Unforgettable Days
Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri
At the end of the year 1974 and at the beginning of year 1975, intelligent sources of I Corps informed that there had been many NVA divisions moving southwards towards the areas located north of Ben Hai River. Nobody could guess exactly what their plan was, but we still continuously followed up on it. Since the day we received no more American intelligence information, our capability to judge the enemy's conditions were limited. This fact caused us in many occasions, to become disconcerted and uncertain whenever we had to evaluate, guess and predict their plan.
Meanwhile in the MR III, NVA divisions 3 and 7 supported by tanks and artillery were attacking Phuoc Long which had been sieged and isolated for many months. The defence forces composed of one Infantry Battalion and four regional forces. The battalions resisted and caused many remarkable losses to the enemy. However, before an overwhelming number of enemy troops, the defence forces of Phuoc Long had to disperse and withdraw. Phuoc Long was only a small town, where apart from being an observation post where one could force the intruding corridor of the NVA into MR III territory, strategically- it was unimportant. The abandonment of Phuoc Long showed the communists that the ARVN had no more ability to organise large-scale counterattacks. However on the other hand, they succeeded in fathoming American reactions in response to their invasion.
Their victory at Phuoc Long increased the NVA's determination in their efforts to prepare an attack on Highland of MR II. At the end of February 1975, there was a multitude of news concerning the enemy's activities in MR II. In addition to the two present divisions 320 and F10, division 316 from Nghe An and division 968 from Laos were moved and prepared to participate in the fighting. Along the Laotian border, strategic lines of troop transportation and logistics situated in the west, were renovated and expanded. Numerous NVA convoys rolled southwards or in the opposite direction daily, but nobody knew that the NVA General, Van Tien Dung, had been present at the Vietnam Cambodia border (MR II), ready to command this campaign.
While the II corps' Commander General Pham Van Phu was concerned about possible attacks on Kontum and Pleiku, an unexpected assault occurred at Ban Me Thuot. The NVA campaign to occupy the Plateau was named "Campaign 275." In Ban Me Thuot town at 02.00 on 10-3-1975, the enemy started violently shelling. Supporting many NVA regiments in the town which had been defended by Infantry Regiment 53 and Regional forces of the Dar Lac district, enemy tanks pushed forward at 04.00.
Although the enemy was four times larger, defending forces resisted fiercely and caused many human and tank losses within the opposition. Ranger Group 21 was ordered to be helilifted to reoccupy already lost positions, especially the Command Post of the district. Helicopters could not land due to the heavy anti-aircraft fire, thus landing at Buon Ho where from there, Ranger Group 21 advanced towards the town. However, since NVA blocked them from far, this was never achieved.
The enemy's pressure was too strong; thus when the TOC of the 22nd Infantry Division, from where Colonel Vu The Quang - executive commander of the Division was commanding his troops, was hit by the enemy's artillery rounds and collapsed- all radio communications were paralysed and caused the defending forces to disperse and withdraw. Ban Me Thuot town was in communist hands since 11.00 on 11-3-1975
1. Quang Tri left behind:
The loss of Ban Me Thuot on 11-3-1975 heavily influenced military situations in Quang Tri particularly and in MR I in general. It was necessary to recall that before the attack in Ban Me Thuot, NVA Division 324 assaulted the ARVN 1st Infantry Division at Nam Phu Thu and Phu Loc (Thua Thien Province) on the night of 8-3-1975. During the same time, Vietnamese communist local force companies infiltrated in densely populated areas of the above regions. However, all the NVA attacking prongs were broken with heavy losses, along with the local VC intruding companies being smashed by Thua Thien Province forces.
Meanwhile, a NVA regiment pushed towards Marine Brigade 147 positions in An Lo. One of our positions on Hill 51 situated between Phong Dien and An Lo districts, about 4 km south of National route 1, was occupied by the enemy during that night. However in the following morning on 9-3-1975, the 4th Marine Battalion reoccupied the hill under the supports of tanks and artilleries. The enemy left behind more than one hundred cadavers and a number were captured as Prisoners Of Wars (POW). Also on the night 8-3-1975, a NVA company invaded Hien Luong hamlet, situated 2 km north of My Chanh Bridge. This unit was encircled and nearly annihilated by a battalion of regional forces of Quang Tri Province after one day. Some remaining NVA waited til nightfall to sneak away.
This military activity of North Vietnam since the Paris Cease-fire agreement, was another strategic push differing from their routine of sending local companies or platoons to infiltrate into densely populated villages, where the aim was to destroy our governmental structures located there. But they failed. The thrust also aimed to cause us many concerns about the frequent pressure and that way, they would tie up the two ARVN general reserve forces, namely Airborne Division and Marine Crops with MR I, while they planned to attack the High land. Thinking that was still not enough to increase our anxiety, another two NVA Divisions appeared north of Ben Hai River. One of them was possibly Division 308 which had not been present in other battle in the South. On 13-3-1975, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Tuong was summoned to Saigon to report to President Nguyen Van Thieu about the I corps situation. On his return, he convened all Division commanders and Province chiefs to a briefing and informed them that I corps would rearrange troop positions so that the Airborne Division could be moved to Saigon and serve as a general reserve there. At that time, defensive lines of Marines Corps were under enemy pressure in some places. Lieutenant General Bui The Lan, Commandant of the Marine Division wanted to personally follow up the situation, thus ordered me to represent him in attending the briefing. In a tense atmosphere and a with a sad, and almost disappointed facial expression, Lieutenant General Truong ordered Airborne Division and Marine Division to exchange positions as soon as possible, but no longer than 3 days from 14-3-1975, adding that this was the President's order. It seemed that nobody wanted to raise a question in this situation. Perhaps everybody wanted to return quickly to care for their unit and was ready to wait for new events which could develop at any moment. According to the permutation plan, Marine Division would leave Brigade 147 at An Lo which had been under its responsibility, where a Ranger group would replace Brigade 369 at La Vang South of Quang Tri City. The responsibility of the area extending from old Trieu Phong district to hamlet Nhat Tan at the sea shore in the east, would be transferred from Brigade 258 to Quang Tri province forces because this Brigade would also leave Quang Tri to go to Da Nang.
On 14-3-1975, I received order from General Lan to lead a group of Staff officers composing of Lt. Colonel Dang Ba Dat (Artillery), Lt Colonel Nguyen Huu Cat (chief of G2), Lt Colonel Tran Van Hien (chief of G3) and Lt Colonel Nguyen Van Nhieu (chief of G4), where we flew to Danang to meet Airborne Division headquarters and discuss about the plan of replacement. Colonel Ninh and other Airborne staff officers were welcoming us at Helipad and lead us to a briefing room. After the briefing about the enemy's situation and our situation, as well as artillery supports, both sides discussed in detail to reach an agreement as follows: Marine Brigade 468 would be airlifted from Saigon to Danang on 15-3-75 to replace Airborne Brigade 1 at Hai Van Pass. Marine Brigade 369 would replace Airborne Brigade 3 at Dai Loc on 16-3-75, followed by the Marine Brigade 258 replacing the Airborne Brigade 2 situated north of the Hai Van Pass area, belonging to Thua Thien Province on 18-3-75. Marine Division Headquarters would move to Danang on 16-3-75.
On 15-3-75, I received order from General Lan to establish a Forward Division headquarters to stay at Huong Dien where the complete Headquarters had been positioned. I had to follow up the troops' permutation and monitor the operations of other units situated in the area that the Marine was responsible of, as well as follow other orders when needs be.
The situation of Quang Tri civilians started seeming tumultuous when Marine Brigade 369 moved. However since Brigade 258 was still there and the Ranger Group 14 was replacing Marine Brigade 369, civilians were not that alarmed or fearful. Still, a great number of local forces soldiers decided on their own, to leave their units to return to their houses in pursuit of taking care of their families in case an evacuation would occur. This was a bad sign.
In the afternoon 18-3-1975, lieutenant general Lam Quang Thi - commander of I corps forward headquarters and Colonel Le Ngoc Hy - chief of I corps artillery and I corps forward chief of staff, came by helicopter to my place at Huong Dien. After having listened to my briefing, General Thi ordered Colonel Hy to hand me an official telegram and asked me to open and read it. That telegram was signed by General Thi himself, assigning me to become Field commander of North West Hue from An Lo to Quang tri. He waited until I had finished reading and asked whether I had an opinion or proposition. Truly I had no idea. Being a marine, we were accustomed to receive any unanticipated events, and no matter how difficult or complicated they were, we always tried to find all means to solve problems. However, in regards to propositions- I had many. My innermost thoughts were to visit all other units to have a more exact idea about situations. I only reported to General Thi about things which I had mostly concerned myself with in the last few days, namely: loose defensive lines, great decrease in artillery supports, and especially absence of reserve force. General Thi nodded reflectively. For sure, like me, he had noticed it. Before leaving, he said that he had communion with me. He understood all the difficulties I would be encounter and that this was the responsibility which I corps had been given to me and it was an honour.
I planned to use a helicopter to visit those units the next morning to query their tanks and artillery supports, as well as see whether they had any proportion in troop deployment. At that time, in Area from An Lo to Quang Tri, there were:
- The forward headquarters of the Marine Division: Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri, the Executive Commandant of Marine Division and other Staff officers of Signal, Medical, Engineer, G2 and Logistics, positioned at Huong Dien.
- Marine Brigade 147, commanded by Colonel Nguyen The Luong, positioned at An Lo; with
a) Marine Battalions 3, 4, 5, Long Range Patrol company and 2nd Marine Artillery Battalion (105 Howitzers)
b) Reinforcing units: A Regional force battalion of Thua Thien Province, M48 Tank squadrons of Tank Regiment 20, M41 Tank squadrons and APC M113 of Tank regiment 17
- Ranger group 14 commanded by Lt Colonel Dao Trong Vuong, positioned at Hai Lang, west of National Route 1.
a) Its own units: Ranger Battalions 77, 78, 79, Reconnaissance Company. Artillery 105 Howitzer Company
b) Reinforcing units: two 2 regional Force battalions of Quang Tri province, M48 and M41 Tank squadrons and APC squadron.
- Tank Brigade 1 - commanded by Colonel Nguyen Xuan Huong. Its headquarters positioned at the old Evan base, 3 km south west of Phomg Dien district.
a) Its own units: Tank Regiment 20 (-) Tank Regiment 17 (-)
b) Reinforcing units: The 7th Marine Battalion, and two Regional Force Battalions of Thua Thien province.
- Quang Tri Province (Colonel Do Ky was province chief)
a) Its own units: Regional Force group 913 composing of three Regional Force battalions commanded by Lt Colonel Nghiem - The Province executive - chief and two other independent Regional Force battalions.
b) Reinforcing units: M48, M41, APC squadrons and company B of the 1st Marine Artillery Battalion.
In an overview, two Marine Brigades (with about five thousand fighters) had moved away and replaced by a single Ranger Group 14 which had been newly resupplied in manpower after a loss in Quang Ngai battles, where now, there were no more than fourteen hundred soldiers. Two Marine Artillery battalions had gone and only one Ranger Artillery company came as replacement. Moreover, 175 mm guns were now unable to support defensive lines in Quang Tri effectively, because it was out of range.
Meanwhile, the NVA forces which were supported by tanks and artilleries, were facing Ranger Group 14 and Quang Tri Province's forces had no less than a Division. I planned to visit those units the next morning and discuss with their commanders about shortening defensive lines in a reasonable way, based on important terrains; they were to send Reconnaissance units or outpost units to high and/or far points. I also prepared my mind for myself. If enemy pressures would be too strong, I planned how Marine units would have to retreat to the Red line (ie. My Chanh line) to avoid losses (only decades later after having read an article written by Lieutenant Ngo Quang Truong, titled "Why did I abandon I corps?" I realised that President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered to abandon I corps since 13-3-75 and II corps since 14-3-75. Thus, front lines in Quang Tri had had no more significance or importance at all).
