B was to give fire supports to all above mentioned units.
2. Succession of events from 17 - to the evening of 21-3-1975 :
In the afternoon and evening of 17-3-75, there were many requests of artillery from 4 RF Battalion and Marine Battalion 6.
My unit tried to fulfil all requests. When more Artillery rounds were needed, the Battery had to use a jeep to transport rounds not packed in wooden boxes. And, it was not sufficient. So each gun team sent two soldiers with signalmen, machine gunners, etc… To fetch 105mm rounds from Hoi Yen (about 1 km away from us), carried them on shoulders and walked by foot back to Battery B.
At near midnight, fire supports were ceased.
Battery B soldiers took turns, rotating to keep watch and guard, to sleep and to re-arrange by-products of the shellings.
A heavy night passed. And how about coming days?
On 18-3-1975, early in the morning, the RF left their defensive line on Thach Han river bank to redeploy from the west of Van Trinh Bridge to national route 1.
However, there still was one consolation. The 6th Marine Battalion was still close to Quang Tri city. From this moment, in front of us and to our right flank, there were no more friendly units. My unit, Battery B now had:
Six 105 mm Howilzer guns without GMC trucks to pull them, and about 90 artillerymen that had never fought like infantrymen. Additionally Battery B was now on the highest and farthest point!
From our position to Huong Dien where the Forward Marine Division headquarters had been, there were no friendly units except a tiny group, equivalent to a squad which had been guarding the Dien Mon ammunition dump!
I really had cold feet. However, as a Battery commander, I kept a calm appearance. I confided only with 1st Lieutenant Huynh Thanh Son, the Executive Officer, and the three platoon leaders. We increased sentries and guards. Fortunately, the NVA did not know that the Thach Han defensive line had been abandoned. For me, a small unit, namely an Artillery company, should be happy if it had a moment of safety.
The night of 18-3-1975 was also heavy. But it passed.
On 19-3-1975, I dozed off in the firing tower. I was startled when I heard an artillery gun sound. Sitting up, I asked: "Supporting which unit?" 1st lieutenant Son answered: Sir, we are supporting the 6th Marine Battalion.
- I asked: Already? For how long?
1st Lieutenant Son answered: Just finishing the adjustments. Now we are going to fire for effect.
- Did you order artillerymen to fetch rounds?
- They are carrying them on their shoulders on the way back to here. I did not use the jeep because its driver told me that there was only limited petrol in the tank.
- Try to fulfil their request. Use only five guns and keep one gun for our defence. Use up all the ammunition from the Hoi Yen store.
- Use the other radio, PRC 25, to call the Battalion Rear Station.
After many calls, we finally, successfully contacted the Rear Station. The Company B's own truck convoy drove from Da Nang to Hue. Each truck consisted of only one driver and no escorts! Those drivers were so brave. I felt deep pity for them.
Succinctly, I appraisingly consoled them and told them to have some hours rest at the Rear station. I asked S4 of the Battalion (there were some soldiers still there) to refuel all those GMC's.
I also told the drivers to try to come back to my position before 4.00pm. Those drivers seriously executed my order. In that afternoon, the convoy of those GMC drove back from Hue which was relatively still safe. Quang Tri was full of risks and dangers due to the enemy shellings, other units from friendly forces running to Hue, and fleeing civilians. When they arrived to my position, the whole Battery B applauded in praise for them.
The 1st Lieutenant Son ordered to disperse the GMC to avoid any enemy shelling rounds. The 1st Lieutenant Tri Thuong, 2nd Lieutenant Luong Van Phuc and 2nd Lieutenant Kim Son were busy with our defence.
The 19-3-1975 was the first day that my company was not "covered" in the front.
Only later, that I had realised that Battalion 7 had replaced Battalion 6. Battalion 6 had moved to Da Nang.
The Battalion 7 headquarters was positioned at Pho Trach Bridge. One company of this Battalion moved northward to Hoi Yen (Where battery B had been alone) and Village route 555 intersection. (But at that time, I did not receive any orders from any Commander).
The next day 20-3-1975, the 7th Battalion received orders from Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri to prepare to move to Da Nang to replace Airborne Battalion 11 on Hai Van Pass.
III. My decision to retreat
Nightfall. This deserted region was so quiet, it made our blood freeze. There were no radio contacts with my superiors. The radio system was in "Complete silence." I was so sad, overwhelmed with anxiety. I came to a decision. I summoned all officers for a briefing. I told them, Battery B had to retreat. I was nearby to accept all responsibility and all punishment if any.
Plan of retreat:
1. Withdraw a small rear group at Hoi Yen. GMC were to carry as many rounds as possible. All detonators would be carried away.