As planned, Marine Brigade 258 withdrew out of Quang Tri at noon 18-3-75. Quang Tri Province forces were responsible for defending the areas left behind. Civilians from My Chanh village, Van Trinh, Thanh Huong and Ke Mon hamlets abandoned their lands to move southwards along National Route 1, country road 555 or by boat along Pha Tam Giang. Even as they were fleeing, these pitiable and miserable people did not know where to go. When they caught a glimpse of Marine green berets or tiger striped uniforms, they stopped temporarily, seeking lodgings in houses of unknown civilians. The fellow citizens' sentiments between Thua Thien and Quang Tri civilians were so warm! Thua Thien's people welcomed those sufferers with wide-opened hearts, sharing with them the pains on our unfortunate nation. On that background, Marines performed numerous acts the images of which caused great emotional impressions on everybody. Those young soldiers, whose uniforms had been soaked in sweat, with their weapons on one shoulder, voluntarily carried the belongings of fleeing people on the other shoulder. They accompanied them along the segment of the road permitted by their unit, on which the enemy's shelling round could fall down anytime. That "fish & water" relations between the ARVN soldiers and civilians, left unforgettable souvenirs in the hearts of village old mothers, as well as women with children who previously had to flee the communists. Regional forces and self-defence forces of Quang Tri Province could no longer control the situation. Quang Tri province town hall's government officials had also moved to Hue; but the headquarters of Quang Tri province were still there with Regional Force Group 913 and two Regional Force independent battalions (as well as another three Regional Force independent battalions which were reinforcing Ranger Group 14). The units mentioned above, were commanded by Lt Colonel Nghiem - the executive officer of Quang Tri province and also commander of R.F Group 913. A number of R.F soldiers had also left their units to go home and care for their families.
At 03.00 of 19-3-1975, Ranger Group 14 reported being attacked heavily, especially at La Vang and Nhu Le and at the same time, asked aircrafts to drop flares. I reminded Quang Tri Province to be cautious, because the enemy could assault Regional Forces positions at the same time. Radio contacts with Ranger Group 14 had been very difficult, thus many times; the Quang Tri province had to act as an intermediate in transferring reports of progress to me. Although Rangers had lost radio contact with some of their companies in hamlets Nhu Le and La Vang, they still tried to resist bravely until day-break. Their morale was to be praised.
At 11.00, I flew by helicopter to observe situations of Hai Lang area and tried to contact Ranger units on the ground. My radio contacts with Quang Tri province were always good, but still very difficult with Ranger Group 14. Groups of Rangers were still moving back and forth in Song Nhung (Nhung River) area. Some other groups were moving towards Marines' village Dien Sanh. East of National route 1, Regional Forces were still at Quang Tri townhall and at crossroads Hoi Yen. Further away, there were scattered small gray smokes rising from hamlets La Vang, Nhu Le, old Quang Tri city, hamlet Phuong Lan Dong, and Gia Dang, due to either the enemy's or our shelling. I had the feeling that our side could not control anything north of Hai Lang because Quang Tri province and Ranger Group 14 were practically unable to know exactly what the fighting had been during that night. On my return to Huong Dien, I visited headquarters of the 1st Armoured Brigade and Marine Brigade 147 to inform Colonel Huong and Colonel Luong respectively about situations of Ranger Group 14 and of Quang Tri Province. At the same time, I let them know about the retreating plan to Red line, ie My Chanh line, when the situation would push us into a forced march. I did not want to tell Ranger Group 14 and Quang Tri Province about it yet, as I thought it still too soon to do so. Back at my headquarters, I personally radioed General Thi to report about Quang Tri situations and also informed Marine Division headquarters in Da Nang to report it to General Lan. At 14.00, Ranger Group 14 reported that NVA had overrun La Vang and old Quang Tri city. At the same time, Regional Forces Group 913 reported that NVA tanks had arrived at Gia Dang and Bac Hoi Yen. I requested Air strikes but the aircrafts had been busy supporting their priority, the 1st Infantry Division and unable to fulfil my request. Nevertheless, reconnaissance aircrafts came to the area.
At 18.00, recognising that the capabilities of resisting would not last long effectively, I ordered Ranger group 14 and RF Group 913 to use "defer" tactics in retreating to the Red line, ie My Chanh line as follows:
- To receive Ranger Group 14 and RF Group 913, Marine Brigade 147 was to send one platoon reinforced by a M48 tanks squadron of 1st Armoured Brigade to position at My Chanh Bridge. This platoon was put under direct order of the 1st Armoured Brigade.
- After having rearranged units, Ranger Group 14 and RF Group 913 were to defend My Chanh line. Ranger Group 14 was to be responsible of the area between My Chanh River to Xom Chua in the north east; RF Group 913 from Xom Chua to Van Trinh bridge.
- The 7th Marine Battalion which had been preparing to board Navy ship bound to Da Nang to reinforce Marine Brigade 468 in Hai Van Pass, was to cancel that movement and defend from Van Trinh bridge to sea shore in the east. RF battalion 121 was to reinforce the 7th Marine Battalion in that job. Squadrons of M48, M41 tanks and M113 APC which have retreated from Quang Tri, were also to reinforce the 7th Marine Battalion headquarters positioned at Ke Mon hamlet where there had been Marine Division Ammunition reserve store and two 105 mm Howitzer artillery pieces.
On 20-3-75, a briefing to reassess situations north of Hai Van Pass took place at Huong Dien. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, General Thi, General Lan, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Diem and I were present. After having listened to reports about situations of areas of responsibility of 1st Infantry Division and My Chanh, General Truong ordered to keep Hue.
While situation in My Chanh became relatively calm, the enemy launched new waves of attack against defensive lines of Marine Brigade 147 along Bo River and Co Bi area. However, they were driven back with many losses, occurring in the same way at Nam Phu Loc where the 1st Infantry Division was in charge. Their plan clearly showed that they decisively wanted to cut Thua Thien territory into segments at South Phu Loc, Mo Tau mountain and An Lo. If they were successful in doing so, they could paralyse the arterial National Route 1 causing disorder and panic in civilians, and especially influence fighting morale of ARVN units. Those efforts of the NVA Division 324, facing ARVN 1st Infantry Division and Regiment 4 in the area of responsibility belonging to the Marine Brigade 147, were destroyed by us.
On 31-3-1975, exploiting a relatively calm situation, I lead General Thi to visit My Chanh bridge area while briefing him about my concept of defence and raising the weakness of lacking a reserve force. He brought to my attention that I was to arrange a reserve contingent reinforced by tanks, use maximum air and artillery supports and Quang Tri Province's regional Forces.
I recalled the Easter offensive in 1972, where the NVA had had to stop north of My Chanh River. Perhaps they had been afraid of US reactions, of US tactical air support, of Naval gunfire and of the presence of the 7th Fleet still cruising in South China Sea in the east. But for certain, they had had to stop advancing because they had been facing an elite unit of ARVN general reserve at My Chanh River. The elite unit of ARVN general reserve consisted of the Marine Brigade 369, strongly supported by powerful US Air Force and Navy gunfire. VNAF fighters had been also ready to take off anytime. ARVN artillery units had been aiming northwards, ready to shell. My Chanh's defensive line was so solid those days! However, now standing at the very same My Chanh defensive line, I could not find any of that mighty power and equivalent advantages anymore. When Marine brigade 258 left Quang Tri to move to Da Nang, they had carried with them civilians' and regional Forces' morales and hopes. It was not difficult to understand why.
The 1972 Easter offensive experiences had been a lesson with numerous tragic events when civilians had fallen victims of NVA inhuman shellings. Images of the "Avenue of Horror" had become a lifelong obsession in the mind of Quang Tri civilians. The RF had never been by themselves and solely in charge of a defensive line in front of a NVA regiment supported by tanks, heavy artilleries and backed by NVA Division 308. Meanwhile before the RF soldiers' eyes, columns of refugees were abandoning their villages with belongings and children in arms; among them were also their families and relatives. In front of this tragic scenario, how could the RF soldiers' minds and morale avoid a shake? Discipline and emotional sentiments of their direct commanders were involved in a tough tug of war. For long, they had lived with their soldiers right on this piece of land which was already ruinous and becoming more and more obliterated, sacked by the NVA. RF soldiers were not running when facing the enemy because of their cowardice, with the NVA able to pass across My Chanh's defensive line easily through crossing RF's area of responsibility on 19-3-1975. Alike the Rangers, Marines and 1st Armour Brigade, the RF stayed at My Chanh line causing the NVA to slow their pace. Nevertheless, sporadic cases of RF's soldiers who had left their units to go home and care for their families in fleeing, had caused negative psychological influences on other soldiers. Basically, RF soldiers had their own limits.
I felt partly secured with the 7th Marine Battalion which was reinforced by M48 M41 tanks, M113 APC and RF's battalion 121 positioned from Van Trinh bridge to the sea shore in the east. Had the 7th Marine Battalion not have been deployed in that line at that time, enemy tanks would have then been able to reach Huong Dien. Moreover, there was a Marine Platoon reinforced by M48 tanks and Rangers at My Chanh Bridge. It was difficult for enemy tanks to pass the bridge to advance to An Lo.
In the afternoon 22-3-75 at 16.30, General Lan and Lieutenant Colonel Hien - chief of G3, used a helicopter to visit the Forward Marine Division headquarters at Huong Dien. General Lan was very concerned about the quick situation changes in Quang Tri. While I was briefing him about My Chanh and Song Bo situations, the enemy's shelling directly hit on I corps' ammunition dump at An Lo causing a sky-shaking explosion. He remarked that Da Nang situations were heavy and North Hai Van pass would encounter many difficulties.
On 23-3-75 at 08.00, RF Group 913 reported that the enemy was violently attacking the area between Xom Chua and Van Trinh bridge of My Chanh defensive line. The night before, the NVA had crossed the river at some points and waited until daylight to attack RF units. It showed that RF could not effectively control their area of responsibility because of shortage of soldiers. Another number of soldiers had to leave their positions under the enemy's pressure. While aircrafts were coming to the area and striking upon targets north of My Chanh, I ordered RF group 913 to try hold on to the remaining positions. I contemplated using a Marine Company of Brigade 147, tanks and APC of 1st Armour Brigade to form a contingent through a counterattack to reoccupy lost positions and restore morales for units defending My Chanh's line. Yet right at that moment, Marine Brigade 147 was shelled and assaulted. In the same time the 7th marine Battalion detected five amphibious crafts heading towards the south direction. This unit ordered artillery men to lower their guns and fire directly on that fleet. Those ships hurriedly returned towards the North direction. Perhaps it was an enemy's tricky tactic or a show of power in attempt to make us to believe that they would land and attack our rear positions. At 13.00, the RF Group 913 reported that they had lost radio contacts with its two battalions which had engaged the enemy at My Chanh line. A NVA unit had crossed My Chanh River, breached RF defensive lines and went deeply in the direction of Quang Dien district along the south west bank Pha Tam Giang.
At 15.00, the enemy increased their shelling and attacking positions of the Marine Brigade 147 along river Bo. Some 5th marine battalion positions were overrun. I asked Colonel Luong whether the situation there had been severe. He replied "yes" but the 5th Marine Battalion would reoccupy these positions at all costs. And it was true; as exactly what he had said, the 5th Marine Battalion counter attacked and recovered all lost positions.
Recognising that RF Group 913 had no more capability to keep My Chanh line because we had no reserve force to counterattack, I suggested to Lieutenant General Thi, commander of the I corps forward headquarters, to accept "delay fighting tactics" plan so we could withdraw to An Lo line. He agreed. So the plan was as follows: Ranger Group 14 would defend from North of An Lo bridge to My Thanh hamlet, Pha Tam Giang. RF Group 913 would gather behind Ranger Group 14 and after having reorganised its units, would reinforce An Lo defensive line.
1st Armour Brigade (-) would support retreating units from My Chanh and would be the last unit to retreat to An Lo bridge to cooperate with marine Brigade 147 and Ranger Group 14 to defend this area. 1st Armour Brigade would leave a Tank unit and an infantry unit to protect right flank of Marine Brigade 147.
The 7th Marine Battalion, RF battalion 121 and other units which had been defending Ke Mon ammunition dump would withdraw to Cho Can of The Chi Tay hamlet, 3 km away from the Forward Marine Division headquarters in the North West. Major Pham Cang, commander of the 7th marine Battalion, was responsible to command in general and defend the assigned area. The Van Trinh Bridge and Ke Mon ammunition dump should be destroyed before retreating. Company B of Marine 1st Artillery battalion was to support the 7th Marine Battalion and reinforcing units.
Huong Dien district's RF was to be responsible for security along Country Road 555 from Huong Dien to Thuan An. It was to organise Reconnaissance groups to perform activities in crowded areas of refugees in detecting the NVA who had infiltrated among them to propagandize, vandalize and cause more chaos.
On 24-3-75 the enemy increased pressure everywhere. Early in the morning, in front of the 7th Marine Battalion defensive line, five NVA tanks T-54 appeared and moved southwards. The 7th Battalion ordered M48 tanks to fire with two enemy tanks bursting into flames. One lay broken in its place, and the remaining two turned their heads and ran away.
I brought to Brigade 147's attention that the NVA could attack from the direction of My Chanh. I felt unassured because if this situation would continue, the enemy would be able to assault on the back of Brigade 147, ie from the direction of National Route 1. However if Brigade 147 contracted its defensive line to have more troops in protecting its right flank, it would cause more chaos. It was absolutely contraindicated.
Meanwhile the situation of the 1st Infantry Division was not less tragic. At some points, the defensive line was breached by the enemy and they were advancing towards Phu Loc and Phu Thu. The enemy's artillery started shelling upon Hue, causing angst and fear among Hue's citizens.
At noon I reported to Lieutenant General Thi about the gloomy situation at An Lo line, in which he had probably followed and known it clearly through I corps TOC. I had no time to suggest anything, but he ordered me to move the Forward headquarters of the Marine Division immediately to Thuan An and attend a briefing at Naval headquarters positioned near this base.
Lieutenant General Lam Quang Thi, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Diem (commander of the 1st Infantry Division), Colonel Le Ngoc Hy (Forward chief of staff of I corps), Colonel Nguyen Huu Duc (Thua Thien Province chief), the Naval lieutenant colonel - commander of the Naval base, and I were present. After all briefings, we came to the following conclusion:
- There was no reserve force to counterattack and to recover lost positions. The contractions of defensive line, demoralised our units
- The enemy was preparing new waves of decisive attacks
- The enemy shelling increased upon Hue city and caused great terror on citizens who were fleeing. It was impossible to control securities.
- The arterial route of evacuation from Hue to Thuan An was blocked by thousands of refugees and motor vehicles of all kinds were broken down and lying everywhere.
- Numerous soldiers who originated from Hue, had abandoned their units to care for their fleeing families. This act caused a chain reaction.
The common opinion was that it was impossible to protect Hue. General Thi decided to propose to Lieutenant General Truong a retreating plan as follows:
All units under my command in North West Hue, were to move to Thuan An, then to Tu Hien river mouth. Navy and I corps engineering unit were to cooperate in establishing a pontoon bridge so that units could cross the river quickly and easily. Marine Brigade 468 in Hai Van Pass was to send a unit to occupy Vinh Phong Mountain to protect the pontoon bridge area and to receive other units. The 1st Infantry Division of Brigadier General Diem was to retreat along National Route 1 and gather at the river crossing area, in parallel with Marines. All heavy weaponry, eg. Artilleries and tanks, unable to cross the pontoon were to be destroyed. General Diem and Colonel Hy were ordered by General Thi to fly by helicopter to Da Nang to present the withdrawal plan to General Truong.
After that briefing session, I informed all units under my command to pack and morally prepare for the retreat. Commanded by Major Nguyen Vinh Duyet, rear units of Marine Division positioned at Mang Ca, was to move immediately to Thuan An meet the Forward headquarters of Marine Division. The plan to retreat from An Lo line was as follows:
1st Armoured Brigade (-) at An Lo was to support successive retreats in the order of Marine Brigade 147, Ranger Group 14 and followed by RF Group 913. The first step was to gather at Thuan An; the second was to move to Tu Hien river mouth. Blocking fire tactics would be used to a maximum while units would be retreating. 1st Armoured Brigade was to retreat last, with a group of Marine engineering troops, which was to destroy An Lo bridge (at the last minute, this bridge was not destroyed due to a technical incident).
At 17.30 Colonel Hy came by helicopter and gave me a hand telegram. He added that this telegram was to confirm that the retreating plan was to be executed. I ordered all units to start retreating at 18.00. Throughout that night, I followed the retreat of each and every unit with a broken heart. The Marines in those last minutes still firmly held their rifles and repulsed waves of charge of the enemy who were trying to cut and occupy territories.
Not a single position was lost in the corridor Bo River, Hien Si or Co Bi. The enemy was never successful in separating Quang Tri and Hue. Yet right now, everybody had to retreat like losers. How could they know that South Vietnam was only to exist from Phan Rang to MR IV according to discussions and decision made by President Nguyen Van Thieu and a committee of generals on 11-3-1975? A number of friends of theirs had just been killed in action yesterday. Before their last breaths, they still thought that Hue was to be kept by all means as Lieutenant General Truong had ordered. However, Quang Tri had practically been far behind those Marines now. The fate of Quang Tri had been almost decided since the departure of Brigade 258 from this province. Combined with the pressure of many NVA divisions, the loss of Hue would be a natural happening. In the silent sky, flares of multiple colours of blue, red and violet occasionally bloomed; as if to help units in communicating with each other about their positions or to help erring contingents to reorientate in rejoining the mother-unit. Sometimes in emergency cases, some units had to neglect the principle of conservation of secrecy which dictated restrictive use of flares. Around Tran Ba, based at Thuan An where the Forward headquarters of Marine Division was positioning, there were occasionally some erratic noises of shooting. It was probably from RF soldiers guarding fuel storage or from naval ships cruising on Pha Tam Giang, or possibly from local communist guerrillas infiltrating inside civilians and approaching.
I was glad when units came closer and closer. They were on the other side of Phu Thu situated somewhere at: Xuan Ha, Dien Da or Xuan O and trying to cross Ha Trung lake to come here after a march of 30 km. Long My (Colonel Luong's radio code name) - commander of Brigade 147, informed me that the retreating plan had been correctly performed without incidents. When I asked him about Ranger Group 14 and RF Group 913, he replied that they had still been following the Marines. Colonel Huong, commander of 1st Armour Brigade, told me that his tanks had been not able to arrive in Tan My due to the road blocked by columns of refugees and broken vehicles of all sorts lying everywhere on the road, about 5 km away from Tan My ferry. Tank units were obliged to destroy their tanks when they found no detour to pass. The 7th Marine Battalion and reinforcing units were also retreating along country road 555 to reach Thuan An safely.
Since the moment the I corps order of retreat started being effective, the Forward headquarters of Marine Division could not have radio communications with the 1st Infantry Division anymore. This happening impeded my follow-up situations on the other side of Phu Thu. The 1st Infantry Division was the force to protect the right flank of retreating columns along the seashore. Had the enemy overrun Phu Thu region and crossed Thuy Tu Lake, they would have been able to intercept retreating Marines and other units before they would reach Tu Hien river mouth.
Early in the morning 25-3-75, Brigade 147 reported that they had finished the gathering on this side, about 9 km south east of Thuan An. At 08.00, the 7th Marine Battalion and reinforcing units started crossing the eastern bank of Thuan An to join Brigade 147. When its last part was about to finish the crossing, the Forward headquarters of Marine Division started boarding the transport ship LCM 8 to sail into the open sea and continue to monitor and command units still located on the seashore. Colonel Huong, commander of 1st Armoured Brigade, was with the Forward headquarters. This LCM 8 had been assigned permanently to Marine Division and had been used as a shuttle ferry to carry logistics and resupplies for Marine Division, along with its supporting units positioned at Huong Dien from Tan My to the western shore of Thuan An and vice versa. However, the ship which had been assigned to the Forward headquarters of Marine Division in the briefing yesterday, was never seen. That LCM 8 suddenly became the saviour, as otherwise the Forward headquarters of Marine Division would have to move with the 7th Marine Battalion, becoming a burden because it would have to supply troops to protect the headquarters.
Out of Thuan An, the craft was welcomed by strong and high waves. It sprang up and ducked incessantly. After half an hour, everybody got seasick and exhausted. Only the under officer who was the craft captain was still quietly and calmly steering it.
At 10.30, through air-land frequency, Marine Brigade 147 received order from I corps Forward headquarters to be prepared for being picked up by ships. The plan to move to Tu Hien was cancelled since it had been impossible to construct a pontoon due to the disadvantageous situation and tide. This event occurred inevitably. How could a pontoon be built only in one night when there were no available material; along with the terrain and tide not thoroughly studied, especially when the safety at that location had been not guaranteed? I told the craft captain to sail at least two nautical miles from the shore to avoid enemy recoiles' gun or AT3 rocket. I requested him to steer slowly or in a circle opposite gathering points of troops on shore so I could easily have radio contacts with them.
At 13.00, a Naval LSM moved to landing beach but anchored 200 m away from the shore. How could Marines swim in a choppy sea with high waves and strong winds, especially when they had to carry with them about one hundred wounded and killed in actions? Had there been some more LCM to transport troops from shore to ship, everything would have been resolved better, because LCM could go closer to the shore. Seeing that it was impossible to help, the LSM moved away after having promised to call LCU's to pick up troops.
I requested the Marine Brigade 147 to try separate themselves from civilians and to choose another pick-up beach a little bit further in south east direction to gain more order and security. Yet this movement was absolutely hard. No matter which direction the troops went, civilians just clung to them and followed. Those disadvantageous and pitiable citizens did not know to whom to rely on or to seek support, other than on the ARVN. For many decades, the soldiers had to support and protect them during devastating wars. This fact was a slap full of contempt, upon the face of the North Communists who had always boasted that "Southerners rose up and with the NVA, to defeat false governments and false soldiers."
The Forward headquarters of Marine Division was still floating on sea to monitor and wait for news of Naval ships to come to pick-up troops. Time heavily passed. Shades of the afternoon faded slowly and slowly, and became dark purple; where then a total darkness covered the whole immerse sea. No longer able to have radio communications with units on shore, the Forward headquarters of the Marine Division were unable to transfer any hope to help the troops in gaining more patience and stamina during their wait. I was distressfully heartbroken and felt powerless. I still understood them _ those Marines accustomed to always be ready to sacrifice themselves and never refuse to confront difficulties or dangers. They had felt in honour bound to do those things _ "the honour of Sea Tigers."
The next morning, 26-3-75, through intermediate of radio of Marine Division headquarters positioned on Hai Van Pass, I received news that two LCU would arrive to pick up troops. I informed Marine Brigade 147 to prepare boarding with top priority reserved to wounded and killed in action.
At 08.30, one LCU started landing and managed to pick-up the Marine Brigade 147 headquarters and about eight hundred marines, including about one hundred wounded and killed in action. The enemy started attacking and aimed their AT 3 rockets at the LCU still there. It was hit and Colonel Luong was wounded his foot. That LCU hurriedly ran out to shore and sailed to Da Nang. Previously, I had discussed with Colonel Luong about a plan that when he would be back on board of that LCU, he was to wait for the LCM 8 on the sea to board it with his staff and then to cooperate with the Forward headquarters of Marine Division, to command and monitor the picking up remaining troops on shore. The wounded and killed in action, along with other marines, were to sail directly to Da Nang _ But now that Colonel Luong was injured, the plan could not be executed. I then ordered Major Cang, Commander of the 7th Marine Battalion, to be in charge of all units still on shore, replacing Colonel Luong.
On an air-land radio frequency approximately past noon, General Thi ordered two LCU located somewhere on the sea to land and pick up all remaining units still on shore _ at all costs! One LCU could transport between eight hundred to one thousand soldiers with all equipments. Thus at least three LCU would be needed to be able to collect all soldiers of the remaining units; however, having two LCU now was better than none. An important thing was how to secure safety within the picking-up area. To have a relatively more secure safety position, Major Cang changed to another picking up area. The first LCU started landing and there was a burst of chaos. A number of soldiers did not obey the preplanned order of boarding, causing everybody to rush competitively in hope to board. That LCU was instantly overloaded and grounded. When the tide ebbed, it sank deeper in the sand. The second LCU tried to enter and pulled the first LCU out by cables, but all efforts were to no avail. Although the sailors had been so conscientious in front of enemy fire, had panic and disorder not occurred and had orderly boarding went as preplanned, a third of the troops on shore were picked up. Finally, facing that chaos, the second LCU had to pull out after having collected the first LCU's crewmen.