2. At 7.00pm, 1st Lieutenant Son and 2nd Lieutenant Luong Van Phuc used 3 GMCs to pull 2 guns, ammunitions, signal instruments, etc to the south, along Village Route 555. They stopped at the Van Tinh T-junction. More than two hours later, the Platoon 3 of 2nd Lieutenant Luong Van Phuc reported: "I am ready to give support to the remainder of the Company."
3. While waiting for the above three GMCs to return, I ordered 1st Lieutenant Tri Thuong to use another three GMCs to pull another two guns, and transport all ammunition, food, personal firearms and Artillerymen of Platoon 1, along village route 555, to go south and to pass Platoon 3. It was then to stop at about 3 km distance, in an appropriate position. The Platoon 1 was to set up guns, ready to give fire support to Platoon 3 and the remainder of Battery B. Then it was to send 3 GMCs back.
4. Battery B headquarters and Platoon 2, now had only "40 heads", and was at the foremost front line. After having received all 7 GMCs, I told 2nd lieutenant Nguyen Kim Son to arrange to carry all rounds and all other things, as many as possible. After a moment, he reported: only one portion of Artillery rounds would be carried away with all detonators. I ordered "Setup explosions to destroy the remainder of them!" This was an overbold decision. However, my superiors had abandoned us and I had to do so to find a way for the survival of all of us!
I radioed 1st lieutenant Son and 1st lieutenant Tri Thuong to follow up the movement of Battery B Headquarters and Platoon 2.
I waved to say goodbye to this abandoned position. The convoy moved along Village Route 555 to go south.
The convoy stopped and collected a small rear station group at Dien Mon. When the convoy passed Platoon 3 and Platoon 1 positions, it was 3.00 am of 20-3-1975.
Sitting on the convoy, I radioed Platoon 1 and 3 just to keep radio contact internally. Then we stopped at North of Dai Loc Bridge. Day break approached. I told the kidchen group to prepare food for the drivers.
Artillery firing and signal teams were busy setting up the Firing tower. Machine gunners kept sentry. I told the GMC's chief to send 3 GMCs back to Platoon 3 and another 3 GMCs back to Platoon 1. Looking toward the Firing tower being established, I saw 1st Lieutenant Nguyen Van Phuc who was busy directing a firing team and ordering the firing under officer as well as the 2nd Lieutenant to aim the guns, ready to support Platoon 1 and Platoon 3.
I then ordered Platoon 3: "Start moving." Some minutes past 8.00am, Platoon 3 arrived at my place. I drove my jeep to meet Thai Son and Luong Van Phuc, right on Vllage Route 555. I pointed them to a place near Cho Bien for Platoon 3 to station.
At about 10.00 am 20-3-1975, Platoon 3 reported: ready to fire for support.
I then ordered 2nd Lieutenant Tri Thuong to move his Platoon 1 to my position. Everything was accomplished at 12:00 noon.
Until that time, I had guessed that the NVA had not known the real condition of the ARVN in Quang Tri. Tired, I lay down on a canvas bed and dozed off in the Firing tower. I was startled and woke up to hear many explosions.
Oh! The enemy had also found my Battery position. I stood up, asking: "Is our Battery OK?"
Phuong, a RTO on duty: “There is nothing captain!"
Putting my helmet on the head and wearing a flak jacket, I walked out the bunker. The firing tower was temporarily built with wooden boxes filled with dirt and was covered on the upper part by three layers of sand bags.
The chief of the firing tower said: "They are shelling. Why do you go out now, Captain?"
I answered: "To see what happened to our brothers. Be careful. They might attack after this shelling. If we are not prepared, we might be annihilated by them."
The NVA shelling rounds continued to explode, but no round fell on our positions yet. Most of them fell on the river flowing under the Dai Loc Bridge. I ordered my artillerymen to stay in shelters, ready to fight, and not to think about counter shelling. I requested 1st Lieutenant Tri Thuong and 1st Lieutenant Phu to measure out directions and to guess distances, then return those facts to me. I and the firing team had determined the enemy artillery guns positions. I then ordered 1st Lieutenant Son "Let Platoon 3 counter shell the enemy." I did not know whether the counter shelling was effective or not, but the enemy stopped their shellings.
It was afternoon then. I told Tri Thuong and Kim Son to rotate each other in eating, resting and controlling the sentry.
I also reminded 1st Lieutenant Thai Son that "He was in a lonesome position, and try to survive."
He answered: "Captain, be relieved! Phuc and I would rotating the watch and guard. Platoon 3 has a high alertness!"
It was 3.00 am on 21-3-1975, exploiting a thick fog, groups of NVA from the hills and riverbanks crawled towards the Battery B position. However, the sentry detected them who were fired at by personal firearms and artillery rounds. They ran away.
In the morning, we did not dare to search their places. Being artillerymen, all we knew was how to fire big guns and at most, defend our position.
On 21-3-1975, in the morning, I called the Company warrant officer and gave him a mission.
"You lead a group of seven people, including a RTO with a PRC 25 - You walk across this bridge to the south of it. On the other side, there is a school which probably had been deserted a long time ago. Occupy it! Guard it on both ends of the bridge and guard the school. After you have finished your deployment, report to me. Our company would move immediately across the bridge. All equipment of these seven artillerymen would be cared for by others and be loaded on the GMC." This warrant officer executed my order quickly and went with the group. I called Tri Thuong and Kim Son, and told them: "Let everybody eat, pack quickly, rotate guards and be prepared to move."
I told Phu to ask Thai Son to calculate coordinates for the fire supports for the company during the retreat.
It was impossible for me to contact the Forward Headquarters of the Marine Division by radio since noon of 19-3-1975. As a commander of a small unit, but right at the front line with big and nearby guns, I could not move all ammunition stores. In the history of the war, an Artillery unit had never been so lonely like my Battery right now. Fortunately, the NVA had not crossed the Thach Han River to pursue us. They were still scared by the days they had been beaten by marines in the Quang Tri battle of 1972. They thought the Marines had been in a defensive line in Quang Tri. From Thach Han River to South of Van Trinh Bridge, the road was open. Had NVA knew that, at the front line of Quang Tri, there was only one Artillery company with 90 Artillerymen, they might have sent just a Battalion and that might have been enough to annihilate my Company.
I and my Company Officers were anxious and discussed how to conserve our unit. However, artillerymen still acted normally because they did not know anything about the danger of the unit. All orders given down were seriously executed by everybody.
At 10 am 21-3-75, Battery B crossed the river, and temporarily occupied the ruined school yard, south of Dai Loc Bridge. Before we could build bunkers or dig foxholes, the enemy shelled again. I thought, their Artillery forward scouts had been at our heels and mingled with local residents. Some rounds fell near our position. The exploded and flooded rice fields splashed water and mud about. There was the voice of 1st Lieutenant Tri Thuong calling 1st Lieutenant Thai Son to counter shell. Outside of the firing tower, Kim Son, I and others were seeking shelters, but also keeping guard.
The NVA big units did not appear. Their small units shelled us with mortars. However, I was highly strung. I did not know anything about friendly and enemy situations. I wished I had been able to contact my superiors.
Enemy artillery rounds fell a little bit less. I ran to the fire tower.
- Bich Chieu! (the radio code name of my Battery B). This is Dalat.
My RTO answered:
- Dalat, this is Bich Chieu, hear you 5 over 5.
- Let me talk to Phuc Yen (my radio code name).
I answered:
- Dalat! This is Phuc Yen
- Phuc Yen! Where are you now? Why didn't you contact and report to me?
His voice was a little bit angry. Calmly I answered: Authority! From noon of 19-3-75, I tried to radio to contact Authority and any other units, but unsuccessfully. I guessed that he understood the obscure situation of my Company.
His voice became softer:
- Change to our "Private frequency of Artillery family!" (33.40; 33.41)
I answered yes. Then we talked to each other. The content of the conversation was:
1. The Forward headquarters of Marine Division, commanded by Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri was at Huong Dien. There was only one long-range patrol Platoon that protected it.
G3 had some low-rank officers and few soldiers. Chief of G4, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Nhieu, and his team were still there. Artillery team had 4 people, among them Major Nguyen Trong Dat.
2. Huong Dien ammunition dump had 20,000 artillery rounds and was protected by the forward station team with 15 soldiers. This team was commanded by 1st Lieutenant Phan Dong of the 1st Artillery Battalion. There was also a Marine engineers team.
Huong Dien District did not know the amount of their soldiers available! Oh! Colonel Tri was the present Field commander, and had such a thin protection! I breathed out, saddened.
3. Quang Tri province forces had retreated to Hue (what for?)
4. Major Dat ordered Battery B to retreat. There would be no forces protecting the rear of the retreating company.
My Company was to withdraw to Thuan An mouth, at 5.00pm, not earlier and not later.
5. Major Dat asked me to give him the position of my Company. Because I wanted to conceal the truth, I lied: Platoon 3 near Cho Bien, the remainder at Dien Mon. Major Dat was highly strung and asked: "Why are you still there?” How long do you plan to wait until you come here?
I answered: "No authority gave me an order. How dared I to move?"
He confided: Try to bring Battery B to Thuan An mouth before night fall 21-3-1975.
I replied: "Yes, sir" Then we stopped contact.
I gave all details of retreat to my Battery B. I radioed Platoon 3. I used the jeep to go see 1st Lieutenant Thai Son. I met Platoon 3 at Cho Bien. I told Thai Son and Luong Van Phuc about the plan of the retreat and it was time. I returned. When I entered the firing tower, my RTO told me that 1st Lieutenant Phan Dong had been waiting for me at "Private frequency of Artillery family" (33.40). I radioed him. Phan Dong advised me to try to cross to the South of Dai Loc Bridge, because a Marine engineer's team had received order to destroy it. I thanked him but not revealing my actual true position. I had also planned that if needs would be, Battery B would destroy the bridge itself to stop enemy tanks before the retreat. However, now a group of engineers was in charge of it, we did not need to think about it anymore.