Late afternoon, the Forward headquarters of Marine Division tried to call all radio frequencies and asked authorities to send ships to pick up troops. Yet all replies were pessimistic and hopeless. A lone helicopter from Da Nang direction flew along the seashore above troops on-shore, then hurriedly returned towards Da Nang direction and disappeared. (Only later I knew that that helicopter was carrying Colonel Le Dinh Que - chief of staff of Marine Division who tried to contact and to find ways to resupply Marine Brigade 147). Before nightfall, I informed Major Cang that there would be not a single means for picking up troops anymore. Nevertheless, I still requested the LCM 8 to sail back and forth in the open sea to maintain radio contacts with units on shore.
At 23.45, there were numerous flares of blue or red soaring up in the dark sky. I called Major Cang to ask about the situation. After some short hurried answers, he asked permission to cut radio contacts because the situation there, were so serious. I wished Cang and Marines "good luck." The LCM 8 was still quietly moving in the open sea. There would be no giving up. The craft captain was still indefatigably steering. In that dangerous period of time, the captain and his assistant were still endurably fulfilling their duties in a praiseworthy discipline. Perhaps in that moment, the LCM 8 was the single and lone ship still erring in the furthermost northern waters of South Vietnam.
At 03.00 on 27-3-75, the craft captain informed me that there would be a ship coming to take me and the headquarters of Marine Division to Da Nang. That ship was advancing towards the LCM 8. They informed each other by flares and light signals about their positions. I ordered my radiomen to call units still on-shore once more, and that was the last time when not a single unit answered my call by radio. For a long time, there were no flares on shore. All was a complete silence and a uniform of darkness.
From the LCM 8 we had to climb up rope ladders to the ship LST (nobody knew what the exact type was, because of the darkness). It carried us further in the south direction, passing Tu Hien river mouth and … I felt a poignant sorrow having to abandon my numerous dear soldiers because my hands were tied and powerless. I admired their courage and their sacrifices.
2. DA NANG, the last city
At about 15.00 on 27-3-75, the ship transporting us arrived in Da Nang. The first thing for me to do was to present myself to General Lan and report to him the succession of events during the withdrawal at South East Thaun An, as well as the security and technical reasons which had hindered naval ships from picking up all troops. Colonel Nguyen Xuan Huong, commander of 1st Armoured Brigade, accompanied me. General Lan attentively listened to me and showed communion about difficulties which everybody had endured. Certainly nobody could avoid heartbroken feelings in front of excessively complicated and disadvantageous events which had a remarkably influence upon fighting morales and the capability of combats of a general reserve division, in which everybody had put hope of being able to keep Da Nang.
Leaving General Lan's office, I went to Marine Division TOC to ask staff officers about Da Nang situations and especially about Marine Division's and third Infantry Division's plans of defence to protect this important city.
Da Nang's situations on 27-3-75 already had some disturbances and disorders. The enemy artilleries shelled now and then on to the city, while hundreds of thousands of civilians had been rushing from all directions as refugees. They came from Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin and Quang Nam. The ones from Quang Tri and Thua Thien ran southwards; the others from Quang Tin and Quang Nam fled northwards to save their lives by all means. They knew that there still had been the presence of government and the ARVN here. There still had been a large airport, a huge naval base of MR1 navy with numerous kinds of ships, and our naval fleet in the open sea.
Being the largest, most important city of the highest economic and military importance's in MR1, Da Nang was the last city being protected by Marine Division and the third Infantry Division after Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Quang Tin had been fallen into northern communists' hand. Marine Brigade 468 occupied Hai Van Pass - the highest point in North West direction. Marine Brigade 369 positioned at west of Dai Loc district, one of main gates through which the enemy could advance to Da Nang. Further south of Marine Brigade 369, was the third Infantry Division. This way of defence was due to the fact that we had not had enough troops to deploy more tightly. Reserve units were also so scarce in comparison with pressure of five NVA Divisions supported by tanks and artilleries. Marine Division had only one Battalion as reserve, positioning in the same place with the Marine Brigade 258 headquarters on Non Nuoc. Infantry regiment 2 and Armoured regiment 11 (-) were considered as reserves for the third Infantry Division; although these units had also been dispersed to protect important points inside defensive parameter and also to protect hills on west of Hieu Duc.
The second Infantry Division after the loss of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin was unable to retreat northwards to join I corps' existing units to defend Da Nang as preplanned by General Truong. This Division had gathered units present at Chu Lai at that time to be picked up by Naval ships and then transported to Cu Lao Re (Re island) 30 km in North east direction. On 26-3-75, this division was to reorganise its units in this island and was to wait for I corps' order.
Soldiers who had been considered as lost or missed in North of Hai Van pass, were trying to come to Da Nang by Naval ship, fishing boats or by mixing up inside columns of refugees. They were in great numbers, but still not exactly countable and not considered as being ready to participate in battles. The Marine Division did not have a large number of soldiers of Thua Thien or Da Nang origins. Most Marines were from the South, thus why none of them had left the unit to take care and help their families to flee. Their fighting morale was still high and they had not neglected their combat duties. However in this moment, the MR II was abandoned, most cities in MR I were lost to communists' hand, and rumour had it that MR I and MR II would belong to what was named "Temporary government of NLF" according to a secret agreement, as well as South Vietnam only composing of MR III and MR IV. None of the soldiers who had still been holding their weapons had not asked themselves: "Does the defence of Da Nang still have any meaning or is it still useful?" Psychologically, it was very disadvantageous. Yet with traditional discipline, they still held their weapons and were ready and waiting for the enemy who was advancing to Da Nang.
NVA divisions 324 and 325 from North of Hai Van Pass with Division 304, Division 2 and Independent regiment 52 supported by tanks and artilleries from South, South West and South East of Da Nang were tightly encircling it. Marines and the third Infantry Division were leaning their backs on the sea to combat. They had no other way to retreat. They knew clearly that this was the last defensive line they had to keep or to sacrifice themselves, except if a miracle would occur; but the magic wand was not raised once more to deter blood thirsty demons.
The private promise that President Nixon had given to President Nguyen Van Thieu, "that he would "strongly react" if the NVA would violate the peace treaty," was no more a responsibility of the successor - President Ford, after Watergate. On the other hemisphere US Senate and Congress easily agreed only 300 millions dollars aid, but specifically only for humanitarian purpose (instead of 722 millions dollars military emergency aid as proposed by President Ford).
Alas! The generous and chivalrous characters of the long time ally were flapping their wings to fly away. Meanwhile Russia and Red China were still profusely pouring aid in North Communists, invigorating them to accelerate their goal of "liberating" South Vietnam. Facing not only an imbalance of weapons but also a complete lack of supplies, the ARVN now had to fight in passive condition and in extreme dangers.
On 28-3-75, chaos increased inside Da Nang. It was estimated that hundreds of thousands had fled from all directions to the city. The number of citizens rose to over a million if all civilians living inside the city and out in suburbs had been included. Central and local governments were unable to supply food and water to that overcrowded mass. Order and safety were above the hands of authorities. Hygienic conditions and the health of refugees were alarming. At 12.00, a telegram from I corps headquarters warned all units of an enemy heavy shelling that would start at 21.00. Main targets would be Da Nang airport, Non Nuoc airfield, I corps headquarters position and Naval Base Tien Sa. At the same time, NVA sappers would attack and try to occupy important positions inside the city, including the important bridge, Trinh Minh The.
When all NVA Infantry prongs approached Da Nang, their heavy supporting artilleries and rockets of five divisions had also been near within their ranges of fire and ready to launch. Da Nang could become a sea of flames. That's what they needed to achieve in order to destroy our fighting capability. Yet the most heartbreaking thing was the fates of more than one million innocent civilians, among them children, women, elderly persons, who had been pulling and pushing each other around the airport, on the sea shore or wandering along streets in the hope of finding a means to evade communists controls. If the NVA would shell, human losses would be very high. Enduring extreme hunger and thirst, refugees were tottering along the border between life and death, wobbling between luck and misfortune. Yet the NVA never had a sense of leniency or pity towards South Vietnam civilians. Mass graves with hundreds of cadavers in each, and thousands of the civilians being executed secretly in The Tet offensive 1968; the avenue of Horror where Quang Tri civilian had been massacred in the Easter offensive, and more recently- Pleiku and Kontum carnage where civilians were and still presently, being killed because they ran with the withdrawal of II corps on interprovincial route 7B. All of them were "brilliant success of the North communists during their process of invasion of the South Vietnam."
About 17.30, Marine Brigade 369 informed Marine Division TOC that NVA supported by tanks had been ferociously attacking a unit of Regiment 57/3rd Infantry Divisions positioned south of that Brigade. After several waves of heavy shellings, VNAF fighters gave supporting strikes which destroyed four enemy tanks.
While I was talking to General Lan about situations of the area mentioned above, in front of a map spread on the hood of a jeep, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong came by helicopter to visit us. It was likely that he had just visited the third Infantry Division. He looked tired, with many signs of anxiety on his emaciated face. General Lan informed him that the third Infantry Division had been attacked. He frowned and approached looking down on the map to find out positions being pushed upon. He then asked to use General Lan's telephone in a near-by trailer to call Saigon. After a moment, he came out saying that he had asked to talk to President Nguyen Van Thieu, but the president was busy.
I returned to the TOC to monitor events and requested Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Xuan Phuc to make close radio contact with the infantry regiment in the south direction. About half an hour later, the Marine Brigade 369 reported that the enemy had managed to breach that regiment defensive line and continued to advance eastwards, ie. National route 1 direction. The southern flank of the Marine Brigade 369 became unprotected. The situation became serious. If the enemy continued to move eastwards and then northwards, they could attack on the rear of this bridgade, causing disorders and difficulties to this brigade.
There was no sign that the third Infantry Division would send any reserve to counter attack. I consulted my staff's officers. We came to the conclusion that if there would be no reserve force for counter-attacking, an usable solution would be to withdraw the Brigade 369 eastwards until it could meet that friendly unit in the south. After having radioed Lieutenant Phuc for confirmation about the situation, I proposed to General Lan to permit Brigade 369 to withdraw eastwards before worsening of the situation. The first step was to retreat to National Route 1; the second step would depend on the situation and would be a retreat to the sea-shore to deploy a protective belt to safe guard Non Nuoc.
Since it had still been untouched, the Marine Brigade 468 on Hai Van Pass' high points was to stay there. After a moment of reflection, General Lan agreed to my proposal. I ordered Lieutenant Phuc to perform the scheme; the sooner the better. At the same time, Marine Division TOC had informed I corps TOC about the retreat. At that time I corps authorities had flown to naval base Tien Sa to have a briefing with General Truong at 19.00. General Lan flew to that place for the briefing too, after having ordered me to closely monitor the Brigade 369's retreat.
At exactly 21.00 as I corps had informed, the enemy started shelling on our positions. Da Nang airport and Naval base Tien Sa were the most heavily hit. Numerous helicopters hurriedly took off from Da Nang airport to fly to Non Nuoc where intensities of NVA shellings were less. A helicopter burst in flames in the air, looking like a moving giant mass of flames. It fell down slowly to a spot between Tien Sa and Non Nuoc. At that time, and probably forever, no one had time to investigate about the cause of accident. Marine Division TOC, still now and then hear the voice of Captain Nguyen Quang Dan - aide de camp of General Lan, who called to ask about situations or exchange information on radio system AN PCR25. Radio contacts were sometimes clear and sometimes inaudible. I felt partly free of anxiety because General Lan and his staff had been safe after that 15 minutes of enemy shellings. (Later on when everybody met each other at Cam Ranh, I realised that General Lan's helicopter had been hit and became unusable. General Lan and Vice Admiral Ho Van Ky Thoai and staff had to walk around Son Cha mountain. It was lucky that a small ship landed and picked up all of them and transferred them to a battle ship in the open sea).
At about 23.00, a Marine Military Police entered the TOC and told me that General Truong had come. Not being informed in advance, I hurriedly came out and met him in front of the TOC. He was accompanied by Brigadier General Nguyen Duc Khanh - commander of the 1st Division VNAF, Colonel Phuoc - commander of Helicopter Squadron 51, Colonel Nguyen Huu Due - chief of Thua Thien Province, and finally Captain Hoa - his aide de camp. I saluted all of them and invited them to come in. General Truong started talking to me: "Now that everybody has all gone, wherever the Marines stay, I will follow them." After a silence, he turned his head to Brigadier General Khanh and the other two colonels and said: "And you, not having any duty here, may go at your own discretion." The atmosphere was excessively heavy and melancholic. No one could utter a single word in this delicate and "difficult to handle" situation. Finally, Brigadier General Khanh and two Colonels stood up, saluted General Truong to return to their helicopter. General Truong shook hands with each of them, but did not forget to recommend Colonel Phuoc that if he would still be able to contact Loi Ho group (Long range patrol), please try to pick them up and deliver them to their original units. I saw the three officers off, shook their hands and said "goodbye" outside of the TOC. When I re-entered it, Lieutenant General Truong said he had felt unwell. I ordered to set up a folding canvas bed for him to rest next to TOC's sofas, and ordered a doctor of Marine Medical Battalion to take care of his health. He gave injection to the general. Then I resumed my monitoring of the withdrawal of Brigade 369 through radios of TOC.
At 24.00, General Truong asked me to lend him a Jeep and a driver so he could visit a Catholic Father in Da Nang city. I tried to prevent him from doing so by reminding him the lack of safety. He insistently said, "Nothing would happen." I then ordered the Marine headquarters Battalion to provide one Jeep for the General and another one for leading Military Police and a GMC truck for an escorting Marines squad. All would be under his command. After he had left, I reprimanded myself "Why didn't I try harder to persuade him to stay here." If anything would happen, I would feel remorse for all my life. He was the commander of a whole I corps and should be protected to the maximum with the Marine Division being obligated to fulfil that responsibility. About an hour later, he returned and lay resting on that canvas bed. It was only then, that I felt relieved.
On 29-3-75 at 06.00, Colonel Ngo Van Dinh - commander of Marine Brigade 468, informed me through our own internal radio system that his entire unit had been picked up completely at the foot of Hai Van Pass. I was a little bit surprised because I had not received any news or order concerning the arrival of ships to pick up troops. However, I thought it was very likely that General Lan and vice admiral Ho Van Ky Thoai had discussed about this plan during the briefing in Naval base Tien Sa. After my conversation with Colonel Dinh, the Marine headquarters Battalion informed me that there had been two LSM coming from the sea and flashing lamps. They seemingly approached the shore to pick up troops. I ordered that Battalion use two Jeeps and flash lamps to answer, letting the ships know that there still had been friendly troops on shore and to mark clearly two landing beaches for picking-up. Following this, I ordered my staff and the TOC to destroy all important documents and maps, while telling all units at Non Nuoc, to gather at sea shore and prepare to board.
The second and the sixth Marine Battalions of Marine Brigade 369 were approaching close to the shore. They were to deploy in a large protective circle for landing beaches and were to board last. General Truong was also informed by Captain Hoa about the arrival of ships to pick-up troops. The General stood up, wore his weapon belt and at the same time- put another pistol in the left pocket of his uniform trousers. He told me that the pistol had been offered to him by Colonel Pham Van Chung - the Quang Nam chief province, as a souvenir. I invited General Truong to mount my Jeep to move towards the sea shore. After few moments of hesitancy he told me: "This is considered as a self-rescue!"
The first LSM landed about 500m from shore; the second, a little bit closer. They were located about 300m away from each other. This season, the tide was rising with strong high waves in mornings. Units used all means they could afford, in transferring troops to these crafts in a shuttle service. Yet most of them used their ponchos transformed into buoys, for carrying light weapons and for supporting them while swimming. Dong Nai small crafts were not suitable for rough sea, because if they were steered perpendicular to waves- they would be overturned by them. Rubber canoes were less dangerous, probably thanks to their elasticity. I wished we had had the LCM to transfer troops quicker and easier. A large number of troops already managed to board the two LSMs.
Situations on shore suddenly became more chaotic when civilians and soldiers from other friendly units started approaching from two directions, Tien Sa and South Non Nuoc. Groups of Marine Military Police and troops who were in charge of security, were unable to stop that immerse crowd. Looking at that scene, I felt so frustrated.
Was the refrain of "retreating scenario at sea shores of Vinh Loc some days ago" replayed right now in this place? Not wanting to let General Truong witness this chaos or wanting unknown people coming to the place where we had been standing, Lieutenant Colonel Dang Ba Dat and I helped General Truong to wear a Marine Landing personal buoy, proposing that he should go to sea. I supported him on one side, Lieutenant Colonel Dat on the other side, in case the general would be felled by waves due to deteriorating health. We aimed at the closed craft. Captain Hoa and the group of radiomen of the TOC followed.
bbbbIn Marine Corps history, this was the second time (the first was at Vinh Loc island shore) that we performed a large scale amphibious retreat under enemy's pressure; but this time, the retreat was not based on any principle or theory. Although the waves were strong and high above heads, the sea was not so deep and only occasionally we had to pass an underwater current running by our legs. Human beings were insignificant before the powerful dignity of the ocean. It was lucky that when we reached the bow of the ship, the sea water was only at our chest level. People on the ship before, took turns to pull new comers up to the ship. Around three hundred troops were already on the deck. I felt glad within because of the process of boarding would continue smoothly and at that rhythm, the deck would soon be fully occupied, ie about one thousand soldiers; although in theory, each LCM had been capable of carrying four hundred troops with all their weapons. Standing on the deck, General Truong asked me about the situation of the Marine Brigade 468. When he was informed that it had been completely picked up by ships at the foot of Hai Van Pass this morning at 06.00, he was surprised and at the same time overjoyed. From being happy to being emotional, he shed tears. I told Colonel Nguyen Xuan Huong to lead General Truong to a cabin to rest, in which the craft captain had reserved for him. I was lead by Lieutenant Colonel Tran Van Hien - chief of G3 of Marine Division, to a small signal cabin equipped with radio ANPCR 25 so I could make contact with units still on shore. From this cabin, through a glass window, I could observe up to the bow of the craft and further until sea shore.
At 10.00, this LSM moved and stayed parallel with the LSM HQ 404. The captain requested that everybody on board move to the other ship by stepping across two ships' flanks. Being passengers we had to obey all instructions of the Naval officer.
At about after 10.00, a helicopter coming from the south direction, landed on the portion of seashore opposite HQ 404. Brigadier General Khanh, Colonel Phuoc and Colonel Duc stepped down, blended with Marines to swim to the ship.
The enemy started shelling on sea shore now and then. Some "overs" rounds fell far away on the ocean. An APC 113, with a number of friendly troops on top from the sea shore, ran directly into the sea in the direction of the ship. After about 100m, this APC slowly began to sink. Troops inside it were lucky to be able to evade out of it. The situation on shore became more and more chaotic. Yet in the sea, there were some regrettable incidents: Some unfortunate soldiers could not reach the stair which had been lowered from the bow and thus were pulled away by waves to both sides of the ship. A number of life saving buoys, including ropes were thrown down the sea, but not all of them could have a chance to grab them. These unlucky soldiers were drifted towards the stern direction, and being exhausted, disappeared. There were no means prepared to rescue people drifting in the open sea. Only 3m away from the bow, the sea water level was already above heads. It's a heartbreaking scene.
At about 11.00, the LSM HQ 404 slowly sailed out and I was informed that there would be another LSM coming to continue to pick up troops. This HQ 404 was ordered to leave Da Nang immediately for another mission. I immediately radioed Marine Brigade 369 to inform them about this news. Lieutenant Colonel Do Huu Tung - the executive officer of this Brigade, was on the radio. I requested Brigade 369 to gather its units towards the picking up beach. At that time, group B of the ninth Marine Battalion composing of two companies and commanded by the executive officer of the Battalion, was still on their way of retreat and had not traversed to this side of the "Trinh Minh The" bridge. The HQ 404 turned its bow towards the south direction and increased speed. The other LSM also sailed out. Later, I realised that the ninth Marine Battalion (-) was the last unit to defend in an area close to an orphanage and about 2 km north of picking-up beach; while its group B was on the way to join the Battalion headquarters. At 19.00, the two LSM were still in the open sea, about 5-7 nautical miles from the shore and still kept radio contacts with the ninth Marine battalion. They promised to pick them up when the sky would be completely dark. At about 20.00, the two crafts approached the shore, but stayed about one nautical mile from it due to more intensive enemy shellings. At 20.30 the enemy started attacking. Not being able to resist for a long time and alone against an overwhelming number of NVA, the ninth Marine Battalion had to disperse at 21.30.
In this retreat, Lt Colonel Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Lt Colonel Do Huu Tung - commanding officer and executive officer, respectively of Marine Brigade 369, were considered missing. Everybody, including their families, had no details concerning the missing of these two brilliant commanders. Until now, more than thirty years have passed, and it's a long enough time for friends and their families to believe that they had sacrificed.
While the HQ 404 was sailing, I was informed by Naval officers that according to an order of the JS everyone was to arrive in Saigon; yet after few hours, another order came namely that was to land at Canh Ranh Bay. I thought there would be a reason for that change of order.
At about 03.00 on 30-3-75, the ship arrived in Cam Ranh. Since it was still dark, troops were not discharged yet. Then another order from JGS was received: Only Marines were to land. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong was to stay aboard and come with the ship to Saigon.
At 06.00, General Pham Van Phu - II corps commander, came to visit General Truong. General Truong wanted to stay with Marine Division, however General Phu advised him to go to Saigon to have medical treatment for his health. Besides, this was already II corps territory.
While Marines were preparing to land, General Truong summoned me to come and see him. He explained that since his health had been so deteriorated, even if he would stay with Marines, he would be still unable to provide any help for them. Thus, General Truong would follow the ship to Saigon and report himself to the President. On shore, there had been a great number of troops of different ARVN units mixed with a huge crowd of civilians. It was known that they were carried here yesterday, but in term of locations to camp and in term of foods- still not being cared for.
Marine units were assigned to camp on hills of fir, some hundred meters from the sea shore. The Forward headquarters of Marine Division positioned temporarily in the logistics camp of the Navy close to the port. Marine groups of security, patrol and military police started performing their duties in and outside positions. At that time, I still had not received any news about Marine Brigade 468 or about General Lan. However the navy informed me that the ship carrying that Brigade was to dock at Cam Ranh in few hours time.
At about 08.00, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang - the JGS Operation assistant, telephoned to Cam Ranh to speak to General Lan, but the latter had not arrived, and General Khang spoke to me. He asked about the present condition of Marine Division. I reported to him that about one thousand Marines had landed in Cam Ranh, with the remainder, ie the whole Brigade 468 was on the way to arrive. He ordered me to prepare a Brigade to be sent to Khanh Duong immediately. (Khanh Duong was on National Route 21, about 50 km from Ninh Hoa District/Khanh Hoa Province. At that time Airborne Brigade 3 was deploying there and under heavy enemy pressure). I proposed to General Khang that a minimum period of time of 48 hrs be granted to Marines so they could reorganise before receiving a new duty. After a lapse of time spent pondering, he said he would come the following day to see clearly what the Marine Division's condition had been.
At about 10.00, ship 802 docked at Cam Ranh. One hour later, Marine Brigade 468 received order to land. After General Khang had flown from Saigon to Cam Ranh to have a briefing with General Lan and Naval commanders, on 16.00 on 31-3-75, the Marine Division received order to board the ship 802 to sail directly to Vung Tau to reorganise. The ship sailed off at 20.30 carrying away about four thousand Marines. It is noteworthy to add that participating force of Marine Division in I corps was about eleven thousand.