IV. Retreating to Thuan An mouth
At about 3:00pm 21-3-1975, I ordered 1st Lieutenant Tri Thuong to go first, pulling guns and transporting rounds, firearms and equipment. I also told 1st Lieutenant Phu to go with Platoon 1. Battery B Headquarters and other platoons would go after.
Passing Cho Bien, we rejoined Platoon 3. We also stopped at Huong Dien to pick up the forward station group of 1st Lieutenant Phan Dong. We just picked up detonators and did not care about the Huong Dien ammunition dump. It's above our strength. I took a risk. I thought "Between the death of my unit and a prison term for myself, which one is more important!"
The convoy reached Thuan An mouth at 5:00pm. I told Thai Son to deploy, arranging all platoons in a defensive line and to let everybody have a rest and eat their meals.
I drove my Jeep to see G4 of the Marine Division. We were given a ferry to transport all of the guns, equipment, and personnel to the south of Thuan An mouth. That ferry needed to go back and forth four times to achieve the transport. When all of us reached the south bank of the mouth, it was late afternoon.
I called a rear station to bring fuel and foods for the company to prepare for a movement to Da Nang by road and hopefully by the next morning 22-3-75. I turned on the radio to listen to news. But there was no broadcast. After 7.30 pm, Sergeant Nguyen Van Moi, of Company B rear station, arrived in a GMC. He brought fuel, but a too little quantity! And absolutely no food. All he could do was buy at an acquaintance, some coffee, sugar, and cigarettes for us!
Sergeant Moi informed me "All rear stations of Marine Artillery Battalions, including rear station of the 1st Battalion had withdrawn to Da Nang”. Only Sergeant Major Huynh Nghiem and some soldiers were still packing equipment. If this group would go, Battery B rear station would be alone at the back, with 3 GMC, but two were broken, with no spare parts.
I consoled him: "If Battery B would go to Da Nang, I would radio contact you first. Your team would wait for us on the way to Phu Bai Airport. Bring with you what you can. Abandon all other things including the two broken GMCs. Don't worry. Company B will not abandon you!"
V. Receiving order to return :
My RTO arrived, saluted me and said: "Captain, Major Dat called you" I walked to the Jeep where a PRC 25 had been. Major Dat said: "According to Colonel Tri's order, Captain Phuc has to return to receive orders; your whole company has to pull back all guns”. I breathed out, sickly.
I executed that order. I fetched 1st Lieutenant Phu, former executive officer of Battery B, currently staying with Battery B (The reason why, only Major Lac knew).
Phu had been newly graduated in "Middle Course of Artillery." He was going to be appointed to be a Battery Commander, no matter which one, A, B, C. But no! To avoid danger from 16-3-75 until today, 21-3-75, I suggested to Phu to always stay inside the firing tower. When he could help with anything, he could voluntarily do it. I did not want to let Phu to be exposed to any danger, because he did not belong to personnel list of B anymore.
He came and asked: "Captain, you called me for what mission, I am ready!" I told him, as if they were orders from a superior: "The 1st Artillery Battalion sent an official telegram from Da Nang requesting you to its headquarters. Now you go with Sergeant Moi to Hue. Then try to find a means of transport to go to Da Nang as soon as possible. We will go there later!"
Phu replied: "Captain, please report to the Battalion Headquarters that I would stay with this Battery and would return to Da Nang at the same time with it."
I answered: "Phu, you have to go, I have no more radio contact with Battalion Headquarters. Major Dat transferred this order to me." I had to lie to him so he could leave the area of operation. We had to come back to Quang Tri with a mission of delaying enemy advances. My Battery B was considered as a unit without an unscathed return. Phu sadly said goodbye to me and to the whole Battery. He shook hands with all people standing close to him. He packed his rucksack and mounted the GMC with Sergeant Moi to go to Hue. By which means of transport he could safely reach Hue, I had never asked him.
I turned to Thai Son, and said: "Thai Son! Now, I and Phuong (the RTO), Tai (my bodyguard) and Thong (my Jeep driver) would step on the ferry and return first. Then the Battery Headquarters would pull cannons down to ferry. After that, follow in the following order: Platoon 1, 2, Commanding Platoon, then Platoon 3. Keep in contact. When you arrive close to Huong Dien, I will wait for you there."
Lowering my voice, I whispered to Thai Son: "We will return to the windy and sandy battlefield to accomplish an unachievable mission: Delay the enemy."
Captain Luu Van Phuc
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