3. The black April
On 1-4-75 at 16.00, the Marine Division arrived in Vung Tau and was ordered to camp in the former Australian barrack in the Back Beach. It was previously built by Australian forces, with pre-manufactured houses for camping and rest.
Being a small town in term of area and population, with three beautiful beaches, Vung Tau had been considered as a tourist centre. The fourth Marine Battalion was the only unit of Marine Division having its rear base in this town since 1962.
The next day, Marine Division started re-arming and complementing manpower. According to an order of JGS, these resupplies should be completed within a minimum period of time and Marine Division should be ready in one week. Uniforms, weapons, ammunitions, food and medical supplies were transported from rear bases of units or from the Division Base Camp in Saigon to Vung Tau. In more than ten days, the Man-Power Complement Department of the Division managed to supply about five hundred troops in twice to units. The above number was composed of new recruits, new NCO, new officers who were recent graduates from Marine Training Centre, along with previously wounded Marines coming out of Marine Hospital Le Huu Sanh or Military General Hospital Cong Hoa.
They were assigned to different units in approximately equal quota so as units combat capacities were nearly the same one to another quantitatively and qualitatively. The system of organisation of Marine Division differed from that of Infantry Division as follows: Each Battalion did not coherently belong to one Marine Brigade as its own sub-unit. A Battalion could be assigned by the Division headquarters to any Marine Brigade for a tactical operation and also could be replaced by another Battalion, in case of suffering heavy casualties in big battles or in case of having performed operations for a long time, needing to be returned to rear base for rest and reorganisation. Thanks to that permutation, the capacity of fighting of Marine Brigades was always as high as expected.
It is worth mentioning that after the arrival of Marine Division in Vung Tau, the Marine Training Center was expediting its training agenda so as to be able to dispatch newly trained soldiers to Man-Power Complement Department. The latter would send new soldiers to units. There was another good signs in this period. Marines considered as missed in action during retreats from island Vinh Loc, Thua Thien province and Da Nang city, were one after another reporting themselves to their units in Saigon or to the Marine Division Headquarters now in Vung Tau. In only about ten days, that number rose to more than five hundred, and if this momentum would continue- that number would be double or even more in following weeks. Generally over viewing, the Marine Division had no difficulties in man power complementing, at least for two Brigades. A delicate point - an anxiety shared by all commanders, was that newly trained Marines still had no experience, while the battles had developed more and more into a conventional war. Besides, the Marine Division had been newly resupplied with only 6 105mm Howitzers, which was enough for just one Artillery Company. Marine Division headquarters was monitoring the resupplies to Brigade 258 and Brigade 468. The latter had the top priority to participate in any combat when receiving order from JGS.
When Khanh Duong and Tuy Hoa fell into the enemy's hands, Nha Trang's days were numbered. Khanh Duong was the important outpost to protect Nha Trang in North West direction, with Tuy Hoa at the junction of interprovincial route 7B and National Route 1 being the defensive blockage to stop NVA coming from the North. On the 2-4-75 and 3-4-75, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh were respectively opened. II corps was unable to perform any "buying time" operation to delay NVA's advance on National Route 1. NVA second Army corps was ordered to head south. They used all means of transport, including tanks left behind by II corps after retreating. Moreover, after Da Nang had been occupied, the North Communist directed another two Divisions of first Army corps in Ninh Binh to go South; thus according to a former NVA Colonel, the North only had one Division _ the 318, to stay back giving protection to "the North-Big Rear".
On 2-4-1975, opposing NVA's advance momentum, the defensive line at Phan Rang was organised and commanded by Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi - the forward commander of III corps. From Phan Rang southwards, originally it was a territory of II corps. It was affiliated to III Corps, with the III corps Forward headquarters positioned in Phan Rang airport. Defensive forces protecting Phan Rang were composed of second Infantry Division's units retreated from I corps, Airborne Brigade 2 (later this brigade was replaced by Ranger Group 31), Ninh Thuan Provincial Regional Forces, a tank squadron, VNAF sixth Division and a navy "shore-fleet" to control and protect the sea shore.
On 14-4-75 NVA third division reinforced by one regiment attacked Phan Rang. Defensive forces supported by VNAF resisted strongly and caused heavy casualties to the enemy. They continued to shell while reorganising and preparing new waves of attack.
Around mid-April 1975, according to an order of JGS, Marine Division sent a Brigade to reinforce III Corps at Bien Hoa.
It was Brigade 468 commanded by Colonel Ngo Van Dinh, and composed of:
The Brigade Headquarters with its Engineering, Signal, Medical Units.
" A long range patrol company
" One artillery 105 mm Howitzer company (instead of a Battalion, because lack of guns)
" A 106 mm anti-tank group
" Three Marine Battalions:
- the first Battalion, commanded by Major Duong Van Hung
- the eighth Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Dang Hoa
- the sixteenth Battalion, commanded by Major Dinh Xuan Lam
This Brigade had about more than two thousand and five hundred. It was a good point because that number was only insignificantly lower than the number before the retreat in MR1. However, only the quantity was accounted for. All units had a number of newly trained soldiers who would have to face numerous challenges in battlefields in order to become experienced Marines- both physically and mentally in the future. Looking at Marine units mounting trucks to go to the battlefield, I was so touched. For a long time I had not seen a gathering of units with such a great number of Marines in a place like this place now. When the convoy arrived in Ba Ria, it was ordered to return to Vung Tau. The reason was that there was a rumour in Saigon that a coup was going to occur and all troop movements, were to temporarily stop. The next day Brigade 468 was ordered to leave Vung Tau again to Bien Hoa and to report itself to III corps headquarters. This Brigade was assigned to defense the East and South East of Bien Hoa, in an area delimited by National Route 1 in the North and by National Route 15 in the South. Defensive line prolonged from Thai Lan T-junction to South of Ho Nai (see map "Defense East of Bien Hoa") to block the enemy from directions Long Khanh and Long Thanh.
Phan Rang lost on 16-4-1975, after NVA threw Division 325 in the battle. Facing that enemy's force - overwhelming in number, having more reserve units, the defensive forces of Phan Rang - composing of shattered units retreated from MRI or from MRII, with shortages in number, lack of supporting fires and exhaustion of morale, could not withstand and the loss of Phan Rang of course, was unavoidable. Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi - the forward commander of III corps, Brigadier General Pham Ngoc Sang - commander of VNAF sixth Division, and Colonel Nguyen Thu Luong - commander of Airborne 2nd Brigade were captured. On 19-4-1975, Binh Thuan - the last province of MR II, newly affiliated to MR III was lost.
Meanwhile the battle of Xuan Loc became more and more violent. The battle broke out when the NVA's fourth Army corps sent three divisions- the 6th, the 7th and the 341st, to attack on 9-4-75. General Le Minh Dao - commander of 18th Infantry Division, was determined to combat the NVA assaults. However, for the first few days, regiment 52 of Division 18 had remarkably suffered heavy casualties in North West of Xuan Loc. In response to situational requests, Airborne Brigade 1 was sent to reinforce Xuan Loc. Seeing the 18th Division's resolution to defend Xuan Loc, the North Communist sent Regiment 95 of Division 325 as reinforcement to their fourth Army corps.
On 16-4-1975, when receiving information concerning a gathering of NVA Division 341 in North of Dau Giay, III corps ordered VNAF to drop two CBU bombs. These two CBU bombs with their high destructive killing power caused heavy casualties and severe damages to the enemy. The VNAF had to transform a C130 aircraft so it could transport and then drop these two bombs on that target. It was regrettable that the USA had given only two detonators and the remaining bombs became useless masses of iron. The effect of these two bombs, forced the enemy to temporarily halt their attacks to search for a new way of acting.
On 21-4-75, a second Marine Brigade was ordered to reinforce III corps. General Lan ordered me to form a Forward headquarters and go with Brigade 258 to Bien Hoa to report to III corps.
Brigade 258 was composed and organised as follows:
" Brigade 258 commanded by Colonel Nguyen Nang Bao, with its headquarters and engineering, signal, medical sub-units
" A long range patrol company
" One Artillery 105 mm Howitzer company (instead of a Battalion, because not being supplied with sufficient quantity of guns)
" A 106 mm anti-tank group
" three Marines Battalion:
- The second Battalion, commanded by Major Tran Van Hop
- The fourth Battalion, commanded by Major Tran Ngoc Toan
- The sixth Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Le Ba Binh
The convoy arrived in Bien Hoa at about 11.00 and I reported myself to Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan, commander of III corps, to receive orders. Firstly he asked about the number of Marines in two Brigades. He seemed very pleased when learning that the number had been more than five thousand. He then told me that situations in Xuan Loc had been serious and heavy. He ordered me to deploy a defensive line East of Bien Hoa with two Marine Brigades (at that time, General Toan had not informed me that the eighteenth Infantry Division had been out of Xuan Loc; he probably wanted to keep it a secret, for fear of influencing fighting morales of unit). Only the next day, General Lan telephoned me to inform me that Xuan Loc had been open. He warned me to be very careful because the NVA forces had been continuing to advance towards Bien Hoa, Ba Ria and Long Thanh. Brigade 258 prolonged the defensive line of Brigade 468 to the North direction until Dong Nai River (see plan of Defence, East of Bien Hoa). The defensive line of two Brigades was 13-15 km from Bien Hoa, protecting the east and south east of the town in the direction Trang Bom and Long Thanh. The Brigade 258 headquarters was positioned in Tam Hiep "prisoners of war" camp. The Forward Marine Division headquarters stationed next to brigade 468 headquarters in Long Binh base. At night, an important political event occurred: The National television showed the last appearance of President Nguyen Van Thieu after 9 years of leading the Nation, before South Vietnam population. After a speech lasting more than one hour, he declared to resign. According to the South Vietnam constitution, Vice President Tran Van Huong would replace him (the ceremony of happened two days later).
On 23/24-4-1975, the enemy temporarily stopped big attacks, yet still maintaining shellings on the Bien Hoa area. Eg. The III corps headquarters, Long Binh base, Infantry and Armour Schools. On the other side, they organised sounding assaults upon the Marine Defensive line; but all their efforts failed to cause any influence.
At noon on 24-4-75 according to an order of Marine Division headquarters, Lieutenant Clonel Nguyen Dang Tong replaced Colonel Ngo Van Dinh as commander of Brigade 468. Colonel Dinh returned to Vung Tau to reorganise Brigade 147. At that moment in Vung Tau, there was the fourteenth Marine Battalion ready to fight with full strength. Yet Division headquarters still needed to reorganise two other Battalions so that Brigade 147 could be ready to participate in the fighting.
In the morning 26-4-1975, I visited the defensive line of Brigade 258 in Ho Nai on National Route 1. Looking at those Marines ready to combat, I felt reassured. The defensive system had been restructured and looked better than on the first days of arrival. That was their routine of duty, but this time, they had been fully aware that they would encounter a greater number of NVA troops, with more overwhelming quantity of tanks and artilleries. A squadron of tanks was assigned as reinforcement for the sixth Marine Battalion and deployed a little bit further back and well camouflaged. Life activities in Ho Nai were still normal except for the armed forces organised by Catholic priests, which were increasing their guards and patrols in villages.
The first gun shot of Ho Chi Minh campaign - ie. The general attack on Saigon started East of Bien Hoa at 1700. NVA's second Army corps sent Division 304 with tanks and artilleries to attack the Armour School (see map of Defense, East Bien Hoa). Division 325 with tanks and artilleries, attacked District Long Thanh on National Route 15. At the same time, the enemy shelled violently on Bien Hoa airport, Long Binh base and Ho Nai. A number of VNAF aircrafts had to take-off and flew to Tan Son Nhut airport to avoid shelling rounds. Concomitantly NVA's fourth Army corps in the north direction, with its Division 6, 7, 341 reinforced by tanks and artilleries, simultaneously attacked Trang Bom - 27 km east of Bien Hoa where regiment 43/Division 18 had been defending. All their prongs of attack disturbed severely ARVN at the beginning, but they were then blocked- thanks to VNAF and artilleries' very effective supports. Yet then in the south direction, the Armour School was overrun by an NVA regiment. Using this place as a pedal, they advanced towards the south west direction to try to occupy National Route 15. Immediately a company of the first Marine battalion reinforced the third Armour Brigade to counter-attack. Facing our strong fires of artilleries, tanks and the courageous combat of Marines and Armours fighters, the enemy had to withdraw to the east direction, leaving behind twelve destroyed Russian tanks and many cadavers. ARVN casualties were considered as light. Meanwhile, the enemy launched reconnaissance activities in front of defensive lines of the fourth and the sixth Battalion of Brigade 258, and of the 16th Battalion of Brigade 468. Some small skirmishes occurred and they ran away. With those reconnaissance activities, the enemy wanted to investigate about terrains for our deployments, so they could prepare coordinates for their artillery for future assaults. Marine units were accustomed to these kinds of enemy activities when they still performed operations in Quang Tri.
In the morning on 27-4-1975, Lieutenant General Toan requested me to lead him to visit the defensive line of Brigade 468 on National Route 15, in the area of responsibility of the first Marine Battalion. On this occasion, he brought to my attention that the enemy would attack more strongly and that it would be necessary to have an effective plan to use tanks and artilleries. The defensive line of Marines should be protected at all costs.
At 13.00, Colonel Luong - III corps chief of staff, informed me that a Ranger Group would come to reinforce Marines. Perhaps it was a result of my report to General Toan this morning about the fact that the two Marine Brigades had been defending a rather large line more than 20 km and the Forward Marine headquarters having had no reserve force handy. We needed a reserve unit with tanks and trucks, so it could perform a blitz counterattack whenever the Defensive line would be pierced. Deep within my heart, I thanked General Toan, who had seen such a need and approved my proposal. Yet whenever the Lieutenant Colonel, commander of that Ranger Group, reported himself to me, he said that his units had been retreated from eastern fronts. The number of fighters has been decreased to about seven hundred, and the units had not been resupplied sufficiently in terms of weapons and ammunitions. I suggested for him to reorganise his Group into just one battalion with full personnel, rather than keeping its three battalions without fighting capacities corresponding to names. This Ranger Group needed to reorganise and rest for some days. I had a communion with the condition of this unit.
In the afternoon, NVA's second Army corps sent Division 3 (a reinforcement unit coming from NVA 5th Army Corps) to attack and overrun Sub-District Duc Thanh and then Ba Ria city defended by Airborne Brigade 1. Facing that overwhelming number of NVA supported by tanks, Airborne Brigade 1 had to withdraw to Vung Tau. Co May bridge between Ba Ria and Vung Tau was then destroyed.
By then NVA Division had also occupied Long Thanh. A unit of that division crossed National Route 15, followed interprovincial route 25, advanced in the direction south west to Nhon Trach. Nhon Trach was only 13 km away from Saigon by birds fly, separated from it by Saigon River. From here, their 130 mm artilleries could shell onto Tan Son Nhut airport. That was the main reason for why the NVA Division 325 tried to occupy Long Thanh as soon as possible.
Anxious about quick changes of military situations at 08.00 on 28-4-75, I came to III corps headquarters to ask about the general situation of III corps and especially about Trang Bom because of the direct influence upon the defensive line of Brigade 258. All my questions were only vaguely answered by staff officers. Presumably they had kept secrets according to orders from their superiors or had had no complete data. I thought Trang Bom had been left open. On the map of operations of III Corps headquarters TOC, ARVN 5th and 25 Infantry Division had been under pressures of NVA's first and third Army corps in the North and North West directions of Bien Hoa. In the South West, NVA Group 232 and four divisions were encircling and pressing Hau Nghia, Ben Luc and Tan An on National Route 4 (see map of 5 NVA Army corps facing ARVN III corps). Feeling uneasy, I returned to the Forward headquarters of Marine Division when Long Binh base had been shelled. I summoned all Marines Brigades and Ranger Group commanders to inform them of what I had known about situations which had direct or indirect influences on Bien Hoa eastern front. I requested that they prepare to encounter new attacks which would be more intensive and more decisive.
At 09.30, defensive lines of the two Marines Brigades were shelled. In front of the defensive line of Brigade 258, the enemy tanks lead with the NVA infantrymen following and advancing to the sixth Marine Battalion position. A part of the fourth Marine Battalion was also assaulted. Simultaneously, NVA division 304 pushed on Marine Brigade 468. Battalions of the latter used artillery to shell on the enemy formation so precise, that they had to run backwards and capturing one NVA. The enemy was also unable to move forward on Marine Brigade 258 defensive line because of our troops and tanks intense fires. VNAF aircrafts came to the sky and supported with effective strikes on the enemy formation, causing much damage against them. They withdrew to the east, leaving behind two tanks which had been destroyed by our tanks. According to information extracted from the NVA captured, their units were the fourth infantry battalion (of regiment 270) and the seventh infantry battalion (of regiment 266). These two regiments belonged to NVA Division 341. At 14.00 General Lan telephoned me, asking about Bien Hoa situations. I reported to him that defensive lines of the two Brigades were under heavy pressures of NVA 341 and 304, and that until now; Marines had been keeping their fighting morales. He also brought to my attention that Marine Division would possibly coordinate with friendly forces to protect safety for the segment of the National Route 15, between Bien Hoa and Vung Tau. He did not explain the goal of that deployment nor did he tell me from whom that order had come from. I could not ask any more questions on the telephone and it was necessary to keep everything secret in this period of time. Before ending the call, he advised me to send my family to Vung Tau, where he would care for and arrange for my family in case of needing evacuation. I thanked him for his concerns, but I had no intention to let my family go in this time. I reflectively thought again and again about what General Lan had said about the protection of National Route 15. In reality the whole NVA second Army corps composing three divisions had been controlling National Route 15. To unblock it, a more powerful force would be needed and many operations should be performed with intense fire supports. Moreover, it would be necessary to have a plan to prevent NVA's fourth Army corps from attacking Bien Hoa, besides the fact that this NVA Army corps could reinforce the NVA's second Army corps along National Route 15 at any moment. At about 15.00, Colonel Luong - the chief of staff informed me that III corps headquarters would move to Armour headquarters in Go Vap at 16.00. Before leaving Bien Hoa, he asked whether Marines needed anything. He added that III corps headquarters TOC had left a small group staying back to continue to work. I thanked him and replied that we did not need anything for the time being.
At night I heard the news that President Tran Van Huong had transferred power to General Duong Van Minh after a resolution of the Senate and Lower House according to a request of President Huong.
Deep within myself, I thought that the situation would not become brighter; even General Duong Van Minh had declared that he wanted to reconcile, respect Paris treaty 1973 and proposed a cease fire for negotiation. How could the North communist sit down to negotiate while they were on the upper hand?
On 29-4-1975, I was summoned to attend a briefing at the eighteenth Infantry Division headquarters at 12.00. General Toan - III corps commander, General Dao - eighteenth Infantry Division commander, General Khoi -third Armour Brigade commander and I were present. After listening to commanders and my reports, General Toan ordered units to withdraw closer to Bien Hoa and Long Binh, achieving a defensive line which would be tighter and more effective. To have a single and unique line of command in new position, Marine Brigade 258 would be in area of responsibility of the third Armour Brigade in the north direction and Marine Brigade 468 would be a reinforcement of the eighteenthh Infantry Division. General Toan added that I would continue to command the two Brigades until they had arrived in their new positions completely; and by then, I would have to inform him. I returned to my headquarters where I still had no time to summon Marine Brigade and Ranger Group commanders to a briefing concerning the retreat because the enemy began to attack the sixth and the sixteenth Marine Battalions. This time their push seemed more intense. I requested aircrafts to arrive to support and ordered the Ranger Group be prepared to participate when needs to be. After some hours of fighting, the enemy realised that it would be impossible to destroy our defensive lines on both side of National Route 1 and having received our VNAF airstrikes on their rear formation, they withdrew. They left two burning tanks in front the defensive line of the sixteenth Marine Battalion.
At 15.30 I gathered Marine Brigades and Ranger Group commanders and told them about the retreating plan and a re-deployment to protect Long Binh base and Bien Hoa city. Marine Brigades were to withdraw about 10-12 km. Ranger Group was to move inside Long Binh base and continue its role of reserve. Tanks assigned to units were to stay as before. The Forward headquarters of Marine Division and Brigade 468 headquarters also stayed as before. After arrival in new positions, Marine Brigade 258 would be commanded by the third Armour Brigade, and Marine Brigade 468 would be commanded by the eighteenth Infantry Division. A plan for artillery blocking the shelling was to be prepared for the retreat. I informed them that the enemy had been attacking violently two Airborne companies, whose duties were to protect Dong Nai bridge and a Naval base about some kilometres south west of Long Binh base.
After many counterattacks aiming at recovering some lost positions at 18.00, two airborne companies had to withdraw before the overwhelming number of the enemy's sapper group 116. The route leading to Saigon was cut at Dong Nai bridge. The only bridge left was the Korean Bridge (across Dong Nai River) on National Route 1 and was still usable to reach Saigon - this bridge was protected by another two airborne companies.
After the Dong Nai Bridge had been lost, regional forces which had been in charge of guarding Long Binh base's gate, logistics and ammunitions, dumped their positions when enemy shellings had become heavy. Some skirmishes between security guards and enemy sapper groups occurred in different places inside the base. At that time, it was extremely difficult to say where friendly forces or foe's forces were. I telephoned the Colonel - commander of the base, but no one answered. I rang III corps TOC liaison group in Bien Hoa to inform them about the uncontrollable situation inside Long Binh base and asked them to report to their superiors to seek orders in case of worsening of situations. An officer in that TOC replied that no authoritive officer was present there; adding that Lieutenant General Toan had climbed up a helicopter at 15.00 and even III corps headquarters in Go Vap did not know where he had presently been.
A number of gun noises were coming from Bien Hoa direction. The Forward headquarters of Marine Division reported to me that the enemy was attacking Bien Hoa airport in the northern area. After about half an hour, they were pushed back by the third Armour Brigade and Rangers.
Before nightfall, the Forward headquarters of Marine Division and Brigade 468 headquarters moved to an area close to the Long Binh Base gate. This was the way through which one could go to Bien Hoa so that defences would become easier and at the same time we could control this important gate. Ranger Group headquarters also moved to its vicinity. In this area a number of offices still had had their air conditioners running, their electric lamps shining their telephones working but absolutely no human beings. Everything was placed on floors or on desks in good order, proof that personnel had left not long before. A picture of an American NCO's family was still on the top of a records cupboard; probably he had forgotten to carry this picture with him when departing hurriedly.
In the briefing at 12.00 when receiving the order to retreat to protect Bien Hoa and Long Binh, everybody understood that was only the first stage. Next stage would probably be a defence West of Dong Nai River, and if there would be a worsening of situations, a third retreat would be towards and around Saigon. But now, the 18th Infantry Division, the third Armour Brigade, Marine Brigades and other units in this area, had to decide their own actions according to changes of situations; but they certainly could not to stay in defensive lines longer since there was no superior commander responsible for a unique and coordinate command.
In the past few days NVA's fourth Army corps' efforts became more intensified and more concentrated on National Route 1 because of an urgent need to coordinate in times with other NVA prongs to launch a general attack on Saigon. This Army Corps pushed from east to west with intention to advance to Bien Hoa and Long Binh after having occupied Trang Bom, and then proceeded with its movement to Saigon. Meanwhile the NVA second Army corp's pressure was initially strong at Armour School with Division 304's push, but then they could not move further in the direction of Long Binh because they were blocked by Marine Brigade 468 and Armour forces. NVA Divisions 3 and 325 were busy attacking Long Thanh and Ba Ria. After occupying Long Thanh, NVA Division 325 would have to cross National Route 15 and move in the South West direction to occupy Nhon Trach and from where - according to their plan, they could use their 130 mm artillery guns to shell Tan Son Nhut airport. The NVA Division 3, after occupation of Ba Ria, would continue their movement to Vung Tau.
In a military memoirs of NVA's seventh Division (Binh Doan Cuu Long) published by NVA Publisher printed in Ha Noi 1986, there was a paragraph mentioning the duty of the NVA 4th Army Corps as follows: "At 00.00 30-4-75, the general attack on Saigon would begin. To be able to advance at the same time with other prongs, the fourth Army corps headquarters decided to occupy the industrial complex in Bien Hoa before 00.00 tonight. The sixth Division was to abandon all positions in Ho Nai and advance left of National Route 1, to occupy the ARVN III corps headquarters and Ghenh Bridge, reaching the other side of the river and keep it as a pedal. Division 341 was to occupy Bien Hoa airport. Division 7 was to continue to attack from Ho Nai; to pierce the ARVN's shield at Tam Hiep and to try to cross Dong Nai River to the western bank tonight”. Reading the above paragraph, one knew that the enemy's forces attacking Ho Nai in that period were composing of units of 3 different divisions, in "chariot wheel" tactics: firstly NVA Division 341, then Division 6, then Division 7. Yet they could not cross the defensive line of Marine Brigade 258 and third Armour Brigade tanks. After having realised that Brigades 258 and 468 had retreated to Bien Hoa and Long Binh in the afternoon, the enemy infantrymen and tanks advanced to Ho Nai in fighting formation. They wrongly thought that the defensive forces had withdrawn to the west bank of Dong Nai River to establish new defensive line. Before they had moved out of Ho Nai, they were blocked by defensive forces at 23.00. In the above mentioned book about NVA Division 7 the following paragraph described the battle here: "Our infantrymen advanced under the enemy's rains of artillery rounds." After Regiment 3 of Division 6 came out of Ho Nai to advance to south of Bien Hoa, the fifth Battalion of Regiment 165 (This was the Regiment 165 of Division 7. Please don't mix up with Regiment 165 of Division 312 which Marines had encountered many times in Quang Tri 1972-1975) led by 4 tanks, started entering Ho Nai.
The formation was between two rows of houses of a street, where the Regiment commander ordered tanks to accelerate. The four tanks moved forward for a short distance, when suddenly from both sides of the street and even from the front, many blue blitz flames flashed up, numerous hellish-red rounds speedingly flew to our tanks. The Regiment commander ordered for the mortars 120 and artillery 85 mm guns to shoot back, with tank guns shooting too. However, only after a few rounds were shot, three of our tanks were hit by the enemy's LAW and burned. The situation became so tense. The Regiment commander reported and asked for advice from the Division commander, while trying to pierce the enemy defensive line at the same time. The division commander arrived on a Honda motorbike and asked: "What was the situation? You have difficulties?" _ "A prisoner just said: - opposing the Regiment was Marine Brigade 258, mainly the sixth Marine Battalion with sixty tanks of the third Armour Brigade." Regiment Commander Tran Quang Dieu, reported succinctly about situations and his plan of assault. The division commander nodded and said: "Attack quickly! Otherwise it would be too late"
But like their previous attacks, the enemy had to finally withdraw in the direction of the east with heavy losses and was still unable to pierce the shield of defence forces. At 03.00 on 30-4-75, Brigade 258 reported to the Forward Headquarters of Marine Division that a number of the third Armour Brigade tanks had been crossing the Korean bridge to reach the western bank of Dong Nai River and asked for my order. I replied that it was to keep close contacts with the third Armour Brigade and follow its orders (because Brigade 258 had been assigned to the third Armour Brigade as an reinforcement); but it was to continuously report everything to the Forward headquarters of Marine Division for follow-up. At that time, the Forward headquarters of Marine Division, Brigade 468 and Ranger Group headquarters were still inside Long Binh base. The situation seemed calmer in the enemy's scattered and rhythmic shelling.
At 03.30, Brigade 258 reported that it started to move with a number of the third Armour Brigade tanks in the direction of the west and would deploy on the left bank of Dong Nai River. I asked the eighteenth Infantry Division to speak to General Dao, but no one answered. I ordered Brigade 258 to leave one Marine Battalion to protect the Korean bridge, until all Brigade 468 and Ranger Group would have finished their retreat to the other side.
At 06.30, when Brigade 468 units nearly finished their crossing, the Forward Headquarters of Marine Division, Brigade 468 headquarters and the Ranger Group started moving towards the western bank of Dong Nai River. The two Airborne companies guarding this bridge were still there. Although our units had still observed their presence at about 3 km in the eastern direction, the enemy phenomenally did not open any attacks. At this time through the ANPCR 25 radio system, Brigade 468 was able to contact the eighteenth Infantry Division and was informed that General Dao and his units had been deploying at the Bien Hoa Military Cemetery on Bien Hoa highway, about 4 km in the south west direction away from the bridge. While I was waiting for any incoming orders, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Luom - the executive commander of Brigade 258, came to see me on National Route 1, near an end of the Korean bridge and informed me that the JGS had asked the third Armour Brigade to act as an intermediate to transfer its orders to units as follows: Marine Brigades were to return to Song Than base and the third Armour Brigade to return to Go Vap to wait for further orders. I heard no news concerning the eighteenth Infantry Division -it probably had received orders directly from the JGS (at that time Lieutenant General Vinh Loc was Chairman of the JGS. He just had received this position yesterday afternoon).
I felt that something had gone awry. How could Marine Brigades be called back to stay in Song Than - the Marine Division Rear base, while more than sixteen NVA divisions had been tightening their siege circles around Saigon from different directions. The III corps headquarters practically had not a single authority to solve problems now. The Forward headquarters of Marine Division informed the Ranger Group about this order and requested it to make radio contact with related units to have means of transport to move at its discretion. The role of reinforcement of this Ranger Group to the Forward headquarters of Marine Division was considered terminated at that time.
I had no certain data about situations of the fifth Infantry Division at North West of Bien Hoa at that period of time. If the whole NVA first Army corps continued to press down southwards along National Route 13, the fifth Infantry Division would hardly be able to keep Ben Cat; Binh Duong city and Lai Thieu district would be lost. The communists would quickly occupy the T-junction Lai Thieu - National Route 1. Song Than base was situated between Bien Hoa (in the east) and Lai Thieu (in the west) and would become an isolated target. After discussion with Brigades and some battalion commanders I ordered brigade 258 to send a contingent directly to Le Thanh Ton barrack - the Marine Division headquarters edifice in Saigon, as a pioneer unit to prepare camps for following units.
The reason we had chosen this option was as follows:
" Firstly, to avoid becoming an isolated target as mentioned above. If the enemy would attack, forcing us to resist- our dependence camps would harvest a multitude of suffering and fatal damages. In Saigon, there still were usable camps such as: Le Thanh Ton, Nguyen Van Nho and Cuu Long barracks.
" Secondly, Marines wounded in action being treated in Le Huu Sanh hospital inside Song Than base, also needed to be evacuated to Saigon to increase their safety.
" Thirdly, if Saigon would be lost, Marines were still be able to retreat to MR IV rather easily to join IV corps forces to continue to combat.
The convoy carrying that pioneer unit to Saigon was commanded by Major Quach Ngoc Lam - the G4 chief of Brigade 258. While it was unable to make radio contacts with III corps headquarters and the JGS, the Forward headquarters of Marine Division tried to solve problems on its own way, to avoid damages to its units. The more the better (as more as possible). Due to a limited number of trucks available, two Brigades could only use means of transport already handy, to move troops in a shuttle way, to Song Than base first. Then there would be a plan to move to Saigon. The most important thing was how to leave the western bank of Dong Nai River as soon as possible to avoid the enemy shellings. The time needed to reach Song Than base, was around thirty minutes.
At 09.30 the Forward headquarters of Marine Division arrived in Song Than base. I was surprised to see the convoy of Major Lam was stopping on the highway in front of the gate of Song Than base, and soldiers had alighted and deployed on both sides of the highway. Major Lam came to me and reported there had been a violent fighting between NVA and ARVN at Lai Thieu, National Route 1 T-junction and at Binh Trieu Bridge; thus the convoy had to return here. I felt anxious and disappointed.
The MP group and gate keepers group had been normally continuing their duties in neat uniforms. They looked courageously strong and disciplined, showing the correct behaviours of Marines. At Song Than base headquarters, I met Lieutenant Colonel Hoang Ngoc Bao - the commander of Marine Signal Battalion, Major To Van Cap - executive commander of Song Than base and a number of other officers. Everybody showed a wistful facial expression but appeared relieved when seeing that the fighting units were returning more and more. I tried to telephone to Vung Tau in hope to report to General Lan about situations in Bien Hoa and at Song Than base, but it was impossible to make contacts through the telephone line. At about 10.00, Lieutenant Colonel Bao hurriedly entered the office and with a deep, low pitched voice and full of sadness and emotion as he reported: "Sir, Colonel! We have surrendered!" Surprised and stunned, I asked: "What? What did you say?" Lieutenant Colonel Bao continued to speak: "President Duong Van Minh had read an order requesting ARVN to stay where they had been to avoid shooting and to wait for the liberation army coming for transferring positions." That news came like a thunderous lightning. Deeply shaken by the news, I did not know what to tell everybody present; not even just one short sentence! Truthfully, I had never prepared my thinking or sentiment to react in front of such crude and cruel reality. For only yesterday, a great number of my brothers in arms had sacrificed in the eastern front - not very far from here, for two words "Honour - Nation" and the word surrender or any word with equivalent meaning, did not exist in lessons or military bibles in our ARVN military schools. What to do now? Everybody looked at me, awaiting a decision.
I summoned all commanders present in Song Than base to officially inform them about President Duong Van Minh declaration. I spoke succinctly as follows: "You have probably listened to the President's declaration - he is the General Commander of all ARVN. We can not do anything else. Being soldiers, we have to obey the discipline. I request that you continue to move your units to Song Than base and at the same time, explain to them what I just had said to avoid regrettable things that may happen. Then you tell them to put weapons in stores and to return to their families safely and good luck. I thank all of you for your courageous and untiring fighting in the eastern front of Bien Hoa for the past few days." Sad eyes looked at each other in silence and being choked with sobs, I could not say anything else.
I asked Lieutenant Colonel Bao to call Le Huu Sanh hospital as I could ask about wounded Marines' conditions. A nurse told me that Dr Tran Cong Hiep - the commander of the hospital, had been continuing to treat wounded Marines in operating theatres. Not wanting to disturb Dr Hiep during this precious time of rescuing wounded Marines, I asked the nurse about the present number of wounded in action. He replied that it was about eighty, not including more than ten in critical condition after just being transported here from Bien Hoa front last night and had been transferred urgently to Cong Hoa general hospital. It was heart-breaking to think about the future destinies of those wounded. Dr Hiep and nurses, female and male, had been treating and caring for them in this final moment. They showed the spirit of responsibility and conscience of Marines Doctors. Their presence in this time had partly soothed physical and spiritual wounds of injured fighters. Besides these "motherly hands," the wounded soldiers surely had found some consolation and felt warmer in heart during this saddest and most shameful time of the South Vietnam.
At noon Dr Hiep allowed those wounded in action and nurses to leave Le Huu Sanh Hospital. Those injured soldiers, some leaning on crutches, others sitting on wheel chairs, and wounded soldiers who were still able to walk, as well as nurses trying to piggyback other wounded, all decided to leave hospital because they did not want to be tortured or brought shame on, by the enemy. Yes! It is time for wounded Marines specially, and ARVN generally, to show their dignity, their courage to fulfil anything to protect their Honour and their collective prestige, despite had being most disadvantageous.
In this time full of anxiety and disappointment, how could one forget our brothers in arms who had been caught as Prisoners of war or still hiding somewhere in Thua Thien and Da Nang. What would they think when realising that ARVN had dropped their weapons in great shame according to the new president's order? To which hope could they cling to, to continue their struggles in those obscure situations? What would become their families? And ironically, I still had no decisive answer for my own personal case.
At 13.30, Lieutenant Colonel Bao came to see me and advised me to leave because at that time, Song Than base had become deserted. We and a number of others mounted Lieutenant Colonel Bao's Jeep and headed to the gate. Sentinels' post and guard-house at the gate were also deserted at that time.
Colonel Nguyen Thanh Tri
